The Parliamentary Conservative Party : the leadership elections of William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith by Hill, Michael
University of Huddersfield Repository
Hill, Michael
The Parliamentary Conservative Party: The leadership elections of William Hague and Iain Duncan 
Smith
Original Citation
Hill, Michael (2007) The Parliamentary Conservative Party: The leadership elections of William 
Hague and Iain Duncan Smith. Doctoral thesis, University of Huddersfield. 
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/741/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
The Parliamentary Conservative Party: The 
Leadership Elections of William Hague and Iain 
Duncan Smith 
                            
Michael Hill 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy 
 
 
The University of Huddersfield 
 Dedication 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father, David Leyland Hill. 
 Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank my supervisory team: Dr. Timothy Heppell, Professor Brendan Evans and 
Professor Valerie Bryson for their help, support and guidance. I am also grateful to Dr. David 
Tyfa and Dr. Jon Blacktop for their assistance and advice with the statistical element of this 
thesis. I would like to express my gratitude to the Rt. Hon. Francis Maude MP for sharing his 
views of the 2001 Conservative Party leadership campaign. Finally I would like to thank my 
partner Corrina Rest and my mother, Pauline Hill, whose support made it possible for me to 
complete this work. 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the post1997 Parliamentary Conservative Party, with 
particular attention placed upon the Conservative Party leadership election of 1997 and 2001. 
The thesis uses these two leadership elections as a lens which can be utilised to focus upon and 
analyse the ideological disputations of contemporary British Conservatism. This is done by 
identifying the voting behaviour of Conservative parliamentarians in the two leadership elections 
and then by putting forwards a systemic explanation of the candidates’ support. Three sets of 
variables are tested. First, the thesis analyses socio-economic variables (i.e. the occupational and 
educational background of conservative parliamentarians). Second, the research considers the 
candidates’ support in relation to electoral and political variables (i.e. electoral vulnerability, 
political insider / outsider status, age and experience). Finally the research will evaluate the 
candidates’ support with regard to the ideological disposition of the candidates and their 
supporters. This requires an extensive exploration of the attitudes of Conservative 
parliamentarians with regard to the dominant ideological divides within contemporary post-
Thatcherite Conservatism – economic policy (wet / dry), European policy (europhile / 
eurosceptic), and social, sexual and moral attitudes (social liberalism / social conservatism). By 
analysing the patterns of voting in relation to social background, political attributes and 
ideological disposition the thesis locates and interprets the differing motivational influences on 
voting behaviour.  
 
The thesis argues the ideological disposition of the candidates and their supporters was the 
crucial factor in both the leadership elections. The final round of the 1997 leadership election 
was a straight ideological battle between the europhile and eurosceptic wings of the 
parliamentary Conservative Party. This benefited the eurosceptic William Hague at the expense 
of the europhile Kenneth Clarke. In 2001 both Clarke and Portillo attracted support from across 
the ideological spectrum of the parliamentary party, suggesting that a section of the 
parliamentary party had moved away from ideologically driven voting behaviour. However, Iain 
Duncan Smith reaching the final ballot was due to the support of an ideologically cohesive group 
of traditional Thatcherite MPs and indicative of the continued significance of ideology on the 
direction of the Conservative party. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Rationale  
The Conservative Party has traditionally and with some justification thought of itself as the 
natural party of government. During the 20th century, the party was in government, either 
alone or in coalition for a total of sixty-two years. The party dominated post-war British 
politics governing for thirty-five years between 1945 and 1997. Moreover, the main anti-
Conservative party only achieved a significant majority in three parliaments before 1997; the 
Liberals between 1906-1910 and Labour between 1945-50 and 1966-70. By contrast, the only 
Conservative government hampered by the lack of a working majority was John Major’s 
administration of 1992-97 (Seldon & Ball, 1996: i). Moreover, of the twelve 20th century 
Conservative leaders only two, Austen Chamberlain and William Hague failed to become 
Prime Minister (Watkins, 1998: 1). Several factors have been put forward for the 
Conservative Party’s dominance: their ideological flexibility, superior organisation, unity and 
strong leadership. The Conservative Party has traditionally ceded considerable power to the 
party leader, giving him or her sole authority to appoint the cabinet in government and the 
shadow cabinet in opposition. The leader is also the sole arbiter of policy and nothing can 
become party policy without the agreement of the leader. However, the extent of this formal 
power can deceive the casual observer into believing that Conservative leaders are 
omnipotent for although Conservative leaders enjoy wide ranging authority, they are not 
automatically blessed with security of tenure. Writing in the days before Conservative Party 
leaders were subject to annual re-election Robert McKenzie noted that: 
It is important to note that the Conservative Leader achieves office and retains power 
only with the consent of his followers; and there is ample precedent for the 
withdrawal of that consent. (McKenzie, 1964: 22) 
In particular, consent depends on the leader delivering that which the Conservative Party 
craves most; power. Conservative Party leaders who do not deliver electoral success are 
ruthlessly removed. Moreover, even the perception of future failure was enough to trigger the 
removal of Mrs. Thatcher, despite three successive electoral victories.   
 
The 1997 general election defeat was one of the worst in Conservative Party history: the 
carnage of election night cut the Conservatives’ representation to a mere 165 MPs, their 
lowest total since 1906 (Cowley & Stuart, 2003, 66), moreover the party polled its lowest 
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share of the vote since 1832 and polled almost six million votes fewer than in 1992 (Garnett 
& Lynch, 2003: 1). The electoral catastrophe of 1997 was followed by a further humiliation 
in 2001, when the party gained just one seat. Since 1997 the Conservative Party has been 
faced with a dual crisis of ideology and leadership, which provides the rationale for this 
thesis. The onus on the party leader to formulate policy, together with the Conservative 
Party’s inability to articulate a coherent, credible and electorally successful response to New 
Labour has further undermined the position of the Conservative Party leader. In turn this has 
contributed to the continued perception that the party was disunited and lacking in strong 
leadership. 
 
The Conservative Party’s disunity and ideological sterility was at its most visible during the 
Conservative Party leadership elections of 1997 and 2001 and it is this that has provided the 
rationale for this thesis. The research will examine the voting behaviour in these two 
leadership elections and analyse this within the context of socio-economic variables 
(educational and occupational background); electoral and political variables (electoral 
vulnerability, age and experience, career status); and ideological variables (attitudes towards 
the economy, Europe and social policy). The main thrust of the research will be placed on 
analysing social, political and ideological factionalism within the PCP in the post-1997 
period, specifically concentrating upon the Hague and Duncan Smith eras. The research 
thesis will use the 1997 and 2001 leadership elections as a lens which can be utilised to focus 
upon and analyse the ideological disputations of contemporary British Conservatism. 
Furthermore, it will seek to identify the links between factionalism, electoral unpopularity 
and the attempt to define the ideology of the parliamentary Conservative Party in the post-
Thatcherite era.   
 
The research will therefore revolve around three hypotheses based on Cowley and Garry’s 
(1998) three motivational models of voting behaviour:  
These will argue that voting in leadership elections is influenced by social background 
(education and former occupation); it is influenced by political attributes (electoral 
vulnerability, age and experience and career status); and centrally that it is determined 
by ideological disposition (economic policy, European policy and social policy).  
Identifying individual MP’s social status and political attributes will be determined through 
analysing career backgrounds of individual MPs through such sources as Dod’s 
Parliamentary Guide. However, the main thrust of the research will be on analysing the 
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ideological disposition of individual MPs and how this relates to voting behaviour in 
leadership elections. In methodological terms, this will involve using analysis of 
parliamentary data; division lists, early day motions (EDMs) and membership of party 
‘ginger groups’ together with press leaks, statements to journalists, semi-structured elite 
interviews and sample surveys of Conservative MPs. The data on the social background, 
political attributes and ideological disposition of individual MPs can then be married to data 
on voting behaviour in the 1997 and 2001 leadership elections to explain the outcomes of 
those elections. 
 
1.2 Structure 
The thesis will consist of five substantive chapters: Conservatism and the Conservative Party: 
Ideology and Politics; The Conservative Party Leadership Elections of 1997 & 2001; The 
Social Background and Political Attributes of the Parliamentary Conservative Party; The 
Ideological Disposition of the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1997 – 2003; Voting 
Behaviour in the 1997 and 2001 Leadership Elections: The Impact of Social Background, 
Political Attributes and Ideological Disposition. The thesis will conclude with an assessment 
of the impact of leadership and ideological renewal on the Conservative Party between 1997 
and 2003. 
 
Chapter two will be in two sections; the first will provide an overview of the ideology and 
politics of the Conservative Party. The concept of ideology is related to an examination of the 
‘building blocks’ of conservatism, utilising Norton’s (1994) theory of tenets and dispositions. 
The interaction of these, sometimes contradictory, tenets and dispositions will then be used to 
draw out the inherent tensions within conservatism in general and British conservatism in 
particular. The discussion of conservatism will conclude by examining the validity of the 
‘death of conservatism’ hypothesis expounded by Giddens (1995), Gray (1997) and the 
counter arguments of their critics, notably Willetts (1997) and Eccleshall (2002). The second 
section of this chapter will examine the institutional aspects of the Conservative Party; the 
National Union, Conservative Central Office and the Parliamentary Conservative Party. This 
includes a discussion on the role of the leader of the Conservative Party; their powers of 
patronage and of policy formulation and the leader’s relationship with the party they lead: it 
will argue that although Conservative leaders are ceded broad powers, this is conditional on 
delivering electoral success and that the introduction of a formal leadership election has left 
Conservative leaders even more dependent on the goodwill of the parliamentary party. The 
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chapter will then examine why the Conservative Party introduced a formal election process, 
designed by Alec Douglas Home and first used in 1965, give an explanation of the 
procedures used and outline how these procedures were subsequently amended. The chapter 
will then analyse the reforms instituted by William Hague, which included an overhaul of the 
party’s organisation and completely new leadership election rules that allowed party 
members to take part on the basis of one member one vote.  
 
Chapter three will be a background chapter, which provides an historical narrative of the 
1997 and 2001 Conservative Party leadership elections, which resulted in William Hague and 
Iain Duncan Smith respectively being elected party leader. This chapter will also be in two 
sections; the first section covers the period from May 1997 to June 2001 and will give an 
account of the party’s defeat in the general election of 1997 that triggered the resignation of 
John Major. It will then give an account of the strengths and weaknesses of the candidates 
who took part in the 1997 leadership, together with an assessment of the potential impact of 
those senior Conservatives who were unable to contest the election, in particular Michael 
Heseltine and Michael Portillo. The chapter will then give an account of the three ballots that 
led to William Hague becoming leader, together with an analysis of Hague’s leadership of the 
Conservative Party. This will centre upon the constraints upon Hague’s leadership, 
particularly his lack of personal following, Michael Portillo’s return to Westminster and the 
legacy of sleaze personified by Jeffrey Archer and Jonathan Aitken. It will then examine 
Hague’s attempt to move beyond Thatcherism by defining a socially liberal ‘Fresh 
Conservatism’ and explain why this failed and Hague reverted to traditional Thatcherism 
with his ‘Common Sense Revolution’. 
 
The second section of this chapter covers the period from June 2001 until October 2003. It 
will examine the circumstances of the Conservative Party’s defeat in the 2001 general 
election and the resignation of William Hague. The chapter will then analyse the qualities of 
the candidates who contested the 2001 leadership election and assess why some senior 
Conservatives chose not to enter the contest. It will then offer an account of the three rounds 
of balloting within the parliamentary party and the final round ballot of the entire party that 
led to Iain Duncan Smith being elected leader. The chapter will then offer an assessment of 
Duncan Smith’s leadership of the party together with an account of his removal from the 
post. It will look at his lack of charisma and how the Conservative Party continued to flat line 
in polls, despite signs of innovative new policies. This section will then examine the failures 
 5
of Duncan Smith’s party management that eventually culminated in him losing a vote of no 
confidence and being forced to resign. The chapter will conclude with a comparative 
assessment of the leadership of William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith. 
 
Chapter four will analyse four sets of non-ideological factors that contribute towards the 
composition and nature of the parliamentary Conservative Party; social background, electoral 
vulnerability, age and experience and career status. Whilst work on the social composition of 
the PCP has been done before, notably Baker, Gamble & Ludlam (1992), Baker & Fountain 
(1996) and Cowley & Garry (1998), it is in need of updating. The chapter will provide a 
discussion of the relevance of the representativeness of a political party’s MPs, together with 
an appraisal of the historical changes in the social background of the Parliamentary 
Conservative Party, as defined by MPs’ education and pre-parliamentary career. It will then 
go on to analyse the social background of the 1997 and 2001 PCP. This analysis, together 
with past analyses has concentrated on the class background of the PCP, due to the paucity of 
women and ethnic minorities within the PCP. Consequently, the final part of this section will 
examine the reasons for the Parliamentary Conservative Party being almost exclusively white 
and male, together with a discussion of the measures the Conservative Party are taking to 
remedy this imbalance. It will then look at the political attributes that may define or impact 
upon a Conservative MP’s career: electoral vulnerability, age and experience and career 
status. The chapter will show that MPs with marginal constituencies are likely to find that 
their electoral vulnerability acts as a severe restraint upon their ability to rise to high office. 
Conversely MPs are far more likely to achieve cabinet, or shadow cabinet, rank if they posses 
a safe seat.  The age and experience of the Conservative Party’s leadership will then be 
analysed in light of Rosenbaum’s assertion that a common goal of politicians is to appear to 
be authoritative and experienced (Rosenbaum, 1997: 179). It will reveal that as the post-war 
period has progressed the Conservative Party has chosen ever younger and less experienced 
leaders, who have in turn appointed younger and less experienced colleagues to cabinet and 
shadow cabinet. Finally, the chapter will outline how the career status of MPs, referred to by 
John Major as the ‘possessed, dispossessed and never possessed’ may affect a Conservative 
MP’s strategy, as they seek the job of leading their party.    
 
Having dealt with non-ideological factors that affect the character and behaviour of the 
parliamentary Conservative Party, chapter five will examine the impact that ideology has had 
upon the post-war Conservative Party and analyse the ideological disposition of the 
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parliamentary party from 1997 to 2003. The chapter will be in three sections; the first will 
examine academic classifications of the Conservative Party (Rose, 1964; Norton, 1990; 
Dunleavy 1993; Baker, Gamble & Ludlam 1993, 1994; Sowemimo, 1996: Baker, Gamble & 
Seawright, 2002; Garry, 1995; Cowley, P. & Garry J. 1998; Heppell 2002). The second 
section will deal with the ideological development of the Conservative Party from 1945 – 
1997 and the third section will provide an analysis of the ideological composition of the 
parliamentary Conservative Party from 1997-2001 and 2001-2003. 
 
Traditional accounts of the Conservative Party have argued that it was primarily interested in 
attaining and retaining power and was therefore more concerned with party unity and 
electoral pragmatism than with ideological ‘purity’. This led Richard Rose (1964) to argue 
that the Conservative Party was a ‘party of tendencies’, rather than a ‘party of factions’. 
However, other academics argued that by the late Thatcherite era the Conservative Party was 
increasingly concerned by ideology and showing signs of factional behaviour (Gamble, 1995, 
1996: Baker et. al., 1993). Consequently, the chapter will begin by appraising the work of 
Rose (1964). The chapter will contain an overview of previous typologies of the Thatcherite 
and post-Thatcherite Conservative party: one-dimensional (Norton, 1990), two-dimensional 
(Dunleavy 1993; Baker, Gamble & Ludlam 1993, 1994; Sowemimo, 1996: Baker, Gamble & 
Seawright, 2002) and three-dimensional (Garry, 1995; Cowley, P. & Garry J. 1998; Heppell 
2002) (Heppell & Hill, 2005: 342). These will be used to critique the contemporary relevance 
of Rose’s (1964) definition of the Conservative Party as a party of tendencies, rather than a 
party of factions. 
 
Chapter five will provide a thematic analysis of historically important ideological 
disputations within the Parliamentary Conservative Party. The thematic scheme will reflect 
Gamble’s definition of the Thatcherite Conservative Party as the party of national 
independence, economic liberty and conservative morality (Gamble, 1996: 28). It will show 
how the party has undergone considerable ideological change over the period. The 
Conservatives’ economic policies initially accepted the Attlee Settlement; welfare state, full 
employment and conciliatory policies towards the trade unions but subsequently rejected of 
these ideas in favour of a return to economic liberalism under Margaret Thatcher, after a 
period of muddle under Heath. The party’s attitudes towards Europe have also evolved with 
time; from indifference in the immediate post-war period, through to enthusiastic engagement 
under Heath and wary acceptance in the early years of Margaret Thatcher’s leadership. 
 7
However, after Thatcher’s Bruges Speech Conservative attitudes to Europe underwent a sea 
change, leading some Conservative MPs to advocate a fundamental redrafting of European 
treaties or outright withdrawal from the European Union. The Conservative disputation over 
Europe reached its zenith during John Major’s premiership, and ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, poisoning intra-party relations and wrecking his government. Finally this section will 
account for the sometimes confused social and moral policies of the Thatcherite Conservative 
Party, which consisted of strong rhetoric against the ‘permissive society’ ushered in during 
the 1960s, together with little serious attempt to reverse the socially liberal reforms of the era. 
The Conservatives’ socially conservative rhetoric eventually opened them up to ridicule after 
John Major launched ‘Back to Basics’ and several of his colleagues were revealed to be 
enmeshed in sexual or financial scandal.  
 
The final section of this chapter will use division lists, early day motions, group memberships 
and public statements to locate the ideological disposition of each Conservative MP elected 
in 1997 and in 2001. This will provide evidence to show that the parliamentary Conservative 
Party moved sharply to the right after the 1997 general election; it was drier, more 
eurosceptic and more socially conservative than the cohort elected in 19921.  
 
Chapter six will present an in depth analysis of the final round of the 1997 Conservative Party 
leadership election and the final parliamentary round of the 2001 leadership election. It will 
explain the methodology used to identify whether an MP voted for Clarke or Hague (1997) 
and Clarke, Portillo or Duncan Smith (2001) and present a series of tables showing who 
voted for whom. The chapter will then offer a number of possible hypotheses that may 
account for voting behaviour: non-ideological hypotheses; social background, age and 
experience and career status, together with ideological hypotheses; economic policy, 
European policy and social and moral policy. Data will be presented that shows composition 
of the candidates’ supporters according to each hypothesis. The data will be examined using 
bivariate analysis to show the impact of non-ideological and ideological factors upon the 
leadership elections of 1997 and 2001. 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Research into the ideological composition of the PCP 1992-1997 was carried out by Heppell (2002)  
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1.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the rationale for this thesis is to explore the impact of two catastrophic election 
defeats upon what was, until 1997 the most successful democratic political party in Europe. 
The thesis is centred on three hypotheses which argue that voting behaviour in leadership 
elections are motivated by several factors: social background, political attributes and 
ideological disposition. The thesis will attempt to do this through an analysis of the 
composition of the contemporary Conservative Party in non-ideological as well as ideological 
terms. The thesis will commence with an outline of the ideological foundations upon which 
the Conservative Party is built, together with a description of how the Conservative Party 
organises itself. This is followed by a contextual analysis of the 1997 and 2001 leadership 
elections and an appraisal of the performance of the leaders elected in those elections. The 
thesis will then examine the social background and political attributes of Conservative MPs 
and look at how these factors impact upon Conservative politics. It will then discuss 
academic typologies of the Conservative Party and whether the party is one of tendencies or 
factions. The chapter will also account for the development of the party’s ideology in the post 
war period and offer an analysis of the ideological composition of the parliamentary 
Conservative party of 1997 and 2001. Finally the thesis will take evidence of candidate 
support during the 1997 and 2001 leadership elections and marry it with data concerning the 
social background, political attributes and ideological disposition of Conservative MPs. This 
data will then be analysed to provide an explanation of voting behaviour in the 1997 and 
2001 leadership elections and to focus on the ideological divisions within contemporary 
British Conservatism. Ideology is explored in relation to non ideological factors in order to 
demonstrate its decisive impact on recent Conservative leadership elections. 
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Chapter Two  
Conservatism and the Conservative Party: Ideology and Politics  
2.1 Introduction 
The rationale of this chapter is to set out the philosophical and organisational foundations 
upon which the Conservative Party is built. The chapter is in two sections; the first will 
provide an overview of the ideology and politics of the Conservative Party. The chapter will 
provide a definition of ideology and discuss the merits and demerits of linear and three 
dimensional ideological spectra. The chapter will then define what is meant by the concept of 
conservatism. This will then be expanded into an examination of the ‘building blocks’ of 
conservatism, utilising Norton’s (1994) theory of tenets and dispositions. The interaction of 
these, sometimes contradictory, tenets and dispositions will then be used to draw out the 
inherent tensions within British conservatism, in particular the tensions can be seen to arise 
between: economic liberals and economic interventionists; eurosceptics and europhiles and 
social liberals and social conservatives. The chapter will then examine three strands or 
traditions of political action within the Conservative Party: paternalism, libertarian 
conservatism and the new right. The discussion of conservatism will conclude by examining 
the validity of the ‘death of conservatism’ hypothesis expounded by Giddens (1995), Gray 
(1997) and the counter arguments of their critics, notably Willetts (1997) and Eccleshall 
(2002).  
 
The second section of the chapter will examine the institutional aspects of the Conservative 
Party the National Union and the role of party activists; Conservative Central Office and the 
role of the Chairman; the Parliamentary Conservative Party and the role of the 1922 
Committee.  The chapter will then examine the formal and informal powers of the Party 
leader and the possible constraints a leader may face, together with an appraisal of the 
different ways the Conservative Party has used to choose its leaders. The chapter will 
conclude by examining the scope and impact Fresh Future reforms instituted by William 
Hague in 1998. 
 
2.2 Ideology 
The term ideology is often used in a negative or pejorative sense; it is seen by many to imply 
extreme, rigid and authoritarian positions that are commonly associated with fascism and 
communism (McLellan, 1996: 7).  Consequently, this has led to the denial of ideology across 
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a wide range of political traditions; liberals have viewed ideology as an officially sanctioned 
belief system that claims a monopoly of truth, Conservatives traditionally regarded ideology 
as a set of unrealistic and possibly dangerous goals divorced from reality. Moreover, whilst 
fascists reject ideology as over-intellectualised and devoid of fervour, traditional Marxists see 
it as a tool used by the ruling class, to manipulate the opinions and emotions of the masses, 
thereby perpetuating the dominance of the ruling class; in The German Ideology Marx 
described ideology as:  
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is 
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time the ruling intellectual force. 
(Heywood, 1998: 7, 15) 
By contrast, Marx claimed that his ideas constituted a set of scientific principles that could be 
used to examine the true nature of society (Leach, 1996: 17). 
 
However, in order to analyse and classify political doctrines it is necessary to adopt a more 
inclusive definition of ideology, which acknowledges that all such doctrines can be 
encompassed by the term. (Evans, 1994: 131). Heywood’s (1998) definition is that: 
An ideology is a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for 
organised political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow 
the existing system of power. All ideologies therefore (a) offer an account of the 
existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world view’, (b) provide the model of a 
desired future, a vision of a ‘good society’ and (c) outline how political change can 
and should be brought about. (Heywood, 1998: 12) 
 
This more inclusive definition allows us to classify political doctrines and relate them to one 
another. The simplest and most frequently used approach has been to relate ideologies on a 
linear left / right spectrum (see Table 2.1 below). 
 
Table 2.1: Linear ideological spectrum 
Source: Heywood, 1998: 17 
 
Socialism Liberalism  Conservatism        Fascism Communism 
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However, this is a rather simplistic interpretation as both soviet communism and  
fascism are authoritarian forms of rule, even though they are at opposite ends of the 
spectrum. Therefore a two-dimensional spectrum, which also shows attitudes to liberty and 
authority, allows a more sophisticated representation of ideological positions (see Table 2.2 
below). 
 
        Table 2.2: Two-dimensional ideological spectrum 
 
          Source: Heywood, 1998: 19 
 
The concept of ideology is relevant to political parties today because political parties need to 
court popularity in order to be electorally successful and consequently must undergo a 
periodic process of ideological renewal. In this search for electoral popularity a party may 
adopt policies that are at odds with its traditions and doctrines, often provoking considerable 
dispute within the party. The policies embraced by the Conservative Party under Thatcherism 
were seen either as a return to basic Conservative principles by her supporters, or as the 
adoption of 19th Century liberalism by her detractors. Similarly, the creation of the New 
Labour project is portrayed by its supporters as a process of modernisation that nevertheless 
remains true to the party’s founding principles, whilst critics allege that the Party has 
abandoned socialism in favour of a Thatcherite agenda (Adams, 1998: 9).  Following three 
consecutive electoral defeats, the Conservative Party is again undergoing a period of 
ideological renewal, provoking disagreement between the modernisers who want the Party to 
promote a more inclusive agenda and the traditionalists who wish to remain true to the 
principles of Thatcherism. 
 Left Right 
Authority 
Liberty 
. New right 
. Stalinism 
. 
Social Democracy 
. 
Anarcho-
capitalism 
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2.3 Conservatism 
Conservatism can be defined as:  
The social and political outlook that comes from a desire to conserve existing things, 
held to be either good in themselves, or better than the likely alternatives, or at least 
safe, familiar, and the objects of trust and affection (Scruton, 1996: p. 100).  
The term “conservative” was first used in the early 19th century to describe a reaction to the 
increasing pace of political and economic change and to the upheaval caused by the French 
Revolution. Indeed, one of the earliest statements of conservatism was Edmund Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France written in 1790 (Heywood, 1998: p. 66). Burke was 
highly suspicious of the power of human reasoning preferring to rely on “prejudice” and 
“prescription”. Prejudice is an opinion that has stood the test of time and was seen by Burke 
as being far superior to reason, whilst prescription means that politics should be based on the 
known, rather than the unknown. Therefore, if a system of government has worked for a long 
time, there is a presumption in favour of that system against any other. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that there is no point in replacing a system that works with one that may not work 
(Gilmour, 1977: p. 62). Given their suspicion of grand political designs traditional 
conservative thinkers argue that conservatism is a set of attitudes, or dispositions, rather than 
an ideology.  
 
2.4 Dispositions of conservatism 
Arguably one of the best analyses of these dispositions is by Philip Norton (1994). Norton 
argues that conservatives have two basic dispositions; firstly they are anti-intellectual and 
sceptical of the power of human reason, which is seen as limited and imperfect. As 
conservatives believe that society is the product of history and the accumulated wisdom of 
generations, they contend that significant improvements cannot be made by any individual or 
group. Moreover, conservatives argue that to make sweeping change is to step into the 
unknown, which may have unintended consequences (Norton, 1994: 40), or as Burke wrote 
in Reflections on the Revolution in France:  
…very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful 
and lamentable conclusions (Burke, 1991: 35). 
It was this suspicion of grand political schemes that led the conservative philosopher Michael 
Oakeshott to criticise Freiderich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom as ‘a plan’ and to say that: 
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…to resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the same style 
of politics. (Gilmour, 1977: 115)  
Consequently, the second disposition is that conservatives prefer society as it currently exists 
and possess an attachment to those institutions which help form and shape the nature of 
society. Conservatives are therefore, inclined to defend institutions such as the monarchy, 
parliament and the police if they are perceived to be under attack. If changes to the status quo 
are proved to be necessary then these changes should be as limited as possible. Norton goes 
on to argue that some basic tenets may be drawn from these dispositions (Norton, 1994: 40). 
 
2.5 Tenets of conservatism 
The first of these tenets is the organic nature of society; society is seen as a living organism, 
rather than a machine. This organism is difficult to change because it is an historical product, 
which grows slowly and naturally (Norton, 1994: 41). Moreover, it is made up of a variety of 
constituent parts, such as the family, church, government and nation, and each plays a vital 
role in ensuring the stability and well being of society. Conservatives attach great importance 
to the defence of the family, which they see as a microcosm of society as a whole (Heywood, 
1998: 75-76). 
 
Conservatives also recognise that society is evolutionary and therefore the second tenet is the 
acceptance of the necessity for some degree of change, though this should always be gradual 
and intended to improve, rather than destroy that which already exists (Norton, 1994: 41). 
Moreover, conservatives value stability and may well accept unpalatable measures, if they 
feel that continued resistance could adversely affect the stability of society (Gilmour, 1977: 
123-124). 
 
The third conservative tenet is that there must be order and discipline, as a condition of 
personal freedom, and that order should come from a deep respect for authority. This 
authority is posited in all the institutions of state and society and in the rule of law, by which 
all such institutions are governed (Norton, 1994: 41). Thus, in the family authority should be 
exercised by parents, in schools by teachers, in the workplace by the employer and in society 
at large by the government (Heywood, 1998: 78). As authority is always necessary in society 
and authority entails inequality, conservatives see hierarchy and inequality as part of the 
natural order, although many would also point to the need for equality of opportunity and 
equality before the law (Vincent, 1992: 69). 
 14
 
Fourthly, conservatives believe that the law must also protect the ownership of private 
property, which is seen as another condition of personal liberty. The ownership of property 
contributes to the stability of society and imparts a sense of responsibility upon the property 
owner. Property also provides independence against an overbearing state and ensures that the 
property owner is not reliant on either other individuals, or the state (Norton, 1994: 42). 
Moreover conservatives also see the widespread ownership of private property as a bulwark 
against socialism and inefficient state monopolies (Gilmour, 1977: 148-149). 
 
The fifth conservative tenet is to accord a limited role to government, as an unfettered 
government is seen as a threat to individual liberty. Conservatives recognise that government 
is necessary in order to maintain peace at home, to defend the security of the nation state and 
to check and prevent abuse. However, conservatives are not against strong government as 
long as it can be held accountable (Norton, 1994: 42).  
 
Sixth, conservatives have always believed in wealth creation and that market forces are 
superior to government intervention. Government intervention, conservatives argue, can only 
lead to monopoly, a decline in efficiency and competitiveness and the loss of individual 
liberty (Norton, 1994: 42). Moreover, it is argued that the best way to guarantee national 
wealth is by ensuring that each person, by pursuing his own material interests,  can thereby 
pursue the well-being of the whole (Scruton, 2001: 88). Therefore the purpose of government 
is to maintain the conditions for capitalism and not to run the economy (Norton, 1994: 42-
43). 
 
British Conservatism has also acquired two further tenets dating from Disraeli’s leadership of 
the Conservative Party. The first of these is the concept of one nation at home, which gives a 
role to government in helping those who cannot help themselves. (Norton, 1994: 43) This is 
seen both as a moral obligation and necessary to appease the working class and avert the 
possibility of societal destabilisation (Heywood, 1998: 84-85). The second tenet, one nation 
abroad is the belief in the need to promote and defend British interests abroad (Norton, 1994: 
43). This strategy, originally based on the British Empire, was designed to appeal to 
nationalist sentiment across class boundaries, by emphasising Britain’s ‘greatness’ and 
unique position in the world (Barnes, 1994: 336-337). 
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2.6 Inherent tensions within conservatism 
The tenets outlined above demonstrate the diversity of conservative thought. However they 
are not necessarily compatible with each other and a number of separate, but interrelated 
tensions can be identified (Norton, 1994: 43). The first is between continuity and change. 
Conservatism is concerned with preserving society as it exists, yet it also recognises that 
society changes and consequently that a degree of political change will be inevitable. 
However, tensions can arise when ascertaining the point at which change becomes necessary, 
a task made more difficult because there are no hard and fast rules. Some Conservatives will 
place greater emphasis on one tenet than on another and therefore will be more inclined to 
accept change than others who highlight the importance of a different tenet (Norton, 1994: 
43). 
 
Tension also arises between those Conservatives who follow the ‘one nation’ tradition and 
stress the need for government to intervene in the economy, to maintain the social fabric, and 
free market conservatives who believe such intervention to be wrong in principle (Norton, 
1994: 43). This tension was clearly visible during Margaret Thatcher’s first administration 
when she pursued a free market monetarist strategy to the dismay of ‘one nation’ 
Conservatives, whom she disparagingly labelled ‘wets’ (Ball, 1998: 124).  Paradoxically as 
Gamble (1994) recognised, Mrs. Thatcher was obliged to strengthen the state in other areas in 
order to protect the institutions of the free economy (Gamble, 1994: 39). 
 
Tension may also become apparent between those who place the emphasis on order and 
standards and those who stress the need for limited government. Whilst many conservatives 
accept that society is greater than the sum of the individuals that inhabit it, there is also a 
recognition that individuals are naturally different. However, free market conservatives place 
special emphasis on the role of the individual to the extent that the role of society is 
diminished or denied (Norton, 1994: 44). Mrs. Thatcher’s contradictory attitude to this 
paradigm was demonstrated by her statement that there is, “no such thing as society” 
(Thatcher, 1993: 626) which clearly gave primacy to the individual. However, whilst she 
believed in individual freedom in the economic sphere, she was a stern critic of moral laissez-
faire and eulogised Victorian social values which she believed far superior to the 
permissiveness of the 1960s (Hayes, 1994: 84-85). 
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In addition, there is also tension within the Conservative Party over the European Union (EU) 
and Britain’s role in the world. This conflict is exacerbated because both europhiles and 
eurosceptics point to the same tenet, one nation abroad, in order to justify their position. The 
key issue is sovereignty; europhiles believe that by ‘pooling’ sovereignty with other nations, 
the process of European integration allows Britain renewed influence upon the world stage 
(Barnes, 1994, 342). By contrast, eurosceptics regard sovereignty as indivisible and fear that 
Britain is in danger of being subsumed within a European superstate, losing its identity and 
influence in the process (Gamble, 1988: 133). This tension has been apparent, although of a 
minor nature, within the Conservative Party ever since Britain’s accession to the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1974. However, these divisions grew steadily worse in the 
late 1980s under Mrs. Thatcher’s premiership, leading to no less than six ministerial 
resignations between 1986 and 1990 and ultimately to the downfall of Mrs. Thatcher herself. 
Her successor, John Major fared no better, after 1992, as further intra-party conflict erupted 
over the issue of further European integration   (Davies, 1995: 363-364). Moreover, this 
conflict became so intense that the Major government’s European policy was informed by the 
fear that the party could split over the issue (Major, 1999: 585). Whilst Major successfully 
prevented the party from splitting he was powerless to avert the very public divisions over 
Europe, which eventually destroyed both his leadership and his government (Holmes, 1998: 
134-136). 
 
These tensions demonstrate why Conservatism has historically been made up of various 
strands of Conservative thought. Because the tenets and dispositions of conservatism are 
open to being interpreted in a variety of ways, they have led to several distinct traditions of 
political action within the Conservative Party.  
 
2.7 Strands of Conservatism 
2.71 Paternalism 
The paternalist strand of Conservatism originates from the 19th Century Conservative leader 
Benjamin Disraeli, who sought to avoid the country becoming: 
Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as 
ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings, as if they were…inhabitants of 
different planets; who are …fed by different food…and are not governed by the same 
laws. (Willetts, 1992: 11) 
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Disraeli’s concern was both practical and moral. On the one hand he feared that a society 
divided by extremes in wealth and poverty risked being undermined by social unrest or worse 
destroyed by revolution. On the other hand he believed that the beneficiaries of wealth and 
privilege had a moral duty to help the most vulnerable sections of society (Heywood, 1998: 
84-85). Furthermore, Disraeli also argued that the interests of both nation and party 
demanded that the Conservatives should not simply be class based. Rather, they should be 
composed of and govern in the interests of all sections and all classes (Gilmour, 1977: 86).  
 
During the early 20th century the paternalist banner was taken up by Joseph Chamberlain and 
his supporters who campaigned for the introduction of import tariffs, in order both to protect 
British industry and to pay for social reforms such as old age pensions (Dutton, 1981: 874). 
Chamberlain also believed that the nation’s security and prosperity were dependent upon 
Britain being at the centre of a wider economic and political unit. Originally this was the 
British Empire; however following Britain’s post-war retreat from Empire adherents to the 
Chamberlainite tradition gradually shifted their focus towards membership of the EEC 
(Gamble, 1996: 21).  
 
The dominance of the paternalist tradition within the Party during the immediate post-war era 
led the Conservatives to accept the great majority of the previous Labour government’s 
collectivist reforms, which formed the basis of a political consensus that was to last until the 
1970s (Heywood, 1998: 87). I would argue that the high water mark for paternalist 
conservatism was during the 1957-63 Macmillan premiership. Macmillan’s ‘middle way’ was 
an attempt to steer a course between socialist statism and laissez-faire capitalism2. Whilst 
Macmillan supported the welfare state, he also sought to maintain full employment as a 
means for the working-class to help themselves (Green, 2002: 186-187). However, whilst 
paternalist values were dominant within the Conservative Party for most of the 20th century, 
they were always rejected by a substantial minority who belonged to the libertarian wing of 
the Party (Ludlam & Smith, 1996: 7). 
 
                                                     
2 Between 1972 and 1974 and the Heath administration nationalised industries and pursued a statutory pay 
policy. However, Heath’s government acted under the pressure of unprecedented events and was severely 
criticised by some members of his own party. (See chapter 5 for a longer discussion of the economic policies of 
the Heath government.) 
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2.72 Libertarian Conservatism 
Libertarian conservatism can be traced back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, when it emerged as a reaction to what some saw as increasing collectivisation. The 
tradition draws heavily upon liberalism’s mistrust of the state and the belief that people 
should be free to do as they please as long as they do not harm others (Ludlam & Smith, 
1996: 7). Libertarian conservatives, therefore advocate a reduced role for the state. In 
practice, this means the state should confine itself to maintaining the best conditions for the 
operation of the free-market and to guaranteeing an individual’s negative rights; that is the 
right to pursue one’s own goals free from interference (Smith, 1996: 147). The failure of the 
post-war consensus led to the renaissance of the libertarian tradition within the conservative 
New Right, whose values had always found sympathy within the ranks of the Conservative 
Party, despite the dominance of paternalist attitudes. 
 
2.73 The New Right 
The New Right is an offshoot of libertarian conservatism although it rejects concepts of 
social liberalism. Rather it is a marriage of economic liberalism and social conservatism and 
is heavily influenced by Friederich Hayek’s 1945 book The Road to Serfdom. The New Right 
rose to prominence in Britain during the 1960s and 1970s, as a result of economic failure and 
widespread social unrest, it rejected the post-war welfarist consensus. The governments of 
Margaret Thatcher from 1979-90, strongly influenced by the ideas of Alfred Sherman and Sir 
Keith Joseph, were an attempt to put New Right theory into practice.  
 
The economic liberal aspect of the New Right emphasises the superiority of the free-market 
and rejects welfarism in favour of individual self-reliance (Heywood, 1998: 92).  The market 
is seen as an efficient, self-regulating device for the allocation of scarce resources, both 
human and material. Moreover, the market is seen as being neutral and impersonal (Hayes, 
1994: p. 27).  The pre-eminence of markets in New Right thinking led to a change in 
economic priorities. The old commitment to full-employment was abandoned in favour of the 
pursuit of low inflation. This was believed to be necessary in order to secure the health of the 
market economy. The New Right also believed that the free-market could not flourish 
alongside high levels of taxation and regulation, both of which were cut in order to encourage 
producers to produce (Heywood, 1998: 94-95). 
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The New Right’s social conservative facet emphasises the need to return to nineteenth 
century social and moral values. This is an explicit response to the permissive society, which 
is responsible, in the eyes of social conservatives, for undermining the traditional family and 
for the questioning of authority (Gamble, 1994: 197). Thus, the rising crime and disorder of 
the Thatcher years were seen, not as a result of economic liberal economic policies, but as a 
consequence of the social decadence of the 1960s (Isaac, 1990: 211). Moreover, social 
conservatives are deeply hostile towards non-traditional family units. One-parent families are 
frowned upon, particularly if they are in receipt of state benefit. In the same vein social 
conservatives disapprove of homosexuality for undermining conventional family values 
(Isaac, 1990: 218-219). Social conservatives are also suspicious of multi-culturalism, as the 
presence of different cultures and religions is believed to undermine both social cohesion and 
national identity (Seidel, 1986: 111-112). This concern for the character of the nation also 
manifests itself within Conservative Party in the form of insular and exclusive euroscepticism 
(Heywood, 1998: 100). Research by Berrington & Hague (1998) found that 76% of anti-
Maastricht MPs were also in favour of the death penalty (Berrington & Hague, 1998: 56). 
  
It should be noted that the two strands of thought that make up the New Right are highly 
contradictory. Whilst economic liberalism emphasises personal freedom in the economic 
sphere, neo-conservatism advocates social authoritarianism in the personal sphere. It has been 
argued that these contradictions ultimately make the New Right enterprise unsustainable. 
John Gray contends that the success of the New Right project adopted by Mrs. Thatcher in 
the 1980s has left conservatism both ideologically drained and in terminal decline 
(Eccleshall, 2002: 31), an argument that has seemingly been reinforced by the Conservative 
Party’s devastating defeats in the 1997 and 2001 General Elections. 
 
2.8 Is Conservatism dead? 
John Gray follows Ian Gilmour in arguing that Mrs. Thatcher abandoned Conservatism for 
19th Century liberalism and the Conservative Party abandoned its traditional pragmatism in 
favour of alien dogma. This additional ideological baggage has made it increasingly difficult 
for the Party to adapt to the changing nature of society (Eccleshall, 2002: 31). Gray also 
argues that the Thatcherite experiment weakened those British institutions that the 
Conservative Party traditionally sought to defend, consequently undermining the Party’s 
intellectual and electoral position (Eccleshall, 2002: 31). This argument is echoed by 
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Anthony Giddens, who claims that the contradictory nature of economic liberalism has fatally 
damaged Conservatism: 
There is a damaging contradiction at the core of economic liberal thought. On the one 
hand, in encouraging the free play of market forces, economic liberal political 
philosophy unleashes detraditionalising influences of a quite far-reaching kind. On the 
other hand, the very traditional symbols which these influences help to dissolve are 
held to be essential to social solidarity. (Giddens, 1995: 40) 
Or, as Lord Harris of High Cross realised, the market has no inherent morality and will 
supply what consumers want, “…from prayer books and communion wine to pornography 
and hard liquor…” (Isaac, 1990: 212). Finally, 20th century Conservatism defined itself 
through a doctrine of anti-socialism, which arguably reached its apogee under the Thatcher 
administrations. However, the collapse of Soviet Communism and New Labour’s adoption of 
much of the Thatcherite agenda, has arguably robbed the Conservative Party of one of its 
most potent electoral strategies (Heywood, 1998: 101). 
 
However, it can be argued that the contradictions of the New Right are not necessarily 
terminal, as conservatism has always consisted of diverse and contradictory strands that have 
left plenty of scope for disagreement (Eccleshall, 2002: 31). Moreover, David Willetts (1997) 
argues that Conservatism is still relevant to contemporary British politics. He rejects the 
concept that a devotion to the free-market is incompatible with concern, both for the family 
and for the social fabric of society (Gray & Willetts, 1997: 70-71). Indeed, Willetts denies 
that the breakdown in social cohesion during the 1980s and 1990s was the consequence of 
economic liberalism, preferring to lay the blame at the door of excessive state intervention in 
society (Gray & Willetts, 1997: 78-79). Consequently, Willetts advocates pushing free-
market reforms further, through what he calls ‘civic conservatism’. This involves giving 
increased autonomy to institutions involved in delivering healthcare and education, which 
would, Willetts argues increase both choice and quality (Gray & Willetts, 1997: 172). 
 
Moreover, although the Conservative Party suffered two heavy electoral defeats during the 
20th century, in 1906 and 1945, it was nevertheless able to reinvent itself to become the most 
successful political party of the era. However, whilst the Party’s ideological flexibility was an 
important factor in its electoral successes during this era, it was not the only factor. The 
Conservatives’ superior organisation also played a major role in the party’s domination of 
20th century Parliamentary politics. The party’s ability to deliver regular electoral victories 
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meant that its structure remained largely unaltered following the 1945 Maxwell-Fyfe reforms, 
until declining membership and the crushing electoral defeat of 1997 prompted William 
Hague to order a fundamental review of the Party’s structure and mechanisms. 
 
2.9 Structures and Mechanisms of the Conservative Party 
Until the Hague reforms, published in 1998 under the title of The Fresh Future, the 
Conservative Party consisted of three separate but interlinked components; The Parliamentary 
Conservative Party (PCP), Conservative Central Office and the National Union of 
Conservative and Unionist Associations, representing the parliamentary, professional and 
voluntary sections of the Party respectively.  
 
2.91 The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations 
The National Union was the body responsible for the 634 individual constituency 
associations in England, Scotland and Wales. All associations had to be approved by the 
National Union, to whom they paid an affiliation fee (Whiteley et. al., 1994: 20). In addition 
the National Union organised the Party Conference, the bi-annual Central Council meetings 
and acted as a sounding board for the membership. Representatives of the constituencies met 
at area and national level, and a system of advisory committees was used to convey grass 
roots opinion to the Party leadership. However, whilst the National Union could express 
opinion and support, it did not possess any mandatory powers (http://www.bodley.ox.ac.uk).  
 
The Party’s grass-roots members, within the associations, play a vital role within the 
organisation as a whole. Members provide funds for Conservative Central Office and supply 
an unpaid army of volunteers, canvassing and leafleting, at election time. The debt owed, by 
the Party to its activists has long been recognised as Walter Long speaking in 1919 said: 
We owe our position in the country, and always have done, much more to local 
personal influence than to the popularity of our own party. (Davies, 1995: 154) 
However, the efficacy of such local influence is now in serious doubt due to a severe decline 
in membership, especially amongst the young. Although membership of all political parties 
has declined, the problem for the Conservatives is acute. In 1975 party membership stood at 
around 1.5 million that has now declined to about 300,000 (Cooke, 2002). Moreover, 
membership of Conservative youth groups has declined from 34,000 in 1979 to less than 
10,000 in 1997. Consequently, the average age of the party has risen, with adverse effects on 
the ability of local associations to campaign effectively during elections (Peele, 1998: 144).   
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Traditionally, the constituency associations retained a high degree of autonomy both from the 
National Union and from Central Office. Only constituency associations could select 
Parliamentary candidates and recruit and expel members, which could have adverse 
repercussions for the parliamentary party3. Furthermore any member with a grievance against 
their association had no recourse to the National Union. Moreover, associations were under 
no obligation to report membership numbers to either body; consequently the Party had very 
little knowledge of either the size or social composition of their activist base (Whiteley et. al., 
1994: 20-21). Associations jealously guard their independence, occasionally leading to bitter 
disputes with Central Office, which activists criticise for treating them as servants, rather than 
clients (Kelly, 1995: 11). 
 
2.92 Conservative Central Office 
The role of the professional section of the Party, Conservative Central Office, is to provide a 
range of services both to the leader and to the Party as a whole.  The services Central Office 
supply to constituencies include the supply of guest speakers, assistance with election and by-
election campaigns and professionally produced publicity and propaganda material. Central 
Office also provides the list of approved candidates from which associations choose their 
prospective MP. The services Central Office provide for the party leader include monitoring 
the state of opinion within the Party and the commissioning of private polling to ascertain the 
state of public opinion. Central Office plays an important role at election time, advising both 
on timing and tactics and co-ordinating the campaign, recommending adjustments where 
necessary (Bell, 1996: 192-196). The professional organisation is run by the Party Chairman, 
who is appointed by the leader and runs Central Office as the leader’s personal fiefdom 
(Davies, 1995: 66). When the Party is in office the Chairman tends to be, a caretaker, 
although a more heavyweight candidate is usually chosen if an election is imminent. The 
Chairman’s powers are undefined, but have been likened to those of a constitutional 
monarch, “…to encourage, to advise and to warn.” Consequently power varies from holder to 
holder, dependent on personality and circumstance (Ball, 1996: 177). However the Chairman 
needs to play a careful balancing act, as he or she needs to retain the confidence of both the 
                                                     
3 In 1997 Neil Hamilton’s local association ignored pressure from Central Office to deselect him, despite 
Hamilton’s involvement in the ‘cash for questions’ scandal. The subsequent election battle between Hamilton 
and ‘the man in the white suit’, Martin Bell came to symbolise all allegations of Conservative Party sleaze 
between 1992-97. The rules governing the selection of candidates were changed in 1998 to allow Central Office 
to deselect candidates it deemed unsuitable. 
 23
leader and the voluntary section of the Party (Norton & Aughey, 1981: 254). Since Cecil 
Parkinson’s tenure, from 1981-83, the Chairman has become the focal point of the Party’s 
public relations, as the media increasingly demanded contact with “…a central and easily 
accessible political voice…” (Ball, 1996: 179).  
 
2.93 The Parliamentary Conservative Party 
The PCP is the oldest of these three organisations and is therefore considered to be the most 
important (Kelly, 1995: 11). The PCP was traditionally drawn from Britain’s social elite 
(Baker & Fountain, 1996: 86). The problematic nature of such a narrow social base was 
addressed by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s inquiry into the Party’s organisation, which was 
prompted by the 1945 election defeat. The reforms introduced by Maxwell-Fyfe were slow to 
take effect, however they did eventually lead to a broader social background and to the 
increasing professionalisation within the PCP. However, examination of the 1992 intake 
shows that 65% of Conservative MPs were privately educated, 7% were Old Etonians and 
43% Oxbridge graduates3 (Baker & Fountain, 1996: 87).  
 
The 1922 Committee represents the views of backbench Conservative MPs. This meets 
weekly and provides a forum for MPs to raise parliamentary or party matters and to make 
their views known to the leadership. The 1922 Committee is both influential and powerful; it 
was instrumental in changing the leadership election rules in 1974-75, thus ensuring that the 
party leader became more sensitive to the concerns of backbench MPs (Norton, 1996b: 112). 
When all is well the 1922 Committee tends to have little influence with the Party leadership, 
however the Committee’s authority is enhanced when the Party is going through a difficult 
period. The second Major government’s small majority and apparent lack of purpose enabled 
the Committee to increase its leverage within the PCP. Consequently, the views of the 
Committee’s Executive were influential in the removal from government of David Mellor, 
Norman Lamont, Neil Hamilton and Michael Mates (Kelly, 1995: 11-12). As the 
representative body of all Conservative backbenchers, the committee is also responsible, 
under its Chairman, for the organisation and conduct of the Party’s leadership elections.  
 
 
                                                     
3 The social background of the PCP will be discussed in greater length in chapter four. 
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2.94 The Party Leader 
The Conservative Party leader is drawn from the ranks of the PCP and is vested with both 
considerable autonomy and powers of appointment. This patronage allows the leader to select 
both Cabinet ministers when in government, and shadow cabinet members when out of 
government (Davies, 1995: 65-66). The leader also appoints the Party’s Chairman and 
Treasurer (Ball, 1998: 20). The power of appointment is a key weapon of party management; 
Mrs. Thatcher’s first cabinet reflected her less than secure position, with the overall balance 
skewed in favour of the paternalist wing of the Party, however, this apparent disadvantage 
was offset by giving all the major economic portfolios to Thatcher loyalists (Shepherd, 1991: 
181). However, by 1981 she felt secure enough to either sack or marginalise many of her 
‘wet’ critics (Kavanagh & Seldon, 1999: 169). Nevertheless, the leader’s powers of 
appointment are constrained by the need for unity within the PCP, hence John Major’s 
reluctance to sack three of his right-wing Cabinets critics for fear of the consequences of 
having “…three more of the bastards out there (Major, 1999: 343). Moreover, although the 
leader’s powers of patronage can be extremely useful, they can also be a liability if misused 
or used badly. Mrs. Thatcher’s treatment of Geoffrey Howe, like a “…cross between a 
doormat and a punch bag”, according to one colleague (Hennessey, 2000: 402) and his 
demotion to the etiolated role of Deputy Prime Minister led to his resignation and ultimately 
to her downfall. Moreover, the prominent role and far-reaching powers bestowed upon the 
leader, arguably entail a correspondingly high responsibility for electoral success or failure 
(Belloff & Peele, 1980: 179). Therefore electoral defeat or even the prospect of defeat renders 
the leader vulnerable (Davies, 1995: 66-67).   
 
The leader also plays the dominant role in the formation of policy; moreover, the leader’s 
authority is magnified by the broad nature of the basic tenets of conservatism which allow a 
great deal of room for manoeuvre (Norton, 1996a: 149).  The policy making process differs 
depending on whether the Party is in government or opposition. In power, Ministers and their 
civil servants will provide the majority of policy proposals, which are primarily concerned 
with the practicalities of government whereas, when the Party is in opposition policy making 
is focused towards the production of the manifesto and courting electoral popularity (Ball, 
1998: 98-99). 
 
Whilst leaders are not personally responsible for every policy initiative, which may come 
from colleagues or think tanks, nothing will be adopted by the Party unless it has the approval 
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of the leader (Barnes & Cockett, 1993: 347). However, the power to set party policy is a 
double-edged sword; popular policies can enhance the leader’s authority, but a disliked or 
unsuccessful policy can undermine the leader’s position. The fallout from Britain’s enforced 
departure from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) not only destroyed the Conservative 
Party’s reputation for economic competence but also weakened John Major’s authority to the 
point where he considered resignation (Hennessy, 2000: 465-466). Occasionally, the damage 
can be even more severe, as Margaret Thatcher discovered in 1990 when the unpopularity of 
the poll tax was a contributory factor in her downfall (Norton, 1996a: 254).  
 
The leader’s extensive personal power has led some to describe the relationship between the 
party and its leader as monarchical, with the leader seen as the monarch, surrounded by a 
court from which the leader’s advisers are chosen. However, Richard Rose has likened this 
association to a baronial system, with the emphasis placed on bargaining and coalition 
building (Ingle, 2000: 54). A third, arguably superior, analogy used by Norton & Aughey 
(1981) is that of a family with the party leader as head of the household. Like a family there 
is a hierarchical structure, with deference accorded to the older and more senior members 
(Norton & Aughey, 1981: 242). 
 
Whilst this hierarchical structure reflects the conservative belief in the necessity of authority, 
Robert McKenzie’s British Political Parties (1955) argued that in practice, the leader could 
only survive with the consent of his followers. The leader according to McKenzie “…leads 
and the party follows, except when the party decides not to follow – then the leader ceases to 
be leader.” (Bogdandor, 1994: 89). Moreover, McKenzie went on to suggest that virtually no 
Conservative leader had retired at the time of their choosing, most being forced out by a 
mutinous party (Ramsden, 1998: 10). Therefore, it is arguable that the relationship between 
the party and its leader can be described as Hobbesian, with absolute power being 
surrendered to the leader, so long as the interests of the party are protected through electoral 
victory. However, if the leader fails to deliver the requisite electoral success, then this 
obligation is no longer considered binding (Ingle, 2000: 54). In a further parallel to Hobbes’ 
Leviathan the party had no clear procedure for removing a leader until 1975 (Norton, 1996a: 
142).  
 
However, Kelly (1995) has argued that the changing nature of the relationship between the 
PCP and its leader has undermined the leader’s position. Tory leaders found it increasingly 
 26
difficult to insist on unquestioning loyalty during the 1980s and early 1990s, as the perceived 
unelectability of the Labour Party led backbench Tories to believe that more open debate and 
even dissent need not be electorally damaging. Moreover, with the adoption of Thatcherite 
populism Conservative MPs no longer thought of themselves as the representatives of a 
besieged middle-class, but rather as tribunes of the people, in touch with the demands of the 
average voter. Therefore, they are now less deferential and more sceptical of the notion that 
‘the leader knows best’ (Kelly, 1995: 11). However, as Gillian Peele has argued, whilst the 
PCP has become less deferential it still retains its attachment to strong leadership and 
therefore has become ‘culturally schizophrenic’ (Peele, 1997: 105).  
 
The introduction of a formal election process to choose the Party leader has led to a process 
of evolutionary change that has further undermined the leader’s position. The first milestone 
in this process was the first election of 1965. As the beneficiary of an election, rather than an 
emergence Edward Heath was arguably more dependent upon the goodwill of the 
parliamentary rank and file than was his predecessor. However, whatever goodwill Heath 
enjoyed was exhausted by 1975, when rule changes, allowing for annual elections, led to the 
precedent of an incumbent leader being challenged.  Heath’s challenger and successor, 
Margaret Thatcher was herself challenged in 1989, the first challenge to a sitting Prime 
Minister and again in 1990, when the PCP took the unprecedented step of removing her from 
office. Consequently, Thatcher’s heir, John Major found himself in charge of a Parliamentary 
Party still reeling from the heady effects of parricide and at times, seemingly eager for a 
repeat performance. Consequently, Major’s position was never secure after 1992 indeed, his 
authority was so undermined that he took the unparalleled step of resigning his position and 
standing for re-election. Rule changes introduced by William Hague in 1998 and first used in 
2001, giving activists a voice in the election process mean that Tory leaders now have to face 
a dual constituency. Whilst the leader must still retain the support of the PCP, in order to 
avoid being challenged, he/she must now also court popularity with the rank and file 
members, who are the final arbiters in any election process. 
 
2.95 The leadership selection process 
Conservative Party leaders were not elected until 1965, when Edward Heath was chosen to 
succeed Alec Douglas-Home. Previous Tory leaders ‘emerged’ after informal consultations 
within the PCP (Bogdanor, 1996: 69). However, the appointment of 14th Earl of Home as 
leader in November 1963, led to widespread discontent within the Parliamentary Party on 
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several counts. Firstly, many felt that the process had been unfairly manipulated in Home’s 
favour and that as Ian Macleod alleged, Harold Macmillan and a “magic circle” of Old 
Etonians had conspired to stop R. A. Butler and make one of their own Conservative leader 
(Thorpe, 1996: 344). Secondly, by the 1960s, the system was beginning to come under attack 
from some in the Conservative Party who found it arcane and out of step with the changing 
climate of the decade. The old process compared badly when compared to Labour’s system 
of electing their leader by a secret ballot of Labour MPs (Davies, 1995: 73). Indeed one 
young Tory MP, Humphry Berkeley, went as far as to describe it as, “More appropriate to the 
enstoolment of an African tribal chief.” (Watkins, 1998: 183). Finally, in order to enter the 
Commons, Home had to renounce his titles and fight a by-election, after the original 
Conservative candidate kindly stood down in Home’s favour. Even The Times was forced to 
conclude that it was not possible to, “…see a dis-ermined fourteenth earl as a perfect 
standard-bearer for a democratic party.” (Punnett, 1992: 44). 
 
Following the Conservative Party’s defeat in the 1964 general election Home consulted party 
colleagues and in February 1965 published, Procedures for the Selection of the Leader of the 
Conservative & Unionist Party. Elected by secret ballot of Conservative MPs, candidates 
needed two nominations to stand. Victory in the first round of balloting required both an 
overall majority and 15% more votes cast than any other candidate. If these conditions were 
not met a second ballot would be held and new nominations could be submitted, victory in 
this round merely required an overall majority. If no one achieved an overall majority in the 
second round, the three leading contenders would enter a third round, in which voters had to 
give their first and second preferences. The second preference votes of the candidate with the 
least amount of first preference votes would be distributed to the leading two candidates to 
decide the winner (Thorpe, 1996: 382-283). The election of Edward Heath, in 1965, marked a 
watershed in Conservative Party history; Heath’s lower middle-class background was in 
marked contrast to his patrician forebears, which according to The Economist made him, “the 
biggest departure from the Tory leadership norm since Disraeli.” (Evans & Taylor, 1996: 
141).  
 
However, the rules were designed only to fill vacancies in the party leadership and made no 
provision for challenging an unpopular incumbent, such as Edward Heath. Heath as Douglas-
Home’s successor was the first leader to be formally elected in 1965. However, despite 
having lost three out of four elections, by 1974 he stubbornly refused to resign. Nevertheless, 
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he eventually bowed to pressure and a committee under Douglas-Home made two 
amendments to the rules. The first allowed for an unqualified annual election, the second 
raised the threshold of votes needed to win by defining it as a proportion of the whole 
electorate, rather than just those who voted. This annual election process was to significantly 
undermine the position of the leader in the 1990s (Kavanagh, 1998: 31). The first election 
under the new rules was scheduled to be held in February 1975 and resulted in Margaret 
Thatcher becoming leader (Ramsden, 1998: 419-420). The rules were amended again in 1991 
to confine the third ballot to the top two candidates from the second ballot. This was as a 
result of the 1990 leadership election, in which John Major fell two votes short of victory, in 
the second round and Michael Heseltine and Douglas Hurd both conceded (Bogdanor, 1996: 
1993).  
 
In the wake of the Conservatives’ crushing election defeat of 1997 their new leader William 
Hague instituted a complete revision of the election procedures as part of a comprehensive 
review of party structures entitled Our Party: Blueprint for Change.  Hague claimed these 
reforms would be based on the principles of unity, decentralisation, democracy, involvement, 
integrity and openness. This was, arguably, a new departure for a party, which had previously 
emphasised leadership and trust (Peele, 1998: 143). The rule changes were intended to 
democratise the party and to strengthen the position of the leader in relationship to the PCP. 
These proposals were put to a ballot of the party’s membership in September 1997. Once 
approved the reforms were instituted in 1998 under the title The Fresh Future (Kelly, 1999: 
28). 
 
2.96 A fresh future? The Hague reforms 
The impetus for reforming the selection procedures came from three concerns within the 
Party. Firstly it was felt that the provision of an annual challenge, combined with the 
necessity of a challenger fostered instability and made the leader’s position insecure. This in 
turn created a poor public image and led to hostile and personalised campaigning (Alderman, 
1999: 263). Secondly, the Party leadership faced increasingly vocal demands from activists 
for more intra-party democracy and a say in choosing future leaders (Alderman, 1998: 3). 
Finally it was felt that the Party’s organisation and administration was in need of fundamental 
reform, which would give activists real influence, in order to attract new members and refresh 
the Party’s ageing and shrinking membership (Kelly, 1999: 28). Indeed, Hague’s ambitious 
target was to double the Party’s membership within five years (Kelly, 2002: 40). 
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The new leadership election procedure introduced by William Hague removed the obligation 
for the leader to submit to annual re-election and the requirement that a challenge be 
instituted by an individual MP. Instead, a vote of confidence can be held at any time if 
proposed by at least 15% of Tory MPs and a full-scale election triggered if the incumbent 
fails to win this initial vote. However, if the no confidence vote fails then no more confidence 
motions are allowed for the next twelve months. If a no-confidence motion is carried, the 
leader must resign and play no further part in the contest. If there are only two candidates, 
their names are submitted to a ballot of all Party members, who have been members for at 
least six months prior to the no confidence motion, on the basis of one member - one vote 
(OMOV).  If there are more than two candidates, then primary ballots are held within the 
PCP, which eliminate the weakest candidate in every round, until only two are left (Kelly, 
1999: 29).  
 
The organisational reforms set out in The Fresh Future brought the three formerly separate 
elements of the Conservative Party, the parliamentary, voluntary and professional wings, 
together as a single entity (see Table 2.3 below) with a constitution, rules and a national 
membership (Peele, 1998: 144). A new Party Board was set up as the supreme decision 
making body. It normally meets monthly and consists of seventeen members, five of whom, 
including the Party Chairman, are appointed by the leader; five are activists from the newly 
formed National Convention, with the remaining four members coming from Scotland, 
Wales, the Association of Conservative Councillors and the 1922 Committee.  
 
In addition, a National Convention was set up to replace Central Council. Like Central 
Council it meets twice yearly and comprises national, regional, and area officials, officers of 
constituency associations and members of other affiliated bodies, such as women’s and youth 
groups. The National Convention keeps the leadership informed of grass roots views and 
advises the Board on all aspects of extra-parliamentary organisation (Kelly, 1999: 28). 
Furthermore, forty-two Area Councils have been established, “…to act as co-ordinating 
bodies between the Board and the Associations.” (Conservative Insight, 2001: 17). The six 
senior officers of the National Convention form the National Convention Executive, with 
day-to-day responsibility for the voluntary section of the Conservative Party. The Executive 
is responsible to the Board (Kelly, 1999: 28). Ordinary members are encouraged to contribute 
their views on policy through the Conservative Policy Forum. Under this system about six 
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discussion papers a year are sent out to constituencies and feedback from activists is passed 
back to the Shadow Cabinet for consideration (Kelly, 2001: 332). Finally, a centrally 
administered membership list has been established, for the first time. Whilst this was 
necessary for the implementation of the final OMOV stage of any future leadership contest, it 
also had two further advantages; the central leadership had access to accurate membership 
figures for the first time in the party’s history, and could use this information to bypass the 
constituency associations and communicate directly with the mass membership of the party 
(Lees-Marshment & Quayle, 2001: 204).  
 
However, Hague’s reforms have been subject to certain criticisms from inside the Party. The 
new procedure for electing the Party leader was used for the first time in June 2001 in a 
contest that lasted for three months. Many felt that this time span was too long and 
contributed to the acrimonious nature of the contest, which in turn damaged the Party’s image 
(Alderman, 2002: 584). Moreover, despite talk of intra-party democratisation the thrust of 
The Fresh Future has been toward centralisation, with much of the day-to-day power in the 
hands of the Party’s Chairman, Deputy-Chairman and Treasurer, all appointees of the leader 
(Peele, 1998: 147). The adoption of OMOV allows Tory leaders to claim a mandate from the 
whole Party, something not previously possible, again concentrating power in the hands of 
the leader. Furthermore, the abolition of the National Union and the creation of a single party 
is likely to undermine the Constituency Associations’ traditional autonomy, leading to more 
central control over both candidate selection and constituency funds (Kelly, 1993: 30). The 
Party’s ballot figures for the 2001 leadership contest show that not only were Hague’s 
ambitious membership targets not met, but that Hague presided over a further decline in 
Conservative Party members (Kelly, 2002: 43). Finally, Kelly has suggested that evidence 
from the 2001 General Election proves that the Conservatives’ organisation was in a worse 
state than it was prior to Hague’s reforms (Kelly, 2002: 38).  
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Table 2.3: Conservative Party Structure Post 1998  
 
                Professional and Elected                                                                                                             Voluntary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conservative 
Party Leader 
Conservative 
MPs 
Shadow 
Cabinet 
Devolved 
Government 
Scotland, 
Wales, London 
Constituency 
Associations 
Backbench 
1922 
Committee 
Conservative 
Peers 
Conservative 
MEPs 
Policy Forum 
Local 
Government 
Organisations 
Fringe Groups 
& Recognised 
Organisations 
Scottish and 
Welsh 
Conservatives 
Party Board 
Supreme decision making body on all matters concerning Party 
organisation and management  
Party HQ 
Area Councils 
Annual Party 
Conference & 
Spring 
Assembly 
National 
Conservative 
Convention 
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2.10 Conclusion 
The purpose of the chapter has been to outline the philosophical and institutional 
foundations of the British Conservative Party and to appraise how these elements 
interact with each other to influence the politics of the Conservative Party. The 
Norton (1996) theory of tenets and dispositions of conservatism demonstrates that 
conservatism is a broad church that can encompass many different, often 
contradictory concepts. This diversity of thought enables conservatism to be 
ideologically flexible and has contributed to the Conservative Party’s ability to adapt 
to changing circumstances. Consequently the Conservative Party has been able to 
follow a governing code, rather than an ideological creed (Bulpitt, 1992: 265).  
 
However, the broad sweep of conservatism can also act to the detriment of the 
Conservative Party; conservatism’s sometimes contradictory tenets can lead to 
tensions. Tensions are apparent between the paternalist / interventionist and economic 
liberal / limited government traditions; between the europhile / integrationist and the 
eurosceptic / independence traditions; between the social liberal / social conservative 
traditions. The party’s traditional pragmatism, desire for power and pursuit of a 
governing code has usually allowed the Conservatives’ to keep these differences from 
the public gaze. This led to the Conservatives being characterised as a relatively 
unified party of tendencies. However, the series of typologies of the PCP published 
between 1990 and 2002 have shown a damaging and widening split along the 
integrationist / independence axis that threatened to split the party asunder as the party 
became increasingly factionalised during John Major’s premiership. 
 
The events of the Major era, together the scale of the electorate’s rejection of the 
Conservative Party in 1997, together with the party’s rigidly Thatcherite ideological 
stance since 1997 has led some academics, notably Giddens and Gray to question the 
viability of conservatism and its relevance to contemporary British politics. However, 
conservative thinkers and politicians vehemently deny this ‘death of conservatism’ 
thesis; David Willetts argues that spreading the choice agenda downwards and 
creating a ‘new localism’ will restore the electoral fortunes of the Conservative Party.  
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The institutional organisation of the Conservative Party arguably reflects the 
dichotomous nature of conservative ideology; an attachment to personal liberty is 
reflected in the autonomy traditionally afforded to local Conservative Associations, 
whilst a belief in hierarchy is evinced by the considerable powers bestowed upon the 
Conservative Party leader. The party leader is vested with considerable powers of 
patronage that allow him / her to appoint those responsible for the day to day running 
of party affairs; the Chairman, Treasurer and another three members of the party 
board. The leader has sole control over the appointment of his / her cabinet in 
government and shadow cabinet in opposition, although this is subject to the 
constraint of maintaining party unity. The leader also has the last word on party policy 
and the final say in the content of the party’s election manifestos. However, the 
leader’s considerable authority is balanced by a commensurate responsibility for 
delivering electoral success; Conservative Party leaders who fail at the ballot box may 
soon find their position untenable.  
 
The Conservative Party's electoral ambition, combined with the leader’s responsibility 
for delivering electoral success has meant that the party has paid particular attention to 
the way in which it chooses its leaders. Prior to 1965 leaders ‘emerged’ to the popular 
acclamation of the Parliamentary Conservative Party, until a formal process of 
election was introduced after the 1964 election defeat by Sir Alec Douglas Home, 
which was first used to elect Edward Heath in 1965. This system continued to be 
used, with amendments until 1997. The most significant amendment was the 
provision for an annual challenge to the leader, introduced in 1975 after Edward 
Heath defied the wishes of the PCP by remaining as leader. The annual challenge was 
never intended to be used against an incumbent Prime Minister; however Margaret 
Thatcher was challenged twice under this rule4. Her successor, John Major’s suffered 
so badly from speculation about the emergence of a challenge that he resigned and 
stood for re-election. Consequently, William Hague introduced new rules that 
dispensed with the requirement for an annual challenge and enfranchised the entire 
party, theoretically strengthening the hand of Hague’s successors. However, the 
democratisation of the Conservative Party has unforseen consequences: the 
                                                     
4 Sir Anthony Meyer stood unsuccessfully in 1989. Michael Heseltine stood in 1990 and inflicted 
enough damage to force Mrs. Thatcher to resign. 
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introduction of a formal electoral process, together with institutionalised campaigning, 
has led to ideological factionalism becoming more important as the leadership 
selection process was opened up to first the wider parliamentary party and ultimately 
to the entire membership of the Conservative Party. The leadership elections of 1997 
(conducted under the Douglas Home rules) and of 2001 (conducted under the Hague 
rules) are the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The Conservative Leadership Elections of 1997 & 2001 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The central theme to this thesis is an analysis of the Conservative Party leadership 
elections of 1997 and 2001. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a narrative 
account of those leadership elections in order to provide a background and to 
illuminate the analysis that will be provided in chapter six. It will be in two sections; 
the first covering the period from 1997-2001 and the second dealing with the period 
from 2001-2003. The chapter will commence with an explanation of the 
circumstances surrounding the 1997 leadership election contest, particularly the 
party’s overwhelming defeat in the 1997 general election and the resignation of John 
Major. It will assess Major’s strategy of immediate resignation in the light of criticism 
from Conservative MPs who would have preferred him to continue long enough for 
the party to analyse the reasons for its defeat. The chapter will then examine the 
qualities of those candidates who were unable or unwilling to take part in the 1997 
leadership election, before moving on to outline the merits of the candidates who did 
contest the election. It will then cover the three rounds of ballots, which culminated in 
William Hague becoming Conservative leader.  
 
The chapter will then examine William Hague’s leadership of the Conservative Party. 
This analysis will begin by looking at the constraints to Hague’s leadership; the size, 
inexperience and low morale of the parliamentary party, together with the manner in 
which Hague acquired the party leadership. The chapter will then look at Hague’s 
poor personal relations with some senior colleagues, especially Michael Portillo and 
Hague’s lack of experience and poor personal and political judgement. It will then 
look the development of Conservative Party policy under Hague. It will focus on 
Hague’s early dalliance with social liberalism and offer an explanation for his change 
of course and adoption of a socially conservative agenda from 1999. The first section 
of this chapter will conclude with an account of the 2001 general election defeat and 
the subsequent resignation of William Hague. 
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The second section of this chapter will take the same form as the first; it will begin by 
noting those senior Conservatives that were either unable or unwilling to enter the 
2001 leadership contest, before describing the qualities of the candidates that did enter 
the race to become Conservative leader. The chapter will then offer an account of the 
three rounds of balloting that led to Iain Duncan Smith and Kenneth Clarke going 
forward to a ballot of the entire Conservative Party and the subsequent election of Iain 
Duncan Smith. It will then look at the constraints upon Duncan Smith’s leadership; 
that he was the favoured choice of party activists, rather than the parliamentary party, 
his lack of charisma and the implications of his record as a Maastricht rebel during 
John Major’s last administration. The chapter will then look at the development of 
party policy under Duncan Smith and then look at the political errors made by the 
Conservative leader; the demotion of David Davis, Duncan Smith’s mishandling of 
the Adoption and Children Bill and the sacking of Mark MacGregor and Rick Nye, 
from Central Office, together with the appointment of Barry Legg as Chief Executive. 
This section will conclude with an account of the events that culminated in Duncan 
Smith losing a vote of no confidence in his leadership.  
 
3.2 The Resignation of John Major 
The result of the 1st May 1997 general election was a catastrophic defeat for the 
Conservative Party. John Major had inherited 376 MPs from Margaret Thatcher, but 
carnage of election night cut the Conservatives’ representation to a mere 165 MPs, the 
party’s lowest total since 1906. The swing from Conservative to Labour (10%) was 
the largest since 1946 and the government’s majority of 179 seats was the largest 
since 1935 (Butler & Kavanagh, 1997: 244) and the Conservative Party’s share of the 
vote (31%) was the lowest since 1832 (Geddes & Tonge, 1997). The Conservatives 
were wiped out in Scotland, Wales and most of urban England; the party that 
traditionally claimed to defend the Union and to represent ‘one nation’ had become 
the party of rural and suburban England (Butler & Kavanagh, 1997: 244-245). The 
result was a personal disaster for John Major and a damning indictment of his 
government.  
 
The Conservative Party is a leader centred party, with the leader responsible for 
delivering electoral victory. Consequently the clear implication and historical 
precedent suggested that Major should take responsibility for defeat and resign. The 
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question was when? Should Major go immediately, or should he announce a caretaker 
leadership to allow the party time to reflect on their defeat and choose a new leader 
accordingly? Major had no doubt which course of action he should take; he would 
resign immediately: 
When the curtain falls it is time to get off the stage, and that I propose to do. I 
shall advise my parliamentary colleagues to select a new leader of the 
Conservative Party. (Major, 1999: 726) 
Robert Cranborne knew Major was reconciled to losing the election and tried to 
dissuade Major from resigning his position immediately, but Major believed that: 
…it was the only possible course. After eighteen years the Conservatives 
needed a new start, and I knew the baggage of my years in Downing Street 
would make an easy target for the new government. I considered staying on 
for a while, but if I did, it was obvious the party would riven by the leadership 
campaigns of the would-be successors. (Major, 1999: 721) 
Major had one further reason for resigning immediately; fourteen years as a minister, 
followed by the near impossible challenge of keeping his fractious party together 
between 1992 and 1997 had left him worn out; he wanted a rest (Major, 1999:721). 
However, Major was not without his critics, who argued that he was negligent to 
leave the party leaderless at such a time. They pointed to the example of Douglas 
Home who stayed on for nine months to oversee the transition to electing a new 
leader. Alderman states that some of the parliamentary party were ready to accept a 
caretaker leader, who could give the party a breathing space before choosing their 
next leader and that Tom King was ready to perform such a role (Alderman, 1998: 3). 
 
3.3 The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 1997 
Consequently the 1997 Conservative Party leadership election began the day after the 
party’s general election defeat. The election was carried out under the Douglas Home 
rules, which had remained largely unchanged since they were introduced in 19651. 
Under these rules the electorate consisted solely of members of the PCP and whilst 
constituency associations could give their MP advice, they could not compel him or 
her to vote for any particular candidate. However, the scale of party’s recent defeat by 
New Labour increased the pressure for an extension of the franchise; the already 
                                                     
1 For an account of the Douglas Home rules refer to chapter 2 
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exclusive electorate was at its smallest ever size – just 165 MPs, none of whom 
represented a Scottish or Welsh constituency. Consequently, the National Union of 
Conservative and Unionist Associations demanded a 20% share in a new electoral 
college. (Alderman, 1998: 3). The 1922 Committee rebuffed any attempt to extend the 
franchise claiming it would take two years to put the necessary measures in place. 
However, the committee agreed to canvass and publish the opinions of constituency 
associations and Conservative peers (Wheatcroft, 2005: 238). The 1997 leadership 
election was the first since Edward Heath’s victory in 1965 that did not involve a 
challenge to an incumbent leader. However, two of the Major Cabinet’s big hitters 
were absent from the ballot; Michael Heseltine was admitted to hospital, suffering 
from angina, two days after the general election, whilst Michael Portillo was one of 
several high profile MPs to lose his seat in the general election.  
 
Michael Heseltine served in the Heath Government as Minister for Aerospace 
between 1972 and 1974. Margaret Thatcher promoted him to the cabinet in 1979 as 
Secretary of State for the Environment. He went on to become Defence Secretary in 
1983 and then resigned in 1986 after a bitter battle with Margaret Thatcher over the 
future of Westland Helicopters. He remained on the backbenches until 1990, when he 
challenged Margaret Thatcher for the leadership of the Conservative Party. He 
inflicted enough damage to force her to withdraw, but was beaten by John Major in 
the second round. He returned to the cabinet as President of the Board of Trade and 
then Deputy Prime Minister. Heseltine was a europhile and interventionist wet; as 
Environment Secretary he was responsible for regeneration in Liverpool after the 
Toxteth riots and the repeal of the poll tax (Williams, 1998: 249-250)2.  
 
On the other hand Michael Portillo came from the Thatcherite wing of the 
Conservative Party and was seen by his biographer Michael Gove (1995) to be, ‘the 
future of the right’. His first cabinet post came in 1992 as Chief Secretary to the 
Treasury. Between 1994 and 1995 he was Employment Secretary and in 1995 became 
Defence Secretary (Williams, 1998: 257). He was one of the three eurosceptic Cabinet 
Ministers that John Major, in an unguarded moment, referred to as ‘bastards’. 
                                                     
2 Heseltine remains proud of his time in Merseyside as an example of one nation Conservatism in 
action, “In Liverpool I had an opportunity to put into practice a philosophy I had all my political life, in 
other words good enlightened capitalism – paternalism if you like. Noblesse oblige. I believe strongly 
that those with power and privilege have responsibilities.” (Hatterstone, 2/5/2001) 
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According to Gove, Portillo was publicly anointed as Mrs. Thatcher’s latest heir 
apparent at his 40th birthday party when she announced, “We brought you up, we 
expect great things of you, you will not disappoint us.” (Gove, 1995: 264) His 
political judgement was called into question after John Redwood challenged Major in 
1995, for although Portillo had chosen not to resign and challenge Major news leaked 
that BT engineers were installing extra telephone lines at the house of a close friend in 
readiness for a second round (Wheatcroft, 2005; 228). 
 
The absence of Heseltine and Portillo denied MPs the opportunity of a straight two-
way fight between left and right that may have cleared the air and given the 
Conservative Party a clearer sense of direction. Moreover, many other major players 
were absent through enforced or voluntary retirement. Apart from Portillo six other 
cabinet members lost their seats at the election; Ian Lang, Tony Newton Michael 
Forsyth, William Waldegrave, Roger Freeman and Malcolm Rifkind (Major, 1999: 
724). Ian Lang was Secretary of State for Scotland from 1990-1995 and then trade and 
Industry Secretary from 1995-1997. Tony Newton was Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster from 1988-1989, Social Security Secretary between 1989-1992 and Leader 
of the House of Commons from 1992-1997. Michael Forsyth was the last 
Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland, serving from 1995-1997. William 
Waldegrave held several posts under John Major including; Health Secretary (1990-
1992), Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (1992-1994) and Minister of Agriculture 
(1994-1997). Roger Freeman was the last Conservative Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster from 1994-1997. Malcolm Rifkind was Defence Secretary from 1992-1995 
and Foreign Secretary from 1995-1997.  
 
Another enforced absentee, although not from the cabinet, was Norman Lamont; 
Lamont managed John Major’s leadership campaign in 1990 and was rewarded with 
the job of Chancellor of the Exchequer. He presided over ‘Black Wednesday’2 and 
resigned3 in 1993. He backed John Redwood against Major in 1995 (Williams, 1998: 
253). The most notable voluntary retiree was Douglas Hurd. Hurd contested the 1990 
leadership election after Mrs. Thatcher’s withdrawal, coming third with fifty-six 
                                                     
2 On ‘Black Wednesday, 16th September 1992 Britain was forced out of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
at a cost of £10 billion 
3 Lamont was demoted to Environment Secretary in the May 1993 cabinet reshuffle; he refused to 
accept the post and resigned 
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votes. He was Foreign Secretary from 1989 until he retired from the cabinet in 1995; 
he chose not to seek re-election in 1997. All these former MPs could have played an 
influential role in the forthcoming leadership contest, even if we cannot say for certain 
if any of them would have run for the vacancy. However, Malcolm Rifkind’s interest 
in the vacancy created by Michael Howard’s departure in 2005 is a strong indicator 
that he would have been a candidate in the 1997 contest, had he been in parliament.  
 
3.31 The candidates 
The scale of the Conservative Party’s defeat in 1997 combined with the absence of an 
incumbent leader produced a dichotomous situation. The 1997 Conservative Party 
leadership election attracted an unusually large field for the first round, but it was also 
one with a greatly restricted range of talent; five candidates put their names forward; 
Michael Howard, Peter Lilley, John Redwood, Kenneth Clarke and William Hague.4 
Michael Howard sought to portray himself as the senior right-wing candidate and 
Major loyalist, who could match Blair at the despatch box (Pierce, 1997). Under Mrs. 
Thatcher Howard was responsible for introducing the unpopular Community Charge 
or Poll Tax. Under John Major Howard was a hard line Home Secretary, often stating 
his belief that ‘prison works’; he removed suspects’ right to silence and called for 
mandatory minimum sentences for burglars’ convicted for the third time. Although 
his populist stance was welcomed within the Conservative Party, he remained 
unpopular with the wider electorate (Williams, 1998: 253). In addition, Ann 
Widdecombe, who had served under Howard as Prisons Minister, fatally undermined 
his chances. In 1995 Howard and Widdecombe disagreed over Howard’s decision to 
sack the head of the Prisons Service, Derek Lewis. Their disagreement became public 
when Widdecombe used a parliamentary debate to attack Howard’s integrity; there 
was she said, “…something of the night” in his character and that when under 
pressure he would, “…do things that are not always sustainable” (White, 1997: 8).  
 
Peter Lilley joined the cabinet as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in 1990. 
After the 1992 general election he became Secretary of State for Social Security and 
was one the third ‘bastard’ in John Major’s cabinet. He suggested that the party could 
avoid intra-party disputes if they voted for him. He claimed that he was the ‘unity 
                                                     
4 Stephen Dorrell also announced his candidacy, but withdrew before the first ballot and gave his 
support to Kenneth Clarke. 
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candidate’ and promised to institute a thorough policy review (Pierce, 10/6/97). Lilley 
came from right of the Party and was a respected conciliator, but lacked charisma 
(White, 5/5/97: 1). Alan Clark believed that Lilley “…should be leader, but hasn’t got 
the oomph – white rabbit in the teapot at the Mad Hatter’s party.” (Trewin, 2002: 
223). 
 
John Redwood was another right-winger, who had served as Welsh Secretary between 
1993 and 1995 when he resigned to challenge John Major for the Conservative Party 
leadership. Redwood portrayed himself as a clean pair of hands, who having 
challenged Major for the party leadership in 1995 bore no responsibility for the 
electoral disaster that had just occurred (Williams, 1998: 187).  However, many 
Conservative MPs saw Redwood as disloyal and as one of those responsible for 
damaging John Major’s government (Brown, 6/5/97: 10); as Williams states: 
The irony of Redwood’s position was that every time he spoke he reminded 
too many MPs of John Major and his failures – so indissoluble was the 
connection between his visage and the wrecked fortunes of Majorism. 
(Williams, 1998: 188)  
In addition, Redwood had something of an image problem; Mathew Parris had 
caricatured Redwood as a Vulcan in The Times. Although the article was published in 
1989 the image of Redwood as an alien persisted and caused him great damage 
(Williams, 1998: 94). Two other events, captured by television and subsequently 
replayed, contributed to an image of Redwood being slightly unhinged. The first was 
his risible attempt to sing the Welsh national anthem at a Welsh Conservative Party 
Conference when he did not know the words. The second was the press conference 
held to launch Redwood’s challenge to John Major in 1995 Redwood; appeared with 
the majority of the ‘whipless wonders’5 behind him including the flamboyantly 
dressed Teresa Gorman and Tony Marlow. Wheatcroft quotes an insult by a character 
in Brideshead Revisited, which could have easily described the dress sense of the 
Redwood’s supporters:  
                                                     
5 The whipless wonders were eight Conservative MPs thrown out of the party for abstaining on the 
European (Communities) Finance Bill 1994; Tony Marlow, Teresa Gorman, Nick Budgen, Richard 
Body, John Wilkinson, Richard Shepherd, Christopher Gill and Teddy Taylor.   
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Your present get-up seems an unhappy compromise between the correct wear 
for a theatrical party at Maidenhead and a glee-singing competition in a garden 
suburb (Wheatcroft, 2005: 228) 
 
Kenneth Clarke had been the last Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer. He was 
the most experienced candidate on offer; by 1997 he had been in the cabinet 
continuously for twelve years including spells as Secretary of State for Health, 
Secretary of State for Education, and Home Secretary, before he became Chancellor 
(Williams, 1998: 244). Clarke’s other strengths were, his handling of the economy 
during the final years of the Major government and that he was a big hitter who could 
stand up to Blair. He was also able to claim that he was the most popular candidate 
with the Conservative Party in the country and the wider electorate; a Daily Telegraph 
/ Gallup survey asked the question, “Now that Mr. Major has resigned as 
Conservative leader, which if any of the following people would you like to see 
succeed him?” (see Table 3.1 below). The poll gave Clarke a clear lead, both amongst 
Conservative supporters and all voters (Shrimsley & King, 25/5/1997). Clarke’s 
weakness was his enthusiasm for Europe, which made him a divisive figure in what 
was now perceived to be a mainly eurosceptic party (Brown, 6/5/97: 10). Clarke 
sought to deflect criticism of his support for Europe and the single currency by 
promising a free vote on the matter, should it arise (Wintour & McSmith, 4/5/97: 1).  
 
Table 3.1: Daily Telegraph / Gallup Conservative leadership poll 1997____________ 
Now that Mr. Major has resigned as Conservative leader, which, if any of the 
following would you most like to succeed him? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
______________All voters     __________Conservative Voters 
Kenneth Clarke         27%                                            Kenneth Clarke                  30%      
None of them            15%                                            William Hague                   19% 
William Hague         12%                                             John Redwood                   10% 
Don’t Know              12%                                            Michael Howard                10% 
John Redwood          10%                                            Don’t know                          9% 
Michael Howard          9%                                           Peter Lilley                           7% 
Stephen Dorrell            5%                                           None of them                        6% 
Any of them / other      2%                                          Any of them / other               0% 
Source: Shrimsley & King (25/5/1997)  
 
William Hague had been an MP for just eight years; he succeeded John Redwood as 
Secretary of State for Wales, his first and only cabinet post, making him the most 
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inexperienced of the five candidates. Hague had first come to prominence when, aged 
just sixteen years old, he addressed the 1977 Conservative Party Conference telling 
delegates that, “Half of you may not be here in fifteen years, but I will and I want to 
be free.” (Wheatcroft, 2005: 240) Youth was both Hague’s weakness and his main 
strength. The prospect of Hague becoming the part’s youngest leader since Pitt led 
some of his less charitable critics to call him ‘William Squitt’ (Garnett, 2003: 49). 
However, although Hague had little parliamentary or ministerial experience, his 
supporters claimed that he could match the youthful appeal of Tony Blair. Moreover, 
the improbability of the Tories winning the next general election made the idea of 
skipping a generation appeal to many within the Party (Alderman, 1998: 5). Hague 
launched his campaign under the slogan ‘A Fresh Start’ (Seldon & Snowdon, 2005: 
250) and used his lack of ministerial experience to portray himself as a clean break 
with the Majorite past, with which Clarke, Howard and Lilley were all strongly 
associated (Collings & Seldon, 2001: 625). However, Hague had to overcome an 
initial controversy; supporters of Michael Howard claimed that Hague had made a 
firm agreement to support Howard’s leadership bid, in return for the posts of Deputy 
Leader and Party Chairman, a charge denied by the Hague camp (Alderman, 1998: 5). 
 
3.32 The ballots 
The result of the first round ballot, held on 10th June, proved inconclusive in that there 
was no outright winner. However, two candidates: Lilley with 24 votes and Howard 
with 23, were forced to retire and switched their support to Hague, (see Table 3.2 
below) leaving the three front-runners; Clarke (49), Hague (41) and Redwood (27) to 
continue the fight. Whilst Clarke was the overall leader, he was only eight votes in 
front of Hague. Many observers did not believe that this was enough for Clarke, the 
only europhile, to maintain his position against two eurosceptic opponents and it 
appeared that Hague was now in the best position to ultimately claim the leadership 
(Alderman, 1998: 10). 
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Table 3.2: Changes in support between rounds, 1997 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
_______________Round 1           Round 2           Change          Round 3          Change 
Hague            41                     62                  (+21)                92                  (+30) 
Clarke            49                     64                  (+15)                70                  (+6) 
Redwood           27                     38                  (+11)                 -                      - 
Lilley                       24                      -                       -                     -                      - 
Howard           23                      -                       -                     -                      -___ 
Source: Cowley & Stuart, 2003: 68 
 
The second ballot was held a week later and resulted in the elimination of John 
Redwood, who trailed in third with thirty-eight votes. Clarke (64) was only narrowly 
ahead of Hague (62) and therefore failed to win the overall majority necessary to win 
outright, consequently Hague and Clarke now contested a third ballot, held on the 19th 
June. Both candidates now needed the votes of John Redwood’s thirty-eight 
supporters, a situation that favoured the eurosceptic Hague somewhat better than the 
europhile Clarke. However, in an attempt to garner the necessary votes, Clarke made 
a tactical alliance with Redwood, in which Redwood would become Shadow 
Chancellor if Clarke became leader. The European single currency, the issue that 
divided them most was fudged; the agenda, they claimed was not in their hands, 
although they believed that Britain’s early participation in the single currency was 
unlikely. If the issue did arise they would have further discussions and allow PCP 
members a free vote on the matter (Williams, 1998: 218). However this move 
backfired badly, Mrs. Thatcher intervened touring the Commons tearoom and 
telephoning the undecided. She appeared in public with Hague telling the assembled 
press: 
I am supporting William Hague. Now, have you got the name? William Hague 
for the same kind of principled government which I led, vote for William 
Hague on Thursday. Have you got the message? (Campbell, 2003, 788) 
Moreover, the idea played badly in much of the Conservative supporting media; The 
Times called it Redwood’s ‘Munich’, whilst The Sunday Telegraph described 
Redwood as, “…a careerist posing as a man of integrity.” (Williams, 1998: 223) 
Norman Tebbit likened the deal to the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and Peter Tapsell 
described the arrangement as, “…one of the most contemptible and discreditable 
actions by a senior British politician that I can recall during 38 years in the 
Commons.” (Watkins, 1998: 197). Consequently, Redwood could only deliver eight 
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of his supporters6 and some Clarke supporters, including John Major who disliked 
Redwood, now voted for Hague, who won by ninety-two votes to seventy (Williams, 
1998: 225-226). 
 
3.4 The leadership of William Hague 
William Hague became leader of the Conservative Party on 19th June 1997. His 
leadership suffered from structural constraints that would limit his room for 
manoeuvre in the four years running up to the 2001 general election; the size, 
inexperience and psyche of the PCP, the manner in which he acquired the leadership 
and the state of popular and party opinion during his leadership. The first of these 
constraints was the size of the Conservative defeat and the psychological state of the 
parliamentary party; a party with only 165 MPs could do little against a government 
with a majority of 179. Moreover, seventy-two Tory MPs chose to retire before the 
general election, a quarter of the PCP was new to Parliament, and just 36 
Conservative MPs had experience of opposition. Hague’s Conservative party was, 
“…one of the smallest and least experienced group of parliamentarians ever to 
constitute Her Majesty’s Official Opposition.” (Cowley & Stuart, 2003: 66) Hague 
also inherited a party that was suffering from denial. In some quarters defeat was not 
taken seriously; there was a temptation to believe that New Labour was a temporary 
phenomenon and that the electoral cycle would soon swing in the Conservatives’ 
favour. An alternative explanation was that defeat was entirely due to the personal 
failings of John Major and that the party would quickly recover with a new leader. 
Consequently there was no attempt to seriously analyse the reasons for defeat (Seldon 
& Snowdon, 2005: 248-249).  
 
The second constraint centred on the manner in which Hague acquired the leadership. 
As has previously been noted the two heavyweight candidates of the right and left, 
Portillo and Heseltine, were absent. Consequently there was a danger that anyone 
chosen in 1997 would be seen as a ‘second division’ leader. Indeed Hague’s position 
was always in question once Michael Portillo returned to parliament, after the 
Kensington & Chelsea by-election in November 1999 (Walters, 2001: 202). It has 
also been suggested that Hague won the 1997 election by default. He was less 
                                                     
6 Julian Brazier, Andrew Robathan, Howard Flight, Theresa Gorman, John Wilkinson, Marion Roe and 
David Wilshire. 
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ideologically objectionable than either the arch europhile Clarke or the ultra 
eurosceptic Redwood. Hague was a moderate right-winger, backed by those on the 
right who did not think Redwood was capable of leading the party. Hague therefore 
seems to have acquired the leadership, because like John Major he was not clearly 
identified with any one faction; like John Major his personal authority suffered as a 
consequence of being the party’s ‘default leader’ (Norton, 1998: 13. Seldon & 
Snowdon, 2005: 250).  
 
In particular Hague’s relationships with senior members of the parliamentary party 
were strained after the return of Michael Portillo. Hague reshuffled his shadow 
cabinet in February 2000 to accommodate Portillo, a mere two months after the 
latter’s re-election, however Hague handled the reshuffle badly angering those senior 
Conservatives who were sacked or moved to make way for Portillo7. In addition, 
Hague struggled to control the feud between his head of media, Amanda Platell on the 
one hand and Portillo and Francis Maude on the other. Platell alleged that aides to 
Portillo and Maude, with or without their knowledge were briefing against Hague. 
She believed that Portillo wanted to destroy her as a preparatory step to removing 
Hague. In turn Portillo believed that Platell was trying to destroy him, because she 
saw him as a threat to Hague’s continued tenure as Conservative leader (Walters, 
2001: 184). Hague had another thing in common with John Major; he was Mrs. 
Thatcher’s anointed successor and this also served to undermine his authority. 
Hague’s actions as leader were scrutinised to ensure that he did not ‘betray’ 
Thatcher’s legacy. This made it difficult for any senior figures to move on to a post-
Thatcherite agenda, as Peter Lilley was to discover; Lilley delivered the Butler 
Memorial Lecture in April 1999, which unfortunately coincided with the 20th 
anniversary of Mrs. Thatcher’s first election victory. The speech was portrayed in 
some quarters as a repudiation of Thatcherism and caused a storm of controversy. 
Consequently, Lilley was sacked when Hague reshuffled his shadow cabinet in June 
(Walter, 2001, 116-118). The Thatcher connection also made Hague an easy target for 
the Labour Party. One Labour poster portrayed Hague with Mrs. Thatcher’s hair 
superimposed on his head, to imply that voting Conservative would mean a return to 
Thatcherism.  
                                                     
7 John Redwood (Environment) and John Maples (Foreign Affairs) were sacked, whilst Francis Maude 
was moved from Shadow Chancellor to Foreign Affairs. 
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Hague’s lack of experience and poor personal judgement also worked against him. 
Garnett argued that Hague’s first misjudgement was to stand for the leadership in the 
first place, given the Conservative Party’s propensity for disposing of leaders who fail 
to win elections; firstly, at thirty-six years old Hague would have plenty of 
opportunities to run for leader in the future. Secondly, Hague needed New Labour and 
the Liberal Democrats to implode, whilst the Conservatives rapidly recovered their 
electoral vigour to stand any chance of achieving a respectable result at the next 
general election (Garnett, 2003: 52-53). Another example of Hague’s poor judgement 
was to give an interview to GQ magazine in August 1999 in which he tried to rebuff 
his nerdy image. Hague recalled his youthful holiday job working as a driver’s mate 
for his family’s soft drinks firm in Rotherham and boasted of drinking fourteen pints a 
day. His boast was derided in much of the media and one Rotherham pub landlord 
branded him, “... a lying little toad.” (Walters, 2001: 64). Worse was Hague’s 
judgement on Jeffrey Archer; in October 1999 Archer won the nomination to become 
the Conservatives’ candidate for Mayor of London despite senior Conservatives 
calling for Hague to block Archer’s candidacy8. After Archer’s election Hague 
backed him describing him as a man of “…probity and integrity.” (Millar, 2/10/1999) 
Later the News of the World published allegations that Archer had committed perjury 
during his 1987 libel trial against the Daily Star newspaper, forcing Archer to 
withdraw his candidacy (Walters, 2001: 51).  
 
In addition to the Archer affair Hague was also dogged by two aftershocks from the 
sleaze of the Major years. In November 1999 former Conservative trade minister sued 
Mohammed Fayed over allegations that Fayed had paid Hamilton to ask questions in 
parliament. After a three week trial the jury sided with Fayed (Wells et. al., 
22/12/1999). The second case involved Jonathan Aitken who lost a libel trial against 
Granada Television and the Guardian in June 1997. As a result of events during that 
trial Aitken was later charged with perjury and perverting the course of justice, he 
pleaded guilty and was jailed for eighteen months in June 1999 (Harding et. al., 
9/6/1999). Although these two events were not Hague’s responsibility and were 
                                                     
8 Archer had a colourful past. He’d been forced to resign from parliament in 1974 because of 
bankruptcy. He later returned to parliament, only to resign as Party Chairman in 1986 to fight a 
successful libel action against the Daily Star newspaper. The Star had accused him of having sex with a 
prostitute and then sending her £2,000 to leave the country. 
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outside his control they served to remind the electorate why they had so emphatically 
rejected the Conservatives in 1997. 
 
The Conservative Party had problems putting forward a coherent set of policies 
throughout the Hague era for a number of reasons. Firstly, there were two conflicting 
explanations of the 1997 defeat. One view was that 1997 had signalled a decisive shift 
in the mood of the British electorate and was proof that the party needed to discover a 
more compassionate form of conservatism. The opposing school of thought argued 
that New Labour was built on shallow foundations and, its popularity would soon 
wane and then the electorate would return to the tried and trusted policies of the 
Conservative Party (Dorey, 2003: 125). Second, the Conservatives had a problem 
identifying government weaknesses that they could target and thereby articulate a 
Conservative alternative. The policy agenda had swung away from the traditional 
Conservative strengths of tax cuts and privatisation to improving public services and 
quality of life, areas in which Labour had an advantage (Seldon & Snowden, 2005; 
253). In addition, the benign performance of the economy and New Labour’s adoption 
of much of the Conservative Party’s free market thinking gave the party little room to 
attack the government (Dorey, 2003: 127). 
 
Hague began by emphasising socially liberal values, but then swung back towards 
traditional Thatcherite social authoritarianism. Hague first outlined his idea of ‘Fresh 
Conservatism’ in July 1997; this had two elements economic and social liberalism. 
There would be a continued emphasis on Thatcherite free market economics – more 
privatisation and strong opposition to joining the Euro. Hague hardened the party’s 
eurosceptic position on Europe, ruling out joining the single currency for the lifetime 
of the next two parliaments. However, this alienated Europhiles, whilst still not 
satisfying the hard-line sceptics; two pro-European MPs, David Curry and Ian Taylor 
resigned from the shadow cabinet in protest, whilst a major Conservative Party donor 
Paul Sykes announced he was joining the Referendum Party because, “I cannot 
stomach it any longer. We must rule out a single currency forever. If you are a true 
Conservative you cannot relinquish control of your economy.” (Jones & Copley, 
30/10/1997; Wastell & Baldwin, 2/11/1997). Another pro-European, Stephen Dorrell 
left the cabinet in June 1998, whilst the backbencher Peter Temple-Morris lost the 
Conservative whip in November 1997 and subsequently crossed the floor of the 
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House to sit on the government benches as and ‘Independent Conservative’. Hague’s 
new policy also provoked criticism from several heavyweight Europhiles including 
Michael Heseltine, Kenneth Clarke, Lord Howe, Lord Hurd and Chris Patten - all 
former ministers (Lynch, 2003; 156). The parliamentary party’s internal wrangling 
over Europe, whilst not a bad as the Major years, perpetuated the electorate’s 
impression, of the Conservatives, as a deeply divided party.                     
 
In addition to promoting traditional Thatcherism Hague also wanted to see the 
Thatcherite concept of ‘small government’ applied to the social sphere and tried to 
reach out to social groups previously ignored or even demonised by the Thatcherite 
Conservative Party; single parents, homosexuals and ethnic minorities (Kelly, 2001; 
197-198). However, by 1999 ‘Fresh Conservatism’ had given way to social 
authoritarianism; the PCP strongly opposed the government’s attempt to repeal 
Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act9 and forced the government to abandon 
its legislation (Dorey, 2003: 135). Hague was again beset by high profile dissent as 
Shaun Woodward defected to Labour and said that the Conservatives “…have become 
increasingly less tolerant and our attitudes seem to be based more on prejudice than 
reason.” (Murphy & Cracknel, 19/12/1999) Hague’s new harder edge was reflected in 
The Common Sense Revolution published in 1999, which evolved into the party’s 
draft manifesto Believing in Britain (2000) (Kelly, 2001: 199).  
 
Believing in Britain pledged the Conservatives to support “…common sense values, 
including personal responsibility, family and marriage.” The party also promised to, 
“Reintroduce recognition of marriage into the tax and benefits system. We will 
reintroduce the married couples’ allowance.” Lone parents whose youngest child had 
begun secondary school would be expected to seek work (The Conservative Party, 
2000: 21-22). The document also promised an overhaul of the asylum system and 
claimed that, “…the great majority of asylum claims are unfounded and are made to 
get round the usual immigration controls.” (The Conservative Party, 2000: 20) Whilst 
Hague’s switch pleased the social conservatives inside the parliamentary party the 
Common Sense Revolution stirred more controversy inside the party. Shadow Home 
Secretary Ann Widdecombe made a speech at the 2000 Conservative Party 
                                                     
9 Section 28 was the clause that prohibited the ‘promotion of homosexuality’ in schools. 
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Conference in which she promised £100 fines and criminal records for possession of 
the smallest amount of cannabis.  Four days later the Mail On Sunday revealed that 
seven members of Hague’s shadow cabinet had smoked cannabis when they were 
younger10. The row again exposed divisions within the party and arguably ended any 
ambitions Widdecombe harboured of becoming leader in the future (Jenkins, 2001: 
78-82).  
 
Another damaging dispute blew up in March 2001, when Conservative MP John 
Townend condemned mass immigration for undermining “…our homogenous Anglo-
Saxon society.” He equated asylum seekers with illegal immigrants and said Enoch 
Powell had been right to be hostile towards Commonwealth immigration (White, 
28/3/2001). Townend made further inflammatory comments in another two speeches, 
however Hague initially did nothing despite calls to remove the whip from Townend; 
Hague claimed that as Townend was retiring shortly it would be a mere ‘gesture’. 
However, black Conservative peer Lord Taylor threatened to resign from the party 
unless Hague took action and in a withering attack said that: 
The leader of the Conservative party prides himself on his judo and 14 pints a 
day macho image. Now is his chance to demonstrate real macho leadership by 
withdrawing the whip from Mr Townend and booting him out of the 
Conservative party. (Perkins & Wainwright 28/4/2001) 
Finally, a month after Townend had made his first comments Hague finally forced 
him to issue an apology. However, the row coming on the eve of the general election 
caused further damage to the Conservative Party; the party was accused of being 
racist and Hague looked like a weak leader who could not control his MPs. 
 
Why did Hague retreat from his vision of Fresh Conservatism? The answer lies in the 
state of opinion, both within the Conservative Party and within the wider electorate. 
Hague’s brand of social liberalism was deeply unappealing to many Conservatives 
from the parliamentary party and the grassroots. Kelly notes that: 
At the 1998 Forum attended by over 1,800 activists, speakers from the floor 
sneered at any attempt to ‘steal Labour’s clothes’ by adopting multiculturalism 
and moral relativism. Eight months later the Conservative women’s 
                                                     
10 The seven were; Francis Maude, Archie Norman, Bernard Jenkin, Peter Ainsworth, Oliver Letwin, 
David Willetts and Lord Strathclyde. Tim Yeo ‘outed’ himself a day later. 
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conference was equally dismissive of ‘Tory feminism’ and ‘permissive 
Conservatism’, insisting on ‘normal family values’ and the ‘centrality of 
marriage’. (Kelly, 2001: 201) 
Moreover, it also appeared that opinion outside the party was not impressed by the 
Conservatives’ newly found inclusiveness. The party’s ‘Listening to Britain’ exercise 
conducted between 1998 and 1999 found that people were more concerned about 
education, welfare and law an order than social liberalism. This was supported by 
suggestions sent to the party’s Common Sense Revolution website; contributors 
wanted ‘tougher’ policies on law and order, school discipline and asylum (Kelly, 
2001: 200).  
 
Hague may also have been swayed by the party’s desperately poor showing in the 
opinion polls, which showed the Conservatives almost constantly ‘flat lining’ below 
30% from June 1997 to December 199911 (see Table 3.8 below). However, even after 
Hague’s tack to the right the polls remained bleak reading for the Conservative Party. 
Despite populist policies designed to enthuse traditional Conservative voters, the party 
remained deeply unpopular. Only once, during the fuel crisis of September 2000 did 
the Conservatives come close to mounting a challenge to the government in the polls 
(see Table 3.3 below). Whilst the opinion polls were almost unremittingly bad the 
party scored a notable success in the 1999 European elections, when it won 36 seats to 
Labour’s 29 and the Liberal Democrats’ 10, albeit on a record low turnout of 24% 
(Butler & Kavanagh, 2002: 14-15). However, this proved to be a false dawn and by 
the time of the June 2001 general election Hague’s Conservatives had done little or 
nothing to recapture ground ceded to New Labour in 1997 and the scene was set for 
another electoral drubbing. 
                                                     
11 The only month the party reached 30% during this period was February 1999 (www.mori.com)  
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Table 3.3: Monthly Mori polls for main party voting intentions June 1997 to May 
2001(%)______________________________________________________________ 
Cons.  Lab.   Lib. Dems. 
1997 
June   24   58   15 
July   23  57   15 
August    28   54   15 
September  25   59   13 
October  24   60   12 
November  24   56   16 
December 26   55   15 
1998 
January   28   54   14 
February 28   52   15 
March  28  53  14 
April   27  55  14 
May  26  55  14 
June  27  56  13 
July  28  53  14 
August  28  52  14 
September 24  56  15 
October  26  53  16 
November 29  53  13 
December 27  54  12 
1999 
January  24  56  14 
February 30  51  14 
March  27  54  13 
April  25  56  13 
May  28  52  14 
June  28  51  13 
July  28  51  14 
August   27  49  17 
September 25  52  17 
October  28  56  11 
November 25  55  14 
December 28  54  13 
2000 
January  30  50  15 
February 29  50  15 
March  29  50  14 
April  27  51  15 
May  32  48  15 
June   33  47  13 
July  33  49  12 
August  29  51  15 
September 35  37  21 
October  32  45  17 
November 33  48  13 
December 34  46  14 
2001 
January  31  50  14 
February 30  50  14 
March  31  50  14 
April  30  50  13 
May  28  54  12_____________________________________           
Source: www.mori.com 
Note: The percentages do not add up to 100 because ‘minor’ parties are excluded 
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3.5 The general election of 2001 and the resignation of William Hague 
William Hague’s leadership of the Conservative Party was plagued by many of the 
same problems that beset his predecessor, John Major. Intra-party divisions over 
Europe, sleaze, low poll ratings and allegations of weak leadership all combined to 
undermine Hague’s position. Consequently the 2001 general election was another 
disaster for the Conservatives. The overall swing from Labour to Conservative was a 
mere 1.8% and the party gained just one seat12 (Butler & Kavanagh, 2002: 251). The 
election was the first time the party had lost by consecutive landslides and at 8.3 
million, the total number of votes the Conservatives received was the lowest since 
1929, when there was a much smaller electorate (Butler & Kavanagh, 2002: 254). In 
an echo of the party’s 1997 general election defeat, Hague resolved, like John Major, 
to resign immediately. Senior party members tried to persuade him to stay on and 
allow the party time to reflect13, but Hague would not be swayed by their arguments. 
He felt that: 
Whatever I do, the leadership election is going to start now. I can’t stop it, and 
if I’m not careful the focus will all be on me and I don’t want that to happen. 
The party will tear itself apart if I stay on. It must start talking about what it 
must do to put things right, not agonise over whether I should remain. 
(Walters, 2003: 2-3) 
 
3.6 The leadership election of 2001 
William Hague’s resignation on 8th June triggered another leadership election. The 
contest was the first to be contested under the new rules devised by William Hague. 
These differed substantially from the old Douglas-Hume rules and allowed the 
membership the final decision for the first time. The role of the PCP was to hold a 
series of primary ballots in and choose two candidates to go forward to the final, one 
member one vote ballot14.  
 
                                                     
12 Peter Duncan won Dumfries & Galloway from Labour. 
13 Andrew Mackay, Ann Widdecombe, Iain Duncan Smith and Lord Strathclyde met Hague at Central 
Office and asked him to remain as leader. 
14 See chapter 2 for a detailed explanation of the Hague rules. 
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3.61 The candidates 
As in 1997 some senior Tories were absent from the contest, notably Michael 
Heseltine, Peter Lilley, Michael Howard and John Redwood. Michael Heseltine had 
retired from parliament; the health scare that ruled him out of the leadership election 
in 1997 had also ended his interest in front line politics. Peter Lilley was no longer 
seen as a serious challenger for two reasons; his poor showing in the 1997 leadership 
election, together with his ill timed speech in April 1999, that led to his sacking. 
Michael Howard announced his intention to retire from frontline politics in March 
1999, saying he wanted the freedom to speak on a wider range of issues (Jones, & 
Shrimsley, 9/3/1999) and left the shadow cabinet in William Hague’s June reshuffle. 
John Redwood’s credibility was undermined by losing two successive leadership 
contests and many on the Eurosceptic right, Redwood’s natural constituency, did not 
regard him as a plausible leader. Consequently, five candidates formally entered the 
contest; Michael Portillo, Ken Clarke, Iain Duncan Smith, Michael Ancram and 
David Davis15.  
 
Portillo was the bookies’ favourite and the person many people felt would already be 
leader, if he hadn’t lost his seat in the 1997 general election (Alderman & Carter, 
2002: 572). A poll prior to the 2001 general election showed him to the popular 
choice to replace Hague with both conservative and non-Conservative voters (Ipsos 
Mori, 3/6/2001). He was forty-eight, still relatively young but had the experience of 
three cabinet posts; Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Secretary of State for 
Employment, before moving to Defence in 1995. He lost his Enfield Southgate seat in 
1997, but returned to parliament in 1999, winning the Kensington & Chelsea by-
election caused by the death of Alan Clark. During his period in government Portillo 
was seen as a pure Thatcherite and was one of John Major’s ‘bastards’. However, 
following the 1997 election Portillo had undergone something of a transformation. He 
worked for a short period as a hospital porter, then just prior to the Kensington & 
Chelsea by-election he admitted to having a brief homosexual relationship whilst at 
university (Mardell, 17/2/2001). Then at the 2000 Conservative conference, speaking 
                                                     
15 Ann Widdecombe took soundings from colleagues but decided not to run when she found she had no 
support. (Tempest, 18/6/2001) 
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the day after Ann Widdecombe’s hard-line speech Portillo made a plea for tolerance 
and inclusivity, telling delegates: 
We are for people whatever their sexual orientation. The Conservative Party 
isn’t merely a party of tolerance; it’s a party willing to accord every one of our 
citizens’ respect. Why should people respect us if we withhold respect from 
them? (Walters, 2003: 76) 
Portillo’s campaign was based on the need for the Party to fundamentally reform all 
aspects of policy (Watt, 10/7/01). However, Portillo’s campaign was poorly run and 
he was accused of disloyalty to former leader William Hague by Hague’s Head of 
Media, Amanda Platell and also by Michael Howard’s nemesis, Ann Widdecombe 
(Walters, 2002: 214-215). The damage done by the disloyalty accusation was 
acknowledged by a source close to the Portillo campaign, although the same source 
also denied that Portillo had been plotting to take the leadership and that if he had he 
would have been, “…buttering people up over the previous two years, instead of 
systematically annoying them.” (Private information). 
 
Ken Clarke was again the only candidate who was not from the Eurosceptic wing of 
the party. He had spent the last fours years as a backbencher and had enraged William 
Hague by joining Michael Heseltine in sitting next to Tony Blair at a Britain In 
Europe16 news conference (Walters, 2003: 52). He told the Party to forget about its 
European obsession and to concentrate on electorally significant issues, such as 
improving public services He based his campaign on his on his personal qualities, 
experience and his high public profile and popularity (Alderman & Carter, 2002: 
576).  
 
Iain Duncan Smith was unashamedly from the right of the party, pro-hanging and 
corporal punishment and anti-section 28 (Tempest, 17/7/01). He entered parliament in 
1992 and first rose to prominence, within the parliamentary party, as one of the 
Maastricht rebels. Although he was not one of the ‘whipless wonders’ he voted 
against the government eleven times, abstained forty-seven times and voted with the 
government on just four occasions, during the course of the Maastricht Treaty’s 
ratification (Walters, 2003: 220). He was the campaign manager for John Redwood’s 
                                                     
16 Britain In Europe was a cross-party coalition to promote closer ties to the European Union. 
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1997 leadership bid, but refused to go along with the Redwood-Clarke pact and voted 
for Hague in the final round (Williams, 1998: 226). He served in William Hague’s 
shadow cabinet, as Shadow Social Security Secretary from 1997 to 1998, when he 
became Shadow Defence Secretary. His appearance led some to liken him to a ‘Hague 
Mk II’ or ‘Hague without the jokes’ (Walters, 2001: 225). However, like Hague he 
portrayed himself as someone who could break the link with past mistakes whilst 
holding on to Conservative principles (Duncan Smith, 19/6/01).  
 
Michael Ancram held a number of junior ministerial positions during the Thatcher 
and Major years; he served at the Scottish Office from 1983 until 1987, he lost his 
Edinburgh South seat in the 1987 election and returned to parliament in 1992 
representing Devizes. He served at the Northern Ireland Office from 1993 to 1997. 
After the 1997 election he served William Hague as Constitutional Affairs spokesman 
until he was appointed Party Chairman in 1998, a post he held until after the general 
election. Ancram portrayed himself as the unity candidate and in the statement 
announcing his candidacy took aim at Portillo’s social liberalism by telling the party 
that: 
This is no time to seek to match spin with spin, or stardust with stardust. It is 
not time to strike out against the grain of our party and its traditions. (Ancram, 
21/6/2001). 
However, Ancram’s social background was a disadvantage. He was the Earl of 
Ancram and heir to the 12th Marquess of Lothian. If the party elected him Ancram 
would become the first hereditary peer to lead the Conservatives since Alec Douglas 
Home. His critics argued that the Party would seem even more out of touch if it made 
him their leader (Sylvester & Jones, 22/6/01).  
 
David Davis entered parliament in 1987, he was PPS to Francis Maude, before joining 
the whips office from 1990-1993. Between 1993 and 1994 he served as Parliamentary 
Secretary at Office of Public Service and Science and then moved Minister of State at 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office where he stayed until the Conservatives lost 
power (www.conservatives.com). However he really came to prominence, within the 
parliamentary party, during Hague years when he chaired the House of Commons 
Public Accounts Committee. Davis was another right wing candidate who also urged 
the Party to concentrate on reforming public services, arguing that Labour’s failure to 
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deliver improvement rendered it vulnerable (Watt, 10/7/2001). Although he was a 
Eurosceptic he was clear that the party, “…must not be obsessed with this issue, nor 
should the majority’s view on it be a test of party loyalty.” (Davis, 19/6/2001) 
 
An Ipsos Mori poll (see Table 3.4 below), published in June 2001 indicted that once 
again Kenneth Clarke was the most popular candidate both with Conservative voters 
and with the wider electorate. Portillo was the second most popular candidate whilst 
the eventual winner, Duncan Smith just beat Michael to third place. 
 
Table 3.4: Popularity of the candidates 
Regardless of which party you support, which of these, if any, do you think would do 
the best job as leader of the Conservative Party?    ________ 
    All voters (%)   Cons. voters (%)_______ 
Kenneth Clarke  32    29 
Davis Davis     4      5 
Iain Duncan Smith    7    13 
Michael Portillo  17    25 
Michael Ancram    6    12 
Other       5      3 
None of these     6      5 
Don’t know   24      8   ___ 
 Source: Ipsos Mori (28/6/2001) 
 
The same poll also made a direct comparison between Kenneth Clarke and Michael 
Portillo and also between Iain Duncan Smith and Michael Portillo (see Tables 3.5 & 
3.6 below), which confirmed that both Consevative voters and the wider electorate 
preffered Clarke over Portillo and Portillo over Duncan Smith. 
 
Table 3.5: Comparison between Kenneth Clarke and Michael Portillo_____  
______________________ All voters (%)   Cons. voters (%)  
Kenneth Clarke  51    49 
Michael Portillo  25    39 
Neither     7      5 
Don’t know   17      5    
Source: Ipsos Mori (28/6/2001) 
 
 
Table 3.6: Comparison between Michael Portillo and Iain Duncan Smith__  
______________________ All voters (%)   Cons. voters (%)  
Michael Portillo  34    46 
Iain Duncan Smith  25    39 
Neither   12      8 
Don’t know   24    10    
Source: Ipsos Mori (28/6/2001) 
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3.62 The ballots 
There were three ballots spread over a period of seven days from Tuesday 10th July to 
Tuesday 17th July (see Table 3.4). The first round of balloting saw Davies and 
Ancram tied in last place, however there were no provisions for a tie in the rules. 
Neither candidate was willing to stand down necessitating a rerun of the first round. 
Consequently after another ballot Ancram was eliminated and Davis withdrew shortly 
thereafter. Surprisingly, in the third ballot of the PCP, the early favourite Portillo 
came last with 53 votes; therefore Clarke (59) and Duncan Smith (54) went forward to 
a final ballot of the entire party. 
 
Table 3.7: Changes in support between rounds, 2001 
____________________________________________________________________ 
_______________Round 1           Round 2           Change          Round 3          Change 
Portillo           49       50  (+1)           53         (+3) 
Clarke            36                      39                    (+3)               59                  (+20) 
Duncan Smith           39                      42                    (+3)               54                  (+12) 
Ancram                     21                      17                    (- 4)                -                        - 
Davis                       21                      18                    (- 3)               -                         -__ 
Source: Alderman & Carter, 2002: 579 
 
 
The campaign for the support of party members lasted until the ballot closed on the 
10th September. As time wore on the contest became increasingly acrimonious; Clarke 
dismissed Duncan Smith’s supporters as ‘headbangers’, whilst Duncan Smith 
suggested that:  
It would have been reassuring to hear from Ken Clarke about some mistakes, 
which led the party to the greatest defeat in its history (Walters, 2001: 221). 
In another sign of the divisive nature of the contest Mrs. Thatcher backed Duncan 
Smith, whilst John Major backed Clarke and castigated Duncan Smith for being 
…one of a number of colleagues who voted night after night with the Labour 
Party in the Labour lobby with the purpose of defeating the Conservative 
government (Walters, 2001: 221) 
In August Duncan Smith’s campaign was nearly derailed when it was discovered that 
Edgar Griffin, father of BNP leader Nick Griffin, was a member of his campaign 
team. Duncan Smith immediately sacked Griffin and called for his expulsion from the 
party. Clarke published an NOP poll, which showed he was more likely to win back 
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former Conservative voters17 (Clarke, 2001: 1). Nevertheless and despite being the 
front-runner amongst the PCP Clarke was defeated by, Iain Duncan Smith with 155, 
933 votes to Clarke’s 100, 864 Duncan Smith therefore became the fourth person to 
lead the Conservative Party in eleven years (Walters, 2001: 230).  
 
3.7 The leadership of Iain Duncan Smith 
Like Hague Duncan Smith’s leadership was constrained in several ways; in common 
with Hague, Duncan Smith was constrained by the manner of his election. He was the 
first Conservative leader chosen to by the party’s rank and file and this should have 
secured his position. However, some activists were unhappy that they were only given 
a choice of two candidates and felt they were forced to vote for Duncan Smith 
because of their distaste for Clarke’s pro European views (Kelly, 2004: 2). In this 
sense it could be argued that Duncan Smith was yet another default leader. Moreover 
the final ballot of the PCP showed that he was not the parliamentary party’s favoured 
choice; less than a third (32½%) of Duncan Smith’s parliamentary colleagues had 
voted for him. He had come second to Clarke and beaten Michael Portillo by the less 
than decisive margin of one vote. This low level of parliamentary support was 
unprecedented, previous systems for selecting the party leader were designed to 
ensure that winning candidate had the support of a good majority of the party’s MPs. 
In another quirk of the Hague rules, Duncan Smith owed his election to the party’s 
activists, but the responsibility for removing him if he proved inadequate was left to 
the parliamentary party.  
 
Throughout his leadership Duncan Smith struggled to raise his profile. Two days 
before he was declared leader Al-Qaeda launched its attack on the World Trade 
Centre in New York. The event completely overshadowed Duncan Smith’s election 
and gave Tony Blair the chance to exercise his role of international statesman, an 
opportunity denied to the Leader of the Opposition (Seldon & Snowdon, 2005: 263). 
The new leader’s low profile was compounded by his lack of charisma; he was the 
first Conservative leader not to have his likeness in Madame Tussaud’s waxworks 
because he was “…too dull and lifeless.” (McDermott, 30/10/2003) Duncan Smith 
tried to turn his low profile to his advantage during the 2002 party conference telling 
                                                     
17 The Poll showed 63% supported Clarke, whilst 37% supported Duncan Smith 
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his audience, “Do not underestimate the determination of a quiet man.” (Duncan 
Smith, 10/10/2002) 
 
 This lack of charisma was compounded by Duncan Smith’s lack of political 
experience; he was the least experienced candidate of the 2001 leadership, or indeed 
any Conservative Party leadership election never holding any government post. Hague 
at least masked his inexperience, to a certain extent, by frequently discomfiting Tony 
Blair at the dispatch box. However, this feat was beyond the uncharismatic Duncan 
Smith, who Guardian sketch writer Simon Hoggart likened to the Fast Show’s Bob 
Fleming, “…who couldn’t utter a sentence without a coughing fit.” (Hoggart, 
29/11/2001). Duncan Smith was also faced with his legacy as a Maastricht rebel. Even 
at the start of Duncan Smith’s tenure was by no means clear if he could demand 
unconditional loyalty from some of his colleagues, when he had done so much to 
undermine them during the last Conservative administration. Indeed, when John 
Major refused to pledge his loyalty to Duncan Smith it was perhaps a sign of trouble 
ahead (Walters, 2001: 221). Duncan Smith was at least free of the hindrance of Mrs. 
Thatcher views on his leadership; the former Prime Minister was forced to quit public 
life in March 2002 after suffering a series of small strokes (Ward, 23/3/2002). 
 
In terms of the party’s image and policies there were initial signs that Duncan Smith 
was adopting Michael Portillo’s agenda of social liberalism. He appointed 
modernisers such as Mark MacGregor and Dominic Cummings to important posts 
within Central Office18 (Kelly, 2004: 2) In October 2001 he ordered three 
Conservative MPs19 to quit the right-wing Monday Club and explained that: 
I am tired of the Conservative Party being diverted by the activities of one or 
two individuals when they are totally at odds with what we are working for. I 
will have no truck with racism in the Conservative Party. (White, 8/10/2001)  
Duncan Smith also said he would not join the Carlton Club as long as it refused to 
admit women as full members on the same terms as men. He became the first 
Conservative leader to turn down the traditional invitation to become an honorary 
member since the club’s inception in 183220 (Anon., 27/12/2001). Duncan Smith also 
                                                     
18 Chief Executive and Director of Strategy respectively 
19 The three were; Andrew Hunter, Angela Watkinson and Andrew Rossindell 
20 Margaret Thatcher was admitted as an honorary member despite her gender. 
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took action against Ann Winterton, who was reported to have told a racist joke at a 
rugby club dinner. In a marked contrast to Hague’s indecision over John Townend, 
Winterton was ordered to resign from the shadow cabinet or be sacked and Duncan 
Smith again expressed his desire to rid his party of racism: 
When I looked at those remarks and discussed them with Ann Winterton, I 
believe that they were offensive, and I believe they were offensive to a large 
number of people. (Watt, 6/5/2002) 
Duncan Smith also backed junior foreign affairs spokesman Alan Duncan who 
revealed he was gay in a newspaper interview; the leader promised Duncan his 
personal support and pledged that the admission would not affect his career 
progression (Brogan, 30/7/2002). 
 
Duncan Smith ordered a complete policy overhaul, which was to be developed in 
three phases; identifying problem areas and learning from other countries, putting 
forward proposals through consultation documents and elaborating policy long before 
the next general election (Seldon & Snowdon, 2005: 260). Much of the policy review 
concentrated on the area of public services, an area the party agreed New Labour were 
vulnerable. The Conservative Party developed a threefold critique of the 
government’s handling of the public services. Firstly the party argued that New 
Labour’s obsession with targets led to huge unproductive bureaucracies leading to a 
‘commend state’. Secondly the party talked about devolving control of hospitals and 
schools down to institutional level. Thirdly the Conservatives sought to introduce a 
choice agenda to empower consumers and force schools and hospitals to improve 
their services (Dorey, 2004: 374). This critique was published in 2002 as Leadership 
with a Purpose: A Better Society in which the party promised to take action against: 
Failing schools, crime, sub-standard healthcare, child poverty and growing 
dependence, and insecurity in old age – the five giants blighting Britain today. 
(The Conservative Party, 2002: 4) 
The document also benefited from the innovative approach of shadow Home 
Secretary Oliver Letwin (Seldon & Snowden, 2005: 260).  Letwin argued that the 
party would tackle ‘The Conveyor Belt to Crime’ by supporting parents, introducing 
neighbourhood policing and a vastly increased programme of treatment and 
rehabilitation for drug addicts, as well as the traditional Conservative prescription of 
tougher prison sentences (The Conservative Party, 2002: 27) 
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However, despite the Conservatives’ more innovative approach to policy development 
under Duncan Smith the party still made little progress, ‘flat lining’ in the polls during 
2001 and 2002. However, the Conservatives managed to close the gap between 
themselves and Labour during the latter part of 2003 (see Table 3.5, below), as the 
government became more unpopular, although this was due in part to support 
switching from Labour to the Liberal Democrats (Broughton, 2004: 350). The party 
was unable to increase their representation in the Commons and failed to win any of 
the three by-elections held between 2001 and 200321 (Broughton, 2004: 350-352). 
The result of the Brent East by-election was particularly disappointing as the Liberal 
Democrats leapfrogged the Conservatives from third place to take the seat from 
Labour. However, the Conservatives made some progress in the local elections; it 
came second to Labour in 2002, but was the largest party in local government after 
the 2003 elections22, gaining 600 seats (Watt, 3/5/2003). The party’s improved 
performance in the 2003 local elections arguably saved Duncan Smith from an 
immediate leadership challenge; on the eve of the elections Crispin Blunt resigned 
from the front bench23 saying that:  
We carry the handicap of a leader whom Conservatives in parliament and 
outside feel unable to present to the electorate as a credible alternative prime 
minister. (White & Watt, 1/5/2003) 
 
The Conservative Party under Duncan Smith suffered from continued disunity, much 
of which was caused by a series of errors of judgement by Duncan Smith. The first of 
these errors concerned the manner in which Duncan Smith demoted Party Chairman 
David Davis24. The Daily Telegraph alleged that Davis was lazy, blocking Duncan 
Smith’s plans to modernise the party and plotting to take his job (Jones & Brogan, 
23/6/2002). Unfortunately Duncan Smith chose to move Davis whilst the latter was on 
holiday in Florida and out of contact with Central Office. The move looked cowardly 
and an angry Davis had to be dissuaded from resigning from the shadow cabinet 
(Brogan, 25/7/2002).  
                                                     
21 Labour held Ipswich (November 2001) and Ogmore (February 2002). The Lib Dems took Brent East 
(September 2003) from Labour. 
22 2002; Lab. 35%, Cons. 32%, Lib Dems. 24%. 2003: Cons. 35%, Lab. 33%, Lib Dems. 21%. 
23 Blunt was a shadow trade minister and MP for Reigate since 1997. 
24 Davis was moved to shadow Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, he was replaced at Central Office 
by Theresa May. 
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Table 3.8: Monthly polling averages for main party voting intentions, September 2001 
to October 2003________________________________________________________ 
Cons.    Lab.    Lib. Dems. 
2001 
September  28   49   18  
October   27    52    16 
November  27    51    17 
December  29    44    20 
 
2002 
January   29    48    18 
February  29    49    17 
March   31    44    19 
April   29    47    17 
May  32    43    19 
June   32    42    19 
July  31    43    20 
August  33    41    21 
September 31    40    21 
October  30    41    22 
November 30   41   22 
December 30    39    23 
 
2003 
January  31    39    23 
February 32    27    24 
March  32    39    22 
April   30   42    21 
May  33    39    21 
June   35    37    20 
July   35   36    21 
August  35   35   22 
September 32   35   26 
October  34   36   23 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: adapted from Broughton 2004: 351 
 
Duncan Smith’s next mistake, in November 2002, was a calamitous political 
misjudgement over the Adoption and Children Bill25. Rather than treat the Bill as an 
issue of conscience and give his MPs a free vote, Duncan Smith imposed a three-line 
whip compelling Conservative MPs to vote against the Bill. Then after disquiet in the 
parliamentary party, the Chief Whip, David Maclean told MPs that they could safely 
miss the vote without facing disciplinary action (Brogan, 2/11/2002). However, this 
did not satisfy some of the party’s social liberals and John Bercow resigned from his 
job as shadow pensions minister so he could vote in favour of the Adoption Bill. 
When Parliament voted on the Bill, seven others Conservatives, including Michael 
Portillo and Kenneth Clarke joined Bercow, prompting speculation of a challenge to 
                                                     
25 The Bill would allow unmarried couples to adopt children. 
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Duncan Smith’s leadership26 (Watt, 5/11/2002). The next day Duncan Smith made the 
situation worse by issuing a personal statement in which he challenged his party to 
‘unite or die’ and claimed that: 
Over the last few weeks a small group of my parliamentary colleagues have 
decided, consciously, to undermine my leadership. (Tempest, 5/11/2002) 
To which Kenneth Clarke’s response was that:  
It would be much easier to unite as a party if Iain Duncan Smith would refrain 
from imposing three-line whips on subjects, which have always been left to 
the judgment of individual MPs. (Tempest, 5/11/2002) 
The episode served to make Duncan Smith look weak, politically inept and somewhat 
ridiculous. His speech was seen as a complete overreaction to the actions of eight MPs 
over what should have been an issue of conscience. Moreover, as commentators were 
quick to point out, because Duncan Smith defied the party line on numerous occasions 
during the Major administration, he was not well qualified to demand that the party 
now ‘unite or die’. (Wheatcroft, 2005: 262). 
 
Duncan Smith’s next misjudgement concerned the sacking of two staff in Central 
Office in February 2003; Mark MacGregor and Rick Nye, both supporters of Michael 
Portillo. It was reported that the party Treasurer Stanley Kalms was ordered to sack 
the pair by Duncan Smith against the formers wishes and against the wishes of the 
party board. Moreover, in an unhappy echo of the Davis affair MacGregor was on 
holiday when he learnt of his dismissal (Tempest, 17/2/2003). Duncan Smith then 
appointed his friend and former MP Barry Legg as Chief Executive and Duncan 
Smith’s Chief of Staff. The appointment outraged the party board, which should have 
been consulted and who felt Duncan Smith had overreached his authority. The crisis 
deepened when the Guardian newspaper revealed that the very eurosceptic Legg had 
held three exploratory meetings with the UK Independence Party to discuss defecting 
from the Conservatives to UKIP (White, 20/2/2003). Then in May the Guardian 
revealed that Legg had been involved in Westminster Council’s ‘homes for votes 
scandal’, during the 1980s27. In the row that followed Legg was forced to resign, a 
                                                     
26 The eight Conservatives who voted against the party line were; Michael Portillo, Kenneth Clarke, 
David Curry, Francis Maude, John Bercow, Julie Kirkbride, Andrew Mackay and Andrew Lansley. 
 
27 As a member of Westminster city council, Legg was involved in housing homeless families in a 
tower block riddled with asbestos. 
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move seen as a victory for the party board and MPs against Duncan Smith (Watt & 
Hencke, 8/5/2003). 
 
By now Duncan Smith’s continued leadership of the party was constantly being called 
into question and his authority undermined. The Legg fiasco was followed in June by 
the resignation of the Conservative Party Treasurer, the multimillionaire Sir Stanley 
Kalms after he reportedly fell out with Duncan Smith over Legg’s appointment 
leading to blazing rows between the leader and his treasurer (Watt, 18/6/2003). In 
September, the party then came a poor third in the Brent East by-election, a 
constituency where they came second in the 2001 general election.  
 
By October events were rapidly spinning beyond the control of Duncan Smith and his 
future was becoming increasingly insecure; allegations surfaced that Duncan Smith 
improperly paid his wife, Betsy £18, 000 pounds for secretarial work she had not 
done. Almost as damaging were the splits revealed in Central Office as Vanessa 
Grearson, a deputy director at Central Office claimed that staff were bullied into 
signing a rebuttal of the ‘Betsygate’ allegations28 (Wintour, 18/10/2003). The party 
conference the following week offered a final chance for Duncan Smith to reassert his 
fractured authority. In his leader’s speech he pronounced that, “…the quiet man is 
here to stay and his turning up the volume.” Party activists enthusiastically cheered 
the speech, constantly interrupting the speech with nineteen standing ovations, in an 
orchestrated show of support that came over badly on television and appalled the 
parliamentary party (Wheatcroft, 2005: 264). On the 22nd October the Conservatives’ 
largest donor, Stuart Wheeler called for the parliamentary party to remove Duncan 
Smith. 
 
On the 27th October Derek Conway announced that he had sent a letter to Sir Michael 
Spicer, Chairman of the 1922 Committee requesting a ballot of no confidence in 
Duncan Smith’s leadership.29The leader’s response was to give his critics forty-eight 
hours to act, saying that: 
                                                     
28 An investigation by the parliamentary commissioner for standards later completely exonerated the 
Duncan Smiths of any impropriety. 
29 Conway was the second MP to write to Sir Michael. Crispin Blunt requested a no confidence vote 
when he resigned in May. 
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…if, by Wednesday night, the chairman of the 1922 committee is in receipt of 
25 names, I will seek to win a vote of confidence in my leadership. Equally, if 
the 25 names are not forthcoming, I will expect my party to call a halt to this 
most damaging episode. (White & Hall, 28/10/2003)  
The next morning Francis Maude and John Greenway announced that they too had 
written to Sir Michael to ask for a ballot. Then in the afternoon Sir Michael confirmed 
that he had received the necessary twenty-five requests and that a ballot would be held 
the next day (Katz & Happold 28/10/2003). Iain Duncan Smith vowed to fight on, 
rather than step down, but lost the ballot by 90 votes to 75 and resigned as leader of 
the Conservative Party.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to offer a narrative account of the circumstances 
surrounding the leadership elections of 1997 and 2001 and the state of the 
Conservative Party between 1997 and 2003. When we analyse the elections of 
William Hague and Iain Duncan we can discern a number of common factors, despite 
the very different procedures of the Home and Hague election systems. 
 
Firstly we can say that neither candidate was the preferred choice of the parliamentary 
party; Hague was a default leader in the absence of Heseltine and Portillo. 
Conservative MPs who wished to stop Ken Clarke becoming leader or who were 
repelled by the Clarke-Redwood pact had no choice but to vote for Hague. There were 
no ‘Hagueites’ in the parliamentary party, as there were ‘Portillistas’ and 
consequently Hague’s authority was undermined almost as soon as Michael Portillo 
returned to parliament. Hague’s leadership was also dogged by plots, either real or 
imagined, to overthrow him and replace him with Portillo. However, at least Hague 
could point to the support of 56% of the parliamentary party, a clear majority in the 
final ballot against Clarke. Duncan Smith was elected with the support of barely one 
third of his colleagues coming second in the final ballot of the parliamentary party and 
he consequently struggled to assert his authority throughout his eighteen-month tenure 
as leader. Hague and Duncan Smith also suffered from an image problem; Hague 
never shook off the perception of him as a ‘geeky’ sixteen year old telling the 1977 
Conservative Party conference that he wanted to be free. Duncan Smith tried and 
failed to make light of his low profile and lack of charisma and low profile by styling 
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himself as a man of quiet determination. Neither ever looked like a credible 
alternative Prime Minister to Tony Blair and their party’s electoral fortunes suffered 
as a consequence. 
 
Both leaders were inexperienced and consequently made mistakes that more seasoned 
politicians may have avoided. Hague had been an MP for eight years and his two 
years in the relatively junior post of Welsh Secretary was his only cabinet experience. 
Duncan Smith was even more unschooled in the arts of high politics; an MP for nine 
years he sat out the final spell of Conservative government on the backbenches. His 
only frontline experience was in Hague’s shadow cabinet covering social security and 
then defence. Hague’s poor judgement led him to boast about drinking fourteen pints 
a day and to describe Jeffrey Archer as a man of integrity. Hague also let the John 
Townend affair drag on too long and the dispute with Lord Taylor created adverse 
press coverage on the eve of a general election. Duncan Smith’s inexperience led him 
into picking an unnecessary fight with one section of his party over the Adoption and 
Children Bill and to use his powers of patronage so ineptly that he undermined rather 
than enhanced his leadership; Duncan Smith’s demotion of David Davis whilst the 
latter was on holiday was unfortunate and created disquiet within the party, yet 
Duncan Smith repeated the mistake with the dismissal of the vacationing Mark 
MacGregor from Central Office and then inflamed a delicate situation by appointing 
Barry Legg over the heads of the party board.   
 
Both leaders were also the preferred candidates of Margaret Thatcher, although this 
arguably hurt Hague more than Duncan Smith. The need to remain loyal to the 
Thatcher legacy was a constraint on Conservative policy development during Hague’s 
tenure, as he felt unable to move on from Thatcherism and sacked Peter Lilley for 
making an ill-timed speech that was seen in some quarters to be a repudiation of Mrs. 
Thatcher’s work. Hague tried to move the Conservative Party towards a new agenda 
of social liberalism characterised as Fresh Conservatism, however, the unease this 
created within the party combined with any sign of a revival in the Conservative’s 
electoral fortunes pushed Hague back towards mainstream Thatcherism and the 
adoption of a more populist agenda encapsulated by Common Sense Revolution and 
Believing in Britain. However, the passage of time, together with Lady Thatcher’s 
withdrawal from public life arguably allowed Duncan Smith more room for 
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manoeuvre than his predecessor. Moreover because Duncan Smith’s Thatcherite 
credentials were never in doubt he was able to begin the search for a new and 
distinctive policy agenda. Leadership with a Purpose showed clear signs of such a 
move. Ideas such as the enhanced programme of treatment and rehabilitation for drug 
marked a clear break from the traditional Thatcherite view that ‘prison works’.  
 
 
Ultimately, neither Duncan Smith’s innovation nor Hague’s more traditional 
Thatcherite approach could lift the party in the polls and threaten Tony Blair and New 
Labour’s continued dominance. The party failed to win a single by-election under 
either leader and suffered an unprecedented second consecutive electoral drubbing 
under Hague. Hague, at least had the opportunity to fight a general election and to 
resign with a degree of honour. Duncan Smith suffered the same fate as his patron 
Lady Thatcher; the first Conservative party leader to be elected by the whole party 
was unceremoniously removed by his parliamentary colleagues, when they perceived 
that they had no chance of electoral recovery under his leadership.  
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Chapter 4   
The Social Background and Political Attributes of the PCP 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse a number of non-ideological factors that 
affect the composition of the parliamentary Conservative Party and may be applied to 
all its members. The Cowley & Garry (1998) study of the 1990 Conservative Party 
leadership election identified four separate factors and hypothesised that each 
influenced the decisions of Conservative MPs when they elected John Major. The four 
factors identified by Cowley & Garry were the social background of Conservative 
MPs, their electoral vulnerability, their age and experience and their career status 
(Cowley & Garry, 1998: 475-478). Consequently, this chapter will explore each of 
these variables and seek to explain how each affects the composition of the 
parliamentary Conservative Party between 1997-2001 and 2001-2003. The 
significance of these non-ideological variables is examined in relation to the three 
ideological variables (economic policy, European policy, social / moral policy) in 
chapter six, contributing to a methodologically rigorous analysis of leadership 
elections. 
 
The chapter will begin by examining the social background of all Conservative MPs. 
Whilst work on the social composition of the PCP has been done before, notably 
Baker, Gamble & Ludlam (1992), Baker & Fountain (1996) and Cowley & Garry 
(1998), it needs to be updated. This section will commence with a discussion on the 
relevance of social background to contemporary democratic political parties.  It will 
then provide an overview of the changes that have occurred in the social composition 
of the parliamentary party during the course of the 20th century, focusing on the 
education of MPs and their occupation prior to entering Parliament, together with 
institutional changes within the party that may have affected its social composition. 
This section will conclude with a study of the social composition of the parliamentary 
party for the 1997 and 2001 parliaments and will analyse whether this constitutes 
continuity or change. 
 
The chapter will then examine the electoral vulnerability of the parliamentary party. 
Electoral vulnerability may be relevant for two reasons; firstly individual MPs may 
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adopt the following attitudinal stance; that the choice of the leader may impact upon 
the popularity of individual MPs. Secondly an MP’s electoral vulnerability may affect 
his / her career progression through the parliamentary party, with MP’s from marginal 
seats being excluded from cabinet or shadow cabinet positions due to electoral 
insecurity. One example of how electoral vulnerability may affect outcomes can be 
seen in the election of John Major as Conservative Party leader in 1990. Major’s main 
rival, Michael Heseltine had already managed to dethrone Margaret Thatcher and 
based his campaign upon his electoral popularity, especially compared to Mrs. 
Thatcher’s unpopularity. In his autobiography Heseltine wrote that, “…my most 
powerful card had been my public support, showing I could bring lost votes back to 
the party.” (Heseltine, 2001: 373). Subsequently, Heseltine’s appeal was neutered by 
the revelation that John Major was just as popular with the wider electorate (Cowley, 
1996: 201) 
 
Therefore we can hypothesise, firstly that MPs holding more marginal seats would 
vote for the candidate with the best popularity rating in opinion polls as this would 
give them a better chance of retaining their seat and achieving promotion. We can also 
hypothesise, like Cowley & Garry, “…that MPs in relatively safe seats would be more 
willing to vote for the least popular candidate…” (Cowley & Garry, 1998: 477), as 
this would not impact upon their own electoral or promotion chances. Taken together 
we are assuming that the choice of candidate could be influenced by the electoral 
vulnerability variable. In order to support this hypothesis this section will analyse the 
composition of Conservative Party cabinets and shadow cabinets between 1951 and 
2002 in relation to the electoral vulnerability of the MPs who served in those cabinets. 
 
Finally the chapter will examine why the career status of MPs is relevant to leadership 
elections, both for the leadership contenders and their electorate inside the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party.  
 
4.2 Social Background 
4.21 Historical Background 
The PCP has traditionally drawn from Britain’s social elite; in 1935 no less than 172 
out of 415 Conservative MPs were drawn from the aristocracy. A 1939 study revealed 
that 145 of the party’s MPs were linked together in a web of family relationships, 
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which was sometimes called the ‘Cousinhood’ (Baker & Fountain, 1996: 86). 
Moreover, it was estimated that, in a remarkable display of nepotism, thirty-five out 
of eighty-five of Harold Macmillan’s 1958 government were related to him by 
marriage (Davis, 1996: 124). Over the course of the 20th century, the elitist nature of 
the PCP has been diluted to a certain extent, however, the PCP is still not 
representative of the electorate. Moreover, whilst the Conservative Party is dependent 
on working class electoral support,1 working class Conservatives have been largely 
absent from Parliament; instead the aristocratic elite has been largely replaced by MPs 
from middle-class professions such as business, law, education and financial services 
(Greenwood, 1998: 456-457). 
 
However, it is arguable that the dominance of the middle and upper middle-class is 
not necessarily problematic. The electorate mainly judge a party by the policies it 
offers, rather than by the social background of the candidates the party fields. 
Moreover, it does not follow that someone who was educated at Eton and Oxbridge 
holds unrepresentative views. For instance Lord Woolton was one of the party’s 
leading moderates, whilst some of the most strident right-wingers in the party, such as 
Norman Tebbit, have relatively modest social backgrounds. Finally, it has been 
argued that the only personality who really matters to voters is the party leader (Butler 
& Pinto-Duschinsky, 1980: 198-199). Therefore, it can be argued that the social 
background of the Parliamentary Party is now an irrelevance; since the institution of 
party leadership elections in 1965 all Conservative leaders have come from modest 
middle-class backgrounds and were all educated in grammar schools, rather than 
private fee paying institutions. 
 
However, the opposite argument is that social composition does matter. In this view 
general attitudes and beliefs about parties are more important than specific policies in 
determining voter choice. Consequently, the impression that a political party favours a 
particular class or excludes certain social groups may alienate some sections of the 
electorate and cost the party votes. Furthermore, in the closed world of Westminster, 
the attitudes of the party leader will inevitably be affected by those around them. 
Consequently, although the leader may not have gone to a public school he or she is 
                                                     
1 One third of the manual working-class has historically supported the party at elections (Coxall & 
Robins, 1998: 76) 
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under pressure to adopt the upper middle-class values, which dominate the 
Parliamentary Party. Finally social exclusivity may act as a brake on policy 
formulation, by giving the Conservatives too narrow a frame of reference (Butler & 
Pinto-Duschinsky, 1980: 200-203). 
 
Crucially, Conservative Central Office has long held the opinion that the narrow 
social background of its MPs is problematic. Specific measures to promote working-
class candidates were first made in 1919 with the formation of the Unionist Labour 
Movement. This was superseded by the Conservative Trade Unionists’ Organisation 
in 1947. Both organisations attempted to rectify the shortage of working-class 
candidates through training and financial support. Financial support was crucial to 
working-class candidates, as local constituency associations usually demanded hefty 
donations from their prospective MPs, which in effect meant that safe seats were 
auctioned to the highest bidder (Clarke, 1998: 271). The issue of donations and 
candidates’ election expenses was addressed by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe’s 1947 
inquiry into the Party’s organisation. The inquiry was prompted by the 1945 Labour 
landslide, which Conservative strategists blamed, in part, on the elitist nature of the 
PCP (Greenwood, 1988, 458-466). The reforms introduced by Maxwell-Fyfe made 
the constituency associations, rather than parliamentary candidates, responsible for 
election expenses. In addition, constituency associations were prohibited from raising 
the question of financial contributions from any prospective candidate until after they 
had been selected and limiting contributions that a candidate could make to £25 a 
year2 (Taylor & Evans, 1996: 77). Whilst these reforms may have addressed the 
power of money in candidate selection they did not lead to an immediate change in 
the social composition of the PCP (Criddle, 1994: 156). The main obstacle to 
selecting working-class candidates was with the individual constituency associations 
who were still reluctant to choose candidates who were not from a middle-class, 
professional background. Despite concerted pressure from Central Office on 
constituency associations, the few working-class or trades unionist candidates that 
were selected were generally doomed to fight solidly Labour seats (Greenwood, 1988: 
461). It was not until the 1955 general election that the first Conservative trades 
unionist, Ray Mawby, was elected. Although Central Office held up Mawby as a 
                                                     
2 £50 for MPs 
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shining example of the modern Conservative Party, neighbouring MP Charles 
Williams opposed his candidacy and complained that, “Devon and Cornwall should 
be the preserve of gentlemen and trades unionists should not be selected. (Criddle, 
1994: 157-158) 
 
Whilst the social composition of the bulk of the PCP remained largely immune to 
institutional changes in candidate selection, the introduction of leadership elections 
arguably made the PCP seem less elitist and more inclusive. Prior to the election of 
Edward Heath in 1965 Conservative leaders were not selected through a formal 
election process. Rather, senior party members canvassed their colleagues in the 
parliamentary party, a practice that became known as “the customary processes of 
consultation” (Bogdanor, 1994: 69).  The new leader would then be appointed Prime 
Minister by the monarch3. Heath came from a lower-middle class background4 and 
was grammar school educated, rather than from public school. This contrasted well 
with previous aristocratic public school educated leaders such as Home, Macmillan 
and Churchill. Heath’s successor Margaret Thatcher had middle class, rather than 
aristocratic roots. In addition, she was the first woman to lead a major political party 
and the first female Prime Minister. When she became Conservative leader Mrs. 
Thatcher was acutely aware that voters the electorate could turn against the 
Conservatives, simply on account of her gender. However, she skilfully turned both 
her gender and her upbringing above a corner shop to her advantage; she portrayed 
herself as a thrifty housewife, in touch with an electorate struggling with inflation, and 
who possessed common sense remedies to the nation’s economic ills. Mrs. Thatcher’s 
successor, John Major also used his humble origins to portray himself as a man of the 
people in a party political broadcast for the 1992 general election; directed by John 
Schlesinger The Journey saw Major retrace his early years in Brixton (Seldon, 1997: 
277). Major tried to reinforce this ‘man of the people’ image through his vision of a 
‘classless society’ and allowing the public to suggest worthy candidates for honours 
(Baker & Fountain, 1996: 88). 
 
                                                     
3 Heath was the first Tory leader since Bonar Law to take charge whilst the party was in opposition 
4 His father was a carpenter 
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4.22 Academic work on the PCP and social background 
4.22.1 Education 
There is a large body of work on the social background of the PCP, this comes both 
from both work specifically related to the Conservative Party and also from various 
Nuffield College election studies. Arguably the most wide ranging study is that by 
Byron Criddle (1994), which covers the periods from 1900 to the 1935 election and 
from 1945 to the 1992 election. Criddle’s study shows the dominance of Eton and the 
Oxbridge educated MPs during the years prior to the Great War (see Table 4.1 
below). However, the influx of ‘new money’ (and a consequent dilution of the elitist 
nature of the party) can be seen in the lower proportion of public school educated MPs 
after the landslide victories of 1918, 1924, 1931 and 1935 (Criddle, 1994: 151).  
 
After 1945 the educational background of Tory MPs remained fairly stable until the 
1979 election, when the public school contingent began to steadily decline (see Table 
4.2 below). In addition, the number of Old Etonian’s within the PCP fell across the 
post-war period; from one in four in 1945 to one in ten5 by 1992 (Criddle, 1994: 161). 
In addition, the party’s more meritocratic nature was reflected in the rise in the 
proportion of graduates within the PCP, many of who came from universities other 
than Oxford or Cambridge (Criddle, 1994: 161). These trends become even more 
obvious through the analysis of cohorts of Tory MPs entering Parliament for the first 
time (see Table 4.3 below). Criddle highlights how the 1945 intake, concentrated in 
safe seats, was predominantly (80%) public school educated. However, by the 1970s 
the proportion of new MPs educated at public school had fallen to an average of 62% 
and fell below 60% during the 1980’s (Criddle, 1994: 161). 
 
 
                                                     
5 Thirty-four out of 336 
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Table 4.1 Education of Conservative MPs 1900-1935 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  Public School     University       Public School Total MPs 
__________________________________________________________________________________      and Oxford or 
  Eton     Harrow     Other     All public     Oxford     Cambridge     Other     All university     Cambridge 
             school  
  (%)  (%)           (%)        (%)                (%)          (%)                (%)         (%)                       (%)                           (N) 
1900  29 10       22          61       28           20         10           58      58   402    
1906  35   7       25          67        28            15          10           53       40    156 
1910 (Jan.) 33  10        31          74        30            16            9           55       44    272 
1910 (Feb.) 34    9        32          75        31            16            9           56      45    272 
1918   19    8        26          53       23            16          14           53       40   382 
1922  22   9        26          57        24            17          11           52       36    344  
1923  25  10        27          62        27            16          11           54      38    258 
1924  23    7        27          57        24            18          14           56       35    412 
1929   27    9        26          62       26            19          17           62       38    260 
1931  22    7        27          56        25            18          15           58       36    470 
1935   26    7        30         63        29            19          12           60       44    387 
Source: Criddle, 1994: 152 
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Table 4.2 Education of Conservative MPs 1945-1992 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  Public School     University       Public School Total MPs 
__________________________________________________________________________________      and Oxford or 
  Eton     Harrow     Other     All public     Oxford     Cambridge     Other     All university     Cambridge 
             school  
  (%)  (%)           (%)        (%)                (%)          (%)                (%)         (%)                       (%)                           (N) 
1945  29   6        41          76        29            22          11           62       48     210 
1950  26   6        43          75        31            21          10           62       50     298 
1951  24   7        43          74            31            21          10           62       49     321 
1955  23   6        47          76        31            22          10           63       50     345 
1959  20   5        47          72        28            22          10           60       46     365 
1964  22   6        47          75        30            22          11           63       48     304 
1966  22   6        53          81        33            24          10           67       51     253 
1970  18   4        52          74        30            22          12           64       45     330 
1974 (Feb)  18  4        52          74       29            24          14           67       48     297 
1974 (Oct) 17   4        54          75        29            27          13           69       47     277 
1979  15   2        55          72        27            23          19           69       43     339 
1983  12   3        55          70        26            22          23           71       42     397 
1987  11   2        55          68        24            20          26           70       37     376 
1992  10   2        50          62        25            20          28           73       32     336 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Criddle, 1994: 162 
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Table 4.3 Education of New Conservative MPs 1945-1992 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year  Public school          Eton          Public school and          Total New MPs 
                      Oxford or Cambridge 
  (%)           (%)   (%)        (N) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1945  84           28    41          71 
1950  70           23    45        119 
1951  75           25    46          41   
1955  75           14     50           49  
1959  73            16     35           71 
1964  85            15     56           41 
1966  61            16     44           18 
1970  63            10     37         100 
1974 (Feb.) 81            15     45           53 
1974 (Oct.) 60             –     33           10 
1979  61            13     30           86 
1983  52              6              25                                   101 
1987  59              6     30            53 
1992  55              5     33            63 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Criddle, 1994; 163 
 
These finding are largely confirmed Burch & Moran’s (1985) study of the British 
political elite. They found that the social composition of the PCP remained largely 
stable between 1945 and 1974, but became more meritocratic from 1979 onwards. 
Burch & Moran were concerned that the large number of new Tory MPs elected in the 
landslide victory of 1983 may have distorted the picture. They argued that the old 
pattern of recruiting well-connected Tories for safe seats might have been hidden by 
large numbers of more meritocratic MPs, who would not ordinarily have been elected. 
To test this theory Burch & Moran measured the educational characteristics of the 
1983 cohort against the marginality of their seats (see Table 4.4 below). If the 
hypothesis were true then the best educated MPs would be in the safest seats. 
However, the proportion of public school / Oxbridge MPs in the safest seats was the 
same as for the party as a whole, whilst the proportion of Old Etonians and ex public 
school MPs is almost identical to that of the PCP as a whole (Burch & Moran, 1985: 
6). Therefore Burch & Moran concluded that the increasingly meritocratic nature of 
the PCP was based on real change and was not a temporary distortion caused by the 
abnormally large intake of 1983 (Burch & Moran, 1983: 6).  
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However, Burch & Moran noted that the rise of the meritocrats was largely confined 
to the rank and file of the PCP (see Table 4.5 below). Despite the election of Ted 
Heath and Margaret Thatcher, both grammar school products from relatively humble 
backgrounds, Conservative cabinets remained dominated by a public school / 
Oxbridge educated elite. Whilst there was a decline in the aristocratic and upper 
middle-class element within the Cabinet, this was not matched by a corresponding rise 
in state school educated meritocrats (Burch & Moran, 1985: 8-9). 
 
Baker, Gamble & Ludlam (1992), updated and expanded on the work of Burch & 
Moran.  Baker et. al. studied the social background and ideological position of both 
new MPs and ministers from 1987 to 1992. In addition they used the same methods as 
Burch & Moran by plotting the social backgrounds of the 1987 and 1992 cohorts of 
the PCP and comparing them against that of 1983. Baker et al.’s results show that the 
broadening of the social base of new Conservative MPs, evident in Burch & Moran, 
was halted or even reversed in the 1987 and 1992 intakes. Furthermore, Baker et. al. 
found evidence that suggested the Conservative Party was reverting to type (see Table 
4.6 below), in that those with a more traditional educational background dominated 
the selection for safe seats (Baker et. al., 1992: 659). Analysis of the educational 
background of cabinet members between 1987 and 1992 (see Table 4.7 below) 
revealed that the numbers of state educated cabinet ministers rose, from 14% in 1979 
to 24% in 1992. However, those from a public school Oxbridge background remained 
fairly stable. In addition, those who did not attend university fell from 29% in 1983 to 
only 10% in 1992. Therefore Baker et. al. largely confirmed the conclusions of Burch 
& Moran, concluding that there was no evidence that the higher echelons of the 
Conservative Party were becoming more meritocratic (Baker et. al., 1992: 661). 
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Table 4.4 Background of New Conservative MPs 1983, Allowing for Marginality of Seat (%): Difference from Figure for All New MPs in 
Brackets 
All   5% Plus Majorities   10% Plus Majorities   15% Plus Majorities 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
All Public Schools   47.0   53.6        (+ 6.6)   51.9          (+ 4.9)   46.9           (- 0.1) 
Eton     6.0   7.2        (+ 1.2)   5.8          (-0.2)   6.25           (+ 0.25) 
Oxbridge   35.0   37.7        (+2.7)   36.5          (+ 1.5)   31. 25           (-3.75) 
Public / Oxbridge   25.0   29.0        (+ 4.0)   26.9          (+ 1.9)   25.0           (0.0) 
Elem. / Sec. Only   12.0   13.0           (+ 1.0)   15.4             (+3.4)   21.9           (+ 9.9) 
State sec. / Univ.   30.0   24.6           (- 5.4)   25.0             (- 5.0)   28.1              (- 1.9) 
 
Number    100   69     52     32 
Source: Burch & Moran , 1985: 14  
 
Table 4.5: Background of Cabinet Ministers (%) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1916 – 1955    1955 – 1984 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
All Public Schools          76.5          87.1  
Eton / Harrow           5.9           36.3 
Oxbridge            63.2           72.8 
Elem. / Sec. Only             4.0             2.5 
All Universities           71.4           81.6 
Aristocrat            31.6           18.1 
Middle Class            65.3           74.0 
Working Class             3.0             2.6 
No Data               –             4.0 
Number           98           77 
Source: Burch & Moran, 1985: 15 
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Table 4.6 New MPs from 1983-1992 grouped by educational background and marginality of seat. Percentage of newly occupied seats with 
certain majorities won by MPs of various educational backgrounds 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Year   All New MPs    5% + Maj    10% + Maj    15% + Maj 
Public School  92         66%          45%            50%                        72% 
87         65%          65%            66%             71% 
83         47%          54%            52%             47% 
Eton   92            5%            9%              0               6% 
87           6%            7%              7%               9% 
83           6%            6%              7%               6% 
Oxbridge  92         43%          27%            17%             53% 
87         42%          42%            42%             44% 
83         35%          38%            37%             31% 
Public / Oxbridge 92         39%          18%            17%             50% 
87         37%          37%            39%             41% 
83         25%          29%            27%             25% 
St. Sec / Uni  92         18%          36%            33%             14%  
87         14%          12%            10%             12% 
83         30%          30%            25%             28% 
State Sec /  HE* 92         25%          45%            33%             19% 
87        28%          30%            20%             24% 
83           -              -               -     - 
Elem / Sec  92           5%             0              0               8%  
87           8%             9%              7%               6% 
83         12%           13%            15%             22% 
Number   92         61                       53            42             36 
87         52            43            41             34 
83       100            69               52             32 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source Baker et. al., 1992: 660    *includes all forms of higher / further education 
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Table 4.7 Educational Background of Cabinet Ministers by Cabinet Cohort from 1979 – 1992 
 
Cabinet Cohort*    1979    1983    1987    1990    1992 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Education 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Private Secondary    86%    71%    71%    77%    76% 
State Secondary    14%    29%    29%    23%    24% 
Oxbridge     82%    81%    67%    77%    71% 
Other University    18%    10%    14%      9%    19%  
No University    14%    29%    29%    23%    10% 
Number     22    21     21    22     21 
 
* Post-election cabinets in 1979, ‘83, ’87, and ’92 and John Major’s first cabinet in 1990 
Source Baker et. al., 1992: 661 
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4.22.2 Occupation 
In terms of occupation, Criddle’s (1994) study observed that up to 1939 the PCP was 
dominated by a plutocratic elite, drawn from landowners, the military, the professions 
and business. However, this research also highlights the decline in the ascendancy of 
the landowning class after the carnage of World War I and as professionals and 
businessmen joined the Conservatives (see Table 4.8 below) rather than the declining 
Liberal Party (Criddle, 1994: 165).  
 
Table 4.8 Occupation of Conservative MPs 1900-1935 
______________________________________________________________ 
Year  Land6     Military7   Professions8    Business9 Total MPs 
(%)     (%)    (%)     (%)   (N) 
_______________________________________________________________ 
1900  26     13    29     32   402 
1906  28     11    25     36   156 
1910 (Jan.) 27     12    33     27   272 
1910 (Dec.) 27     12    33     27   272 
1918  15     14    33     38   382 
1922  14     14    37     35   344 
1923  16     12    36     36   258 
1924  12     15    40     33   412 
1929  14     17    37     32   260 
1931  11     12    41     36   470 
1935  10     15    36     40   387 
Source: Criddle, 1994: 147 
 
The post-war Nuffield election studies divided occupational categories into 
professions, business, miscellaneous and manual, (see Table 4.9 below) although the 
last category was largely irrelevant, as it consisted of a sole MP first elected in 1964. 
The further decline of the landed gentry and the military is demonstrated by their 
relegation to components of the ‘miscellaneous’ category. The balance between the 
other three categories remained fairly stable throughout the post war period and 
reflected the switch of electoral power from the shires to the suburbs (Criddle, 1994: 
160-161). 
 
 
                                                     
6 Owners of land and their heirs 
7 Army, Navy or Air Force Officers 
8 Essentially the Bar, and lesser numbers of solicitors, civil servants, diplomats, medics, academics, 
journalists and publishers 
9 MPs engaged in commerce, finance and industry 
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Table 4.9 Occupation of Conservative MPs 1945-1992 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year   Professions10      Business11      Miscellaneous12    Manual      Total 
MPs 
  (%)    (%)  (%)        (%) (N) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1945   48     27   25         __  210 
1950  43     41   16         __   298 
1951   41     37   22         __   321 
1955   46     29   24         __  345 
1959  46     31   23         __  365 
1964  48     26   25         1   304 
1966  46     30   23         1   253 
1970  45     30   23         1   330 
1974 (Feb.) 45    32   23         1   297 
1974 (Oct.) 46    32   21         1   277 
1979  45     34   20         1   339 
1983   45     36   19         1   397 
1987  42     37   20         1   376 
1992  39     38   22         1   336 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Criddle: 1994, 160 
 
The research of Criddle, Burch & Moran and Baker et. al. has revealed a slow but 
steady transition of the Conservative Party from being a party dominated by the 
aristocracy to one overwhelmingly made up of the professional middle classes. 
However, their research also demonstrated that the PCP remained socially exclusive 
and unrepresentative. My research in this area aims to show whether the PCP has 
become more inclusive or whether it has remained a bastion of elitism. 
 
4.3 Social Background of the PCP 1997-2001 
4.31 Education 
The PCP of 1997 was slightly more elitist than those of the preceding two 
parliaments, however this was reversed in 2001 (see Table 4.10 below). The 
proportion of Old Etonians and Old Harrovians in the PCP has continued to fall, 
whilst the proportion of privately educated MPs rose in 1997 (67%), but then fell back 
again in 2001 (61%). Again, the number of Oxbridge graduates in the PCP rose in 
1997 (50%), but fell back in 2001 (46%). In another sign of continuity, Oxford 
                                                     
10 Barristers, solicitors, doctors, architects, surveyors, engineers, accountants, military officers, civil 
servants, lecturers and teachers. 
11 Company directors and executives in commerce, finance and industry 
12 Farmers and landowners, publishers, journalists, political organisers and housewives 
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graduates still outnumber their colleagues from Cambridge. One noticeable trend is 
the rise in the proportion of MPs who have had some form of higher education; this 
has increased from 73% in 1992 to 92% in both 1997 and 2001. This is possibly a 
consequence of the retirement of many of the older members of the PCP and a 
reflection of the wider trend for more people to be university educated. Examination 
of the new intake of Tory MPs elected in 1997 shows that public school and public 
school / Oxbridge educated MPs were more likely to be selected for safest seats, 
whilst those who received a state secondary school and a non-Oxbridge university 
more likely to be selected for the most marginal seats (see Table 4.10 below). MPs 
with a state secondary and Oxbridge education were over-represented in the group of 
second safest seats. All of the new intake were university educated. Study of the 2001 
cohort reveals that those MPs who went to state secondary schools and non-Oxbridge 
universities were again over-represented in the most marginal seats. By contrast those 
who attended state secondary schools, but who attended one of the Oxbridge 
universities are over-represented in the safest seats (see Table 4.11 below). 
 
However, my research also shows that the highest ranks of the PCP are becoming 
more inclusive and meritocratic (see Table 4.12 below). Baker et. al. found that from 
1979-1992 cabinet positions were overwhelmingly taken up by privately educated 
MPs (on average 76%). However, this figure dropped to 58% for the 1997 Shadow 
Cabinet and 54% in 2001. The 1997 Shadow cabinet conformed to type, in that 
Oxbridge graduates (79%) far outnumbered contemporaries from less prestigious 
universities. However, the first 2001 Shadow Cabinet a significant shift with 
Oxbridge graduates in a minority (42%), compared to their colleagues from other 
universities (50%). 
 
4.32 Occupation 
My research shows that the social composition of the PCP has remained more or less 
static. The PCP is still drawn overwhelmingly from business and the professions (see 
table 4.8 below), the dominant profession being law.   
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Table 4.10 Education of Conservative MPs 1979-2001 
  
Year  Public School     University       Public School Total MPs 
__________________________________________________________________________________      and Oxford or 
  Eton     Harrow     Other     All public     Oxford     Cambridge     Other     All university     Cambridge 
             school  
  (%)  (%)           (%)        (%)                (%)          (%)                (%)         (%)                       (%)                           (N) 
1979  15   2        55          72        27            23          19           69       43     339 
1983  12   3        55          70        26            22          23           71       42     397 
1987  11   2        55          68        24            20          26           70       37     376 
1992  10   2        50          62        25            20          28           73       32     336 
1997    9  1       57          67                  28           22         42           92              40    165 
2001    8         -        54         61       25           21         46           92      35    166 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Criddle, 1994: 162, Dod’s Parliamentary Companion 1997-2001, Websites of individual MPs       
 
Table  4.11 Background of New Conservative MPs 1997, Allowing for Marginality of Seat (%): Difference from Figure for All New MPs in 
Brackets 
All   Under 5% Maj 5% + Maj  10% + Maj   15% + Maj 
All Public Schools  58.0  53.5  (  -  4.5)  57.2  ( - 0.8)  50.0   (  - 8.0)  63.2 (+ 5.2)   
Eton       7.0  11.1  (  + 4.1)  14.3  (+ 7.3)    0.0        5.3 ( - 1.7) 
Public / Oxbridge              30.2  33.3  (  + 3.3)  28.6  (-  4.7)  12.5   ( -17.7)             36.8 (+ 6.6) 
Public / Univ   25.6  22.2  (  -  3.4)  28.6  (+ 3.0)  25.0   ( -  0.6)  26.3 (+ 0.7) 
State Sec. Oxbridge  14.0  11.1  (  -  3.1)    0.0   37.5  (+ 23.5)  10.5 (-  3.5) 
State Sec. / Uni.  28.0  44.4 (  +16.4)  28.6  ( +0.6)  25.0   (  - 3.0)  21.1 ( - 6.9) 
Elem. / Sec. Only   0     -                                   -                                  -                                   -  
Number    43    9      7                                  8                               19 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Dod’s Parliamentary Companion 1998, Websites of individual MPs  
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Table 4.12 Background of New Conservative MPs 2001, Allowing for Marginality of Seat (%): Difference from Figure for All New MPs in 
Brackets* 
 
All   Under 5% Maj 5% + Maj   10% + Maj   15% + Maj 
All Public Schools   63.6  33.3  (- 30.3)           100.0    (+ 33.4) 50.0   (-16.6)  60.0 (-6.6)   
Eton      18.0    0   33.3   (+ 14.3)    0   30.0  (+ 11.0) 
Public / Oxbridge    22.7    0   33.3    (+  9.5)    0             40.0 (+ 16.2) 
Public / Univ    40.9             33.3  (-  7.6)  66.6    (+23.7)  50.0  (+7.1)  30.0 (- 12.9) 
State Sec. Oxbridge     4.5    0      0                                  0                              100.0 (+95.2) 
State Sec. / Uni.   31.8  66.6 (+ 34.8)    0   33.3 (+ 1.5)  30.0 (+1.8) 
Number     22    3     3     6                                10 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Dod’s Parliamentary Companion 2002, individual MPs’ websites. 
* Two MPs (John Baron and Andrew Selous have chosen not to reveal their secondary education and have been excluded from this study 
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Table 4.13 Educational Backgrounds of Shadow Cabinet Ministers by Cabinet Cohort 
from 1997 – 2001 
 
Cabinet Cohort*    1997   2001 
 
Education 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Private Secondary    58%  54% 
State Secondary    42%  46% 
Oxbridge     79%  42% 
Other University    16%  50% 
No University      5%    8% 
Number     19  26 
Sources: Dod’s Parliamentary Companion 1998 – 2002, Individual MPs’ websites 
* Post election  shadow cabinets in 1997 and 2001 
 
Table 4.14 Occupation of Conservative MPs 1979-2001 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Year   Professions8      Business9      Miscellaneous10      Manual      Total 
MPs 
  (%)    (%)  (%)        (%) (N) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1979  45     34   20         1   339 
1983   45     36   19         1   397 
1987  42     37   20         1   376 
1992  39     38   22         1   336 
1997  34    32  33        1  165  
2001  35    32  32        1  166 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Criddle: 1994, 160, Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, 1997-2001, Websites of individual MPs 
 
The research presented in this chapter shows that the PCP, by its own standard, has 
become more inclusive, a process that accelerated after 1979 and that this trend has 
continued, despite a ‘blip’ in 1997 probably caused by the scale of the party’s defeat 
at the hands of New Labour. 
 
However it is still a long way from being representative of the nation as a whole 
where 79% are state educated, 5% attend grammar schools and 13% are privately 
schooled (http://www.statistics.gov.uk). Moreover, whilst 44% of school leavers 
attend university (http://www.dfes.gov.uk), over 90% of the PCP passed through the 
                                                     
8 Barristers, solicitors, doctors, architects, surveyors, engineers, accountants, military officers, civil 
servants, lecturers and teachers. 
9 Company directors and executives in commerce, finance and industry 
10 Farmers and landowners, publishers, journalists, political organisers and housewives 
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higher education system. The proportion of the PCP that is Oxbridge educated is even 
greater; 50% (1997) or 48% (2001) of Conservative MPs went to either Oxford or 
Cambridge compared to a mere 2% of the general public. In addition, the PCP still 
contains a small contingent drawn from the ranks of the aristocracy; Archie Hamilton 
and Peter Brooke sat in the 1997 Parliament, whilst Michael Ancram, Douglas Hogg, 
Nicholas Soames and George Young served in both the 1997 and 2001 Parliaments. 
Eighteen Tory MPs who sat in the 1997 Parliament had knighthoods and ten knights 
were elected as Tory MPs in 200112.  Thirteen Conservative MPs from the 1997 
Parliament had relatives who had previously either been Conservative MPs or who 
had served in earlier Conservative administrations, this figure fell to ten MPs in the 
2001 session13. By contrast, the PCP of 1997 contained only thirteen women and the 
PCP of 2001 had just fourteen. 
 
4.33 Gender 
The low number of female Conservative MPs in the 1997 and 2001 parliaments is not 
unusual. However, it is surprising given that the post-war Conservative Party has been 
the beneficiary of a political ‘gender gap’; evidence suggests that between 1945-1979 
women were much more likely to vote Conservative, rather than Labour. This is 
highly significant, had there been no women’s franchise Labour would have been in 
office almost continuously from 1945 to 1997  (Lovenduski et. al., 1994: 615). The 
party also gave women the vote on the same terms as men in 1928, it was the first and 
to date only British political party to be led by a woman who went on to become the 
country’s first and only female Prime Minister. Nevertheless, the party’s record in 
producing female MPs has been poor. The post-war Conservative Party has 
consistently selected fewer female candidates than the Labour Party (see Table 4.15 
below). Furthermore, the last time the Conservative Party selected more women than 
the Liberal Democrats (and their predecessors) was 1970, although the Conservatives 
have a better record than the Liberal Democrats when it comes to ‘converting’ female 
candidates into MPs. 
                                                     
12 1997; Ray Whitney, Richard Body, Peter Emery, Norman Fowler, Edward Heath, Geoffrey Johnson-
Smith, Nicholas Lyell, David Madel. 1997 & 2001; Sydney Chapman, Patrick Cormack, Michael 
Spicer, John Stanley, Peter Tapsell, Teddy Taylor, Alan Haselhurst, Brian Mawhinney, John Butterfill, 
Michael Lord 
13 1997; David Prior, Peter Brooke, David Faber, Peter Temple Morris. 2001; Andrew Mitchell, Bill 
Wiggin. 1997 & 2001; Michael Ancram, Francis Maude, Douglas Hogg, Nicholas Soames, Geoffrey 
Clifton-Brown, David Heathcoat-Amory, Bernard Jenkin, James Arbuthnot, Dominic Grieve 
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The main problem appears to be that a culture of overt sexism is still rife within the 
Conservative Party. Aspiring women candidates interviewed for research by the 
Fawcett Society felt that: 
…there is a widespread assumption within the Conservative Party that MPs 
should be white, male, professional, middle aged with a family. (Fawcett 
Society, 2004: 2) 
The worst offenders in this culture of sexism are the older members, both male and 
female and the problem is arguably exacerbated by the elderly profile the 
Conservative grassroots members. In 1998 women under the age of forty five 
comprised a mere 2% of the Conservative Party’s membership and Baroness 
Buscombe, a former party vice chairman with responsibility for women claimed that 
“…the Conservative Party was not a place where women under sixty could feel 
comfortable.” (Buscombe, 30/8/2001) 
 
Table 4.15 Women candidates and elected MPs 1945 – 1997   ___ 
Year    Conservative                    Labour         Liberal14  
   Candidates    Elected       Candidates    Elected    Candidates    Elected___ 
1945          14       1     41          21           20       1 
1950          29       6     42          14           45       1 
1951          25       6     41              11                     11                0 
1955             33     10     43              14                     14       0 
1959          28     12                   36              13                     16       0                 
1964             24               11                   33              18                     24                0 
1966          21                 7                   30              19                     20                0 
1970            26               15                   29              10                     23                0 
1974 Feb      33                 9                   40              13                     40                0 
1974 Oct      30                 7                   50              18           49                0 
1979          31                 8                   52              11                     52                0 
1983             40               13                   78              10                     76                0                   
1987             46               17                   92              21                   105                2 
1992             63               20                 138              37                   143                2 
1997          67     13                 154            101                   122       5 
2001          94               14                 149              95                   132       5____ 
Sources: Dods’s Parliamentary Companion 1998 – 2002, Lovenduski et. al., 1994: 626, The Family 
Policy Studies Centre 1997, The Fawcett Society 2002 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 Including all Alliance candidates in 1983 and 1987 and Liberal Democrats in 1992 
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3.34 Race 
If the party’s record on female candidates and MPs is poor, its record on ethnic 
minorities is even worse. The Conservative Party’s only Asian MP Nirj Deva lost his 
seat in the 1997 Labour landslide (Criddle, 1997: 199). Consequently there were no 
ethnic minority Conservative MPs between 1997 and 2005. Only fourteen candidates 
at the 2001 election were black or Asian and of those only two were in winnable 
seats. Shadow cabinet member Andrew Lansley admits there is endemic racism 
within the Party and that: 
I know a number of prospective candidates who, if they were not from ethnic 
minorities, would have been selected in safe seats and would be Conservative 
MPs today. There are people who, if they simply had a different name, would 
have been interviewed many times, are immensely impressive and would have 
been selected. (Sylvester & Johnston, 1/9/2001) 
Baroness Buscombe believes that the way the party treats people from ethnic 
minorities mirrors the way the party treats women: 
I remember one party at Central Office, which was billed as a Caribbean 
evening. The guests were black Britons who, almost without exception, had 
been born in this country and had left their desks in the City in order to attend 
the event. They were served fried plantains and there was a steel band playing. 
I nearly died. They were all really enthusiastic about the Conservative party, 
and completely baffled. (Buscombe, 30/8/2001) 
 
4.4 Political Attributes 
4.4.1 Electoral vulnerability 
Once elected most members of Parliament regard the Commons as a career and 
consequently give it up with great reluctance (Adonis, 1993: 53). The commentator 
Noel Malcolm referred to, “…the deepest need of Tory backbenchers: the need to 
retain one’s seat at a general election.” (Davies, 1995: 121) Therefore it is reasonable 
to hypothesise that constituency or electoral marginality can be identified as a salient 
variable upon leadership elections, even if it is not the most important variable. The 
constituency marginality of individuals within the PCP is salient as it magnifies the 
perception of vulnerability for MPs in marginal constituencies, which potentially 
constrains them and can hinder their career. On the other hand it can be an enabling 
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dynamic for MPs with large majorities as it empowers them and can enhance their 
prospects for promotion.  
 
MPs in marginal constituencies are constrained by a number of factors; firstly there is 
a relationship between the marginality of a seat and turnout, with turnout being 
stronger in marginal seats. One explanation is that individual voters may feel that they 
have a chance of affecting the outcome and are therefore more motivated to vote. 
Another explanation is that party’s campaign more extensively in marginal seats, 
compared to safe seats and that this heightened campaigning persuades voters to turn 
out (Whiteley et. al., 1988: 191) Consequently, MPs may feel compelled to devote an 
above average amount of time to constituency matters and working on behalf of their 
constituents.  Philip Norton has identified seven constituency roles that an MP has to 
fulfil:  
1 safety valve, allowing constituent to express their views; 2 information 
provider, giving information or advice to those constituents that seek it; 3 
local dignitary, attending local events; 4 advocate, giving support to a 
particular cause; 5 benefactor, providing benefits to a particular constituents 
who seek them; 6 powerful friend, intervening in a particular dispute on behalf 
of a constituent; 7 promoter of constituency interests, advancing the case for 
collective interests (such as employment) in the constituency (Norton, 2002: 
21). 
MPs might hope that by working in this way they could build up a degree of personal, 
rather than party support. Although constituency work is not thought to persuade 
many voters to switch allegiance it may well serve to retain support that would 
otherwise drain away (Norton, 2002: 34). This could be vital in holding the seat at an 
election if the popular mood was running against the political party that an MP 
represented. Michael Portillo’s perceived indifference towards his constituents in his 
Enfield South seat has been cited as a major factor that led to his dismissal at the 1997 
general election (Paxman, 2003: 132). 
 
A second strategy an MP with a marginal majority might feel compelled to take is to 
rebel against their party over certain issues. In this case the MP might hope that by 
defying the party line over an unpopular issue their constituents would see them as 
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independent of party and concerned to properly represent their constituents. This 
feeling could again be translated into a ‘personal’, rather than ‘party’ vote at election 
time.  
 
Whilst both these strategies may enable an MP to hang on to their marginal seat 
whilst the tide is against their party, the downside is that both may curtail their rise up 
the party and governmental ladder. MPs that have to devote a considerable amount of 
time to ‘nursing’ their constituencies have less time to devote to speaking in 
parliament, working in committees and getting noticed by their party’s whips and are 
therefore often overlooked for promotion. Whilst poor parliamentary performance 
may result in an MP being overlooked for promotion, a rebellious MP will get 
noticed, but for all the wrong reasons. Rebellion against ones’ party is not taken 
lightly and rebellious MPs can expect to miss out on trips abroad, membership of 
parliamentary committees and of course ministerial office. Rebellious MPs may also 
face trouble from within their local association who hold the ultimate sanction of 
deselection, as Sir Anthony Meyer wrote, “The price of liberty, for an independent 
minded MP, is eternal coffee mornings.”15 (Davies, 1995: 120) Finally, an MP for a 
marginal constituency may find their party and governmental career is curtailed by the 
insecurity of tenure. It would be reasonable to hypothesis that the party leader would 
be unwilling to promote an MP who is likely to loss their seat at the next general 
election. 
 
Evidence that Conservative MPs in marginal constituencies are less likely to attain 
high office is provided in Table 4.16 (below). This analyses the composition of 
Conservative Party cabinets and shadow cabinets in relation to electoral vulnerability. 
The table shows every Conservative cabinet and shadow cabinet formed immediately 
after a general election, since 1951 together with every Conservative cabinet and 
shadow cabinet that preceded the next general election. These are broken down into 
four groups, ranging from those in the most marginal seats (majorities under 5%) to 
those in normally safe seats (majorities of 15% and above). The table clearly 
demonstrates the adverse affect that holding a marginal constituency can play upon a 
                                                     
15 In the end Meyer’s rebellious streak cost him his job, when his local association deselected him for 
challenging Mrs. Thatcher for the leadership of the party in 1989. 
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Conservative MP’s career aspirations. Over a period of fifty years only 26 MPs 
(5.8%) from the most marginal seats have attained cabinet (or shadow cabinet) rank 
from the 26 cabinets and shadow cabinets analysed.   
 
By contrast the largest group 299 MPs (66.4%), who attained cabinet (or shadow 
cabinet) rank sat in the safest seats. This group is by far the largest of the three 
comprising 2/3rd of the total number of MPs who have served in Conservative 
cabinets and their shadow equivalents. The table also shows the effect how the 
Conservative Party’s fluctuating electoral fortunes are reflected in the composition of 
cabinets according to marginality. Thus when the party has been at the peak of its 
electoral success during the One Nation and Thatcher periods no MPs from the most 
marginal constituencies made it into the cabinet. Indeed, Mrs. Thatcher’s first cabinet 
after her 1983 landslide election victory contained no one with a majority smaller that 
15%. Conversely, the periods in which MPs with the most marginal seats are most 
numerous coincide with some of the Party’s leanest years; Heath 1966-1970, Hague 
1997-2001 and Duncan Smith 2001-2002. This is conceivably due to the distorting 
effect of the electoral cycle; when the party is at a peak of electoral popularity 
individual MPs majorities will increase accordingly, then the most marginal seats the 
party holds will be those that it would not normally expect to win. Consequently these 
will be held by relatively inexperienced MPs would not be eligible for high-ranking 
jobs. Conversely, when the party is in a trough of electoral unpopularity even 
relatively safe seats may become marginal16, thus a Conservative shadow cabinet may 
include experienced and able MPs who find themselves in marginal constituencies. 
                                                     
16 Extremely adverse electoral conditions can result in the loss of what were apparently ultra-safe sets; 
thus in 1997 Michael Portillo lost Enfield Southgate despite winning a 31% majority at the 1992 
general election 
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Table 4.16 Conservative cabinet members’ majorities 1959-2003 
Cabinet      Under 5%  5%+   10%+   15%+   N 
Churchill Oct. 1951 - Sept. 1953       1    1     2     6   10 
Churchill Oct. 1954 - April 1955       1    1     4     8   14 
Eden May 1955 – Dec. 1955   0    1     4     9   14 
Macmillan Jan. 1958 – Oct. 1959        0    2     1   12   15 
Macmillan Oct. 1959 – July 1960       0    1     1   13   15 
Home April 1964 – Oct. 1964   0    2     4   14   20 
Home Oct. 1964 – July 1965*                   1    3     3   10   17 
Heath July 1965 – March 1966*       1    3     4   10   18 
Heath March 1966 –Oct. 1967*       3    2     6     4   15 
Heath Oct. 1969 – June 1970*   3    1     5     5   14 
Heath June 1970 – July 1970   0    0      4   11   15 
Heath Jan 1974 – Feb 1974         0    0     3   14   17 
Heath Feb 1974 – Oct 1974*   0    1     7   12   20 
Heath Oct 1974 – Feb 1975*   1    5     6     7   19 
Thatcher 1979*                    3    4     4     9   20 
Thatcher 1979     1    2     3   13   19 
Thatcher Jan 1983 – June 1983       0    1     4   14   19 
Thatcher Jun 1983 – Oct 1983       0    0     0   19   19 
Thatcher May 1986 – June 1987       0    0     1   18   19 
Thatcher June 1987 – Oct 1987       1    1     0   17   19 
Major Nov 1990 – April 1992       1    2     2   15   20 
Major April 1992 – Sept. 1992        0    2     2   16   20 
Major July 1995 – May 1997   1    2     2   16   21 
Hague June 1997 – June 1998*        3    0     4   10   17 
Hague Sept. 2000 – July 2001*       3    2     3   10   18 
Duncan Smith Sept 2001 – July 2002*      2    3     5     9   19 
Total                 26               42                84              301              453 
%age                   5.8   9.3   18.5   66.4              100.0 
Average      1.0                1.6     3.2   11.5   17.3 
Sources: Dod’s Parliamentary Companion 1951 – 2002, Butler & Butler, 1994: 33 – 44, 131-132 
*Denotes a shadow cabinet 
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4.42 Age and Experience 
Members of Parliament are the public face of major British political parties. The age 
and experience of a party’s MPs and their leader can affect public perceptions of that 
party in the same way as social background.  Rosenbaum argues that one of the most 
common goals of politicians is to seem authoritative and experienced (Rosenbaum, 
1997: 179), it is therefore of value to examine the age and experience of the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party and its leaders.  The Conservative Party’s first three 
post-war leaders; Churchill, Eden and Macmillan all possessed over thirty years 
parliamentary experience upon their accession to the leadership. (See Table 4.17 
below). Conservative leaders of the early post-war period also tended to be older than 
their modern counterparts, reflecting their wealth of experience. Eden was at fifty-
eight the only leader of the period under sixty; his predecessor Churchill assumed the 
leadership at the age of sixty-six. The trend towards younger, less experienced leaders 
coincided with the introduction of the formal system of leadership elections. Edward 
Heath who took control of the party at the relatively youthful age of forty-nine and 
with fifteen years experience in parliament. This was arguably a sign of Conservative 
MPs’ desire to ditch their old-fashioned ‘grouse moor’ image and appear modern and 
relevant. Consequently, Heath represented a sea change in the type of leader the party 
chose because of his youth, as well as his lower-middle class background. By contrast 
Margaret Thatcher had been in the Commons nearly twenty years when she became 
leader and was the most experienced of all the elected leaders. This may be no 
coincidence as it is arguable that Thatcher’s gender slowed her rise through the ranks 
of the parliamentary party. Nevertheless she had still spent much less time in 
parliament than any of her predecessors who ‘emerged’. Thatcher’s successor, John 
Major had only been an MP for eleven years when he replaced Mrs. Thatcher in 1990. 
Major enjoyed a meteoric ascent through the party hierarchy; one commentator 
claimed he had ‘risen without trace’ (Wheatcroft, 2005: 185) and one of his senior 
civil service advisers, Judith Chaplin wondered whether he was experienced enough 
to be Prime Minister (Seldon, 1997: 130). Major was also younger than all his 
predecessors, the first post-war Conservative leader under fifty. William Hague was 
even younger and less experienced than Major, arguably the consequence of the 
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dearth of quality candidates available in the 1997 leadership election and of the 
parliamentary party’s desire to skip a generation17. 
 
The age and experience of Conservative cabinets is analysed in Table 4.18 below. It 
should be noted that this study is confined to Conservative MPs, members of the 
House of Lords who have served in conservative cabinets and shadow cabinets are 
excluded as the thesis as a whole deals solely with the motivation and behaviour of 
the elected element of the Parliamentary Party. This shows that the overall age of 
Conservative cabinets and shadow cabinets has remained relatively stable over the 
post-war period. The oldest being Churchill’s final cabinet (av. 56.6), whilst the 
youngest is Hague’s final cabinet (av. 47.3). However, the parliamentary experience 
of Conservative cabinets has declined substantially; Churchill’s final cabinet was 
populated by seasoned politicians with an average of 23.5 years of parliamentary 
experience, however the members of William Hague’s final cabinet had less that half 
the collective experience of Churchill’s (10.1) average. Arguably this is another 
reflection of the decimating affect of the 1997 general election defeat upon the 
Conservative Party. 
 
Table 4.17 The Age and Experience Of Conservative Party Leaders   
 
Leader   Age    Years in Parliament     
Churchill  66    32 
Eden   58    32 
Macmillan  63    31 
Home   60    27* 
Heath   49    15 
Thatcher   50    19 
Major   47    11 
Hague   36      8 
Duncan Smith  47      9     
* 15 years in the Commons and 12 in the Lords 
Source: 
                                                     
17 See chapter three for an account of the 1997 Conservative Party leadership contest 
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Table 4.18 The Age and Experience of Conservative Cabinets 1951-2002 (Excluding members of the House of Lords) 
                         Age      Experience  
Cabinet     Mean / Median   Mean / Median     
Churchill Oct. 1951 - Sept. 1953  56 55.5    21.9     23.5 
Churchill Oct. 1954 – Apr. 1955  56.6 57    23.5 25 
Eden May 1955 – Dec. 1955   55.4 56.5    21.4 24.5 
Macmillan Jan. 1958 – Oct. 1959  52.7 54    16.7 15 
Macmillan Oct. 1959 – Jul. 1960  52.6 54    15.9 14 
Home Apr. 1964 – Oct. 1964   52.1 51    18.1 16.5 
Home Oct. 1964 – Aug. 1965*  52.1 52    18.1 14 
Heath Jul. 1965 – Mar. 1966*  52.4 52.5    18.5 15 
Heath Mar. 1966 – Oct. 1967*  49.1 49    15.7 16 
Heath March 1969 – June 1970*  51.6 51.5    18.5 18.5 
Heath Jun. 1970 – Jul. 1970   51.1 50    16.4 15 
Heath Jan. 1974 – Feb. 1974   53.9 54    18.7 19 
Heath Feb. 1974 – Oct. 1974*  51.3 50    16.4 15 
Heath Oct. 1974 – Feb. 1975*  50.2 50    15.2 15 
Thatcher 1979*    53.1 52.5    16.2 15 
Thatcher 1979     53.7 53    16.6 16 
Thatcher Jan. – Jun. 1983   53.6 52    17.5 17 
Thatcher Jun. Oct. 1983   53 52    17.1 17 
Thatcher May – Jun. 1987   52.9 54    18.5 16 
Thatcher Jun. – Oct. 1987   53.1 53    17.6 17 
Major Nov. 1990 – Apr. 1992  50.7 49.5    14.9 14.5 
Major Apr. 1992 – Sep. 1992   50.9 50    14.9 13 
Major Jul. 1995 – May 1997    53.5 54    18.1 18 
Hague Jun. 1997 – Jul. 2001   50.3 52    14.1 14 
Hague Sep. 2000 – Jul. 2001   47.3 46.5    10.1   8 
Duncan-Smith Sep. 2001 – Jul. 2002  48.3 45    10.5   9      
Source: Adapted from Dod’s Parliamentary Companion 1951 - 2000
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4.43 Career Status 
The career status of MPs’ may be a significant determinant of Conservative Party 
leadership elections. Cowley & Garry (1998) suggested that the career status of 
Conservative MPs’ could be analysed by utilising a threefold typology made famous 
in John Major’s ‘bastards’ comment. This categorised MPs as either ‘possessed’; 
those with a government post, ‘dispossessed’; backbenchers who once had a 
government job or ‘never possessed’; backbenchers who have never served in any 
government post18. Cowley & Garry refered to the possessed as ‘insiders’, whilst the 
dispossessed and the never possessed were collectively referred to as ‘outsiders’. 
They suggested that the dispossessed and the never possessed would be inclined to 
support Heseltine because they blamed Mrs. Thatcher, for thwarting their ambitions 
and political careers (Cowley & Garry, 1998: 476). 
 
The importance, for aspirant leaders, of being an insider can be clearly seen in the 
career paths of post-war Conservative leaders; all were insiders immediately before 
becoming party leader19. However, this has not stopped outsiders from making a 
virtue of their status and challenging for the leadership. When Michael Heseltine 
stood against Mrs. Thatcher, he claimed that his four-year absence from the cabinet 
meant that he was not tainted by recent government failures (Foley, 2002: 20). John 
Redwood relinquished his insider status by challenging John Major in 1995. John 
Redwood later echoed Heseltine, when during the 1997 leadership election Redwood 
claimed that because he was an outsider between 1995 and 1997 he bore no 
responsibility for the Conservatives’ 1997 election defeat (Williams, 1998: 187).  
 
Therefore, despite coming from different wings of the Parliamentary Party, both 
Heseltine and Redwood tried to use their position to distance themselves from the 
some Conservative policies20, which they argued had caused the party electoral 
difficulties. They claimed that as outsiders they could give the party a fresh appeal 
and offered a better chance of electoral success. By contrast Clarke sought to play 
down his outsider status and instead emphasised his popularity with the wider 
                                                     
18 This typology can also be applied to the party in opposition, with reference to senior party positions.  
19 Churchill and to a lesser extent Eden both spent time amongst the dispossessed before regaining their 
insider status 
20 In the case of Heseltine this was the poll Tax, whilst Redwood argued that the tax rises of March 
1993 were a betrayal of both Conservative principles and voters. 
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electorate that did not vote Conservative in 1997 and 2001. Clarke’s desire to play 
down his outsider status was understandable; he joined the ranks of the dispossessed, 
when he refused to serve in Hague’s Shadow Cabinet and later appeared on the same 
platform as Tony Blair to launch the Britain in Europe Campaign in 1999.  
 
All three outsiders discussed above ultimately failed in their attempt to become leader. 
One explanation is that outsiders can be extremely divisive figures and that as Foley 
states, “The party’s hierarchical ethos and internal discipline are widely seen as being 
the necessary concomitants to electoral success.” (Foley, 2002: 24). Michael Heseltine 
acquired his outsider status by abruptly walking out of the government in the middle 
of a cabinet meeting21 (Wheatcroft, 2005: 126). He then compounded this disruptive 
behaviour by challenging and wounding the incumbent leader and Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher. Although Heseltine was popular with one section of the 
parliamentary party, his role in Thatcher’s downfall meant he also made many 
implacable enemies. If the party had chosen Heseltine it risked further instability and 
perhaps fracture (Foley, 2002: 25). John Redwood also challenged an incumbent 
Prime Minister. Moreover, Redwood was publicly backed by many of the 
parliamentary party’s hard-line eurosceptics, some of whom had only just been 
readmitted to the party following their expulsion for breaching party discipline. Once 
again Redwood’s disloyalty together with the rebellious nature of some of his 
supporters made him a divisive figure within the Westminster party. Finally Clarke’s 
reason for becoming an outsider, his pro-European views, meant that he was regarded 
with deep suspicion or even hostility by his fellow conservative MPs, who believed 
that the party may split under his leadership.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to analyse four sets of non-ideological factors that shape the 
composition and nature of the parliamentary Conservative Party; social background, 
electoral vulnerability, age and experience and finally career status. The chapter 
demonstrates that both social background and age and experience variables have 
changed over time, whilst the electoral vulnerability and career status variables have 
                                                     
21 Heseltine’s resignation concerned the future of the ailing Westland helicopter company; he wished to 
see it taken over by a European consortium, whilst Mrs. Thatcher favoured a buyout by the American 
Sikorsky company. 
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shown a degree of continuity. The social background of the parliamentary party has 
undergone significant change over the course of the 20th century. The parliamentary 
party initially had large contingents of Old Etonians and Harrovians, together with a 
significant cohort of Oxbridge educated MPs. However, the alumni of Eton and 
Harrow began a slow decline after the Great War, a process that continued as the 
century progressed. This has been mirrored by a rise in MPs both from less 
prestigious public schools and also from grammar schools. This evolution in the 
educational background of the parliamentary party has coincided with a 
corresponding change in the occupational background of the party’s MPs. Prior to the 
Great War Conservative MPs were drawn from the ranks of the landowning 
aristocracy and the military, together with MPs with business and professional 
backgrounds. The landowning and military classes within the party declined during 
the inter–war years, consequently the party came to be dominated by business and the 
professions, whose ascendancy was confirmed following the 2nd World War.  
 
The social background of the party’s leaders also changed in the latter half of the 20th 
century, coinciding with the introduction of a formal process of leadership election in 
1965. Prior to this date Conservative Party leaders tended to be drawn from the public 
schools and have strong links, either through birth or marriage, to the aristocracy. The 
election of Edward Heath in 1965, a grammar school educated son of carpenter, 
therefore marked a significant departure from the previous norm for Conservative 
leaders. It was not just Heath’s social background that was significant, but also his 
relative youth. Heath’s predecessors had all (with the exception of Eden) been over 
sixty when they became party leader, whereas Heath was a mere forty-nine. Taken 
together Heath’s background and age made a statement about the more meritocratic 
nature of the Conservative Party and about its dynamism and modernity, which were 
in tune with the spirit of the mid-sixties. Heath’s relative youth and his inexperience, 
compared to his unelected predecessors is a feature common to all his elected 
successors, which reached its apogee with William Hague, at thirty-nine, the party’s 
youngest leader since Pitt.  
If Hague was abnormally young to be leading his party, then he did at least have 
something in common with all his predecessors, he had the luxury of a relatively safe 
seat. The chapter has demonstrated that the career prospects of a Conservative MP are 
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considerably enhanced by the possession of a seat with a majority of over 15%. 
Conversely that an MP in a marginal seat with a majority of under 5% can expect it to 
have a detrimental effect on their chances of holding a senior position within the 
parliamentary party. Of course this is not to say that ineffective Conservative MPs in 
safe seats are guaranteed promotion nor that talented MPs in marginal constituencies 
are doomed to spend their days on the backbenches, but electoral vulnerability does 
play a part in career progression. A further constant is the career status of 
Conservative leaders prior to their ascendancy: all possessed cabinet rank and could 
therefore be classed as insiders. While non-ideological factors clearly have a role to 
play the central proposition of this thesis is the role of ideology in recent leadership 
elections as an expression of the general trajectory of the Conservative party. 
Consequently the next chapter will explore the ideological evolution of the post-War 
PCP and analyse the ideological composition of the parliamentary party between 1997 
and 2003. 
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Chapter 5 
The Ideological Evolution of the PCP 1945 to 2003 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Traditional accounts of the Conservative Party have characterised it as united and 
loyal to the leader. However, Barnes argues that: 
Because Conservatism is not a fully worked-out ideology, it lays itself open to 
ideological projects of one kind or another and to the possibility of 
factionalism. (Barnes, 1994: 340) 
Furthermore, Barnes argues that organisations like the Tariff Reform League, the 
Tory Reform Group, the Suez Group, are equivalent to modern groupings such as the 
No Turning Back Group and Conservative Way Forward and therefore evidence that 
factionalism has been endemic within the Conservative Party (Barnes, 1994; 342-
343). Consequently the purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the ideological 
development of the modern Conservative Party and to analyse the ideological 
disposition of the parliamentary Conservative Party between 1997 and 2003. The 
chapter will firstly give an overview of academic typologies of the Thatcherite and 
post-Thatcherite parliamentary party, beginning with the seminal work of Norton 
(1990) then two-dimensional typologies (Dunleavy, 1993; Baker et. al. 1991, 1993, 
2002; Sowemimo, 1996) and finally three-dimensional typologies (Garyy, 1995; 
Cowley & Garry, 1998; Heppell, 2002). The chapter will then move on to discuss the 
historical development, changes to ideological thought and important factional 
disputations within the modern Conservative Party. Finally the chapter will provide an 
analysis of the ideological disposition of the parliamentary Conservative Party 
between 1997 and 2003 and will utilise three ideological variables in the discussion; 
economic policy, (wet / dry) national identity, (europhile / eurosceptic) and social / 
moral policy (liberal / conservative).  The key argument is that ideological 
factionalism plays an important role in the outcome of Conservative Party leadership 
elections. Consequently, we must understand the ideological composition of the 
parliamentary party in order to explain the leadership elections of 1997 and 2001. 
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5.2 The ideological composition of the PCP 
Given the wide scope covered by the dispositions and tenets of conservatism and the 
inherent tensions therein, it is hardly surprising that the membership of the PCP 
constitutes a broad church. Furthermore, some issues will evoke widely differing 
responses from individual MPs according their interpretation of the disposition and 
tenets of conservatism. However, these differences have often been obscured by the 
Conservative Party’s traditional emphasis on the necessity of unity. Indeed, the PCP 
has traditionally been thought of as a party of tendencies, rather than a party of 
factions. This classification originated from Richard Rose’s (1964) study of the 
internal ideological alignment of the Labour and Conservative Parliamentary parties. 
Rose defined a political tendency as: 
…a stable set of attitudes, rather than a stable group of politicians. It may be 
defined as a body of attitudes expressed in Parliament about a broad range of 
problems; the attitudes are held together by a more or less coherent political 
ideology…The number of MPs who adhere to a tendency varies from issue to 
issue. Adherents are often not self-consciously organised in support of a single 
policy and they do not expect, nor are they expected, to continue to operate as 
a group supporting the same tendency through a period of time. (Rose, 1964: 
37-38) 
Rose argued that the PCP was a party of tendencies and identified the four prime ones 
as; reaction, defence of the status quo, amelioration and reform. However, Rose also 
argued that the fluidity and transitory nature of many of the alignments within the 
PCP, allowed the Party leader considerably more scope for manoeuvre than his 
Labour counterpart, who had to contend with a factionalised party (Rose, 1964: 40). A 
party made up of factions, Rose contended, was harder for the leader to deal with 
because factions were individual MPs who sought to promote certain policies through, 
“consciously organised political activity.” Factions differed from tendencies because: 
…factions are self-consciously organised as a body, with a measure of 
discipline and cohesion thus resulting. Identification with a faction usually 
increases an individual’s commitment to a programme, as well as creating the 
expectation that the politician will consistently take the same side in quarrels 
within an electoral party. (Rose, 1964: 37) 
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Although Rose classified the PCP as a party of tendencies and identified what he 
believed to be the major tendencies within the PCP, he made no attempt to categorise 
the ideological position of individual MPs.  
 
5.3 One-dimensional typologies 
The first attempt to categorise the ideological belief of individual MPs was made by 
Philip Norton (1990)3. Norton’s taxonomy divides the PCP into four subsections, with 
further subdivisions, giving seven groups in total. These are; (1) Thatcherites – 
Economic Liberals and the Tory Right, (2) the Party Faithful – Thatcher Loyalists and 
Party Loyalists, (3) Populists and (4) Critics – Damps and Wets (Norton, 1990: 49-
50).   
 
5.31 Thatcherites 
Economic liberals favoured minimal government involvement in economic matters 
and were generally hostile to the EU. They were also by and large in favour of the 
death penalty and of more open government. By contrast, their colleagues of the Tory 
Right were more concerned with morality and law and order. They were pro-hanging 
and mostly opposed to more open government (Norton, 1990: 49). Norton’s study 
categorised 72 members of the 1979-89 PCP as being Thatcherites (Norton, 1990: 
52). 
 
5.32 Party Faithful 
This group, according to Norton comprised the bulk of the PCP, with 217 members, 
58% of the Parliamentary Party (Norton, 1990: 52). Thatcher Loyalists had no strong 
ideological beliefs, but did have a strong personal allegiance to Margaret Thatcher and 
her style of leadership. By contrast Party Loyalists were loyal to the Party, rather than 
to any personality or ideology. Whilst mostly loyal to the leader, some members of 
this sub-group could be rebellious (Norton, 1990: 49).  
 
                                                     
3 Earlier, less comprehensive, typologies include; Harris (1972), Greenleaf (1973), Gamble (1974), 
Norton & Aughey (1981) and Crewe & Searing 1988  
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5.33 Populists 
This section of the PCP took right-wing positions on law and order, whilst being left-
wing on economic and social issues. Populists were either sceptical of or opposed to 
Europe (Norton, 1990: 49). Norton that found a mere 17 members (5%) of the PCP 
took the Populist position (Norton, 1990: 52). 
 
5.34 Critics 
This left-wing group had 67 members, 18% of Conservative MPs (Norton, 1990: 52). 
Wets were ‘One Nation’ Conservatives and pro-Europe. Damps were similar to Wets, 
but less likely to rebel against the government than their Wet counterparts (Norton, 
1990: 50).  
 
Norton’s study was significant not only because it was the first to attempt to classify 
the ideology of all the members of the PCP, but also because it demonstrated that the 
PCP was not Thatcherite in nature. This finding goes some way to explaining why 
Mrs. Thatcher’s position as leader was not secure despite her three election victories. 
An updated version of this typology was used by Cowley & Norton to assess 
backbench Conservative dissent in the 1992 parliament (Cowley & Norton, 1999: 84-
105).  
 
5.4 Two-dimensional typologies 
Dunleavy (1993) criticised Norton for classifying the PCP along a one-dimensional 
left / right axis Dunleavy (1993: 125). Consequently, Dunleavy created a more 
sophisticated two-dimensional typology, although he did not attempt to place 
individual MPs within it (Dunleavy, 1993: 126-129). This typology consists of a left / 
right split between those who accepted the welfare state and those who rejected the 
welfare state and were inegalitarian. Cutting across this left / right divide is another 
split between those MPs who adhered to traditional Conservative belief in the primacy 
of the British nation state and those who saw the individual as the most important 
political consideration. The left / right divide combined with the nation-state / 
individualist split gives four basic groupings; the traditional far right, Tory 
paternalists, Tory technocrats and market liberals. The traditional far right believed 
in strong government and the defence of hierarchy and tradition, whilst Tory 
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paternalists represented the ‘one nation’ tradition within the Party, Tory technocrats 
were strongly committed to Europe and an interventionist government industrial 
policy aimed at promoting efficiency, market liberals were committed to a new right 
platform of free market economics and rolling back the state (Dunleavy, 1993: 126-
129).  
 
The Conservative’s deep divisions over Europe were more explicitly addressed by 
Gamble (1990), Baker, Gamble & Ludlam (1991, 1993).  These studies have led to 
the development of a two-dimensional map of attitudes within the PCP (table 5.1 
below) along two axes; extended government / limited government and 
interdependence / sovereignty (Baker et al., 1993: 426). The authors argue that the 
debate over Europe was primarily about Britain’s place in the world political 
economy. Consequently there were echoes of the debates and divisions over the repeal 
of the Corn Laws in 1846 and over Tariff Reform in 1903, both of which led to splits 
in the Party (Baker et. al., 1993: 421-422). These splits occurred after three thresholds 
were crossed; firstly, cabinets divided and ministers resigned; second, a distinct 
coalition materialised, voting against the government; and thirdly, there emerged 
separate extra-parliamentary electoral organisations. The authors claimed that under 
John Major the Conservative Party had crossed the first two thresholds, but not the 
last (Baker, et. al., 1993: 431-433). However, the map illustrates how pro and anti 
European sentiment was spread amongst all sections of the Party, making the issue so 
contentious for the PCP (Baker et. al., 1993: 425). Whilst Baker et. al. suggest 
ideological positions for some prominent members of the PCP they make no attempt 
to categorise the whole Parliamentary Party on the lines of Norton.    
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Table 5.1: Two Dimensional Map of Conservative positions on EC 
 
(Source: Baker et. al., 1993: 426) 
There are two further typologies which are influenced by the work of Baker et. al.; 
Sowemimo (1996) and Baker, Gamble & Seawright (2002). Sowemimo’s typology 
identified three groups within the Thatcherite Conservative Party; Thatcherite 
nationalists, neo-liberal-integrationists and interventionist-integrationists. The 
Thatcherite nationalists were analogous to those Conservative MPs who saw 
European integration as an obstacle to the pursuit of their domestic free-market 
agenda and as a threat to British sovereignty and national independence. Neo-liberal 
integrationists shared the free market ideology of the Thatcherite nationalists and 
opposed the EU’s social agenda. However, they saw other aspects European 
integration, including the single currency as an opportunity to promote the free-
market across Europe. The third grouping in Sowemimo’s typology were the 
Interventionist-integrationists, corresponding to those who Mrs. Thatcher 
disparagingly labelled wets; essentially a Heathite rump. interventionist-
integrationists sought further powers for the European Parliament, reductions in the 
national veto and some were even willing to countenance Britain’s adoption of the 
social chapter (Sowemimo, 1996: 84-86).  Despite being influenced by Baker et. al. 
Sowemimo makes no reference to any category that relates to the Eurosceptic but 
economically wet grouping:  
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This is a limitation in typological design, as it implies that Euroscepticism 
within contemporary British Conservatism in the immediate post-Thatcherite 
era was exclusively the preserve of the economic dry neo-liberals and that all 
economic wets were pro-European. (Heppell & Hill, 2005: 347) 
 
The typology advanced by Baker, Gamble & Seawright (2002) analysed attitudes to 
European integration in the post-2001 Conservative Party through the lens of 
globalisation and categorised three possible Conservative positions; hyperglobalism, 
intergovernmentalism and open regionalism. Which category Conservatives’ 
belonged in depended upon their beliefs on globalisation; how far globalisation had 
advanced and what the implications were for the British economic performance in the 
world economy (Baker et. al., 2002: 399-428). Advocates of hyperglobalism believed 
that globalisation was now so complete that individual nation states could do little, in 
the way of economic management, except keep inflation, spending and regulation 
low. Consequently, hyperglobalists viewed the regulatory frameworks of the 
European Union as a threat to British competitiveness in the global marketplace and 
advocated the renegotiation of European treaties and in some cases total withdrawal 
from the EU (Baker et. al., 2002: 409-410). The second grouping, the 
intergovernmentalists reject the globalisation thesis advanced by the hyperglobalist 
colleagues. Intergovernmentalists saw the world economy as international, rather than 
global and this still allowed nation-states some degree of economic autonomy. 
Accordingly, intergovernmentalists believed that the EU played a positive role in 
boosting British influence in world affairs and in the world markets, but opposed 
further integration including economic and monetary union on the grounds that 
national independence was still important (Baker et. al., 2002: 411-412). By contrast 
open regionalists accepted the globalisation thesis, advanced by the hyperglobalists, 
although they disagree about the consequences. Open regionalists argue that Britain’s 
traditional economic objectives are best pursued collectively, through the EU and they 
therefore favoured joining the single currency. (Baker et. al., 2002: 413-415) 
 
5.5 Three-dimensional typologies 
The two-dimensional typologies outlined above have largely analysed the ideological 
footprint of the Parliamentary Conservative Party along the axes of European 
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integration / national sovereignty and economic intervention / liberalism. However, 
some writers have argued for the inclusion of a third axis of moral and social 
conservatism / liberalism (Garry, 1995: Cowley and Garry, 1998: Heppell, 2002), 
which identifies eight ideological groupings across three dimensions (see Table 5.2 
below). This is arguably a more sophisticated way of analysing the ideological 
disposition of the parliamentary Conservative Party as it encompasses all shades of 
possible opinion, from traditional one nation conservatives (economic interventionist, 
europhile, socially liberal) to pure Thatcherites  (economic liberal, eurosceptic, 
socially conservative).  
 
The Garry (1995) typology was used with survey data4 to assess the size and relative 
importance of policy divisions within the Parliamentary Conservative Party and 
concluded that the issue of Europe had become “…the party’s most powerful and 
polarising policy divide.” (Garry, 1995: 185) A three dimensional typology was also 
used to analyse the impact of ideology on voting behaviour in the second round of the 
1990 Conservative Party leadership election (Cowley & Garry, 1998: 473-499). This 
again highlighted the saliency of the European policy divide within the PCP, with 
Eurosceptics backing John Major, whilst pro-Europeans supported Michael Heseltine 
(Cowley & Garry, 1998: 495-496). The Heppell typology was used to map the 
ideological disposition of every Conservative MP from the 1992-1997 parliaments 
and thereby analyse the importance of policy divisions within the PCP (Heppell, 
2002: 299-323). Heppell also highlights the importance of Europe and states that, 
“…the question of Europe was the ideological determinant of Conservatism.” 
(Heppell, 2002: 320). The Heppell typology was also used by Alderman & Carter 
(2001) to inform their analysis of the 2001 Conservative Party leadership election 
(Alderman & Carter, 2002: 569-585; Heppell & Hill, 2005: 352) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 Collected between November and December 1991 
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Table 5.2: A Three Dimensional Typology of Conservatism 
Economic policy  European policy  Social and moral policy__ 
Interventionist wets   Pro-European    Socially liberal 
Interventionist wets   Pro-European    Socially conservative 
Thatcherite dries   Pro-European    Socially liberal 
Thatcherite dries   Pro-European    Socially conservative 
Interventionist wets   Eurosceptic    Socially liberal 
Interventionist wets   Eurosceptic    Socially conservative 
Thatcherite dries   Eurosceptic    Socially liberal 
Thatcherite dries   Eurosceptic    Socially conservative____ 
Source: Gary (1995), Heppell, (2002), Heppell & Hill, (2005) 
 
5.6 Factions or tendencies? 
Richard Rose (1964) asserted that the PCP was a party of tendencies, rather than 
factions. However, the ‘party of tendencies’ thesis has been increasingly challenged 
following the overthrow of Mrs. Thatcher and Conservative Party’s fractious debate 
over European integration between 1992 and 1997. Cowley & Norton (1999) still 
argued that:  
…the party remained one of tendencies, albeit well organised and cohesive 
tendencies rather than factions.” (Cowley & Norton, 1999: 84). Dunleavy 
(1993) argued that factionalism was low except for the vexed question of 
Europe (Dunleavy, 1993: 134).  
However Baker et. al. (1993) argued that: 
Conservative behaviour over the European Union suggests that the possibility 
of a split is real, even if so far party managers have succeeded in preventing it 
at incalculable cost to the party’s authority and image. (Baker et. al., 1993: 
428) 
Garry (1995) found evidence of factionalism when comparing members of the Fresh 
Start Group to the rest of their colleagues in the PCP and argued that, “…the former 
should be regarded as a separate group within the party, being substantially and 
significantly different from their colleagues.” (Garry, 1995: 185). Sowemimo also 
identified the Fresh Start Group as the vehicle that the PCP’s Euro rebels used to 
organise themselves (Sowemimo, 1996: 83). In addition, Heppell (2002) has 
concluded that: 
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…such was the dominance of the European ideological policy divide it 
consumed the other two ideological policy divides: factionalism evolved on 
the basis of members’ Europhilia or Euroscepticism. (Heppell, 2002: 321) 
John Barnes has gone even further, denying the existence of a ‘golden age’ of 
harmonious tendencies. Rather, Barnes argues that the very nature of conservatism 
has caused frequent bouts of factionalism within the PCP and cites as evidence the 
activities of a variety of groups from The Tariff Reform League to Conservative Way 
Forward (Barnes, 1996: 340-343). Over recent years, the increasingly factional nature 
of the party has placed increasing demands on the leader both in keeping the Party 
united and in securing the loyalty of his backbenchers. 
 
5.7 Economic Policy 
Attitudes within the Conservative towards economic policy have undergone 
considerable change in the last sixty years. The party moved from the one nation 
tradition from 1945 until its apotheosis under Macmillan, through a transitional period 
of uncertainty under Heath to become the party of free-market liberalism under Mrs. 
Thatcher. The Conservative Party accepted the Attlee settlement after 1945 out of a 
mixture of ideology and pragmatism. The party, especially at elite level, accepted that 
a major factor in their defeat was the electorate’s association of the party, with the 
mass unemployment of the inter-war period. Moreover the Conservatives realised 
they would have to take positive steps to reverse their image and reassure the 
electorate if the party was to win power again. One manifestation of this belief was 
the work of the Conservative Research Department (CRD) led by Rab Butler (Fisher, 
1977: 63). Butler believed in the Disraelian One Nation tradition and admired 
Baldwin’s strategy of class conciliation (Charmley, 1996: 113).  Under Butler’s 
supervision the CRD produced two publications that played a crucial role in 
repositioning the party within the post war political climate; The Industrial Charter 
(1947) and The Right Road for Britain (1949). The Industrial Charter advocated the 
removal of unnecessary controls on industry and spending cuts to finance reductions 
in taxation. Whilst it opposed nationalisation in principle it accepted the 
nationalisation of coal, the railways and the Bank of England and accepted existing 
industrial relations law (Evans & Taylor, 1996: 81-82). The purpose of the Charter 
was twofold; firstly to destroy the perception of the Conservatives as the party of 
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poverty and mass unemployment, whilst the second purpose was to provide an 
alternative to socialism without turning the clock back to the inter-war period 
(Willetts, 2005: 181). The Right Road for Britain was more neo-liberal in tone than 
The Industrial Charter it nevertheless accepted the welfare state and full employment 
(Evans & Taylor, 1996: 90). The Right Road for Britain was the basis for the general 
election manifesto, This is the Road published in 1950 (Willetts, 2005: 186).   
 
Future Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was another influential figure within 
revisionist tendency of the post war Conservative Party. Macmillan had helped to 
write The Industrial Charter, but his publication The Middle Way (1937) arguably 
went further than either The Industrial Charter or The Right Road for Britain; The 
Middle Way advocated the nationalisation of the Bank of England and the coal 
industry and argued that that the railways, gas, electricity and water were already 
effectively in public ownership (Green, 2002: 171). Macmillan’s brand of One Nation 
Conservatism was strongly influenced by his experiences in the trenches during the 
First World War. Moreover, he had been an MP for Stockton during the inter-war 
years and was acutely conscious of the human misery caused by mass unemployment 
and was determined to avoid a recurrence (Green, 2002: 158).  
 
The general election of 1951 gave the Conservatives twenty-six seats more than 
Labour and but with fewer votes (48% compared to Labour’s 48.8); Labour’s share of 
the popular vote was barely reduced since 1945 and the Conservatives owed much of 
their success to the collapse in Liberal support. Consequently, the party could hardly 
claim a mandate for wholesale change. (Clarke, 1996: 408). Moreover, whilst the 
mood in the country favoured moderate reform there was little support for a return to 
the Britain of the 1930s (Jenkins, 2002: 853) In addition, the Conservative majority of 
seventeen made it necessary to contemplate the possibility of another election in the 
near future and Churchill made it clear that his priorities were, “…houses and meat 
and not being scuppered” (Roberts, 1994: 252). To this end Churchill appointed the 
emollient Walter Monckton as Minister of Labour, with strict instructions not to 
antagonise the trades’ union movement12 (Jenkins, 2002: 853). In addition the 
                                                     
12 Monckton was so adept at avoiding conflict he acquired the nickname of ‘the old oil can’ (Roberts, 
1994: 243) 
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Churchill government did little to undo their Labour predecessor’s nationalisation 
programme; only the iron and steel industry was denationalised in 1953 followed by 
the road haulage industry the following year (Dorey, 1995: 45).   
 
One nation Conservatism reached its high water mark under the premiership of 
Harold Macmillan between 1957 and 1963. The end of the Korean War in 1953 saw 
an increase in world trade and the growth of mass prosperity in Britain to the electoral 
benefit of the Conservative Party (Evans & Taylor, 1996: 108). The Conservatives 
were returned again under Eden in 1955; after Macmillan succeeded Eden in 1957 his 
government continued to reap the electoral benefits of affluence and remained 
committed to full employment and the welfare state. However, concerns were 
growing over the underlying state of Britain’s economic performance, in particular 
rising inflation and worsening industrial relations. The Macmillan government sought 
to counter inflation by announcing a seven month ‘pay pause’ for public sector 
workers in 1961 and sought to draw the trades union movement into the policy 
making process through the National Economic Development council (NEDC); a 
tripartite body comprising the government, employers and trades unions. It was hoped 
the NEDC could bring all three parties together to discuss the economic problems 
facing Britain and work through mutually acceptable solutions (Dorey, 1995: 72). 
However the NEDC was hamstrung as the unions refused to participate after 1962 
angered by the government’s pay pause (Clarke, 1996: 335).  
 
Some Conservatives had already begun to voice their doubts over the long-term 
viability of the British economy. In 1958 Macmillan’s entire Treasury team of Peter 
Thorneycroft, Enoch Powell and Nigel Birch resigned over Macmillan’s refusal to 
combat inflation by curbing public expenditure (Turner, 1996: 329). Moreover, 
worsening industrial relations led to increasing pressure within the party for legal 
curbs on the trades unions. However, as the Conservatives’ lost the 1964 general 
election the party would have to wait until 1970 to attempt to resolve the question of 
trades union power (Dorey, 1995: 73). The 1964 defeat led some Conservatives to 
reappraise One Nation Conservatism questioning the efficacy of state intervention in 
the economy and seeking to return the party to laissez-faire economic liberalism 
(Evans & Taylor, 1996: 142). Enoch Powell was one of the chief exponents of this 
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critique of One Nation Conservatism and was supported by a small number of young 
Conservative MPs such as John Biffen and Nicholas Ridley. Powell made an 
unsuccessful bid for the party leadership in 1965 advocating free-market policies and 
rejecting state planning and intervention in the economy, but only garnered fifteen 
votes. However, Powell’s vote was damaged by the closeness of the battle between 
Reginald Maudling and the eventual winner Edward Heath and it is arguable that 
Powell’s influence upon the party was greater than his vote suggested (Evans & 
Taylor, 1996: 145-146).  
 
Under Edward Heath the Conservative Party seemed to take on some of Powell’s 
ideas. The Party’s manifesto for the 1970 general election promised cuts in income 
tax and public spending, reduced inflation, an end to nationalisation and new 
industrial relations laws to promote ‘responsible trades unions’ (The Conservative 
Party, 1970). However, once in government Heath made a series of ‘U turns’ and 
abandoned or failed to achieve many of its manifesto commitments. In line with the 
Conservative Party’s manifesto promise to curb union power the Heath government 
passed the Industrial Relations Act, which became law in August 1971. Although the 
Act enjoyed strong public support it was bitterly opposed by the trades union 
movement; unions refused both to register under the Act and to recognise the new 
Industrial Relations Court. Moreover the number of working days lost through strike 
action was not cut by the Act, but actually increased dramatically; eventually the Act 
was ignored by employers as well as unions and became virtually inoperable 
(Kavanagh, 1996; 370). Heath’s industrial relations policies were a disaster and 
eventually led to the downfall of his government. In October 1973 the miners went on 
strike in pursuit of a pay claim. The strike dragged on into the next year and Heath’s 
response to the seemingly intractable situation was to call a general election, which 
the Conservative Party lost on the theme of ‘Who rules Britain?’ (Charmley, 1996: 
194)  
 
The Heath government also reneged on its manifesto commitment to end further 
industrial nationalisation; the government nationalised the aero engine manufacturer, 
Rolls Royce when it was faced with bankruptcy and intervened to bail out the loss 
making Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (Dorey, 1995: 119). Moreover, when faced with 
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rising unemployment the government massively increased public spending, including 
wide scale state assistance to industry. In order to deal with the subsequent inflation 
caused by huge rises in spending the Heath administration resorted to a statutory 
prices and incomes policy, despite a manifesto pledge not to pursue such a policy 
(Kavanagh, 1996: 373). In mitigation Heath’s supporters claim he faced an 
unprecedented set of circumstances. At the beginning of 1972 unemployment reached 
its highest level since 1947, which was deemed to be politically unacceptable. Not 
only did the public hold the government accountable for high unemployment, but also 
ministers believed it was their responsibility to maintain full employment. 
Furthermore, Keynesian methods of economic management were still universally 
accepted at elite level (Kavanagh, 1996; 373-374). Finally the outbreak of the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973, between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Jordan, led to the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupling oil prices, 
leading to the end of the long post-war boom (Dorey, 1996: 124). 
 
However, Heath’s policy U turns caused considerable disquiet within the 
Conservative Party. One sign of disapproval was the formation of the Selsdon Group 
in 1973. The Selsdon Group took their name from a shadow cabinet meeting at the 
Selsdon Park Hotel in 1970, which hammered out the contents of that year’s general 
election victory. Members of the group were committed market liberals appalled at 
Heath’s failures and who believed that: 
The function of government should not be to provide services, but to maintain 
the framework within which markets operate. (Seyd, 1980: 235-236) 
Another critic was Heath’s fellow contender for the leadership in 1965, Enoch Powell; 
Powell was a vociferous critic of the government’s U turns and after it introduced 
prices and incomes policy asked Heath in the Commons if he had taken leave of his 
senses by pursuing policies he had specifically ruled out in the manifesto (Kavanagh, 
1996: 373). However, Powell decided not to seek re-election in 1974 and left the 
Conservative Party.  
 
In Powell’s absence Keith Joseph took up the critique of Heath administration, 
demanding free market policies and advancing a monetarist analysis of the causes of 
inflation. Joseph criticised both himself and every other post-war Conservative 
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government, for betraying the true principles of conservatism, saying that, “It was 
only in April 1974 that I was converted to Conservatism.” (Kavanagh, 2005: 223). 
Joseph’s critique was not new, there was always disquiet about the post-war 
settlement within some sections of the Conservative Party. However, whilst the free 
market right were once seen as extremists, Joseph found his colleagues increasingly 
receptive to his ideas. Dissatisfaction with Heath’s management of the party led to 
demands for change and in February 1975 Margaret Thatcher challenged Heath for 
the party leadership. The conventional explanation of Heath’s downfall was that it 
was a non-ideological ‘peasants’ revolt’ motivated by two factors; firstly Heath had 
lost three out of four elections and secondly Heath’s rudeness and poor interpersonal 
skills alienated many of his would-be supporters. However, Thatcher did have the 
support of a cohesive group of right-wing MPs and although this was not large 
enough to be a decisive factor it was nevertheless an indication of an emerging left-
right split on the economy (Cowley & Bailey, 2000: 628-629).  
 
This left-right split was apparent in the composition of Mrs. Thatcher’s first cabinet as 
Prime Minister. Despite her election victory Mrs. Thatcher was not strong enough to 
exclude senior One Nation Conservatives from office. However, she placed her 
supporters in the key economic departments13 (Gilmour & Garnett, 1997: 308). Both 
Mrs. Thatcher and her economic ministers saw reducing inflation, rather than 
maintaining full employment, as their prime economic objective. In order to reduce 
inflation the government attempted to the put economic theory of monetarism into 
practice. Monetarism was defined by Nigel Lawson as: 
…a new name for an old maxim, formerly known as the quantity theory of 
money…It consists of two basic propositions. The first is that changes in the 
quantity of money determines, at the end of the day, changes in the general 
price level; the second is that government is able to determine the quantity of 
money. (Dell, 1997: 451) 
However, the Thatcher administration’s commitment to monetarism fluctuated; from 
May 1979 to early 1981 the government used M314 as its key target indicator. Yet, by 
mid 1980 pressures from the strong pound and deepening recession began to grow and 
                                                     
13 Geoffrey Howe, John Biffen and Nigel Lawson at the Treasury: Keith Joseph at Industry: John Nott, 
Trade: Angus Maude: Paymaster-General 
14 The money supply including cash and bank current and deposit accounts. 
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eventually forced the government to row back from its strict targets as interest rates 
were cut, despite the money supply growing above the desired level (Riddell, 1991: 
18).  
 
The Thatcher administration’s determination to tackle inflation despite the economy’s 
slump into recession, together with the emergence of mass unemployment caused 
deep rifts within the first Thatcher cabinet. Jim Prior believed that: 
We must have been the most divided cabinet ever. There was a deep division 
on economic and social policy. (Prior, 1986: 134) 
Mrs Thatcher labelled her critics as ‘wet’15, meaning that they lacked the courage to 
implement the tough policies necessary to defeat inflation and revive the British 
economy. Consequently those Conservative MPs who concurred with Mrs. Thatcher’s 
economic policies were labelled ‘dry’ and the battle for the soul of the party between 
the One Nation wing and the Thatcherites was characterised as ‘wets versus dries’. As 
Mrs. Thatcher became more securely entrenched as leader she used her 1981 cabinet 
reshuffle to remove or marginalise many of the wets (Dorey, 1995: 170). 
 
The concept of a property-owning democracy has long been popular within the 
Conservative Party. The Thatcher governments sought to put this ideal into practice 
through the extension of the house owner-occupancy and through the sale of shares in 
state owned companies. In terms of extending owner-occupancy the most important 
factor was the ‘right to buy’ legislation that allowed council house tenants of three 
years or longer to purchase their houses at substantial discount. In addition mortgage 
tax relief was increased to encourage home ownership. By 1988 home ownership had 
gone up by 3 million since Mrs. Thatcher came to power, over 1/3rd of which was the 
result of the sale of council houses (Ridell, 1991; 114-115). 
 
In addition to their belief in a property owning democracy Thatcherite Conservatives 
believed in reducing state intervention in the economy. To this end the second 
Thatcher administration privatised a number of previously state owned industries16. 
Despite Harold Macmillan’s criticism that it was akin to ‘selling the family silver’, 
                                                     
15 The wets included Ian Gilmour, Norman St John Stevas, Jim Prior and Peter Walker. 
16 British Telecom (1984), British Gas (1986), British Airways (1987) 
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privatisation was less controversial within the Conservative Party than monetarism 
(Gilmour, 1992: 95). According to Dunn & Smith (1990) privatisation policy 
involved three main areas: 
1. de-nationalisation – by the sale of publicly owned assets and equity 
(shares) to the private sector, e.g. British Rail hotels, British Telecom, 
British Gas. 
2. ‘contracting-out’ subcontracting the provision of government financed 
goods and services to private contractors, e.g. refuse collection, 
hospital cleaning. 
3. ‘de-regulation’ - removing inhibitions and regulatory restrictions on 
enterprise and competition, e.g. the opticians’ dispensing monopoly, 
coach transport regulations. (Dunn & Smith, 1990; 34) 
 
Privatisation bestowed a number of financial and governing benefits upon the 
Thatcher administration. Firstly the government was spared the need to subsidise loss 
making state industries. Secondly, the money saved, together with the money raised 
from the privatisation process could be used to fund electorally popular tax cuts. 
Finally, privatisation relieved government from the responsibility for wage 
negotiation for a number of large industries. This process had been problematical 
during the 1970s as wage negotiations routinely turned into a political battle between 
the trades unions and the government of the day. Therefore, privatisation can be seen 
as a crucial component of the fight to restore autonomy of the central government. 
The privatisations conducted before 1987 were successful, politically popular and 
strengthened the British economy. However, Gilmour & Garnett (1997) argue that 
later privatisations were problematical, because they fell into three categories: 
…natural monopolies, truly crippled ducks like nuclear power, or absurd 
nurseries of free enterprise like prisons. (Gilmour & Garnett, 1997: 330) 
 
Another plank of the Thatcher administration’s economic policy was the 
marginalisation of the trades’ union movement. In line with monetarist theory the 
government also rejected any form of prices and incomes policies, arguing that 
employers and unions were entitled to negotiate high pay settlements, but had to 
accept the consequences in terms of possible bankruptcies and higher unemployment. 
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Consequently the Thatcher governments refused to negotiate or deal with the Trades 
Union Congress (TUC) or individual union leaders, unlike previous Conservative 
administrations, which had tried to include organised labour in the governance of the 
country. Furthermore the Conservatives now sought to reduce the power of trades 
unions through legislation. In contrast to Heath’s large and complex Industrial 
Relations Act, which sought to totally redraw the industrial relations map, the 
Thatcher government introduced legislation piecemeal (Riddell, 1991: 45). This 
incremental approach, denied union leaders the opportunity to persuade their members 
that the legislation constituted an all out attack on union rights and consequently 
avoided a major confrontation with the unions (Dorey, 1996; 174). Altogether the 
Thatcher government introduced five acts; the 1980 Act outlawed secondary 
picketing, restricted closed-shops and made public funds available for union ballots. 
The 1982 increased protection for non-union members in closed shops, required 
closed shop reviews by secret ballot, made unions liable for damages for unlawful 
industrial; action and made disputes with third parties unlawful. The 1984 Act 
required senior union leaders to be elected by secret ballot of all members at least 
every five years and that secret ballots be held before industrial action. In addition the 
act required all unions with political funds to seek approval by secret ballot every ten 
years. The 1988 act gave union members the right to take court action to stop their 
union calling them out on strike and a right not to be disciplined for not joining a 
strike (Riddell, 1991; 47-48). Finally the 1990 Employment Act made all secondary 
or sympathy action unlawful and made it unlawful for an employer to turn down a job 
applicant who refused to join a union (Dorey, 1996: 175). 
 
When John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher in 1990 Conservative economic policy 
continued along broadly the same lines as it had done before Mrs. Thatcher’s fall. 
Another piece of trades’ union legislation, The 1993 Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Act was made law. Amongst the Act’s provisions were, the abolition of 
Wages Councils and minimum wages, the right for employers to offer incentives to 
employees to give up their union membership, unions were made to give employers 
seven days notice of strike action and customers of public services were given the 
right to seek injunctions to prevent unlawful action by public service employees 
(Dorey, 1996: 249). The Major government also extended the privatisation 
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programme into new areas, selling off the British Rail, the remains of British Coal, 
arguably extending privatisation into areas that Mrs. Thatcher dare not tread. Free 
market reforms were also pushed through in health and education. The Major 
government’s continuation of the Thatcherite economic agenda aroused minimal 
parliamentary dissent  and demonstrated that the wet / dry dispute had been settled in 
favour of the  dries (Ludlam, 1996: 117, Heppell, 2002: 309). However, even before 
Major became leader another and far more damaging factional disputation had already 
burst into the open; this was the dispute over European integration between the 
europhile and eurosceptic wings of the party. 
 
5.8 Europe 
Attitudes towards Europe within the Conservative Party have undergone considerable 
change during the last sixty years; from detached superiority in the immediate post-
war period, the Conservatives then became the ‘party of Europe’ under Heath and the 
early years of Margaret Thatcher’s leadership, before turning sceptical or even hostile 
towards many aspects of the European project. Prior to 1945 the Conservative Party 
utilised a discourse of Imperialism and stout defence of the national interest, however 
in the aftermath of the Second World War, this claim began was looking increasingly 
threadbare. The Conservative Party’s association with the inter-war depression and 
the appeasement of Hitler and Mussolini, together with Labour’s positive record 
during the War meant the Conservative’s could no longer claim to be the undisputed 
champions of patriotism. Furthermore the Conservative’s traditional narrative of 
nationhood and patriotism was further challenged by world events; the ebbing away 
of Britain’s great power status, the retreat from Empire and the impact of New 
Commonwealth immigration (Lynch, 1999: 22) The culmination of these events 
occurred when the illusion of great power status was shattered by the Suez Crisis of 
1956, when Britain was forced to abandon its invasion of Egypt due to financial and 
diplomatic pressure from the United States. Consequently, the realisation of Britain’s 
diminished power and influence in the world, together with emerging concerns over 
the state of the British economy prompted a rethink that led the Macmillan 
government to apply to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1960 (Ball, 
1998: 142-143).  
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The parliamentary debate and vote on Macmillan’s application revealed unease within 
the Conservative Party, so recently the party of Empire, with the European project. At 
least one hundred Tory MPs had concerns and forty were convinced opponents, 
although only one Conservative voted against and 29 abstained (Lynch, 1999: 25). 
Evans & Taylor saw this as the moment when “…the European virus was injected 
into the Conservative Party.” (Evans & Taylor, 1996: 12) Macmillan’s application 
was ultimately vetoed by France’s General De Gaulle in 1963, on the grounds that the 
UK was too closely linked with the United States, would act as a Trojan horse for 
American influence and would be a less than wholehearted member. Britain finally 
joined the EEC under the leadership of Edward Heath in 1973. Macmillan saw 
membership as an opportunity to modernise British industry. Heath shared this view 
and also had a deep commitment to European integration, which he believed was 
necessary to prevent another war. However, joining the EEC revealed deep splits in 
both the Conservative and Labour parties. According to Geddes, the Conservative MP 
and sceptic Michael Spicer has identified four strands of eurosceptic opinion within 
the parliamentary party; die-hard anti-marketeers, such as Teddy Taylor who voted 
against joining the EEC under Heath and were still hostile towards the EU. Then there 
were neo-liberals who feared the reintroduction of regulation that the Thatcher 
government had swept away. A third group consisted of nationalists and patriots who 
saw the EU as a threat to national identity and finally there were constitutionalists 
who argued that the EU was a threat to parliamentary sovereignty and self-
government (Geddes, 2005: 127). 
 
The concept of sovereignty has come to define the European rift within the 
Conservative Party. In its simplest sense sovereignty can be defined as in supreme 
command over civil society, in Britain this power is vested in the Queen in Parliament 
(Scruton, 1996; 522-523). The key division that opened up in the Conservative Party 
was between those who believed that sovereignty is indivisible and those who 
believed that sovereignty can be ‘pooled’ with other countries. Enoch Powell saw 
sovereignty as indivisible and: 
Though XYZ may be formed from a combination of X and Y and Z, it is not 
the same as any of those three and none of them enjoys independence or 
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possesses sovereignty if it accepts the overriding authority of XYZ; they are 
not governed by themselves but by others. (Lynch, 1999: 40). 
In addition, Powell pointed to the fact that:  
The law of the Community overrides the law of parliament; it does for the 
most part automatically and silently without so much as the formality of 
debate or vote; and those that make the law wield the power. (Lynch, 1999: 
40) Powell’s views were in sharp contrast to the man who took Britain into 
Europe, Edward Heath. Heath believed that Europe enabled its member states 
to ‘pool’ sovereignty and act together for the greater good of the Community 
as a whole. As Heath told Parliament in 1975: 
Sovereignty is not something to be hoarded, sterile and barren carefully 
protected by the Right Honourable Member for Down South 
[Powell]…Sovereignty is something for us as custodians to use in the interests 
of our country…It is a judgement which we have to make, and I answer 
without hesitation that the sacrifice of sovereignty, if it may be put in that 
extreme form, or the sharing of sovereignty, the transfer of sovereignty or the 
offering of sovereignty is fully justified. Indeed were we not to do so in the 
modern world, I believe that as a Parliament, as a party and as a government 
we should be culpable in the eyes of history. (Lynch, 1999: 30) 
 
Despite Powell’s misgivings the Conservative Party came to be perceived as the 
‘party of Europe’, partly due to Heath’s personal commitment to the issue, but also 
because of the rejectionist stance of the Labour Party at the time (Berrington, 1998; 
5). Moreover, the Conservative Party remained committed to constructive engagement 
in Europe for the first two terms of Mrs. Thatcher’s premiership, indeed she told the 
1983 party conference that, “We are not half-hearted members of the Community. We 
are here to stay.” (Campbell, 2003: 302). Lynch (1999) analysed the Thatcherite 
Conservative Party’s relations with Europe in three periods; the budgetary dispute 
(1979-1984); the making of the Single European Market (1984-1988); and the 
rejection of moves towards ‘ever closer union’ (1988-1990). Relations with Britain’s 
European partners were marred by an acrimonious dispute over Britain’s budget 
contribution that was eventually settled in June 1984 (Campbell, 2003: 304). 
However, the next four years marked a far more positive attitude from Mrs. Thatcher, 
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who saw moves towards completing the single European market, with its emphasis on 
free trade between partner states as complementary to her own domestic programme 
of economic liberalisation (Lynch, 1999: 68). Indeed she believed that moves towards 
the completing the single market would export her vision of deregulation and free 
enterprise to an over governed continent. However, she failed to realise the 
implication that creating the single market involved not just deregulation, but also the 
harmonisation of regulations across nation states, which carried implications for the 
sovereignty of the nation state (Campbell, 2003: 308-209). Moreover, whilst Mrs. 
Thatcher saw the Single European Act as the final piece of the European jigsaw her 
fellow leaders viewed it merely as a stepping stone towards further integration that 
included a single currency and a European foreign policy (Lynch, 1999: 69). When 
the implications of the SEA finally became clear Mrs. Thatcher entered her third 
phase, which was marked by increasingly strident euroscepticism from 1988 until her 
defenestration in 199017 
 
This third phase was marked by Margaret Thatcher’s famous (or infamous) speech to 
the College of Europe in Bruges in September 1988, in which she explicitly rejected 
any further moves towards integration and argued that: 
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the State in Britain, only 
to see them re-imposed at a European level with a European superstate 
exercising a new dominance from Brussels. (Campbell, 2003: 605) 
The Bruges speech was a seminal moment in Conservative party politics and 
according to Geddes the speech: 
…reconfigured the boundaries of discourse about Europe within the 
Conservative Party by legitimising Euroscepticism from the top, and impelled 
a huge and divisive internal debate within the Party to which ideas about the 
state, the nation and sovereign authority were crucial. (Geddes, 2005: 125) 
Consequently Europe grew to be the critical policy divide within the Conservative 
Party.  (Garry, 1995: 170; Heppell, 2002). Furthermore, disputes over Europe led to 
the departure of several of Mrs. Thatcher’s cabinet, before she too was ousted. 
Michael Heseltine walked out of a cabinet meeting due to a dispute over the future of 
                                                     
17 Out of office she continued to make eurosceptic speeches and statements, much to the chagrin of her 
successor, john Major. 
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Westland helicopters; Nigel Lawson resigned in 1989 believing he was being 
undermined by Mrs. Thatcher’s Eurosceptic economic adviser Alan Walters, Nicholas 
Ridley was forced out in 1990 after giving an ill-judged interview to the Spectator, in 
which he claimed that European monetary policy was, “…all a German racket 
designed to take over the whole of Europe.” and that, “You might as well just give it 
to Adolf Hitler.” (Young, 1993: 572). Finally Geoffrey Howe resigned in 1990 over 
differences with Margaret Thatcher’s European policy and intemperate language 
(Young, 1993: 577-578). Howe’s departure and his resignation speech in which called 
for a challenge to Mrs. Thatcher’s leadership triggered Michael Heseltine’s challenge 
and Mrs. Thatcher’s subsequent downfall (Campbell, 2003: 720).  
 
The question of European integration was also an important factor in the subsequent 
election of Mrs. Thatcher’s successor, John Major. Major received strong backing 
from the eurosceptic wing of the Parliamentary Conservative Party, whilst the 
europhiles supported Major’s closest rival, Michael Heseltine (Cowley & Garry, 
1998: 492 – 498). For a while John Major’s leadership and his unexpected victory in 
the general election of April 1992 seemed to have drawn the poison from the internal 
Conservative debate over Europe. However, this situation was not to last as: 
The development of the EU persisted in being the issue on which Major was 
tested, monitored and evaluated. It had become a litmus test that divided the 
party and fuelled both explicit and clandestine disloyalty (Foley, 2002: 58) 
Moreover, the potential for division was accentuated because the pro and anti 
European factions were of similar size and because the European cleavage was cross-
cutting. Although there were correlations between economic interventionism and 
europhilia and between economic liberalism and euroscepticism these were not 
absolute (Heppell, 2002: 316-317). 
 
The period of uneasy calm within the parliamentary party that followed the 1992 
general election was shattered four months later by Britain’s ejection from the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Britain had entered the ERM in October 1990, 
during the dog days of Mrs. Thatcher’s leadership and Major, her Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was personally associated with the currency.  The ERM was intended to 
be a first step towards economic and monetary union, it linked and stabilised Europe’s 
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currencies. Britain entered at the rate of 2.95 Deutchmarks to the pound, which it was 
hoped would deliver, falling inflation and interest rates together with increased 
economic growth (Williams, 1998: 28). However, on the 16th September currency 
speculators started a run on the pound that forced Britain to withdraw from the ERM, 
although not before interest rates reached 15% and a large part of Britain’s currency 
reserves were wasted in a futile attempt to keep sterling within its ERM margins. The 
day was dubbed ‘Black Wednesday’, although eurosceptics called it ‘White 
Wednesday’ believing it presaged the end of any further moves towards economic 
union (Wheatcroft, 2005; 197). 
 
Consequently, the ERM debacle had the effect of emboldening some of the 
Eurosceptic wing of the parliamentary party, with adverse consequences for the 
effectiveness of the government and the cohesion of the Conservative Party that again 
highlighted the salience and divisiveness of the European policy divide; nowhere was 
this more clearly demonstrated than in the tortuous parliamentary ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty during 1993 (Garry, 1995: 185). Maastricht was intended to be the 
next step on from the SEA and pursued further moves towards political and economic 
integration. Major had negotiated British exemptions from the single currency and the 
‘social chapter’ (Wheatcroft, 2005; 192). However, despite these ‘opt-outs’ Major 
faced stiff opposition from Eurosceptics within his own party. Some of this dissent 
was open; significant party figures including Mrs. Thatcher, and three former party 
chairmen, Norman Tebbit, Cecil Parkinson and Kenneth Baker all announced their 
opposition to the treaty (Ludlam, 1996; 111). However, Major was also undermined 
by the tacit support given by serving cabinet ministers who Foley argues: 
…manoeuvred behind the scenes to pursue an ideological and political  agenda 
at variance to that of the government. Although there were many variants of 
euroscepticism, they collectively constituted a network of dissent and in many 
respects an alternative power base within the party (Foley, 2002: 57). 
 
The consequence of this network of dissent was a rebellion over the Maastricht Treaty 
on the 22nd July that resulted in the worst defeat ever sustained by a 20th century 
Conservative government and which Major only reversed by playing Russian Roulette 
with his backbenchers by calling a vote of confidence, daring them to risk electoral 
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defeat and a pro-European Labour Government (Ludlam, 1996: 101). Europe again 
impacted upon the cohesion of the Parliamentary Conservative Party when Major 
withdrew the whip from eight MPs18 who abstained from a vote on European 
(Communities) Finance Bill 1994, leaving Major leading a minority administration. 
The nine rebel MPs were allowed back into the parliamentary party, without any form 
of apology and later went on to lend their support to Welsh Secretary, John Redwood 
when he resigned from the cabinet in order to challenge John Major for the party 
leadership (Heseltine, 2001: 476).  
 
Redwood’s leadership bid came about because John Major resigned the party 
leadership and stood for the self-created vacancy, claiming that, “…for the last three 
years I’ve been opposed by a small minority in our party.” and challenging his critics 
to, “…put up or shut up.” (Major, 1999: 626). Major embarked on this high-risk 
strategy, partly through frustration at the lack of intra-party cohesion that the 
European issue was causing but also to stem constant speculation about a possible 
challenge to his leadership in November (Foley, 2002: 127). Whilst Major won the 
battle with Redwood (Table 5.3 below), his strategy was not completely successful. 
When he held his resignation press conference Major talked of being opposed by a 
small minority within the parliamentary party, however it was now clear that 109 of 
his MPs, fully 1/3rd of his parliamentary party did not support his leadership. 
Moreover, Redwood’s candidature demonstrated that the extent of the dissent reached 
right inside John Major’s cabinet. Finally, Major’s support base had changed since his 
victory in 1990, when he won the leadership with the support of the eurosceptic right. 
However, this faction now supported Redwood, whilst Major’s votes now came from 
the pro-European wing of the parliamentary party. 
 
Table 5.3: The Conservative Party leadership election 1995 
John Major  218 
John Redwood   89 
Abstentions      8 
Spoilt Ballots    12      
Source: Major, 1999; 645 
                                                     
18 The eight were; Tony Marlow, Teresa Gorman, Nick Budgen, Richard Body, John Wlikinson, 
Richard Shepherd, Christopher Gill and Teddy Taylor. A ninth MP, Richard Body voluntarily resigned 
the whip in sympathy. 
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John Major’s re-election did little to stop the internecine warfare over Europe within 
the Conservative Party and the BSE crisis provided further evidence of division and 
the impact of Europe on the ability of the Conservative government to control the 
domestic agenda. Scientists established a link between Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) in humans. In 
March 1996 the European Commission responded by banning the export of British 
beef on a worldwide basis (Williams, 1999; 155). To the delight of his eurosceptic 
MPs, Major announced a policy of non-cooperation with Europe and vetoed seventy 
European measures (Williams, 1999: 156). The standoff was eventually resolved with 
the government agreeing to an extensive cattle-slaughtering programme supervised by 
the EU. Major failed to achieve an automatic end to the beef export ban or even a 
timetable leading to an end of the ban. Consequently the result was widely perceived 
to have been a climbdown and further divided the Conservative Party (Seldon, 1998: 
652-653). 
 
As the Major government neared the end of its political life, Major was faced with an 
awkward balancing act as he tried to frame the Conservative Party’s policy for the 
forthcoming general election. The Conservatives faced a challenge from Sir James 
Goldsmith’s Referendum Party, which campaigned for a referendum on continued 
British membership of the EU. Major had to balance the threat of the Referendum 
Party and the demands of the Eurosceptics for a tough line against the Euro with the 
wishes of pro-Europeans for a more conciliatory approach. Consequently Major had 
adopted a policy of ‘wait and see’ on the Euro. Britain would only join the single 
currency if and when the conditions were right and this decision would be subject to a 
referendum. However, many Conservative MPs, including two junior ministers19 used 
their election addresses to voice their outright opposition to the single currency. This 
prompted Major to make an extraordinary speech at an election press conference in 
which he appealed to his MPs “Like me or loathe me, do not bind my hands when I 
am negotiating on behalf of the British nation (Major, 1999: 715). The speech 
highlighted the depth of Conservative divisions at the height of a general election 
campaign. Whilst Conservative MPs grew to be obsessed by Europe, voters regarded 
                                                     
19 Jim Paice and John Horam 
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it as a side issue, which arguably only increased the harm it caused to the 
Conservative Party. As Ivor Crewe succinctly states: 
The government was deeply damaged by the European issue. It preoccupied 
and distracted the Prime Minister, demoralised backbenchers and party 
activists, and alienated the public, for whom the issue was both baffling and 
boring. What repelled voters was not the substance of the government’s 
European policy but the conspicuous disunity in its ranks that it exposed 
(Crewe, 1996; 431). 
Crewe’s observations were borne out by the 1997 general election results which made 
it clear that the electorate did not care which position Conservative candidates took on 
Europe leading John Major to observe that, “Candidates who had defied the party line 
fared as well – or as badly – as those who had abided by it.” (Major, 1999; 724) 
 
However, the Major government marked the high water mark of Conservative battles 
over Europe. Many pro-European MPs retired at the 1997 election and the new intake 
was younger and more Eurosceptic than the retirees. Consequently the balance of 
power in the party tilted decisively in favour of the Eurosceptics. However, as the 
divisions over Europe died down, another conflict began to emerge; between those 
who espoused traditional conservative social and moral values and those who thought 
the party should recognise and accept the social diversity of modern Britain   
(Redwood, 2004: 143). 
 
5.9 Morality 
As Norton outlined there is an inherent tension at the heart of conservatism centred 
upon the values of individual liberty and authority. Some conservatives emphasise the 
importance of individual freedom, whilst others highlight the necessity of authority 
and respect (Norton, 1990: 44). This dichotomy became more pronounced as the 
influence of the New Right grew within the party as the Thatcher governments 
adopted the policies of economic liberalism and social conservatism, which advocated 
increased powers for the police and stressed the importance of the traditional family 
unit. Conservatism has traditionally stressed the importance of authority and the 
centrality of institutions in society, the foundation of which is the family. Gilmour 
argues that: 
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The family is the natural social unit, and the primary support of the individual. 
Man is a member of a family before he is the member of anything else. The 
family the centre of affections and the transmitter of traditions. (Gilmour, 
1977: 148) 
The type of family envisaged by Gilmour is one of a married man and woman with 
children; many conservatives find other types of family unit (single parent families, 
same sex couples) deeply unsatisfactory and therefore Scruton argues that: 
It hardly needs saying…that the support and protection of this institution 
[marriage] must be central to the conservative outlook, and that changes in the 
law which are calculated to loosen or abolish the obligations of family life, or 
which in other ways facilitate the channelling of libidinal impulse away from 
that particular form of union, will be accepted by conservatives only under the 
pressure of necessity. (Scruton, 2001: 129). 
   
Many Conservatives believe these values to have been under attack for many years, 
despite eighteen years of Conservative Party hegemony. Many Conservative 
politicians are clear about what caused this breakdown in standards; the liberal values 
of the 1960s. The sixties were the decade when, according to Margaret Thatcher,  
The fashionable theories and permissive claptrap set the scene for a society in 
which the old fashioned virtues of discipline and self-restraint were 
denigrated. (Edgar, 1986: 55) 
Despite the misgivings of Mrs. Thatcher and her supporters the Conservative Party 
mounted no serious opposition to the liberalisation of Britain’s laws during the sixties. 
Even though many Conservative MPs opposed the liberalisation of laws governing 
abortion and homosexuality, there were also Conservatives who supported such 
liberalisation (Pilbeam, 2005: 162). Margaret Thatcher opposed the abolition of the 
death penalty and always supported its reintroduction and opposed the 1968 
liberalisation of the divorce laws. However, she also supported the legalisation of 
homosexuality and also voted for David Steel’s Abortion Bill (Campell, 2000: 192). 
 
However, despite a great deal of rhetoric that extolled the virtues of the traditional 
family and denigrated ‘alternative’ lifestyles it is arguable that the Thatcher 
government made little serious effort to reverse the alleged permissiveness of the 
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sixties (Durham, 1989; 58). During Mrs. Thatcher’s first term the government passed 
legislation to allow parents to check teaching materials used for sex education classes, 
but refused to allow parents to withdraw their children from such lessons (Durham, 
1989: 59). Moreover, David Alton’s 1988 private members bill to limit abortion failed 
due to a lack of government support despite the backing of many Conservative MPs20 
(Durham, 1989: 60). Furthermore, the government’s treatment of the AIDS crisis of 
the 1980s was one of neutrality, concentrated on the dissemination of a public health 
message, which promoted condom use and ‘safe sex’, rather than a sermon on the 
morality of homosexuality. This led to criticism from social conservatives such as 
Digby Anderson from the Social Affairs Unit who claimed the government’s AIDS 
campaign was a, “…second best message, which will destroy the very morality 
needed to avoid AIDS and social degeneracy.” (Isaac, 1990; 219) The Thatcher 
government also bent its own rules to allow Rupert Murdoch’s Sky TV to take over its 
only rival, BSB in 1988. The deregulation of television has arguably increased the 
quantity of offensive material available on British television, as pornography is 
beamed down from Sky’s satellite (Campbell, 2003: 573).  
 
The deregulation of television and the emergence of BskyB highlights the tension 
between free-markets and deregulation on the one hand and concern for a ‘moral 
society’ on the other highlighted by Lord Harris of High Cross who argued that the 
free market would provide whatever consumers wanted, “…from prayer books and 
communion wine to pornography and hard liquor.” (Isaac, 1990: 212). In addition 
Thatcherite economic policies arguably contributed to the breakdown of traditional 
family life, as families were hit by high unemployment, whilst government policy 
made it more attractive for companies to employ part-time female workers, taking 
women away from traditional child rearing and homemaking activities. Consequently 
the Thatcher government undermined the traditional conservative concept of the 
patriarchal family of a male breadwinner and female homemaker (Abbott & Wallace, 
1990: 85). The reality was that by 1988 despite nine years of Conservative 
government and pro-family rhetoric family life in Britian had been seriously eroded. 
As Kenneth Baker pointed out: 
                                                     
20 Alton was a Liberal MP. Mrs Thatcher refused to support the Bill 
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The figures for divorce and illegitimate births keep rising and Britain has the 
highest number of divorces per thousand existing marriages of any country in 
the European community. Around one in five of all registered births is 
illegitimate and in some parts of the country it is as high as one in three… 
(Isaac, 1990; 218) 
 
However, the Thatcher governments did make one serious attempt to impose their 
moral agenda upon society; this was Section 28 of the 1988 Local Government Act, 
which forbade local authorities from promoting intentionally homosexuality (Pilbeam, 
2005: 167). This echoed Margaret Thatcher’s belief, articulated at the 1987 Party 
Conference, “…children who needed to be taught respect and traditional moral values 
were being taught that they had an inalienable right to be gay (Isaac, 1990: 218). 
 
If the Thatcher governments made little serious attempt to remoralise society, one 
must ask why some ministers articulated strident socially conservative rhetoric. I 
would suggest there were two motives behind this language. The first was that 
blaming the liberal values of the 1960s for current social ills deflected criticism of the 
present government’s social and economic policies and the strain they put on some 
families. Secondly, it is arguable that socially conservative rhetoric was driven by the 
government’s desire to save money and cut benefit payments. Consequently, in 1988 
Social Security Minister John Moore told the Party Conference that state benefits 
might affect behaviour, to the extent that unmarried women deliberately became 
pregnant in order to secure a guaranteed income and a council house (Isaac, 1990: 
217). Moore’s view were echoed in 1993 by another Social Security Minister, Peter 
Lilley, who delighted activists at the 1993 party conference by rewriting the lyrics of 
Gilbert & Sullivan’s Lord High Executioner:  
I've got a little list of benefit offenders who I'll soon be rooting out, young 
ladies who get pregnant to jump the housing list, and dads who won't support 
the kids of ladies they have kissed! (Lilley, 1992) 
 
Lilley’s speech highlighted another target of the Conservatives’ moral wrath, absent 
fathers who refused to contribute financially towards the cost of raising their children. 
These concerns led to the creation of the Child Support Agency (CSA) in 1993.  The 
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Agency’s purpose was to assess, review, enforce and collect child maintenance 
payments from absent parents. Again despite the moral tone of some Conservative 
rhetoric an obvious attraction of the CSA was in cutting the social security bill, as 
benefits could be cut pound for pound for every payment recovered. However, the 
Agency was dogged by problems including an appalling level of errors, overcharging, 
and inefficiency, which left the CSA £112m short of its £530m collection target in its 
first year (Anon., 18/1/2006). Consequently the Agency arguably became an electoral 
liability for the Major government. 
 
However, the electoral repercussions of the failure of the CSA were minor compared 
to the moral quagmire opened up by John Major’s ‘Back to Basics’ speech at the 1993 
Conservative Party Conference. Back to Basics was Major’s attempt to relaunch his 
government and present a ‘big idea’ that was exclusively his, rather than something 
inherited from his predecessor. According to Major these basics included: 
 “…sound money; free trade; traditional teaching; respect for the family and 
the law.” (Major, 1999: 555).  
Major’s speech was billed in some sections of the media as a rolling back of the 
liberal tide that had swept the country since the 1960s, in part thanks to a briefing 
from central office spin-doctor (later MP) Tim Collins who suggested that Back to 
Basics contained a moral element (Sergeant, 2005: 291). Moreover, both Peter Lilley 
and John Redwood had recently attacked parenthood outside marriage, but in his 
autobiography Major denied he had been trying to launch a moral crusade, claiming:  
“…my ‘back to basics’ was not about  bashing single mothers or preaching 
sexual fidelity at private citizens.” (Major, 1999: 555) 
We now know Major had good reason not to preach sexual fidelity at private citizens 
after his parliamentary colleague Edwina Currie revealed in her Diaries (2002) that 
they conducted an extra-marital affair between 1984 and 1988 (Currie, 2002: 236-
7)21. It is arguable that had this come to public attention in the febrile aftermath of 
Back to Basics that it would have cost Major his job and even caused the government 
to fall.  
 
                                                     
21 In her diaries Currie refers to Major as ‘B’ 
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Whilst Major’s Back to Basics speech was hugely popular with the delegates at the 
party conference, Chief Whip Richard Ryder and his colleagues in the whips’ office 
were less than pleased. They knew about the human frailties of some Conservative 
MPs and feared that any hint of moralising would give the press an excuse to expose 
those MPs who did not live up to the moral right’s rhetoric (Selsdon, 1998: 403). 
Ryder was justifiably worried; in January 1994, Environment Secretary Tim Yeo was 
forced to resign because he had fathered an illegitimate child and David Ashby was 
revealed to have shared a bed with another man whilst on holiday. In addition the wife 
of Conservative peer, Lord Caithness committed suicide because she feared he was 
about to leave her for another woman. In February Stephen Milligan was found dead, 
the victim of bizarre sexual practices that went wrong and Hartley Booth, Mrs. 
Thatcher’s successor in Finchley, resigned as a PPS, having written love poems to a 
female researcher (Williams, 1998: 64). Whilst sexual scandals are not necessarily 
harmful to a party’s public image, in the context of Back to Basics they made the 
Conservative Party seem deeply hypocritical. 
 
In addition to sexual scandal the party began to be dogged by accusations of 
individual financial impropriety. Alan Duncan was forced to resign over the purchase 
and resale of a Westminster council house. The affair was made worse because 
Conservative controlled Westminster Council was already under investigation over its 
council house sales policy (Seldon, 1998: 433). In 1995 Neil Hamilton and Graham 
Riddick were both accused of taking cash in brown envelopes for asking 
parliamentary questions on behalf of Mohammed Fayed. In addition, Jonathan Aitken 
resigned from the cabinet to fight a libel action against the Guardian newspaper, 
which had accused him of conducting dodgy arms deal with Arabs22 (Wheatcroft, 
2005; 226). The succession of personal and financial scandals involving Conservative 
MPs became collectively known as ‘sleaze’. Sleaze was seen, both by the media and 
the electorate as an exclusively Conservative phenomenon and became one of the 
defining characteristics of the Major government and as Alan Clark wrote: 
Combined with their evident incompetence, and their staleness, it caused the 
Conservative Party to forfeit that most valuable of all political currencies in a 
democratic society – respect. (Clark, 1998: 510) 
                                                     
22 Aitken lost his libel action and was subsequently convicted of perjury and imprisoned. 
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5.10 The Ideological Composition of the PCP 1997 & 2001 
Phillip Norton (1990) argued that it was possible to analyse the political stance of 
every Conservative Member of Parliament, by using a number of indicators, including 
voting behaviour and membership of particular groups (Norton, 1990: 41).  
 
5.10.1 Methodology 
In order to analyse the ideological disposition of the Parliamentary Conservative Party 
I have chosen to use three policy divides; economic policy, attitudes to Europe and 
sexual and moral policy.  The analysis of the ideological composition of the PCP will 
be in two sections; the first section will group MPs according to the ideological stance 
in each of the three policy areas to produce a one-dimensional typology. The second 
section will then categorise MPs according to their position to each of the three policy 
areas combined, producing a more sophisticated three dimensional typology. Both 
these typologies can then be applied to the final round of the 1997 leadership election 
and to the final Westminster round of the 2001 leadership election to analyse the 
connection between and the voting behaviour of Conservative MPs23. The 
methodology used to ascertain the ideological disposition of individual MPs is taken 
from Norton’s (1990) groundbreaking work on the ideological composition of the 
Parliamentary Conservative Party. Consequently this study will utilise votes in 
Parliament, Early Day Motions (EDMs), membership of ginger groups and public 
statements.  
 
5.10.1.1 Division Lists 
Division lists are the record of votes taken in Parliament. Norton argues that these 
provide ‘hard data’, bald statements of fact, whose contents cannot be subject to 
dispute (Norton, 1990: 47). However, care must be taken with regard to division lists 
to distinguish between free votes where an MP is free to vote according to his or her 
                                                     
23 Shaun Woodward was elected as a Conservative MP in 1997, but defected to Labour in 1999. 
Consequently there is little data, with which to position Woodward within the typology. He has 
therefore been excluded from this study 
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conscience and whipped votes when MPs come under (sometimes severe) pressure to 
toe the party line.  
 
5.10.1.2 Early Day Motions 
Berrington & Hague (1998) define EDMs as: 
…motions put down by backbenchers; their subject matter covers a wide range 
of topics, some politically controversial. While some EDMs are designed as 
mere demonstrations by one member or a handful of MPs, others attract many 
signatures (Berrington & Hague, 1998: 44-45)  
EDMs can be regarded as a valuable source of data because they are attitudinal 
indicators. They may reveal an MPs true feelings on a given subject that may not be 
apparent from division lists, when backbenchers come under pressure to conform to 
the party line (Heppell, 2002: 308). 
 
5.10.1.3 Group Membership 
Group membership provides, “…an MPs self-ascription as to his or her political 
stance.” (Norton, 1990: 43). Group membership may provide evidence of a particular 
stance on economic policy; the interventionist Tory Reform Group (TRG) or the neo-
liberal Conservative Way Forward (CWF). Pro European groupings include the 
Conservative Group for Europe (CGE) and the Tory Euro Network.  It should be 
noted that some groups are dual purpose; for example the TRG is both economically 
wet and europhile, whilst the CWF is both economically dry and eurosceptic. Groups 
utilised to determine the socially liberal / conservative divide Party comprise both 
party and cross-party groupings. These include the All Party Parliamentary Pro-
Choice and Sexual Health Group. On the socially conservative side groups include the 
Conservative Christian Fellowship (CCF), the All Party Parliamentary Pro-Life 
Group.  
 
5.10.1.4 Public Statements 
Public statements by MPs are another valuable source of data. This information has 
been derived from both primary sources (MPs’ websites and Hansard) and secondary 
sources, notably comments and interviews in the press. 
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5.10.1.5 Location of MPs 
The process of ascertaining the ideological disposition of any given MP starts with the 
assumption that the said MP is ideologically ‘neutral’ and has an ideological ‘score of 
zero. If an MP is a member of a dry economic group they are given a score of +1, 
conversely if they are a member of a wet group they are given a score of –1. This 
method of scoring is then repeated for public and private comment; a statement 
supporting a dry position scores +1, whilst a statement supporting a wet position 
scores –1. The same process is applied to EDMs and division lists, MPs with a score 
above zero are regarded as economically dry, those with a score below zero are wet, 
whilst those with a score of zero can be considered to be neutral. For example, John 
Redwood is the Honorary President of the dry Selsdon Group and therefore scores +1. 
In addition he has said that: 
Keeping taxes low and few in number is the best way to make a people well 
off. Cutting taxes and tax rates can increase total revenue, because it is likely 
to increase the overall prosperity of the society promoting those lower taxes. 
(Redwood, 2002) 
This dry statement gives him a further score of +1 and places him in the economic 
‘dry’ category. The same method can be applied to determine if an MP is eurosceptic 
or europhile, socially liberal or socially conservative. 
 
5.10.1.6 The Economy 
The collection of data that demonstrates the wet / dry policy divide between 1997 and 
2001 has proved methodologically challenging because the Conservatives were no 
longer in power. Whilst many public statements by Conservative can be found about 
the economy these can be considered of the type that the Conservatives often make 
when they are in opposition; that taxes under Labour are too high and that the Labour 
government is inefficient and wastes taxpayer’s money. For example a paper 
published by the ‘wet’ Tory Reform Group in 2003 asserted that:  
Conservative Governments will seek to extract less tax than Labour ones. 
Essentially the task is to use the tax revenue most efficiently to ensure high-
quality public services. (Green & Taylor, 2003) 
Moreover economic policy has arguably become the least salient ideological division 
within the Conservative Party, in that although it was the dominant schism of British 
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conservatism during the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was superseded by the question 
of European integration and the emerging divide between social liberals and social 
conservatives.  
 
Consequently, I have made two assumptions about the economic disposition of 
Conservative MPs between 1997 and 2001. Firstly, I have used evidence from 
Heppell (2002) to locate the ideological position of MPs who entered parliament 
before 1997, unless there is clear evidence that they have changed their views since 
the 1997 general election. Secondly, I have assumed that those MPs who entered 
parliament since 1997 would have undergone their political socialisation during the 
Margaret Thatcher era. These MPs have therefore been classified as dry, unless there 
is clear evidence to the contrary.  
 
5.10.1.7 Europe 
The question of European integration was the defining issue for the Conservative 
Party during the later part of the 20th century. One strong indicator of an MP’s 
position on Europe is the membership of various party and non-party groups. Perhaps 
due to the bitterness with which this disputation was fought, there is a plethora of pro 
and anti EU groups and as with the economic variable, many MPs are members of 
several organisations. Europhile groups include; The Action Centre for Europe, the 
Conservative Group for Europe, the Tory Euro Network and the Tory reform Group. 
On the eurosceptic side groups include Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE), Conservative Way Forward, the European Foundation, the European 
Research Group and the Freedom Association. Because of the contentious nature of 
the European debate, there are no shortage of speeches, newspaper articles and 
statements on individual MPs’ websites. A third source of data on Europe is Early 
Day Motions24 and finally, one parliamentary division list was utilised; the European 
Communities Amendment Bill 1997, which ratified the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 
                                                     
24 Eurosceptic EDMs include calls for the repatriation of control over UK fishing grounds and for the 
government to produce a white paper on …’the constitutional, economic and political implications of 
the United Kingdom joining the European single currency’, which was signed by eighty-two 
Conservative MPs. Conversely an EDM welcoming ‘Europe Day’, as a chance to celebrate Britain’s 
membership of the EU, was signed by a lone Tory MP; Robert Jackson. 
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The 1997 defeat should have taken some of the heat out of the European issue; the 
decision on EMU was no longer the Conservatives’ to take and indeed Hague’s more 
eurosceptic position satisfied most of his party. However, three pro European shadow 
cabinet members resigned; Ian Taylor and David Curry in October 1997, followed by 
Stephen Dorrell in June 1998 (Lynch, 2003: 148). In addition, Peter Temple-Morris 
defected to Labour in 1998 and Hague’s policy was criticised by several high profile 
Conservative ex-ministers (Lynch, 2003: 158). Nevertheless, the party has become 
significantly more eurosceptic; many europhile MPs have been have either retired and 
been replaced by eurosceptics or lost their seats to other parties. Furthermore, a 
number of Conservative MPs have become more eurosceptic as a result of what they 
see as the consequences of further integration. A survey of Conservative MPs by 
Baker, Gamble and Seawright conducted in 1998 found that 75% of respondents 
believed that joining the Euro would ‘signal the end of the UK as a sovereign nation’ 
and 80% favoured an Act to establish the ultimate supremacy of Parliament and 26% 
advocated withdrawal from the EU (Lynch, 2003: 155). 
 
5.10.1.8 Sexual & Moral Issues 
This has been another difficult area to research because of the paucity of divisions in 
Parliament over issues of social, sexual and moral policy. The totemic issue of the 
death penalty, which used to come before Parliament every five years, has been 
permanently abolished with the passage of the Human Rights Act. Corporal 
punishment in schools was abolished in the 1998 School Standards and Framework 
Bill. The vote was taken at 5.38am; only 18 Conservative MPs took part, one in 
favour and seventeen against. (Hansard, 1998: Col. 395) One issue that offered scope 
for research was that of hunting with dogs. However, this too has proved problematic. 
Firstly, is the defence of the right to hunt socially conservative or liberal? At first 
glance it is easy to categorise those who defend hunting as socially conservative; they 
seek to perpetuate a traditional country pursuit – and the defence of tradition is at the 
heart of conservative ideology. However, it could also be argued that the abolition of 
hunting is an example of the tyranny of the majority and an infringement of individual 
liberty and many socially liberal Tories defend hunting on precisely these grounds. 
Then there is the question of cruelty – is hunting foxes with dogs a cruel and outdated 
practice, or the most humane and efficient method of pest control? Finally, the 
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hunting issue is not a typical representation of ideological division within the PCP. 
Only seven Conservative MPs support an outright ban on hunting with dogs and of 
these, four; Ann Widdecombe, Sir Teddy Taylor, David Amess and David Atkinson 
are from the socially conservative wing of the parliamentary party. Consequently, I 
have decided not to use the hunting issue in this study, because it is not clear that it is 
a reliable indicator of socially liberal / conservative behaviour.  
 
To categorise Conservative MPs as socially liberal or Conservative I looked at three 
areas; reproductive issues - abortion and embryo research, gay rights and euthanasia. 
‘Life issues’ like abortion, voluntary euthanasia and embryo research are hugely 
important for many social conservatives, like Ann Widdecombe, Ann Winterton, 
David Amess and other MPs who are members of the Conservative Christian 
Fellowship.  There is a broad range of positions, within the PCP on these issues, 
ranging from the aforementioned Christian conservatives to pro-choice liberals. MPs’ 
opinions are generally consistent, but there are exceptions; David Davis is in favour of 
voluntary euthanasia, but opposes embryo research.  Conversely, Edward Garnier is 
typical of many Tories who are in favour of Embryo research, but oppose voluntary 
euthanasia. Michael Portillo is an exceptional case, because he has never voted on a 
life issue during his entire Parliamentary career. However, life issues, whilst 
important to many MPs do not have the totemic significance of gay rights.  
 
Gay rights have been a significant issue within the PCP as the Conservatives try to 
shake off their ‘nasty party’ image. Two pieces of legislation have been particularly 
problematic for the Tories the Adoption and Children Bill and the repeal of ‘Section 
28’. The passage of the Adoption and Children Bill, allowed gay couples adopt and 
this caused a massive rift within the PCP, after IDS ordered his MPs to vote against 
the bill and imposed a three-line whip. This prompted John Bercow to resign from the 
Shadow Cabinet and he together with Michael Portillo, Ken Clarke and five others 
defied IDS by voting for the Bill, prompting IDS to tell his party they had to, “unite or 
die”25. IDS avoided making the same mistake twice and MPs were given a free vote 
over the repeal of Section 28 of the Local Government Act, which bans the promotion 
                                                     
25 MPs were told that they could miss the vote if they did not wish to vote against the Bill 
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of homosexuality in schools. However, Duncan Smith joined Ann Widdecombe, Bill 
Cash and seventy other Tories in voting to retain Section 28. As with life issues, 
opinions within the PCP are varied, ranging from relaxed to homophobic. Again MPs 
are generally consistent, over a range of gay issues, however there are exceptions; 
Mark Field voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (arguably because it was a 
whipped vote), but supported the abolition of section 28. Another oddity is Andrew 
Lansley who opposed the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill, which reduced the age 
of consent for gays, but supported the Adoption and Children Bill.  
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5.11 Ideological Disposition of the PCP 1997-2001 (One Dimensional) 
            
 
Table 5.4: Limited state (dry) (n = 112) 
            
David Amess   Michael Ancram  James Arbuthnot 
David Atkinson  Peter Atkinson  Greg Barker  
John Bercow    Crispin Blunt   Richard Body  
Graham Brady   Julian Brazier   Angela Browning 
William Cash   Christopher Chope  Alan Clark 
Michael Clark   Tim Collins   Michael Colvin 
James Cran   David Davis   Iain Duncan Smith 
Alan Duncan   Peter Emery   Nigel Evans  
David Faber   Michael Fabricant   Michael Fallon 
Howard Flight   Eric Forth   Liam Fox   
Christopher Fraser  Roger Gale   Edward Garnier 
Nick Gibb    Christopher Gill  Cheryl Gillan  
Teresa Gorman  James Gray   John Greenway 
Dominic Grieve  William Hague  Archie Hamilton 
Philip Hammond  John Hayes   David Heathcoat Amory 
Charles Hendry   John Horam   Michael Howard 
Gerald Howarth  Andrew Hunter  Robert Jackson 
Bernard Jenkin   Julie Kirkbride  Eleanor Laing  
Andrew Lansley  Edward Leigh   Oliver Letwin  
Julian Lewis   David Lidington  Peter Lilley   
Peter Lloyd   Michael Lord   Tim Loughton  
Peter Luff   John MacGregor  Andrew Mackay  
David Maclean  Humfrey Malins  John Maples   
Francis Maude   Brian Mawhinney  Theresa May  
Anne McIntosh  Piers Merchant  Malcom Moss 
Patrick Nicholls  Archie Norman   James Paice  
Owen Patterson  Eric Pickles   David Prior  
John Redwood  Andrew Robathan  Laurence Robertson 
Marion Roe    David Ruffley   Jonathan Sayeed 
Gillian Shephard  Richard Shepherd  Keith Simpson 
Caroline Spelman   Michael Spicer  Nick St. Aubyn 
Anthony Steen  Gary Streeter   Desmond Swayne 
Peter Tapsell   Teddy Taylor    John Townend  
David Treddinick   Andrew Tyrie   Charles Wardle 
Nigel Waterson  Bowen Wells   Ray Whitney  
John Whittingdale  Ann Widdecombe  John Wilkinson  
David Willetts   David Wilshire  Ann Winterton  
Nicholas Winterton          
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Table 5.5: Economic agnostic (n = 13) 
            
Ian Bruce   Simon Burns   Peter Brooke  
James Clappison  Geoffrey Johnson-Smith  Patrick McLoughlin   
John Major    Richard Ottaway  Richard Spring 
Robert Syms   Michael Trend   Peter Viggers  
Robert Walter           
    
 
            
 
Table 5.6: Extended state (wet) (n = 39) 
            
Peter Ainsworth  Tony Baldry   Paul Beresford 
Timothy Boswell   Peter Bottomley   Virginia Bottomley 
John Butterfill   Sydney Chapman   Kenneth Clark 
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown Patrick Cormack   David Curry 
Quentin Davies  Steven Day    Stephen Dorrell 
Norman Fowler   Alistair Goodlad  Damian Green  
John Gummer   Alan Haselhurst  Nick Hawkins  
Oliver Heald    Edward Heath   Douglas Hogg  
Michael Jack   Robert Key   Tom King 
Nicholas Lyell   David Madel   Michael Mates 
Richard Page    Andrew Rowe   Nicholas Soames 
John Stanley    Ian Taylor    John Taylor 
Peter Temple-Morris  Tim Yeo    George Young   
 
 
            
 
Table 5.7: Eurosceptic (n = 140) 
            
Peter Ainsworth   David Amess   Michael Ancram 
James Arbuthnot   David Atkinson   Peter Atkinson  
John Bercow    Sir Paul Beresford   Crispin Blunt 
Sir Richard Body  Tim Boswell    Peter Bottomley  
Graham Brady   Julian Brazier    Peter Brooke  
Angela Browning   Ian Bruce     Simon Burns  
John Butterfill    William Cash     Sydney Chapman 
Christopher Chope    James Clappison   Alan Clark  
Michael Clark    Geoffrey Clifton-Brown  Tim Collins  
Michael Colvin   James Cran    Stephen Day   
David Davis    Iain Duncan Smith   Alan Duncan   
Peter Emery    Nigel Evans     David Faber    
Michael Fabricant   Howard Flight    Eric Forth    
Liam Fox    Norman Fowler    Christopher Fraser  
Roger Gale    Edward Garnier    Nick Gibb    
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Cheryl Gillan    Christopher Gill    Teresa Gorman  
James Gray    John Greenway    Dominic Grieve   
William Hague   Archie Hamilton    Philip Hammond   
John Hayes    Nick Hawkins    David Heathcoat-Amory 
Oliver Heald   Douglas Hogg    John Horam    
Michael Howard   Gerald Howarth    Andrew Hunter  
Michael Jack    Bernard Jenkin    Geoffrey Johnson-Smith 
Robert Key    Tom King     Julie Kirkbride   
Eleanor Laing   Andrew Lansley   Edward Leigh   
Oliver Letwin    Julian Lewis     David Lidington   
Peter Lilley    Sir Peter Lloyd    Michael Lord   
Tim Loughton    Peter Luff     John MacGregor   
Andrew Mackay    David Maclean  David Madel    
John Major     Humfrey Malins  John Maples   
Michael Mates   Francis Maude  Piers Merchant  
Theresa May     Anne McIntosh   Patrick McLoughlin  
Malcolm Moss    Patrick Nicholls    Archie Norman  
Richard Ottaway    Richard Page     James Paice  
Owen Paterson    Eric Pickles     David Prior    
John Randall     John Redwood    Andrew Robathan  
Laurence Robertson    Marion Roe     Andrew Rowe   
David Ruffley    Jonathan Sayeed    Gillian Shephard  
Richard Shepherd    Keith Simpson    Nicholas Soames  
Michael Spicer    Richard Spring    John Stanley  
Nick St. Aubyn    Anthony Steen    Gary Streeter  
Desmond Swayne   Robert Syms     Peter Tapsell    
John Taylor     Teddy Taylor     John Townend  
David Tredinnick   Michael Trend    Andrew Tyrie    
Peter Viggers     Charles Wardle    Nigel Waterson   
Bowen Wells     John Whittingdale    Ann Widdecombe   
John Wilkinson    David Willets     David Wilshire   
Ann Winterton    Nicholas Winterton      
 
 
            
 
Table 5.8: European agnostic (n = 12) 
            
Tony Baldry    Virginia Bottomley  Patrick Cormack 
Anthony Grant  Damian Green   Nicholas Lyell 
Brian Mawhinney  Caroline Spelman  Robert Walter 
Ray Whitney   Tim Yeo   George Young   
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Table 5.9: Europhile (n = 12) 
            
Kenneth Clarke  David Curry   Quentin Davies  
Stephen Dorrell    Alistair Goodlad  John Gummer 
Edward Heath    Alan Haselhurst    Michael Heseltine   
Robert Jackson    Ian Taylor     Peter Temple-Morris  
 
            
 
Table 5.10: Socially conservative (n = 122) 
            
Peter Ainsworth    David Amess     Michael Ancram 
James Arbuthnot    David Atkinson    Peter Atkinson  
Tony Baldry     Paul Beresford    Peter Bottomley 
Graham Brady    Julian Brazier     Angela Browning  
Ian Bruce     Simon Burns     John Butterfill  
William Cash     Sydney Chapman    Christopher Chope  
James Clappison    Alan Clark   Tim Collins    
Michael Colvin   Patrick Cormack   James Cran   
David Davis     Stephan Day    Iain Duncan Smith   
Alan Duncan     Nigel Evans     David Faber    
Michael Fallon    Howard Flight    Eric Forth    
Norman Fowler    Liam Fox    Christopher Fraser   
Roger Gale    Edward Garnier   Christopher Gill   
Cheryl Gillan     James Gray    Damien Green   
John Greenway    Dominic Grieve   John Gummer   
William Hague    Archie Hamilton   Phillip Hammond   
Nicholas Hawkins    John Hayes     Oliver Heald    
David Heathcoat-Amory  Douglas Hogg   John Horam    
Michael Howard    Gerald Howarth   Andrew Hunter   
Michael Jack     Bernard Jenkin    Geoffrey Johnson-Smith  
Tom King     Eleanor Laing   Edward Leigh  
Oliver Letwin     Julian Lewis     David Liddington   
Peter Lilley    Michael Lord    Timothy Loughton   
Peter Luff     Nicholas Lyell   David Maclean   
David Madel     Humfrey Malins   Michael Mates   
Brian Mawhinney    Theresa May     Anne McIntosh   
Patrick McLoughlin    Patrick Mercer   Piers Merchant  
Malcom Moss    Patrick Nicolls    Richard Page   
James Paice     Owen Paterson    Eric Pickles   
David Prior     John Redwood    Laurence Robertson  
Andrew Robathan    Marion Roe     David Ruffley  
Jonathan Sayeed   Gillian Shephard    Richard Shepherd   
Keith Simpson    Caroline Spelman    Michael Spicer  
Richard Spring    Nick St. Aubyn    Anthony Steen   
Gary Streeter     Desmond Swayne    Robert Syms   
Peter Tapsell     John Taylor     Teddy Taylor   
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Michael Trend    Andrew Tyrie     Peter Viggers    
Robert Walter    Charles Wardle    Nigel Waterson  
Bowen Wells     Ray Whitney     John Whittingdale  
Ann Widdecombe    John Wilkinson    David Wilshire   
Ann Winterton    Nicholas Winterton      
 
 
            
 
Table 5.11: Socially Agnostic (n = 13) 
            
Virginia Bottomley    Peter Brooke     Michael Clark  
Peter Emery     Michael Heseltine    John Macgregor   
John Major    John Maples     Nicholas Soames  
John Stanley     David Tredinnick    David Willetts   
George Young           
  
 
            
 
Table 5.12: Socially liberal (n = 29) 
            
John Bercow     Crispin Blunt     Richard Body  
Tim Boswell     Kenneth Clarke   Geoffrey Clifton Brown 
David Curry    Quentin Davies    Stephen Dorrell   
Michael Fabricant    Nick Gibb     Alistair Goodlad  
Teresa Gorman   Alan Haselhurst   Edward Heath  
Robert Jackson    Robert Key     Julie Kirkbride   
Andrew Lansley    Peter Lloyd     Andrew Mackay  
Francis Maude  Archie Norman    Richard Ottoway   
Andrew Rowe    Ian Taylor     Peter Temple Morris   
John Townend   Tim Yeo       
 
 
 
5.12 Ideological Disposition of the PCP 2001 – 2005 (One Dimensional) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.13: Limited state (dry) n = (121) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
David Amess   Michael Ancram  James Arbuthnot 
David Atkinson   Peter Atkinson  Richard Bacon 
Greg Barker   John Baron   John Bercow   
Crispin Blunt    Graham Brady   Julian Brazier  
Angela Browning  David Cameron  William Cash 
Christopher Chope  Tim Collins   Derek Conway 
James Cran   David Davis   Jonathan Djanogly 
Iain Duncan Smith  Alan Duncan   Peter Duncan 
Nigel Evans   Michael Fabricant   Michael Fallon 
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Mark Field   Howard Flight   Adrian Flook  
Eric Forth   Liam Fox   Mark Francois  
Roger Gale   Edward Garnier  Nick Gibb   
Cheryl Gillan   Paul Goodman  James Gray  
Chris Grayling  John Greenway  Dominic Grieve 
Phillip Hammond  William Hague  John Hayes  
David Heathcoat-Amory Charles Hendry   Mark Hoban  
John Horam   Michael Howard  Gerald Howart h 
Andrew Hunter  Bernard Jenkin  Boris Johnson  
Julie Kirkbride  Eleanor Laing   Andrew Lansley  
Edward Leigh   Oliver Letwin   Julian Lewis  
Ian Liddell-Grainger  David Lidington  Peter Lilley 
Michael Lord   Timothy Loughton  Anne McIntosh  
Andrew Mackay  David Maclean  Humfrey Malins 
John Maples    Francis Maude  Brian Mawhinney 
Theresa May   Patrick Mercer  Andrew Mitchell 
Malcolm Moss  Andrew Murrison   Archie Norman  
George Osbourne  James Paice   Owen Patterson 
Michael Portillo   Mark Prisk   Eric Pickles  
John Randall   John Redwood  Andrew Robathan 
Hugh Robertson  Laurence Robertson  Marion Roe  
Andrew Rosindell   David Ruffley   Jonathan Sayeed 
Andrew Selous  Gillian Shephard  Richard Shepherd 
Mark Simmonds  Keith Simpson   Caroline Spelman 
Michael Spicer  Robert Spink   Anthony Steen 
Gary Streeter   Desmond Swayne  Hugo Swire  
Peter Tapsell   John Taylor   Teddy Taylor  
David Tredinnick   Andrew Turner  Andrew Tyrie 
Nigel Waterson  Angela Watkinson  John Whittingdale 
Ann Widdecombe  Bill Wiggin   John Wilkinson 
David Willetts   David Wilshire  Ann Winterton 
Nicholas Winterton_____________________________________________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.14: Economic agnostic (n = 11) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Simon Burns    James Clappison  Patrick Cormack  
Greg Knight   Patrick McLoughlin  Richard Ottoway 
Richard Spring   Robert Syms   Michael Trend  
Peter Viggers   Robert Walter_________________________________ 
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.15: Extended state (wet) (n = 34) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Peter Ainsworth   Tony Baldry    Henry Bellingham 
Paul Beresford   Tim Boswell    Peter Bottomley  
Virginia Bottomley  Alistair Burt    John Butterfill  
Sidney Chapman  Kenneth Clarke  Geoffrey Clifton-Brown 
David Curry   Quentin Davies  Stephen Dorrell  
Damian Green   John Gummer   Alan Haselhurst 
Nick Hawkins   Oliver Heald   Douglas Hogg  
Michael Jack    Robert Jackson  Robert Key 
Jaqui Lait    Peter Luff   Michael Mates 
Stephen O’Brien   Richard Page    Nicholas Soames 
John Stanley   Ian Taylor   Tim Yeo 
George Young _________________________________________________________ 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.16: Eurosceptic (n = 149) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Peter Ainsworth    David Amess     Michael Ancram  
James Arbuthnot    David Atkinson    Peter Atkinson  
Richard Bacon    Greg Barker     John Baron  
Henry Bellingham    John Bercow     Paul Beresford  
Crispin Blunt     Timothy Boswell    Peter Bottomley  
Graham Brady    Julian Brazier     Angela Browning  
Simon Burns     John Butterfill    David Cameron  
William Cash     Sydney Chapman    Christopher Chope   
James Clappison    Geoffrey Clifton-Brown  Tim Collins    
Derek Conway    James Cran     David Davis   
Jonathan Djanogly    Alan Duncan     Peter Duncan    
Iain Duncan Smith    Nigel Evans     Michael Fabricant  
Michael Fallon    Mark Field     Howard Flight   
Adrain Flook     Eric Forth     Liam Fox  
Mark Francois    Roger Gale     Edward Garnier   
Nick Gibb     Cheryl Gillan     Paul Goodman  
James Gray     Chris Grayling    John Greenway  
Dominic Grieve    William Hague    Philip Hammond  
Nicholas Hawkins    John Hayes     Oliver Heald  
David Heathcoat-Amory  Charles Hendry    Mark Hoban  
Douglas Hogg    John Horam    Michael Howard  
Gerald Howarth    Andrew Hunter    Michael Jack  
Bernard Jenkin    Boris Johnson    Robert Key  
Julie Kirkbride    Greg Knight     Eleanor Laing   
Jacqui Lait     Andrew Lansley    Edward Leigh   
Oliver Letwin     Julian Lewis     Ian Liddell-Grainger  
David Lidington    Peter Lilley     Michael Lord  
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Timothy Loughton   Peter Luff     Andrew Mackay   
David Maclean   Humfrey Malins    John Maples    
Michael Mates   Francis Maude    Teresa May    
Anne McIntosh   Patrick McLoughlin    Patrick Mercer   
Andrew Mitchell   Malcolm Moss    Andrew Murrison   
Archie Norman   Stephen O’Brien    George Osbourne   
Richard Ottaway   Richard Page     James Paice    
Owen Paterson   Eric Pickles     Michael Portillo   
Mark Prisk,    John Randall     John Redwood   
Andrew Robathan   Hugh Robertson    Lawrence Robertson   
Marion Roe    Andrew Rosindell    David Ruffley   
Jonathan Sayeed   Andrew Selous    Gillian Shephard   
Richard Shepherd   Mark Simmonds    Keith Simpson   
Nicholas Soames   Caroline Spelman    Michael Spicer   
Robert Spink     Richard Spring    John Stanley    
Anthony Steen    Gary Streeter     Desmond Swayne   
Hugo Swire    Robert Syms     Peter Tapsell    
John Taylor    Teddy Taylor     David Tredinnick   
Michael Trend   Andrew Turner    Andrew Tyrie   
Peter Viggers    Nigel Waterson    Angela Watkinson   
John Whittingdale   Ann Widdecombe    Bill Wiggin    
John Wilkinson   David Willetts    David Wilshire   
Ann Winterton   Nicholas Winterton      
 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.17: European agnostic (n = 9) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Tony Baldry   Virginia Bottomley  Alistair Burt 
Patrick Cormack  Damian Green   Brian Mawhinney 
Robert Walter   Timothy Yeo   George Young  _ 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.18: Europhile (n = 8) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Kenneth Clarke    David Curry     Quentin Davies 
Stephen Dorrell    John Gummer    Alan Haselhurst  
Robert Jackson   Ian Taylor____________________________________  
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_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.19: Socially conservative (n = 133) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Peter Ainsworth   David Amess     Michael Ancram  
James Arbuthnot    David Atkinson    Peter Atkinson  
Richard Bacon    Tony Baldry     Greg Barker    
John Baron     Henry Bellingham    Paul Beresford   
Peter Bottomley    Graham Brady    Julian Brazier    
Angela Browning    Simon Burns     Alistair Burt    
John Butterfill    David Cameron    William Cash   
Sydney Chapman    Christopher Chope    James Clappison  
Tim Collins     Derek Conway    Patrick Cormack  
James Cran     David Davis     Jonathan Djangoly  
Alan Duncan     Iain Duncan Smith    Nigel Evans    
Michael Fallon    Mark Field     Howard Flight   
Adrian Flook     Eric Forth     Liam Fox  
Mark Francois    Roger Gale     Edward Garnier  
Cheryl Gillan     Paul Goodman    James Gray  
Chris Grayling    Damian Green    John Greenway  
Dominic Grieve    John Gummer    William Hague   
Philip Hammond    Nicholas Hawkins    John Hayes    
Oliver Heald     David Heathcoat-Amory  Mark Hoban    
Douglas Hogg    John Horam   Michael Howard  
Gerald Howarth    Andrew Hunter    Michael Jack    
Bernard Jenkin    Greg Knight     Eleanor Laing   
Jaqui Lait     Edward Leigh    Oliver Letwin    
Julian Lewis     Ian Liddell-Grainger    Davis Lidington   
Peter Lilley     Michael Lord    Timothy Loughton  
Peter Luff     David MacLean   Humfrey Malins   
Michael Mates    Brian Mawhinney    Teresa May    
Anne McIntosh    Patrick McLoughlin    Patrick Mercer  
Malcom Moss    Andrew Murrison    Stephen O’Brien  
George Osbourne    Richard Page     James Paice  
Owen Paterson    Eric Pickles     Michael Prisk  
John Randall     John Redwood    Andrew Robathan  
Hugh Robertson    Laurence Robertson   Marion Roe  
Andrew Rosindell    David Ruffley    Jonathan Sayeed  
Andrew Selous    Gillian Shephard    Richard Shepherd  
Mark Simmonds    Keith Simpson    Caroline Spelman  
Michael Spicer    Robert Spink     Richard Spring  
Anthony Steen    Gary Streeter     Desmond Swayne  
Hugo Swire     Robert Syms     Peter Tapsell  
John Taylor     Teddy Taylor     Michael Trend  
Andrew Turner    Andrew Tyrie     Peter Viggers  
Robert Walter    Nigel Waterson    Angela Watkinson  
John Whittingdale    Ann Widdecombe    Bill Wiggin  
John Wilkinson    David Wilshire    Ann Winterton  
Nicholas Winterton          
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.20: Socially agnostic (n = 9) 
_________________________________________________________________  
Virginia Bottomley    Peter Duncan    John Maples    
Andrew Mitchell   Nicholas Soames    John Stanley    
David Tredinnick   David Willetts   George Young _____ 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.21: Socially liberal (n = 24) 
_________________________________________________________________  
John Bercow     Crispin Blunt     Timothy Boswell  
Kenneth Clarke   Geoffrey Clifton-Brown  David Curry    
Quentin Davies   Stephen Dorrell    Michael Fabricant   
Nick Gibb    Alan Haselhurst   Charles Hendry   
Robert Jackson   Boris Johnson    Robert Key   
Julie Kirkbride   Andrew Lansley    Andrew Mackay  
Francis Maude    Archie Norman   Richard Ottaway   
Michael Portillo    Ian Taylor    Tim Yeo___________  
 
 
5.13 Ideological Composition 1997 – 2001 (Three Dimensional) 
            
Table 5.22: Wet, Europhile, Socially liberal (n = 8) 
            
Kenneth Clarke  David Curry  Quentin Davies 
Stephen Dorrell  Alistair Goodlad Alan Haselhurst  
Edward Heath   Ian Taylor  Peter Temple-Morris  
 
            
Table 5.23: Wet, Europhile, Socially conservative (n = 1) 
            
Damian Green 
            
 
            
Table 5.24: Dry, Europhile, Socially liberal (n = 1) 
            
Robert Jackson  
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Table 5.25: Dry, Europhile, Socially conservative (n = 0) 
            
 
            
 
            
Table 5.26: Wet, Eurosceptic, Socially liberal (n = 5) 
            
Timothy Boswell  Geoffrey Clifton-Brown Robert Key 
Andrew Rowe   Nicholas Soames 
            
 
            
Table 5.27: Wet, Eurosceptic, Socially conservative (n = 17) 
            
Peter Ainsworth  Paul Beresford  Peter Bottomley 
John Butterfill   Sydney Chapman  Steven Day  
Norman Fowler  John Gummer   Nick Hawkins  
Oliver Heald   Douglas Hogg   Michael Jack  
David Madel   Michael Mates  Richard Page  
John Taylor    
            
 
            
Table 5.28: Dry, Eurosceptic, Socially liberal (n = 13) 
            
John Bercow   Richard Body   Michael Fabricant 
Nick Gibb   Charles Hendry  Teresa Gorman 
Julie Kirkbride  Andrew Lansley  Peter Lloyd  
John MacGregor  Andrew Mackay  Francis Maude 
Archie Norman  John Townend 
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Table 5.29: Dry, Eurosceptic, Socially Conservative (n = 86) 
            
David Amess   Michael Ancram  James Arbuthnot 
David Atkinson  Peter Atkinson  Greg Barker  
Crispin Blunt   Graham Brady   Julian Brazier  
Angela Browning  William Cash   Christopher Chope 
Tim Collins   Michael Colvin  James Cran  
David Davis   Iain Duncan Smith  Alan Duncan  
Nigel Evans   David Faber   Michael Fallon 
Howard Flight   Eric Forth   Liam Fox   
Christopher Fraser  Roger Gale   Edward Garnier 
Christopher Gill  Cheryl Gillan   James Gray  
John Greenway  Dominic Grieve  William Hague 
Archie Hamilton  Philip Hammond  John Hayes  
David Heathcoat Amory John Horam   Michael Howard  
Gerald Howarth  Andrew Hunter  Bernard Jenkin 
Eleanor Laing   Edward Leigh   Oliver Letwin   
Julian Lewis   David Lidington  Peter Lilley  
Michael Lord   Tim Loughton   Peter Luff  
David Maclean  Humfrey Malins  Brian Mawhinney 
Theresa May   Anne McIntosh  Piers Merchant 
Malcom Moss   Patrick Nicholls  James Paice  
Owen Patterson  Eric Pickles   David Prior  
John Redwood  Andrew Robathan  Laurence Robertson 
Marion Roe    David Ruffley   Jonathan Sayeed 
Gillian Shephard  Richard Shepherd  Keith Simpson 
Michael Spicer  Nick St. Aubyn  Anthony Steen 
Gary Streeter   Desmond Swayne  Peter Tapsell  
Teddy Taylor    Andrew Tyrie   Charles Wardle 
Nigel Waterson  Bowen Wells   Ray Whitney  
John Whittingdale  Ann Widdecombe  John Wilkinson  
David Wilshire  Ann Winterton  Nicholas Winterton 
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5.14 Ideological Composition 2001 – 2005 (Three Dimensional) 
            
Table 5.30: Wet, Europhile, Socially liberal (n = 5) 
            
Kenneth Clarke  David Curry   Quentin Davies 
Stephen Dorrell  Alan Haselhurst  Ian Taylor 
            
 
 
            
Table 5.31: Wet, Europhile, Socially conservative (n = 4) 
            
Tony Baldry   Damian Green   John Gummer  
Michael Jack   Michael Mates 
            
 
 
            
Table 5.32: Dry, Europhile, Socially liberal (n = 0) 
            
 
            
 
 
            
Table 5.33: Dry, Europhile, Socially conservative (n =0 ) 
            
 
            
 
 
            
Table 5.34: Wet, Eurosceptic, Socially liberal (n = 3) 
            
Tim Boswell   Geoffrey Clifton-Brown Robert Key  
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Table 5.35: Wet, Eurosceptic, Socially conservative (n = 15) 
            
Peter Ainsworth  Henry Bellingham  Paul Beresford 
Peter Bottomley  John Butterfill   Sidney Chapman 
Nick Hawkins   Oliver Heald   Douglas Hogg  
Jaqui Lait   Peter Luff   Richard Page  
Stephen O’Brien  Nicholas Soames 
            
 
 
            
Table 5.36: Dry, Eurosceptic, Socially liberal (n = 9) 
            
John Bercow   Crispin Blunt   Michael Fabricant 
Charles Hendry  Boris Johnson   Julie Kirkbride 
Andrew Lansley   Andrew Mackay  Francis Maude  
Archie Norman  Michael Portillo 
            
 
 
            
Table 5.37: Dry, Eurosceptic, Socially Conservative (n = 98) 
            
David Amess   Michael Ancram  David Atkinson 
James Arbuthnot  Peter Atkinson  Richard Bacon 
John Baron   Graham Brady   Julian Brazier  
Angela Browning  David Cameron  William Cash 
Christopher Chope  Tim Collins   Derek Conway 
James Cran   David Davis   Jonathan Djanogly  
Iain Duncan Smith  Alan Duncan   Nigel Evans  
Michael Fallon  Mark Field   Howard Flight  
Adrian Flook   Eric Forth   Liam Fox 
Mark Francois   Christopher Fraser   Roger Gale  
Edward Garnier  Cheryl Gillan   Paul Goodman 
James Gray   Chris Grayling  John Greenway 
Dominic Grieve  William Hague  John Hayes 
David Heathcoat-Amory Mark Hoban   John Horam  
Michael Howard  Gerald Howarth  Bernard Jenkin 
Eleanor Laing   Edward Leigh   Oliver Letwin  
Julian Lewis   Ian Liddell-Grainger  David Lidington 
Peter Lilley   Timothy Loughton  Anne McIntosh 
David Maclean  Humfrey Malins  Theresa May 
Patrick Mercer  Malcolm Moss  Andrew Murrison 
James Paice   Owen Patterson  Mark Prisk  
Eric Pickles   John Randall   John Redwood 
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Andrew Robathan  Hugh Robertson  Laurence Robertson 
Marion Roe   Andrew Rosindell   David Ruffley  
Jonathan Sayeed  Andrew Selous  Gillian Shephard 
Richard Shepherd  Mark Simmonds  Keith Simpson 
Michael Spicer  Robert Spink   Anthony Steen 
Gary Streeter   Desmond Swayne  Hugo Swire 
Peter Tapsell   John Taylor   Teddy Taylor  
Andrew Turner   Andrew Tyrie   Nigel Waterson 
Angela Watkinson  John Whittingdale  Ann Widdecombe  
Bill Wiggin   John Wilkinson  David Wilshire 
Ann Winterton  Nicholas Winterton 
            
 
This data can be compared to the findings of Heppell (2002) to see if the ideological 
composition of the Parliamentary Conservative Party has changed between 1992 and 
2001. Table 5.38 shows that the Parliamentary Party became markedly more right 
wing after the 1992 general election. The ratio of dries to wets increased as did the 
ratio of social conservatives to social liberals, whilst the proportion of eurosceptic 
MPs grew by over a quarter, leaving a europhile rump of just 12 MPs. This trend was 
confirmed after the 2001 general election when dries, eurosceptics and social 
conservatives all grew as a proportion of the Parliamentary Party.    
 
Table: 5.38 Changes in the ideological disposition of the PCP 1992-2001   
 
__________________1992*    (331)  1997  (164)  2001  (166)     
 
Dry   56.0%  (188)  68.3%   (112)  72.9%   (121) 
Agnostic    9.4% (  31)      7.9%  (  13)    6.6%   (  11) 
Wet   33.8%  (112)  23.8%   (  39)  20.5%   (  34) 
 
Eurosceptic  58.0%  (192)  85.4%  (140)  89.8%   (149) 
Agnostic  12.4%  (  41)    7.3%   (  12)    5.4%   (    9) 
Europhile  29.6%  (  98)    7.3%   (  12)    4.8%    (    8) 
 
S. conservative 69.5%  (230)  74.4%   (122)              80.1%    (133) 
Agnostic         7.9%  (   13)    6.6%    (  11) 
S. liberal  30.5% (101)  17.7%   (   29)  13.3%    (  22) 
*Source: Heppell, 2001: 309-312 
 
Arguably, much of this change was due to the high numbers of older Conservative 
MPs who retired in 1997, many of whom would have been replaced by younger MPs 
who became politically aware during the Thatcher era. This new breed of 
Conservative MP is possibly influenced by Mrs. Thatcher’s three election victories 
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and is therefore more ideologically driven than their predecessors. However, the rise 
in the number of social conservatives is perhaps surprising, given that the early days 
of the Hague regime were about promoting a more socially liberal agenda for the 
Conservative Party and the prominence of the modernising tendency, who argued that 
the party had to change the way it looked and acted if it were to regain power 
 
5.15 Conclusion 
The Conservative Party has undergone significant ideological change since 1945. 
Most accounts of the Conservative Party, prior to the ascent of Margaret Thatcher, 
emphasise the party’s pragmatism and ideological flexibility. This pragmatism is 
reflected in Rose’s (1964) description of the Conservatives as a party of tendencies, 
rather than of factions. Consequently the Conservative Party was able to come to 
terms with the Attlee settlement of 1945, accepting the idea of a government 
committed to maintaining full-employment, the welfare state, conciliation with the 
trades union movement and keeping major industries under state control.  The 
Conservative Party’s commitment to the Attlee settlement reached its zenith under the 
leadership of Harold Macmillan. However, growing disillusion with the deteriorating 
state of the British economy and ever worsening industrial relations led to Edward 
Heath trying, but failing to make significant reforms to modernise the British 
economy. Heath’s rhetoric about not supporting loss making industries and his 
attempts to reform trades union law were seen as an early form of Thatcherism, 
although Heath ultimately failed because he maintained a very un-Thatcherite desire 
to avoid mass unemployment. However, Mrs. Thatcher learnt from Heath’s 
experiences and successfully abandoned much of the Attlee settlement by reforming 
trades union law and privatising much of the large state sector.  
 
Despite Mrs. Thatcher’s success the Parliamentary Conservative Party did not 
immediately become a Thatcherite party. Norton’s seminal (1990) research on the 
ideological composition of the Conservative Party also remains faithful to the idea 
that the Parliamentary Conservative Party was more concerned with gaining and 
holding power, rather than with ideological purity. Whilst the Norton typology shows 
some intra-party groups that could be a source of factionalism, such as the Critics and 
the Tory Right, Norton highlights that the majority of the PCP was made up of the 
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Party Faithful who had no strong ideological beliefs, but were loyal to the 
Conservative Party or its leader.  
 
However, Norton’s research was carried out before the European issue exploded 
within the PCP during the 1990s.  Both Labour and Conservatives largely ignored 
membership of the EEC in the early post-War period; however the success of the six 
founding members, together with Britain’s relative economic decline led Macmillan 
to bid for membership in 1961. Although the bid to join was scuppered by General De 
Gaulle it revealed many conservative MPs were deeply unhappy about Britain joining 
the European project. Twelve years after Macmillan’s bid was rejected Edward Heath 
finally took Britain into the EEC, however, Heath needed the support of Labour rebels 
to push the necessary legislation through parliament. The Conservative Party was split 
over Europe from the first days of membership, however, these splits did not damage 
the cohesion of the PCP and were not electorally damaging. The party’s leadership 
was united in support for the EEC and the rejectionist Labour Party was even more 
divided than the Conservatives, consequently Europe never re-emerged as a 
significant and divisive issue until the latter days of Mrs. Thatcher’s leadership.  
 
Indeed, Mrs. Thatcher remained committed to Europe for the first two terms of her 
premiership, despite the budget dispute that ran until 1984. Mrs. Thatcher was an 
enthusiastic supporter of the Single European Act, believing that it mirrored the free 
market reforms she was introducing in Britain. However, she failed to realise the full 
implications, especially the growth of regulation from Brussels, of the SEA until the 
Act was passed. When the consequences of the SEA became clear, she became an 
outspoken critic of the European project, which she now saw as a threat to her 
economic reforms and a way for socialism to re-emerge through the back door. This 
outright hostility towards the EC was marked by her 1988 Bruges speech that 
legitimated backbench Euroscepticism, by signalling the PCP elite were no longer 
committed pro-Europeans.  
 
The deepening Conservative rift over Europe was reflected in two-dimensional 
typologies of the PCP (Dunleavy, 1993; Baker et. al. 1991, 1993). Baker et. al. 
explicitly addressed the European question by dividing the party on two axes; 
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extended government / limited government and interdependence / sovereignty and 
showed that the European divide cut across the traditional wet / dry economic divide. 
Consequently whilst some neo-liberals shared Mrs. Thatcher’s view that the EU was a 
threat to British sovereignty and the Thatcherite programme, other neo-liberals saw 
European integration, including the single currency as a way to push the free-market 
across Europe. 
 
The PCPs rifts over Europe triggered by Mrs. Thatcher’s Bruges Speech worsened to 
the point that they proved to be a major contributory factor to her downfall from 
Michael Heseltine’s leadership bid in November 1990. The divisions within the PCP 
only temporarily healed by the election of John Major as Mrs. Thatcher’s successor 
and hostilities were resumed following Britain’s ejection from the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism in September 1992. The ERM fiasco emboldened the Eurosceptic wing of 
the party, many of whom rebelled against the government during the various stages of 
the Maastricht Treaty ratification, culminating in the worst parliamentary defeat 
suffered by a Conservative government. Divisions over Europe were also reflected in 
John Redwood’s challenge to Major’s leadership in 1995; whereas Major had been 
supported by Eurosceptics in 1990, in 1995 he was reliant on the votes of pro-
European MPs to defeat Redwood. The European rift effectively destroyed John 
Major’s government and was a major factor in the Conservatives’ massive defeat in 
1997. This unprecedented degree of backbench dissent was reflected in the Garry 
(1995), Garry & Cowley (1998) and Heppell (2002) typologies. These typologies 
utilised a three-dimensional approach and demonstrated the importance and 
divisiveness of the European divide in Conservative politics, indeed Cowley and 
Garry (1998) demonstrated that it was the decisive in the election of John Major as 
Mrs. Thatcher’s successor. Heppell also showed that Europe was the defining issue of 
Conservative parliamentarians between 1992 and 1997. Heppell’s typology also 
demonstrates the ideological fragmentation of the PCP and provides evidence of 
factionalism within the parliamentary party.   
 
The Garry (1995), Garry & Cowley (1998) and Heppell (2002) typologies also 
through light on tensions within conservatism, between the values of authority (social 
conservatism) and individual liberty (social liberty). Whilst this tension has always 
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been present it has only recently become problematical. Under Mrs. Thatcher’s 
leadership the party was avowedly socially conservative, although its record on 
implementing socially conservative policies was mixed. For whilst Thatcherites 
bemoaned the corrosive effects of the permissive society ushered in during the 1960s, 
the Thatcher governments made little attempt to reverse any of the reforms they 
thought so harmful. Section 28 of the Local Government Act forbade local authorities 
from ‘promoting of homosexuality’, but the AIDS crisis was treated as an issue of 
public health rather than personal morality and regulation concerning television 
broadcasting were relaxed, rather than tightened. Consequently the issue of social 
morality was never really a problem for Mrs. Thatcher’s Conservative Party, but that 
was to change under John Major. Major’s Back to Basics campaign was seen in the 
light of socially conservative rhetoric from right-wing ministers and interpreted as a 
morality campaign based on family values. However, Back to Basics turned into a 
political disaster when a number of sexual and financial scandals beset, making the 
Conservatives seem sleazy and deeply hypocritical. 
 
Following the 1997 election the PCP has become more socially conservative than it 
was under Major, it was also more dry and more Eurosceptic. Moreover, this drift 
rightwards was maintained after the 2001 general election. In part this may explain 
the failure of Hague’s flirtation with social liberalism between 1997 and 1999 and the 
failure of ‘modernisers’ within the party to secure any major changes in the selection 
process to pick parliamentary candidates who are more reflective of modern Britain.  
However, as the Parliamentary Conservative Party has moved to the right it has 
become more ideologically cohesive, with the wets and Europhiles reduced to an 
almost insignificant rump. However, the social liberal / conservative disputation has 
continued to cause controversy, especially, new leader David Cameron’s recent move 
to introduce an ‘A’ list, designed to boost the number of women and ethnic minority 
parliamentary candidates. These have been denounced by one right wing MP who 
claimed that: 
The idea that we can parachute insubstantial and untested candidates with little 
knowledge of the local scene into key seats to win the confidence of people 
they seek to represent is the bizarre theory of people who spend too much time 
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with the pseuds and posers of London's chi-chi set and not enough time in 
normal Britain (White, 30/5/2006) 
The drive to modernise the Conservative Party may yet prove to be a test of the 
party’s desire for power. So far, although some of the social conservatives in the PCP 
have criticised Cameron’s reforms, many have kept their counsel and pragmatically 
accepted reform as a necessary precursor to electoral success. However, the 
ideological composition of the parliamentary party has become ever-more Thatcherite 
since the 1997 general election: consequently there may be limits to this pragmatism 
if the party continues to trail New Labour in the opinion polls. The Conservative 
Party’s subordination of electoral pragmatism, in favour of ideological purity was 
evident in both the leadership election of 1997 and that of 2001 as we shall see in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
Voting Behaviour in the 1997 and 2001 Conservative Party 
Leadership Elections: The Impact of Social Background, Political 
Attributes and Ideological Disposition 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The goal of this chapter is to present an in depth analysis of the 1997 and 2001 
Conservative Party leadership elections. The first section of the chapter will explain 
the methodology employed to ascertain who voted for whom in 1997 and 2001 and 
justify its validity through comparison with Cowley & Garry (1998). The second 
section of the chapter will present a detailed breakdown of who voted for the 
candidates in the final rounds of the 1997 (Clarke and Hague) and the final 
parliamentary round of the 2001 (Clarke, Portillo and Duncan Smith) elections. The 
third section of the chapter will combine this data together with data from the 
preceding chapters to analyse the impact of social background, political attributes and 
ideological disposition on the final outcomes of the two leadership elections. 
 
6.2 Methodology 
The Parliamentary Conservative Party has been described by The Guardian 
newspaper as the most sophisticated electorate in the world and also as one of the 
most ‘slippery and duplicitous’ (Tempest, 20/8/2001). Consequently, the 
machinations of Tory MPs together with the anonymity afforded by the secret ballot 
make it difficult to work out who voted for whom in every case. However, it is 
possible to ascertain the voting intentions of a good majority of the PCP by using a 
variety of sources. These include lists of candidates’ supporters published in 
newspapers and other related newspaper articles, books and published interviews 
which enabled individual MPs to be placed into one of four classifications; definite, 
probable, speculative and unclassified. MPs in the ‘definite’ category have been 
identified by three or more different sources as voting for a particular candidate, the 
probable category consists of MPs who have been identified by two sources, whilst 
the speculative category consists of one source, the unclassified category contains the 
MPs about whose intentions nothing has been discovered or about whom there is 
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contradictory data. These unclassified MPs have been omitted from this analysis and 
there has been no attempt to deduce for whom they were likely to have voted1.  
 
Occasionally MPs have stated who they voted for, after the event, in published 
interviews and have been classified as ‘definite’. Finally, I have written to the MPs of 
whom I knew little about, asking them for whom they voted. Those that answered 
have also been included in the ‘definite’ category. Although this may seem like a leap 
of faith given The Guardian’s view of Tory MPs’ probity, Cowley & Garry found that 
there was little need to publicly lie about ones’ support when there was no threat to an 
incumbent leader and that lying did not constitute a methodological problem (Cowley 
& Garry, 1998: 498-499). Altogether it is possible to classify 60% of the PCP as 
‘definite’ in the 1997 election and when the ‘probable’ MPs are added this total rises 
to 84%. In the 2001 leadership election 74% of the PCP can be classed as ‘definite’, 
rising to 76% when the ‘probable’ MPs are added to the total2. 
 
This data was then analysed using the chi square test of independence to provide 
bivariate breakdowns of the candidates’ support in an attempt to test the hypotheses 
derived from the work of Cowley & Garry (1990). This procedure leads to multiple 
significance tests but provides no method to assess higher order interactions. This led 
me to attempt to use log linear modelling on those hypotheses that the chi square tests 
had shown to be significant, in order to assess interaction effects as well as the effects 
of variables. However, the unavoidably small sample size, combined with the large 
number of variables gave unreliable results. For example very small populations of 
one or two MPs were flagged up as significant groups, whilst larger populations were 
not. Consequently the results have not been included in the thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 Cowley & Garry (1998) admit that not all of their data was backed by hard evidence, “…a few were 
nearer to being guesswork, albeit educated guesswork.” (Cowley & Garry, 1998: 498). 
2 Cowley & Garry (1998) found “…firm evidence on the intentions of 60 per cent of the electorate; and 
good evidence on over 90 per cent.” (Cowley & Garry, 1998: 499) 
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6.3 Who voted for whom 
            
Table 6.1: William Hague’s Supporters 1997 
            
Definite 
Peter Ainsworth  David Amess    Michael Ancram 
James Arbuthnot  David Atkinson  Peter Bottomley 
Graham Brady              Ian Bruce   Simon Burns 
Bill Cash   Christopher Chope  James Clappison 
Michael Clark   Geoffrey Clifton-Brown James Cran 
Stephan Day   Alan Duncan   Iain Duncan-Smith 
Nigel Evans   Michael Fallon  Liam Fox 
Roger Gale   Christopher Gill  Cheryl Gillan 
James Gray   Dominic Grieve  William Hague 
Nick Hawkins   David Heathcoat-Amory Michael Howard 
Bernard Jenkin  Julie Kirkbride  Eleanor Laing 
Peter Lilley   Tim Loughton   Nicholas Lyell 
Humfrey Mallins  John Maples   Francis Maude 
Malcolm Moss  Patrick Nicholls  Richard Page 
James Paice   Owen Patterson  David Prior 
David Ruffley   Jonathan Sayeed  Gillian Shepherd 
Michael Spicer  Richard Spring  Desmond Swayne 
Robert Syms    Teddy Taylor   John Townend 
David Tredinnick  Bowen Wells   John Whittingdale 
David Willets (58) 
 
 
Probable 
Crispin Blunt   Tim Collins   Michael Colvin 
David Faber   Christopher Fraser  Nick Gibb 
Phillip Hammond  John Hayes   Oliver Heald 
Gerald Howarth  Andrew Hunter  Robert Key 
David Maclean  John Major   Andrew Mackay 
Archie Norman   Peter Tapsell   Michael Trend 
Tim Yeo (19) 
 
Possible 
Eric Forth   David Liddington  Teresa May 
Patrick McLoughlin  Richard Shephard  Andrew Tyrie (6) 
 
Total 83 / 92           
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Table 6.2: Kenneth Clarke’s Supporters 1997 
            
Definite 
Peter Atkinson   Paul Beresford  Tim Boswell 
John Butterfill   Kenneth Clarke  David Curry 
David Davis   Stephan Dorrell   Peter Emery 
Michael Fabricant   Norman Fowler  Teresa Gorman 
Damien Green   John Greenaway  Michael Heseltine 
Douglas Hogg   John Horam   Michael Jack 
Robert Jackson  Geoffrey Johnson-Smith Andrew Lansley 
Oliver Letwin   Peter Luff   John MacGregor 
Michael Mates  Eric Pickles   Andrew Robathan 
Nicholas Soames  Keith Simpson  Anthony Steen 
Gary Streeter   Ian Taylor   John Taylor 
Peter Temple-Morris  Robert Walter   Charles Wardle 
Ray Whitney   Ann Widdecombe  John Wilkinson 
Shaun Woodward   George Young (41) 
 
Probable 
Tony Baldry    Richard Body   Virginia Bottomley 
Angela Browning   Patrick Cormack  Quentin Davis 
Howard Flight   Edward Garnier  Alistair Goodlad 
John Gummer    Alan Haselhurst   Edward Heath 
Tom King    Peter Lloyd    David Madel 
Anne MacIntosh  Richard Ottoway  John Redwood 
Andrew Rowe    John Stanley   Peter Viggers (21)  
 
 
Possible 
Julian Brazier    Archie Hamilton  Edward Leigh 
Michael Lord   Brian Mawhinney  Piers Merchant 
Caroline Spelman  Nick St Aubyn (8) 
 
Total 70 / 70           
 
 
            
 
Table 6.3: Others 
            
Abstained 
Alan Clark, Julian Lewis (2) 
 
Unclassified 
John Bercow   Peter Brooke    Sydney Chapman 
Laurence Robertson  Marion Roe   Nigel Waterson 
David Wilshire  Ann Winterton  Nicholas Winterton (10) 
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Table 6.4: Kenneth Clarke’s Supporters 2001 
            
Definite 
Peter Atkinson  Tony Baldry   Timothy Boswell 
Simon Burns   Alistair Burt   James Clappison 
Kenneth Clarke  Derek Conway  Patrick Cormack 
David Curry   Quentin Davies  John Greenway 
John Gummer   Oliver Heald   Douglas Hogg 
John Horam   Robert Jackson  Boris Johnson 
Greg Knight   Jaqui Lait   Humfey Malins 
John Maples   Michael Mates  Andrew Mitchell  
James Paice   Anthony Steen  Ian Taylor 
Andrew Tyrie   Robert Walter   Ann Widdecombe 
George Young (31) 
 
Probable 
Michael Jack   Anne McIntosh (2) 
 
Possible 
Peter Bottomley  Virginia Bottomley  Graham Brady 
Sydney Chapman  Alan Haselhurst  Peter Luff (6) 
 
Total 39 / 59           
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Table 6.5: Michael Portillo’s Supporters 2001 
            
Definite  
Peter Ainsworth  David Atkinson  Greg Barker 
John Bercow   John Butterfill   David Cameron 
Stephan Dorrell  Alan Duncan   Nigel Evans 
Michael Fabricant  Mark Field   Howard Flight 
Adrian Flook   Liam Fox   Edward Garnier 
Nick Gibb   Cheryl Gillan   Chris Grayling 
Damian Green   Philip Hammond  David Heathcoat-Amory 
Mark Hoban   Robert Key   Julie Kirkbride 
Oliver Letwin   David Liddington  Peter Lilley 
Timothy Loughton  Andrew Mackay  Francis Maude 
Teresa May   Malcolm Moss  Andrew Murrison 
Archie Norman  George Osbourne  Richard Ottaway 
Michael Portillo  Mark Prisk   Andrew Robathan 
Hugh Robertson  David Ruffley   Keith Simpson 
Nicholas Soames  Gary Streeter   Robert Syms 
Nigel Waterson  John Wilkinson  David Willetts 
Tim Yeo (49) 
 
 
Probable 
Nicholas Hawkins (1) 
 
Possible 
James Arbuthnot  Patrick McLoughlin (2) 
 
Total 52 /53           
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Table 6.6: Iain Duncan Smith’s Supporters 2001 
            
Definite 
Michael Ancram  Richard Bacon  John Baron 
Crispin Blunt   Julian Brazier   Angela Browning 
William Cash   Christopher Chope  Tim Collins 
David Davis   Jonathan Djangoly  Peter Duncan 
Iain Duncan Smith  Michael Fallon  Eric Forth 
Mark Francois   Paul Goodman  James Gray 
Dominic Grieve  John Hayes   Michael Howard 
Gerald Howarth  Andrew Hunter  Bernard Jenkin 
Eleanor Laing   Edward Leigh   Julian Lewis 
David Maclean  Patrick Mercer  Stephan O’Brien 
Owen Patterson  Eric Pickles   John Redwood 
Laurence Robertson  Andrew Rosindell  Andrew Selous 
Richard Shepherd  Mark Simmonds  Desmond Swayne 
Hugo Swire   Peter Tapsell   Teddy Taylor 
Andrew Turner  Angela Watkinson  Bill Wiggin (45) 
 
Probable 
William Hague (1) 
 
Possible 
David Amess   James Cran    Marion Roe 
Robert Spink    John Whittingdale  David Wilshire 
Ann Winterton  Nicholas Winterton (11) 
 
Total 54 / 54           
 
            
 
Table 6.7: Unknown 2001 
            
Henry Bellingham  Paul Beresford  Geoffrey Clifton-Brown 
Roger Gale   Alan Haselhurst  Charles Hendry  
Andrew Lansley   Ian Liddell-Grainger  Michael Lord  
Brian Mawhinney  Richard Page   John Randall  
Jonathan Sayeed  Gillian Shephard  Caroline Spelman  
Michael Spicer  John Stanley   John Taylor  
David Treddinick  Michael Trend   Peter Viggers (21)  
 
6.4 Accounting for voting behaviour 
Cowley and Garry (1998) put forward seven hypotheses in three broad types to 
account for the voting behaviour of Conservative MPs in the 1990 party leadership 
election. They hypothesised that voting could be driven by socio economic factors; 
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the educational and occupational background of MPs. The leadership candidates 
studied by Cowley and Garry (1998) were from clearly different backgrounds; 
Douglas Hurd was educated at Eton and Cambridge and had been a career diplomat 
before becoming an MP. Heseltine was also educated at a public school (Shrewsbury) 
and Oxford and was a businessman. By contrast Major attended Rutlish Grammar 
School and left at sixteen with three ‘O’ levels and eventually joined Standard 
Chartered Bank. Norton argued that Major was representative of a growing number of 
self-made men and women in the PCP and that these MPs “…voted for one of their 
own” (Norton, 1993: 59).  Cowley and Garry therefore hypothesised that MPs may 
have voted for a candidate with a similar educational or professional background. 
Secondly they argued that voting may be influenced by political characteristics; age 
and parliamentary experience, career status and electoral vulnerability. Finally they 
hypothesised that voting behaviour was driven by the ideological positions of MPs; 
views on the economy, Europe and social and moral issues (Cowley & Garry, 1998: 
475). All bivariate analysis was done using the Chi-square test of association. 
 
6.5 Voting behaviour in the 1997 leadership election 
6.5.1 The socio economic hypothesis  
There was a difference in the social backgrounds of Hague and Clarke in the 1997 
leadership election, although this was not as stark as that between Major and his rivals 
in 1990. Hague attended a comprehensive school, whilst Clarke was educated at a 
grammar school3. However both candidates were Oxbridge educated, Hague at 
Oxford, Clarke at Cambridge, where both became President of the respective unions. 
After university Hague went to work for Shell UK, before joining McKinsey and 
Company in 1983; Clarke became a lawyer and was called to the bar in 1963 (Dods, 
1998: 555, 607). Table 6.8 shows the educational background of the PCP at the time 
of the 1997 leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
3 Wath-on-Dearne Comprehensive and Nottingham High School respectively 
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Table 6.8: Social Background of the Conservative MPs 1997   
    N  %     
Private    110  67.1 
Grammar     31  18.9 
State      23  14.0 
 
Oxbridge     83  50.6 
Other University    67  40.9 
No University     14    8.5 
 
Business     54  32.9 
Professional     57  34.8 
Miscellaneous     53  32.3      
 
Neither Clarke (grammar) nor Hague (state) had the same educational background as 
the majority of the PCP who were privately educated. However, both candidates 
attended Oxbridge, in common with a small majority of their colleagues. Table 6.8 
(above) shows that both candidates received most of their support from privately 
educated MPs, however this is hardly surprising, given that 67% of Conservative MPs 
were privately educated. 
Table 6.9: Secondary educational background and voting behaviour   
     Clarke     Hague 
   N %   N %    
State school  7 33.3   14 66.7 
Grammar school 16 57.1   12 42.9 
Public School  46 44.7   57 55.3    
 
Table 6.9 also shows that Clarke garnered greater support from those MPs who 
attended grammar school, whilst Hague attracted 2/3rds of the former state school 
MPs. However, bivariate analysis shows that there is no statistical significance to this 
and therefore the hypothesis is not supported (Chi-Square = 2.814, df = 2, p = 0.245). 
 
A small majority of the PCP attended Oxbridge universities, as did Clarke and Hague. 
Support is fairly evenly split, with Hague having an advantage in all three categories 
(see table 6.10 below), however this advantage is roughly in line with the predicted 
outcome. Analysis shows that the hypothesis of university education affecting voting 
behaviour is not supported (Chi-Square = 0.947, df = 2, p = 0.623). 
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Table 6.10: Higher educational background and voting behaviour    
     Clarke     Hague 
   N %   N %    
University  28 44.4   35 55.6 
Oxbridge  37 48.1   40 51.9 
None     4 33.3     8 66.7    
 
The third variable of the social economic hypothesis is that of previous career. 
Conservative MPs are reasonably evenly spread across the three career categories, 
with the PCP containing a small plurality of professionals. It can be hypothesised that 
Clarke’s background as a lawyer would be more likely to attract support from MPs 
who had also worked in the professions before entering parliament. Similarly, it is 
possible to hypothesise that Hague’s business background would be attractive to those 
MPs with a similar career history. Table 6.11 (below) shows that whilst a plurality of 
Clarke’s support came from MPs with a background in the professions Hague 
attracted an equal number of former professionals to his cause. Hague also attracted 
more support than Clarke from those in the business and miscellaneous categories. 
 
Table 6.11: Previous career and voting behaviour      
   Clarke    Hague 
              N %   N %    
Professional  27 50.0   27 50.0  
Business  21 43.8   27 56.2 
Miscellaneous  21 42.0   29 58.0    
 
However, analysis shows that there is no statistical significance (Chi-Square = 0.747, 
df = 2, p = 0.688) therefore the hypothesis of a link between an MP’s former career 
influencing them to vote for a candidate with a similar career background has been 
disproved. 
 
6.5.2 The political characteristics hypothesis  
This hypothesis argues that MPs will vote for candidates with similar political 
characteristics to their own. At the time of the 1997 election Clarke was 57 years old 
and had been in parliament for twenty-seven years. If the hypothesis were proved 
Clarke would have benefited from being a member of the largest age group in the PCP 
(see table 6.12 below). Hague was at 37, much younger than Clarke and a member of 
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the smallest age group within the PCP. However, with only eight years in parliament 
his relative inexperience could have been beneficial as 69 of his colleagues, a plurality 
of the PCP, had less than nine years service. Clarke was also closest to the median 
Conservative MP who was aged 50. 
 
Table 6.12: The age and service of the PCP 1997      
Age  N  %  Service N  %  
30 – 39 17  10.4  0 – 9  70  42.7 
40 – 49 61  37.2  10 – 19 63  38.4 
50 – 59 62  37.8  20 – 29 25  15.2 
60 +  24  14.6  30 +    6    3.7  
 
The median age of Clarke supporters was 53, whilst the median age of Hague 
supporters was 45. These figures are reflected in table 6.13 (below), which shows that 
Clarke was more popular amongst older MPs, scoring more votes than Hague in the 
50 – 59 and 65 + age groups. Conversely younger MPs (aged between 30 and 49) 
were more likely to vote for Hague.  
 
Table 6.13: Age and voting behaviour     
   Clarke   Hague 
Age   N %  N %   
30 – 39    1   6.7  14 93.3 
40 – 49  22 37.9  36 62.1 
50 – 59  33 55.9  26 44.1 
60 +   13 65.0    7 35.0   
 
Analysis of these figures shows that relationship between the ages of two candidates 
and the ages of their electorate may have played a role in the voting behaviour of 
Conservative MPs during the 1997 leadership election and therefore supports the 
hypothesis (Chi-Square = 16.124, df = 3, p = 0.001). 
 
The next variable of the political experience hypothesis is length of service. In this 
case the hypothesis is that the more inexperienced MPs, with the shortest length of 
service backed Hague (eight years in parliament), whilst the more experienced MPs 
voted for Clarke (twenty-seven years in parliament). The effects of the 1997 election 
defeat and the unusually high number of retiring MPs is shown in table 6.12 (above). 
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The median Conservative MP had been in parliament for ten years, whilst the median 
Hague supporter had nine years service. The median Clarke voter had fourteen years 
experience. Table 6.14 (below) shows that Hague attracts a majority amongst MPs 
with 0 – 9 years service and 10 –19 years, whilst Clarke is more popular with the most 
experienced MPs, who have more than twenty years service. 
 
Table 6.14: Years in parliament and voting behaviour   
   Clarke   Hague 
Years    N %  N %   
0 – 9   20 30.8  45 69.2 
10 - 19    28 48.3  30 51.7 
20 - 29    17 77.3    5 22.7  
30 +      4 57.1    3 42.9   
 
Analysis of the variables supports the hypothesis that there is a relationship between 
years of service and voting behaviour. Less experienced MPs tended to vote for 
Hague, whilst their longer serving colleagues supported Clarke (Chi-Square = 15.062, 
df = 3, p = 0.002). 
Another aspect of the political characteristics hypothesis is government experience. 
The PCP was relatively evenly divided between those who had previously been in 
government (76) and those who had not (89), both candidates had been in the previous 
Major administration. However, Clarke was the senior figure and had a wealth of 
experience; he been a cabinet minister for twelve years, and had headed four 
ministries, including two of the most senior departments of state, the Home Office and 
Treasury. By contrast Hague had just two years of cabinet experience, which he spent 
exclusively at the relatively junior Welsh Office. We can hypothesise that 
Conservative MPs who had previously held government posts would be inclined to 
support Clarke with his broad depth of governing experience. Conversely we can 
hypothesise that those MPs who had not been in government would be more inclined 
to vote for the inexperienced Hague. Table 6.15 (below) shows that just over half the 
MPs who had previously been in government voted for Clarke, whereas most of 
Hague’s support came from MPs who had never been in government. However 
analysis shows that this relationship is not statistically significant (Chi-Square = 
2.915, df = 1, p = 0.088) and that therefore the hypothesis is not supported. 
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Table 6.15: Government experience and voting behaviour   
    Clarke   Hague 
     N %  N %  
Govt. experience  37 52.9  33 47.1 
No govt. experience  32 39.0  50 61.0  
 
The next hypothesis to be tested is the insider / outsider hypothesis: insiders are 
defined as those MPs who had been in John Major’s final government. Outsiders are 
defined as those MPs who were not in that government; who had either never held 
office or who had held office at some time, but had either been sacked or forced to 
resign. At the time of the 1997 leadership election there were 43 insiders and 122 
outsiders. Both Clarke and Hague were insiders, however Hague was a relatively 
junior and unimportant member of Major’s cabinet, whereas Clarke was a senior and 
highly influential figure; one of a small coterie of ministers upon whom Major was 
dependent (Foley, 2002: 34). Therefore we can hypothesise that outsiders may have 
blamed Clarke for their marginal status, or believed that their career progression 
would be further stymied under a future Clarke leadership and would therefore have 
supported Hague. Conversely, we can hypothesise that the insiders, who had held 
government posts under Major, would be more likely to vote for Clarke, in the belief 
that Clarke victory would choose more of his fellow insiders for senior opposition 
posts.  
 
Table 6.16: Insider / outsider and voting behaviour    
    Clarke   Hague 
     N %  N %  
Insider    22 51.2  21 48.8 
Outsider   47 43.1  62 56.9  
 
However analysis shows that there is no significant relationship between voting 
behaviour and an MP’s status as an insider or outsider (Chi-Square = 0.805, df = 1, p 
= 0.370).  Consequently the insider / outsider hypothesis is not supported. 
 
6.5.3 The electoral vulnerability hypothesis 
Electoral vulnerability has been shown to be an important factor in an MPs career. 
Maximising one’s majority is not only good for an MPs job security, but it is also an 
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important factor in promotion; Conservative MPs with a healthy majority are more 
likely to attain high office than their colleagues in marginal constituencies. 
Consequently the constituency marginality hypothesis is that MPs in marginal 
constituencies would vote for the leadership candidate who is most popular with the 
wider electorate, in the hope of picking up extra votes at election time. As Kenneth 
Clarke was clearly more popular than Hague amongst Conservatives as well as non-
Conservatives, MPs in marginal constituencies may have been more likely to support 
Clarke. However, the median Hague MP had a majority of 11.6%, whilst the median 
Clarke MP a majority of 12.3%. Indeed the candidates’ support is fairly evenly spread 
across the range of majorities (table 6.17 below). Furthermore, analysis shows that 
there is no relationship between the size of MPs’ majorities and their voting behaviour 
(Chi-Square = 3.549, df = 5, p = 0.616). 
 
Table 6.17: Electoral vulnerability and voting behaviour  
   Clarke   Hague 
Majority %  N %  N %  
0 – 4   15 53.6  13 46.4 
5 – 9    10 40.0  15 60.0 
10 - 14    14 37.8  23 62.2  
15 - 19    15 53.6  13 46.4 
19 –24    11 47.8  12 52.2 
24 +      4 36.4    7 63.6  
 
Having dealt with hypotheses that consider socio economic factors and explanations 
that consider political characteristics of the candidates and voters, we can turn to 
possible evidence that ideological factors influence voting behaviour. Three 
ideological variables were used; based on economic policy (wet / dry), European 
policy (europhile / eurosceptic) and social and moral policy (socially liberal / socially 
conservative). 
 
6.5.4 The economic policy hypothesis 
The economic policy divide was a significant feature of Conservative Party politics 
during the early 1980s. Subsequently this debate was settled in favour of those who 
believed in a laissez-faire economic policy and a minimal state (dries) at the expense 
of those Conservative MPs who believed in a more interventionist style of economic 
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policy and an expanded state (wets). However, there was still a ‘rump’ of wet MPs 
that accounted for nearly a quarter of the 1997 PCP. The economic policy hypothesis 
therefore suggests that wet MPs would support Kenneth Clarke, a traditional one-
nation Conservative. Conversely, dry MPs would vote for William Hague, a moderate 
Thatcherite. Table 6.18 (below) confirms that Clarke was the choice of three-quarters 
of the wets, whilst nearly two-thirds of the dries preferred Hague. Although agnostics 
also favoured Hague, the margin was close to that predicted by the Chi-square test. 
 
Table 6.18: Economic policy and voting behaviour    
    Clarke   Hague 
     N %  N %  
Wet    28 75.7    9 24.3 
Dry    37 35.9  66 64.1 
Agnostic     4 33.3    8 66.7  
 
However, the Chi-square test indicates that there is strong association between the wet 
/ dry dichotomy and voting behaviour, which supports the hypothesis (Chi-Square = 
18.119, df = 2, p < 0.0001). 
 
6.5.5 The European policy hypothesis 
For nearly a decade divisions had wracked the Conservative Party over European 
policy.  Europe had been a contributory factor in Mrs. Thatcher’s defenestration and 
was also a decisive factor in the election of her successor, John Major. Therefore it 
would be surprising if European policy was not a factor in the 1997 leadership 
election. The European policy hypothesis postulates that the pro-European MPs would 
support the Europhile Clarke, whilst Eurosceptic MPs would prefer their fellow 
sceptic, Hague. Given that, following the 1997 general election, the PCP contained a 
preponderance of eurosceptic MPs this should have benefited Hague. Indeed, Clarke’s 
unlikely pact with John Redwood showed that Clarke recognised he was unlikely to 
win because of his past pro-European positions. Table 6.19 (below) shows that Clarke 
received the support of all his europhile colleagues and most of the agnostic MPs. 
More than 2/3rds of the eurosceptics supported Hague. Analysis shows that there is an 
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association between the European policy variable and voting behaviour4 (Chi-Square 
= 22.377, df = 2, p < 0.0001). 
 
Table 6.19: European policy and voting behaviour    
    Clarke   Hague 
     N %  N %  
Europhile   12 100    0   0.0 
Eurosceptic   49   37.7  81 62.3 
Agnostic     8   80.0    2 20.0  
 
6.5.6 The social and moral policy hypothesis 
The debate on the future direction of the Conservative Party’s social and moral policy 
did not really take hold during the 1997 leadership election and neither candidate 
made it a key plank of their election strategy. However, we can hypothesise that 
Clarke as a social liberal would draw support from likeminded MPs, whilst Hague as 
the Thatcher backed candidate could have expected socially conservative MPs to vote 
for him. Clarke was supported by nearly 2/3rds of the socially liberal MPs, whilst a 
similar proportion of socially conservative MPs voted for Hague (table 6.20 below). 
Even though the social and moral policy divide did not dominate the story of the 1997 
leadership election is a significant relationship between social and moral policy and 
voting behaviour5 (Chi-Square = 7.498, df = 2, p = 0.024). 
 
Table 6.20: Social and moral policy and voting behaviour   
    Clarke   Hague 
     N %  N %  
Liberal    19 65.5  10 34.5 
Conservative   44 38.9  69 61.1 
Agnostic     6   60.0  4 40.0  
 
The effects of the three ideological variables together can be seen in table 6.21 
(below). There are twenty-seven possible ideological positions of which seventeen are 
actually populated by MPs voting for either Clarke or Hague. Clarke’s support is 
broad but shallow, spread across fourteen groups, whilst Hague’s support was 
narrower, spread across nine groups. 
                                                     
4 1 cell had an expected count of less than 5 
5 1 cell had an expected count of less than 5 
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Table 6.21: Multi-dimensional ideology and voting behaviour 
 Clarke Hague 
Economy        Europe            Social / Moral Count % Count % 
 Wet                Europhile          Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
9 
2 
1 
13.0 
2.9 
1.4 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
                        Agnostic           Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
0 
2 
3 
0.0 
2.9 
4.3 
1 
0 
1 
1.2 
0.0 
1.2 
                        Eurosceptic       Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic  
                                                  Conservative 
3 
2 
7 
4.3 
2.9 
10.1 
1 
0 
6 
1.2 
0.0 
7.2 
Agnostic          Europhile          Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic             
                                                  Conservative 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
                         Agnostic           Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
1.4 
- 
- 
0 
- 
- 
0.0 
                         Eurosceptic      Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
- 
0 
2 
- 
0.0 
2.9 
- 
1 
7 
- 
1.2 
8.4 
Dry                   Europhile         Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
1 
- 
- 
1.4 
- 
- 
0 
- 
- 
0.0 
- 
- 
                         Agnostic           Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
- 
- 
2 
- 
- 
2.9 
- 
- 
0 
- 
- 
0.0 
                         Eurosceptic      Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
6 
0 
28 
8.7 
0.0 
40.6 
8 
3 
55 
9.6 
3.6 
66.2 
 
 
6.6 Voting behaviour in the 2001 leadership election  
The final, parliamentary, round of the 2001 leadership election differed from the 1997 
election in that it was not the final overall ballot and therefore there were three 
candidates, rather than two. In some respects this made it more like a second round 
ballot under the previous rules. Consequently, some MPs may have been trying to 
second-guess the result and voted to stop the candidate they least wanted, rather than 
voting for the candidate they preferred. For example, both Portillo and Duncan Smith 
were eurosceptics, whereas Clarke was a europhile. It was believed that grassroots 
Conservatives, who voted in the final ballot, were strongly eurosceptic; therefore it 
was in the interests of Portillo and Duncan Smith to face the europhile Clarke in the 
final ballot, rather than their fellow eurosceptic. Arguably this may have led some 
MPs to vote tactically for Clarke, if they felt their preferred candidate was assured of 
progression into the last round. Whilst the possibility of this type of tactical voting 
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cannot be discounted there is no anecdotal evidence that it took place and the 
closeness of the ballot also suggests that it would be unlikely to have happened. 
Therefore, the methodology for analysing the 2001 election remains the same as for 
the 1997 leadership election, even though the circumstances of the ballot were slightly 
different.  
 
6.6.1 The socio economic hypothesis 
The educational profile of the 2001 candidates was slightly different from that of 
1997; Clarke, Portillo and Duncan Smith were all former grammar school pupils. As 
the PCP was still dominated by MPs who had been to public school, rather than 
grammar or state schools, it is reasonable to expect that the candidates’ secondary 
education would make no difference to the voting behaviour of the PCP.  The 
secondary educational profile of Portillo and Duncan Smith was roughly the same, 
whereas Clarke polled poorly amongst those MPs who went to state secondary 
schools (table 6.22 above). However, Chi-square analysis shows that there are no 
significant relationships between secondary education and voting behaviour (Chi-
Square = 4.393, df = 4, p = 0.355) 
 
Table 6.22: Secondary educational background and voting behaviour   
   Portillo    Clarke    IDS4 
   N %  N %  N %  
State school  11 44.0    3 12.0  11 44.0 
Grammar school 10 33.3  11 36.7    9 30.0 
Public school  31 35.2  25 28.4  32 36.4  
 
The second element of the socio economic hypothesis is higher education and voting 
behaviour. Clarke went to Oxford, whilst Portillo went to Cambridge. However, 
Duncan Smith’s CV is slightly hazy; his entry in Dod’s Parliamentary Companion, 
2002 states that he attended the University of Perugia, one of Italy’s most prestigious 
universities (Dod’s, 2002: 146), however the BBC’s Newsnight programme later 
revealed that he actually went to Perugia’s Universita per Stranieri, an Italian 
language school where he spent just three months (McDermott, 30/10/2003). 
                                                     
4 Two MPs who voted for Iain Duncan Smith, John Baron and Andrew Selous, have not disclosed their 
secondary education and have been excluded from these figures 
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However, this was not known at the time of the 2001 leadership election. Therefore 
we can hypothesise that Oxbridge educated Conservative MPs would support Clarke 
or Portillo, whilst MPs who went to less prestigious universities would support 
Duncan Smith. Table 6.23 (below) shows that Duncan Smith polled poorly amongst 
Oxbridge educated MPs, whilst getting the majority of his support from MPs who 
went to ‘ordinary’ universities. The Chi-square test shows that there is a significant 
relationship between the candidates’ higher education and the voting behaviour of 
their supporters and this supports the hypothesis (Chi-Square = 13.448, df = 4, p = 
0.009). 
 
Table 6.23: Higher educational background and voting behaviour    
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
University  17 26.2  14 21.5  34 52.3 
Oxbridge  31 44.2  23 32.9  16 22.9 
None     4 40.0    2 20.0    4 40.0  
 
The final element of the socio-economic hypothesis is that of former career: Clarke 
had been a lawyer, before entering parliament. Portillo spent most of his pre-
parliamentary career working for the Conservative Research Department and then as 
government adviser in Mrs. Thatcher’s first administration; he also had a brief spell 
working for Kerr-McGee oil. Iain Duncan Smith served with the Scots guards before 
working in business, first with GEC Marconi and then with a publishing company. 
With a candidate in each of the three categories it can be hypothesised that former 
professionals would vote for Clarke, whilst MPs with a business background would 
support Duncan Smith, finally we can hypothesise that those who fell into the 
miscellaneous category would support Portillo. Table 6.24 (below) shows that 
contrary to what was predicted Portillo did best amongst the professionals, whilst 
Clarke received more support from the miscellaneous category than his rivals. 
However, Duncan Smith’s support outpolled the other candidates amongst MPs who 
had previously been in business. Nevertheless, analysis of the figures shows that there 
is no relationship between candidates’ and MPs’ former career and voting behaviour 
(Chi-square = 9.858, df = 4, p = 0.43). 
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Table 6.24: Previous career and voting behaviour      
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
Professional  21 39.6  15 28.3  17 32.1 
Business  18 38.3    6 12.8  23 48.9 
Miscellaneous  13 28.9  18 40.0  14 31.1  
 
6.6.2 The political characteristics hypothesis  
This hypothesis argues that MPs will vote for candidates with similar political 
characteristics to their own. At the time of the 2001 election, Duncan Smith was the 
youngest candidate, aged forty-seven; Portillo was just one year older at forty-eight, 
whilst Clarke was the senior candidate again, now aged sixty-one; the median 
Conservative MP was forty-nine years old. If the hypothesis is correct, Portillo and 
Duncan Smith should benefit from their membership of the largest single age group 
(40 – 49) within the parliamentary party (table 6.25 below). The median Portillo 
supporter was forty-five, whilst the median Duncan Smith voter was slightly older, at 
forty-eight; the median Clarke supporter was fifty-six. 
 
Table 6.25: The age and service of the PCP 2001      
Age  N  %  Service N  %  
30 – 39 23  13.9  0 – 9  88  53.1 
40 – 49 62  37.3  10 – 19 52  31.3 
50 – 59 55  33.1  20 – 29 17  10.2 
60 +  26  15.7  30 +    9    5.4  
. 
Portillo was the most popular candidate amongst the younger MPs, whilst the 40 – 49 
age group was fairly evenly split between Portillo and Duncan Smith. Clarke polled 
poorly with MPs under fifty, but led the other two candidates amongst the over fifties. 
However, Duncan Smith was also popular amongst the over sixties, Portillo was the 
most unpopular candidate, with this final group. 
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Table 6.26: Age and voting behaviour       
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
30 – 39  12 52.2    2   8.7    9 39.1 
40 – 49   24 44.4    8 14.8  22 40.8 
50 – 59   13 27.1  20 41.7  15 31.2 
60 +     3 15.0    9  45.0    8 40.0  
 
Testing the data shows that there is a significant relationship between the age of the 
candidates and the voting behaviour of Conservative MPs, therefore the hypothesis is 
supported (Chi-Square = 0.04, df = 6, p = 0.004). 
 
The next political characteristic to be examined is length of service. This hypothesis 
suggests that MPs voted for the candidate with a similar record of service to 
themselves. As in 1997 Clarke was the senior candidate, first elected to in 1970, 
Clarke had been in parliament continuously for thirty-one years. Next was Portillo, 
who had been in parliament for fifteen years. The candidate with the shortest service 
as an MP was Duncan Smith, who had been an MP for nine years. The median Clarke 
voter had been in parliament for fourteen years, whilst the median length of service of 
Portillo and Duncan Smith supporters was nine years. Portillo did best amongst MPs 
who had served the least time in parliament, closely followed by Duncan Smith. In the 
group who had served 10 – 19 years Duncan Smith was the most popular, followed by 
Clarke. Clarke was the most popular candidate amongst the longest serving MPs, 
whilst Portillo was the most unpopular (table 6.27, below) 
 
Table 6.27: Years in parliament and voting behaviour     
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
0 – 9   37 46.8  11 13.9  31 39.3 
10 – 19   11 23.9  17 37.0  18 39.1 
20 – 29     3 27.3    6 54.5    2 18.2 
30 +     1 11.1    5  55.6    3 33.3  
 
Testing the data shows that there is a significant association between length of service 
and voting (Chi-Square =20.035, df = 6, p = 0.03). 
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The next variables to be tested are government experience and voting behaviour. 
Clarke was again the most experienced candidate. Portillo was given his first 
ministerial post in 1988 and joined John Major’s cabinet in 1992, initially as Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury and later held the portfolios of Employment and Defence. 
By contrast Duncan Smith had no previous ministerial experience and had been a 
Maastricht rebel, during the Major government. If the hypothesis is true then we can 
expect those MPs with government experience to support either Clarke or Portillo, 
whilst those MPs who had not served in government would support Duncan Smith. 
Clarke was the most popular candidate amongst those MPs who had government 
experience, whilst Duncan Smith was the least popular. Conversely, Duncan Smith 
was the most popular with those MPs who had not served in government, whilst 
Clarke was the most unpopular candidate with MPs from this group (table 6.28 
below). Analysis of these figures shows that there is a strong association between 
government experience and voting behaviour (Chi-Square = 20.623, df = 2, P < 
0.0001). 
   
Table 6.28: Government experience and voting behaviour     
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
Govt. experience 19 33.9  26 46.5  11 19.6 
No govt. exp.  33 37.1  13 14.6  43 48.3  
 
Part of the political characteristics hypothesis suggests that the career status of the 
candidates and their electorate may influence voting behaviour. MPs who are 
‘insiders’ are hypothesised to have voted for ‘insider’ candidates, whilst outsider MPs 
are hypothesised to have voted for ‘outsider’ candidates. Insiders are defined as those 
who served in William Hague’s last frontbench team or in the whips’ office, whilst 
outsiders are defined as those who served on the backbenches. Although Clarke had 
been an insider in 1997, he was an outsider in 2001, having refused to serve in 
William Hague’s shadow cabinet. Portillo and Duncan Smith were both insiders; 
Portillo had been Shadow Chancellor since 2000 and was the most senior figure in the 
shadow cabinet after Hague, whilst Duncan Smith had been Shadow Secretary of 
State for Social Security (1997-1999) and then Defence (1999 –2001). Portillo was 
clearly the most popular candidate amongst the insiders, whilst Duncan Smith polled 
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the highest number of outsiders. Analysis of the data shows that there is a relationship 
between career status and voting behaviour (Chi-Square = 13.595, df = 2, p = 0.001) 
 
Table 6.29: Career status and voting behaviour      
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
Insider   32 53.3  12 20.0  16 26.7 
Outsider  20 23.5  27 31.8  38 44.7  
 
6.6.3 The electoral vulnerability hypothesis 
The final political characteristic is electoral vulnerability; this hypothesis suggests that 
MPs in marginal constituencies would vote for the leadership candidate who is the 
most popular with the general public, in the hope that a popular leader would boost 
the party’s overall share of the vote at a general election.  Clarke was again the most 
popular candidate with the ordinary voters, whilst Portillo was also a high profile and 
charismatic figure. By contrast Duncan Smith was an uncharismatic figure, who was 
barely known outside the Conservative Party.   If the hypothesis is true both Clarke 
and Portillo should have attracted the support of MPs in marginal constituencies at the 
expense of Duncan Smith. The median Portillo supporter had a majority of 15.1%, 
whilst the median Clarke voter had a majority of 13.5%. The median Duncan Smith 
backer had a 14.7% majority. Surprisingly, the grey and unknown Duncan Smith was 
most popular candidate amongst Conservative MPs with the most marginal seats, 
under 5% (table 6.30 below). However, analysis of the data shows that there is no 
relationship between electoral vulnerability and voting behaviour (Chi-Square = 
13.955, df = 10, p = 0.175). 
 
Table 6.30: Electoral vulnerability and voting behaviour     
%age   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
Majority  N %  N %  N %  
0 – 4     2 14.3    2 14.3  10 71.4 
5 – 9      6 25.0  10 41.7    8 33.3 
10 – 14   17 48.6    8 22.8  10 28.6 
15 - 19   11 35.5    8 25.8  12 38.7 
19 – 24    9 37.5    8 33.3    7 29.2 
24 +     7 41.2    3 17.6    7 41.2  
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The 1997 leadership election gave Conservative MPs a straight ideological choice 
between the Thatcherite Hague and the one-nation Clarke. However, the 2001 
leadership election offered MPs a wider ideological spectrum from which to choose.   
 
6.6.4 The economic policy hypothesis  
Former chancellor, Kenneth Clarke was the sole representative of the wet side of the 
economic debate. Both Portillo and Duncan Smith were from the majority dry wing of 
the party. The hypothesis predicts that Clarke would be the most popular candidate 
amongst the wets, whilst Portillo and Duncan Smith would be the favoured choice of 
dry MPs. As predicted Clarke polled well amongst the wet MPs, but also did well 
amongst economic agnostics (table 6.31 below). Portillo picked up just over a quarter 
of the wet votes available and over a third of the votes of dry MPs.  All Duncan 
Smith’s backers were dry apart from one wet MP, Stephan O’ Brien. When the data is 
analysed it points to a highly significant relationship between the economic policy 
variable and voting behaviour (Chi-Square = 44.489, df = 4, p < 0.0001). 
 
Table 6.31: Economic policy and voting behaviour      
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
Wet     8 27.6  20 69.0    1   3.4 
Dry   41 37.6  15 13.8  53 48.6 
Agnostic    3 42.9    4 57.1    0   0.0  
 
6.6.5 The European policy hypothesis  
The next ideological variable is European policy; Clarke was the only pro-European 
candidate, both Portillo and Duncan Smith were eurosceptics. However, it is arguable 
that Duncan Smith, as a Maastricht rebel, was more associated with the eurosceptic 
cause than Portillo. The hypothesis predicts that Clarke would be supported by 
europhile MPs, whilst eurosceptics would vote for either Portillo or Duncan Smith. 
Table 6.32 (below) shows that Clarke was the choice of europhile and agnostic MPs, 
however, he also picked up 1/5th of the eurosceptic vote. Portillo was heavily favoured 
by eurosceptics, but also managed to collect 1/5th of the europhile vote. Duncan 
Smith’s support was exclusively eurosceptic. Analysis of the data shows there to be a 
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strong relationship between the European policy variable and voting behaviour (Chi-
Square = 31.978, df = 4, p< 0.0001) 
 
Table 6.32: European policy and voting behaviour      
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
Europhile    2 22.2    7 77.8    0   0.0 
Eurosceptic  50 38.5  26 20.0  54 41.5 
Agnostic    0   0.0    6      100.0    0   0.0  
 
6.6.6 The social and moral policy hypothesis 
The final element of the ideological hypothesis is social and moral policy. Duncan 
Smith was a social conservative, whilst Clarke was socially liberal, as was Portillo. 
However, Portillo made social liberalism a central plank of his campaign, whereas 
Clarke did not. The hypothesis predicts that social liberals would support Clarke or 
Portillo, whilst social conservatives would support Duncan Smith. More than half the 
socially liberal Conservative MPs supported Portillo and Clarke also polled well 
amongst this group. Just one socially liberal MP, Crispin Blunt supported Duncan 
Smith5. The rest of Duncan Smith’s support was made up of socially conservative 
MPs; nearly 1/3rd of social conservatives voted for Portillo, whilst 1/5th supported 
Clarke (table 6.33 below). Analysis of the data shows that there is a significant 
relationship between social and moral policy and voting behaviour (Chi-Square = 
17.318, df = 4, p = 0.002) 
 
Table 6.33: Social and moral policy and voting behaviour     
   Portillo    Clarke     IDS 
   N %  N %  N %  
Liberal    10 55.6    7 38.9    1   5.6 
Conservative  39 32.8  27 22.7  53 44.5 
Agnostic    3 37.5    5       62.5    0   0.0  
 
The combined effect of the three ideological variables upon voting behaviour can be 
seen in table 6.34 (below). There are twenty-seven possible ideological groupings, of 
which fourteen are populated by MPs voting for one of the three candidates. As in 
                                                     
5 Blunt later said it had been a mistake to vote for Duncan Smith and called for the party to remove 
him. 
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1997 Clarke support covers a broad cross-section of the PCP drawing support from 
twelve out of the fourteen groups. Portillo’s support is nearly as broad covering ten 
groups. However, Duncan Smith’s support covers just three groups and 96% of his 
support is concentrated in just one group of dry, eurosceptic, socially conservative 
MPs. 
 
Table 6.34: Multi-dimensional ideology and voting behaviour 
 Clarke Portillo IDS 
Economy       Europe             Social / Moral Count % Count % Count % 
 Wet               Europhile           Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
5 
0 
2 
12.8 
0.0 
5.1 
1 
0 
1 
1.9 
0.0 
1.9 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
                       Agnostic            Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
0 
2 
2 
0 
5.1 
5.1 
1 
0 
0 
1.9 
0.0 
0.0 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
                       Eurosceptic        Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic  
                                                  Conservative 
1 
0 
8 
2.6 
0.0 
20.5 
1 
0 
4 
1.9 
0.0 
7.7 
0 
0 
1 
0.0 
0.0 
1.9 
Agnostic         Europhile           Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic             
                                                  Conservative 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
                        Agnostic           Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
2.6 
- 
- 
0 
- 
- 
0.0 
- 
- 
0 
- 
- 
0.0 
                        Eurosceptic       Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
0 
0 
3 
0.0 
0.0 
7.7 
1 
0 
2 
1.9 
0.0 
3.8 
0 
0 
0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
Dry                  Europhile          Liberal 
                                                  Agnostic 
                                                  Conservative 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
                         Agnostic           Liberal 
                                                   Agnostic 
                                                   Conservative 
- 
1 
- 
- 
2.6 
- 
- 
0 
- 
- 
0.0 
- 
- 
0 
- 
- 
0.0 
- 
                         Eurosceptic       Liberal 
                                                   Agnostic 
                                                   Conservative 
1 
2 
11 
2.6 
5.1 
28.2 
6 
3 
32 
11.5 
5.8 
61.5 
1 
0 
52 
1.9 
0.0 
96.2 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter set out to establish how Conservative MPs voted in the 
1997 and 2001 leadership elections and to analyse MPs’ voting behaviour to see if 
any discernable patterns emerged that might explain the results. Consequently three 
motivational hypotheses of voting behaviour were tested; socio economic factors (the 
educational and occupational background of MPs), political characteristics; age and 
parliamentary experience, career status and electoral vulnerability) and ideological 
beliefs (the economy, Europe and social / moral issues). The research combined data 
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on MPs whose voting behaviour is known together with data about their social 
background, political characteristics and ideological beliefs. The study identified 153 
of the 1645 eligible voters (92.3%) in the third round of the 1997 leadership election 
and 145 out of the 166 eligible voters (92.3%) in the 2001 leadership election. The 
hypotheses used to account for voting behaviour were the same for both elections and 
were based on the work of Cowley & Garry (1998). These hypotheses were socio 
economic factors (secondary education, higher education and previous career), 
political characteristics (age and service, government experience, career status and 
electoral vulnerability) and ideology (economic policy, European policy and social / 
moral policy).  
 
Bivariate analysis of the various hypotheses shows that both the 1997 and 2001 
elections may have been influenced by non-ideological as well as ideological factors. 
The non-ideological factors in 1997 were age and parliamentary service; whilst in 
2001 they were higher education, career status and government experience. In 1997 
Clarke was fifty-seven years old and had been in parliament for twenty-seven years. 
The median Clarke supporter was fifty-three years old and had been in parliament for 
ten years. By contrast, Hague was thirty-seven and had been an MP for eight years. 
The median Hague supporter was forty-five and had been in parliament for nine years. 
These results arguably reflect the candidates’ campaigns in which Clarke’s appeal was 
his experience and political gravitas and Hague sought to portray himself as the ‘fresh 
start’ candidate who could match Tony Blair’s youthful energy. 
 
In 2001, unlike 1997 one elements of the socio-economic hypothesis proved 
statistically significant; higher education. Portillo was the most popular candidate 
amongst Oxbridge educated MPs followed by Clarke, whilst Duncan Smith was 
favourite candidate with MPs who attended non-Oxbridge universities.  The political 
characteristics of age and service were also significant in the 2001 leadership election; 
Clarke was again a popular candidate amongst the older MPs aged over fifty, Portillo 
did well amongst MPs in their thirties and forties, IDS also did well amongst these 
groups, but also picked up nearly 1/3rd of the votes of MPs in their fifties. As in 1997 
the length of parliamentary service also was also statistically significant. Portillo 
                                                     
5 Piers Merchant has been excluded 
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polled best amongst the newest MPs, consistent with his appeal to the younger end of 
the party. Clarke was most popular amongst those who had been MPs for the longest, 
consistent with his appeal to the older end of the party, whilst Duncan Smith polled 
well across the first two groups of MPs. Two other elements of the political 
characteristics hypothesis proved significant in the 2001 leadership election; 
government experience and career status. Clarke was the most popular candidate with 
those who had experience of government, whilst Duncan Smith was the least popular. 
Conversely, Duncan Smith was the most popular choice with MPs who had not served 
in government, whilst Clarke polled the fewest votes. Portillo was the most popular 
candidate amongst insiders, whereas Clarke was the least popular candidate. Duncan 
Smith performed best with the outsiders, whilst Portillo did the worst.  
 
These results seem to suggest that Clarke was the candidate of the ‘old guard’ he was 
the preferred choice of older, longer serving MPs who had previous experience of 
government. Portillo was arguably the ‘establishment’ choice whose modernising 
agenda also appealed to the younger end of the PCP; he was most popular amongst 
Oxbridge educated MPs, insiders and with MPs in their thirties and forties. Finally, 
Duncan Smith can be seen as the outsider candidate, who appealed to backbench MPs 
with MPs with no government experience.   
 
The three ideological hypotheses tested were shown to be statistically significant in 
both 1997 and 2001. In the 1997 leadership election Clarke was the most popular 
candidate amongst wet MPs, whilst Hague was the clear choice of the dries. Clarke 
collected the votes of all the europhile MPs, whilst Hague was the choice of nearly 
2/3rds of Eurosceptics.  The social/moral policy divide is not as clear cut as the 
economic and European divides, however, Clarke polled better amongst social 
liberals, whilst Hague was the most popular candidate amongst social conservatives. 
Overall Clarke’s support was broad but shallow, whilst Hague’s was narrow but deep. 
Therefore we can say that Clarke was the candidate of the wet/europhile/socially 
liberal left, whilst Hague was the candidate of the dry/eurosceptic/socially 
conservative right. Unfortunately for Clarke the dry/eurosceptic/socially conservative 
MPs made up the largest ideological bloc and Clarke’s failure to appeal to these MPs 
through the pact with John Redwood ultimately cost him the leadership election.  
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In 2001 Iain Duncan Smith was the only candidate to attract a cohesive ideological 
vote. His supporters were exclusively eurosceptic and overwhelmingly socially 
conservative. Portillo’s support was also overwhelmingly eurosceptic in nature, only 
two MPs; Damien Green and Stephen Dorrell were not from the eurosceptic camp. 
However, Dorrell’s liberalism on social issues may account for his support of Portillo. 
Whilst Portillo attracted higher than average numbers of social liberals, they 
constitute only a small percentage of the PCP he had to rely on the support of social 
conservatives. Likewise, Ken Clarke was reliant on the votes of eurosceptic MPs, 
because the europhile wing of the PCP is so small. Both Clarke and Portillo did 
remarkably well in the final ballot when we consider that both men’s defining 
ideological positions (pro-Europeanism and social liberalism) were shared by so few 
of their colleagues. Consequently, the ability of Clarke and Portillo to attract 
significant support from outside their natural ideological constituencies suggests that 
many of their supporters may have motivated by pragmatism, rather than ideology. 
Both Clarke and Portillo were experienced, high profile, charismatic, ex-ministers and 
arguably either man stood a better chance at reversing the party’s ill fortune than the 
inexperienced, unknown and rather grey IDS.   
 
However, Iain Duncan Smith attracted the support of the third of the party, who 
possibly were more concerned with finding an ideologically acceptable, rather than an 
electable leader and this was enough to see him through to the final ballot and 
eventual victory. Had one more person voted for Portillo, then Portillo and Clarke 
would have gone forward to the final ballot. Consequently, it is arguable that the 
majority of the PCP were more concerned with choosing an electorally appealing 
leader, than one who was ideologically ‘pure’, unfortunately, for the Conservative 
Party, they could not agree on a single candidate.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The Conservative Party’s humiliating defeat at the hands of New Labour in 1997 and 
again in 2001 left the party shell-shocked and struggling to reinvent itself as a relevant 
political force. The rationale for the thesis was to shed light upon the related crises of 
ideology, leadership and electability that beset the Conservative Party between 1997 
and 2003. It has done this by using the 1997 and 2001 Conservative Party leadership 
elections as a lens that could focus upon the ideological disposition of the 
parliamentary party and the consequential factional disputations. This has been done 
through a detailed analysis of the 1997 and 2001 leadership elections based on a 
hypothesis on the motivational basis of voting behaviour:  
This argued that voting in leadership elections is influenced by social 
background (education and former occupation); it is influenced by political 
attributes (electoral vulnerability, age and experience and career status); and 
centrally that it is determined by ideological disposition (economic policy, 
European policy and social policy).  
Consequently the research has examined the social background of the post-war 
parliamentary Conservative Party; the educational and occupational background of 
Conservative parliamentarians, together observations about gender and race issues 
within the parliamentary party. The thesis has also examined how political 
characteristics (electoral vulnerability, age and experience and career status) can 
enhance or diminish a Conservative MP’s career both within the party and 
government. In addition, the thesis has conducted a detailed analysis of the 
ideological composition of the parliamentary Conservative Party of 1997-2001 and 
2001-2005. Finally this data on social background, political characteristics and 
ideological disposition was combined with data on voting behaviour to explain the 
motivational influences on voting behaviour in the 1997 and 2001 Conservative party 
leadership elections. 
 
The thesis has found that the social background of the parliamentary party has 
evolved during the course of the 20th century. This evolution has in many respects 
mirrored the social changes of society as a whole, although it has moved at a much 
slower pace. The Conservative Party during the early 20th century was dominated by 
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the landowning aristocracy and ex-military men, however their dominance was 
greatly reduced after First World War, when the number of MPs from business and 
the professions began to increase and after 1945 came to dominate the parliamentary 
party. Similarly the number of MPs educated at the elite public schools of Eton and 
Harrow declined during the inter-war years and after the Second World War the party 
came to be dominated by MPs from lesser public schools and grammar schools. The 
party’s leaders continued to have close connections with the aristocracy and the elite 
public schools until the election of Edward Heath in 1965. Heath was a mould-
breaking Conservative leader; he was the first to be formally elected, he was from a 
lower middle-class background and he was relatively young. By 1965 the public 
image of a Conservative leader was an old aristocrat shooting grouse. Consequently, 
Heath’s youth signalled that the Conservative Party was reinvigorated and more in 
tune with the zeitgeist of the mid-sixties. Since Heath’s election it is arguable that 
youth and lack of parliamentary experience have not been a serious bar to the 
leadership; Hague at 39 was the youngest leader of the party since Pitt, whilst Duncan 
Smith was the most inexperienced with just nine years in parliament. Whilst youth 
and inexperience do not disqualify prospective leaders, it would seem that they need 
to have a reasonably safe seat and be a party insider.  
 
The research on the ideological development of the Conservative Party has shown that 
the party has changed markedly since 1945. Under Churchill’s leadership the party 
accepted the Attlee settlement and committed itself to maintaining full employment, 
the welfare state, a mixed economy and conciliation with the trades unions. However, 
as signs of economic stagnation became apparent during the 1960s the Conservatives 
began to evolve a new approach towards the economy under Edward Heath, which 
initially rejected the Attlee settlement, in favour of less government intervention in the 
economy and legislation to curb the power of the trades unions. Heath’s attempt to 
change the direction of British politics failed, but provided valuable lessons for Mrs. 
Thatcher, who successfully reformed the trades unions and privatised most of the state 
owned industries. The party’s attitude to Europe similarly underwent an evolution; the 
Conservatives, like Labour began the immediate post-war period as detached 
observers of early moves towards European integration. However, as the British 
economy began to run into difficulties some in the party began to see membership of 
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the EEC in a positive light and Heath negotiated British membership in 1973. The 
Conservatives portrayed themselves as ‘the party of Europe’ until Mrs. Thatcher’s 
1988 Bruges speech marked a commitment to euroscepticism at the highest level of 
the party.  
 
Academic work has charted the evolution of Conservative Party ideology in the 
Thatcherite and post Thatcherite period with a number of typologies that show the 
centre of gravity within the parliamentary party has moved away from the advocates 
of extended government and interdependence and towards those who support minimal 
government and sovereignty. This thesis has confirmed that the parliamentary 
Conservative Party that was elected in 1997 and 2001 has become more economically 
liberal, more eurosceptic and more socially conservative than its counterpart elected 
in 1992. The Conservative Party’s ideological shift has been the consequence of a 
battle within the party that began under Mrs. Thatcher, gathered pace during the 
Major years and carried on under Hague and Duncan Smith and which was the 
outstanding feature of Conservative Party politics from 1990. Ideological differences 
led to Mrs. Thatcher sacking her Chancellor and Foreign Secretary5; events that 
ultimately led to Michael Heseltine’s challenge for the leadership. John Major’s 
success, in the contest that followed Mrs. Thatcher’s resignation was largely down to 
the belief that he was eurosceptic (Cowley & Garry, 1998: 495-496). The subsequent 
internecine strife within the PCP was largely due to the realisation by the eurosceptics 
that Major was not ‘one of them’; consequently the issues of Europe and tax cuts were 
at the heart of John Redwood’s unsuccessful challenge to Major’s leadership in 1995. 
This thesis has shown that ideology continued to play a key role in the selection of 
Conservative Party leaders; in 1997 Hague was supported by a largely cohesive block 
of Thatcherite MPs as was Duncan Smith in 2001. Therefore we can say that the 
dominant determinant in Conservative leadership elections has been the question of 
ideology, which has largely subsumed other considerations that should influence 
leadership selection.  
 
Potential leaders should arguably possess four key qualities; they should possess 
electoral appeal – an ability to win the trust of the wider electorate and convert this 
                                                     
5 Nigel Lawson and Geoffey Howe respectively. 
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into votes at election time. Secondly they should be able to demonstrate 
administrative competence – to be seen as a ‘safe pair of hands’ and thus as a 
potential future Prime Minister. Thirdly, potential leaders should be feared by other 
political parties. Finally, potential leaders should possess the capacity to unify their 
party, as unity is a key feature of any potential party of government (Norton, 1998: 
75-112). This task requires the leader to unite both right and left, whilst still appealing 
to the moderate centre ground of the wider electorate. In 1997 the candidate that 
possessed most of these qualities was Kenneth Clarke – he was clearly the favourite 
with the electorate, ‘Ken the Bloke’ was a rare example of a politician who the 
general public regarded as a normal person. By contrast Hague was remembered as 
the teenage boy lecturing the Conservative conference in 1977, giving him the image 
of a political ‘anorak’. Clarke had demonstrated his competence across government 
and was regarded as a successful Chancellor of the Exchequer and although Hague 
was not regarded as incompetent Clarke was clearly the superior candidate. Clarke 
was also the candidate that the Labour Party most feared; whereas Hague’s image and 
Mrs. Thatcher’s endorsement of him made him an easy target for Labour 
propagandists.  
 
Clarke’s only weakness was that because he was a europhile in a largely eurosceptic 
party many MPs believed he would be a force for division rather than unity. Clarke 
clearly recognised this weakness and tried to remedy it through his pact with John 
Redwood. Hague’s credentials as a moderate Thatcherite with few enemies made him 
seem to be a better bet as a unity candidate. However, Hague’s election failed to bring 
unity to the party; within months of Hague taking over Peter Temple-Morris had 
crossed the floor of the House of Commons to sit as an Independent One Nation 
Conservative and in 1999 Shaun Woodward defected to Labour. Moreover the return 
to Parliament of Michael Portillo in 1999 triggered a prolonged low level civil war 
within both Conservative Central Office and the Parliamentary party.  
 
In 2001 both Clarke and Portillo fulfilled the criteria of electoral appeal, competence 
and they were both feared by Labour; however, neither was seen as having the 
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capacity to unify the party; Clarke because of his europhilia6 whilst Portillo was 
distrusted by many in the PCP for his advocacy of social liberalism, his alleged 
disloyalty towards Hague and his youthful homosexuality. Iain Duncan Smith did not 
possess any of the qualities needed for a successful leader. He had no electoral appeal, 
he lacked charisma and most of the general public had not heard of him until he 
became leader. He’d never demonstrated administrative competence in government 
and had only been in Hague’s Shadow Cabinet since 1998 and he was not feared by 
Labour. Duncan Smith also had little claim to be a unifying influence within the party. 
His chief claim to fame before standing for the party leadership was as one of the MPs 
who rebelled against John Major over the Maastricht Treaty and contributed to the 
disunity of the 1992-1997 parliamentary party. This made him an inappropriate 
candidate for leader as he could not demand the loyalty of his colleagues without 
appearing to be a hypocrite. Indeed, Duncan Smith’s previous disloyalty towards 
Major would come back to haunt him in the future; when he demanded that the party 
‘unite or die’ and was ignored it made him seem to be both a hypocrite and an 
impotent leader.  
 
Consequently, we can say that ideology overshadowed all other considerations when 
the Conservative Party chose its leaders in 1997 and 2001. The dominance of 
ideology was a consequence of the removal of Margaret Thatcher and the ideological 
legacy of Thatcherism and that this adversely affected the party’s ability to compete in 
the political arena. Problems arose because Michael Heseltine did not defeat Margaret 
Thatcher when he challenged her; Mrs. Thatcher actually had a majority of fifty-two 
over Heseltine, however her majority of 13.7% was just below the 15% threshold 
required for outright victory. She initially intended to run in the second round, but 
withdrew when her cabinet advised her that they did not think she could win. Instead 
she threw her support behind John Major as the candidate most able to defeat 
Heseltine.  
 
The Conservative Party went on to win the 1992 general election under Major; 
however this success masked a number of negative consequences of the coup against 
                                                     
6 Since 1997 Clarke had committed the cardinal sin of joining Tony Blair on the platform of Britain In 
Europe. 
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Mrs. Thatcher. Firstly it left a legacy of bitterness and ill feeling within the 
parliamentary party; the party’s preferred leader was not Major – it was Mrs. Thatcher 
and many of her supporters felt she had been betrayed by the pro European supporters 
of Heseltine.  Secondly the manner of her removal undermined the security of future 
Conservative leaders. Mrs. Thatcher had been the Conservatives’ most successful 
post-war leader, she had won three elections in a row and overturned much of the 
Attlee settlement. Yet when the parliamentary party believed she had become an 
electoral liability she was ruthlessly overthrown. The Conservatives’ defenestration of 
a sitting Prime Minister showed any future could be threatened with removal and 
stimulated intra-party debate about the position of the current incumbent leader. The 
Parliamentary party became ‘culturally schizophrenic’, becoming less deferential and 
demanding a greater say over policy, whilst still remaining wedded to the idea of 
strong leadership (Peele, 1997: 105).  
 
Major and Duncan Smith both faced leadership challenges, whilst Hague’s future was 
a matter of much speculation and debate. Finally, Mrs. Thatcher’s involvement in 
internal Conservative politics did not end when she left office. Just as she backed 
Major to beat Heseltine in 1990, so she backed Hague and Duncan Smith in 1997 and 
2001 respectively to beat Kenneth Clarke. If Mrs. Thatcher could no longer lead the 
party she and her supporters could at least protect her ideological ‘legacy’; this 
entailed her intervening against the non-Thatcherite candidate (Heseltine in 1990, 
Clarke in 1997 and 2001). Consequently Major, Hague and Duncan Smith were not 
just elected as party leader, but also appointed as the (sometimes reluctant) guardians 
of pure Thatcherism. Thus Mrs. Thatcher’s successors were elected with the support 
of the Thatcherite wing of the party and were therefore expected to maintain faith 
with Thatcherism. John Major’s troubles over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty 
were the result of a series of rebellions by Thatcherite Eurosceptics, with Mrs. 
Thatcher’s backing.  
 
The negative consequences of ideology could be seen in both the 1997 and 2001 
leadership elections which ended with the party choosing, for electoral purposes at 
least, the wrong candidate as leader. The 1997 election boiled down to a straight fight 
between eurosceptics and europhiles; Hague was supported by nearly 2/3rds of the 
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parliamentary party’s eurosceptics and none of its europhiles. The small europhile 
vote went entirely to Clarke, who also picked up most of the votes of the European 
policy agnostics. Although Hague was endorsed by Mrs. Thatcher, this endorsement 
did not come until it was clear that Clarke had a chance of winning and it is arguable 
that Hague was not Mrs. Thatcher’s first choice as leader. Consequently, Hague 
suffered from being a default leader with a weak ‘anybody but Clarke mandate’. 
Hague failed to heal the Conservative Party’s deep divisions over Europe, alienating 
many pro-Europeans, whilst being insufficiently hard-line for some of his eurosceptic 
MPs. Furthermore Hague was forced to sack Peter Lilley, when Lilley seemingly 
suggested it was time to move on from Thatcherism. Hague also tried to take the party 
in a new direction and dabbled with social liberalism under the guise of ‘Fresh 
Conservatism’, but was forced to draw back, partly as result of Thatcherite disquiet, 
within both the parliamentary party and the wider membership; Hague reverted to 
Thatcherite social conservatism with his Common Sense Revolution. Because Hague 
was Mrs. Thatcher’s chosen successor it was easy for Labour to argue that the 
Conservative Party had not changed, but was still stuck in the past and was not ready 
to meet the challenges of the future. 
 
The seductive power of ideology was also apparent in the 2001 leadership election, 
however, unlike 1997 this can be seen as a two stage ideological battle; the first stage 
was a battle between Portillo’s social liberalism and Duncan Smith’s social 
conservatism, whilst the second stage was another fight between europhiles and 
eurosceptics, this was further complicated by the new rules, which removed the final 
decision from the parliamentary party. Duncan Smith was elected because the 
parliamentary party could not stomach the idea of Portillo as leader, whilst the wider 
membership could not tolerate the concept of Clarke leading the party. Again Mrs. 
Thatcher waited to interfere until it seemed that Clarke might snatch the prize and 
again she appeared unconvinced about Duncan Smith’s ability. A further consequence 
of this two stage battle was that a majority of the parliamentary party opposed Duncan 
Smith’s leadership and it uncovered an inconsistency within the Hague rules. Duncan 
Smith’s mandate came from the membership, but he could be removed by the 
parliamentary party, most of whom had voted against him.  
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This inconsistency was tested in 2003, when Duncan Smith’s competence as leader 
was being increasingly questioned by his parliamentary colleagues. The Hague rules 
were intended to strengthen the position of the leader and put an end to debilitating 
speculation over leadership challenges of the kind suffered by Hague and Major. The 
rules allow for one challenge every parliament, rather than an annual election. There 
is no requirement for a challenger; instead 15% of the parliamentary party have to 
write to the Chairman of the 1922 committee requesting a vote of confidence in the 
leader. When this threshold is reached a vote is held and decided by a simple majority. 
If the leader loses they must step down and cannot take part in the subsequent election 
to choose a successor. Arguably the confidence vote made a challenge easier than 
before because no one had to risk the wrath of their colleagues and constituency 
parties by stepping forward as a contender. Once a confidence vote was triggered the 
odds were stacked against Duncan Smith; to remain as leader he was required to win a 
simple majority - in this case eighty three votes, however this was twenty-nine more 
than he polled when he won the leadership. Although, Duncan Smith lost by 90 votes 
to 75 and was forced to resign, it is arguable that Duncan Smith did quite well, in that 
he increased his vote by twenty-one from his position in the 2001 leadership election. 
 
Hague and IDS may have been ideologically acceptable leaders but they were 
electorally disastrous for the Conservative party. The unopposed election of Howard 
suggested that the Party began to learn from its mistakes and began to rectify those 
errors. David Davis issued a statement within minutes of Duncan Smith losing the 
confidence vote; this declared that although Davis believed he could win the 
forthcoming leadership election he had decided to stand aside in favour of Michael 
Howard in the hope of uniting the party (Davis, 30/9/2003). Shortly after Davis made 
his statement Stephen Dorrell, Oliver Letwin and Liam Fox issued a joint statement 
that called on Michael Howard to stand for the vacant position. Letwin argued that the 
Conservative Party had to, “…above all demonstrate two things: unity, and that we 
have a leader who is unchallengably competent and capable of persuading anybody 
that he could be an effective prime minister.” (Letwin, 30/10/2003). Other senior 
Conservatives including Michael Portillo, Kenneth Clarke and Michael Ancram also 
announced that they would not seek the leadership. On 31st October, just two days 
after Duncan Smith’s defenestration, a list of ninety two Howard supporters, from all 
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wings of the parliamentary party, was published. Events moved so quickly that 
Howard was forced to deny that there was a plot within the parliamentary party to 
remove Duncan Smith in favour of Howard. Six days later Howard was elected leader 
unopposed, his candidacy was not put to a ballot of rank and file Conservatives, but 
instead was put to an ‘informal consultation’ with party members over the following 
weekend (Tempest, 6/11/2003). 
 
Faced with the prospect of another long and divisive leadership battle and the prospect 
of electing the wrong leader again the parliamentary party reverted to the practices of 
a bygone era as Howard emerged to unanimous acclamation. Howard was everything 
that Duncan Smith and Hague had not been; he was a heavyweight politician, with a 
degree of electoral appeal. A Mori poll conducted just before he was made leader 
showed that 30% of their respondents felt Howard was ready to be Prime Minister, 
compared to 15% for Duncan Smith (Ipsos-Mori, 4/10/2003). He was clearly able to 
unify the parliamentary party, as evidenced by the manner of his election. 
Consequently he was feared by the Labour Party, especially as he soon demonstrated 
that he was a match for Blair in parliament. Ironically Howard had come last in the 
1997 leadership contest and as one Conservative moderniser said: 
If someone had told me in 1997 that six years later Michael Howard would be 
hailed as the great healing candidate I would have wept. (Freedland, 
30/10/2003) 
 
The Conservative Party under Howard achieved a degree of success that had eluded 
both Hague and Duncan Smith; the 2005 general election campaign was largely free 
of the discord and disciplinary problems that had plagued both John Major in 1997 
and Hague in 2001.7 The party secured a 3% swing from Labour, gained thirty three 
seats; Labour saw its majority cut from one hundred and sixty-seven to sixty-six 
(Anon. (1), 6/5/2005). Cabinet minister Peter Hain acknowledged Howard’s 
achievement saying that, “…he has made them into a more professional fighting 
machine and therefore a harder opponent for the Labour Party.” (Anon. (2), 6/5/2005)  
                                                     
7 Deputy Chairman Howard Flight was sacked and prevented from standing for re-election as a 
Conservative after he suggested that the true extent of the party’s plans for spending cuts was being 
concealed until after polling day (Jones & Sparrow, 26/3/2005) 
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However, Howard recognised that the Conservative share of the vote needed to be 
significantly greater if they were to achieve power and that he would be too old to 
lead the party into the next general election. He therefore announced that he would 
resign ‘sooner rather than later’, but that he would wait to give the party time to see if 
it wished to change the leadership rules again (Jones & Helm, 7/5/2005). The delay 
between Howard’s announcement of his resignation and his actual departure did not 
lead to changes in the rules governing leadership elections. However, it allowed the 
Conservative Party to have the extended debate about its future that it was denied in 
1997 and 2001. It also turned that year’s party conference in Blackpool into a modern 
day rerun of the fateful conference in 1963 that led to Douglas Home assuming the 
party leadership in controversial circumstances and which led to the introduction of 
formal leadership elections. Whilst the prospective leaders of 1963 campaigned 
covertly and unofficially, their modern day counterparts were allotted fifteen minutes 
each in order to convince the membership of their merits. Whilst the front runner 
David Davis gave a poor speech and flopped, by contrast David Cameron’s optimistic 
vision of the future, delivered without notes, won over the activists in the hall. 
 
The Blackpool conference sent Conservative MPs a clear signal, before the MPs 
ballot, that Cameron was the activists’ clear choice. When the parliamentary party 
voted they whittled the choice down to Davis, who fought off a strong challenge from 
Liam Fox, representing the traditional Conservative right and Cameron, who had 
made a Portilloesque journey from the traditional right to the modernising centre and 
social liberalism. Unlike the final 2001 ballot in which the three contenders’ polled 
roughly a third of the vote each there was a clear winner in 2005 (table 7.1 below). 
The result of the membership ballot was almost a foregone conclusion and Cameron 
beat Davis by 134, 446 to 64, 398 (Tempest, 6/11/2005).  
 
Table 7.1: Final MPs’ Ballot 2005 CP Leadership Election   
 
_____________________No. votes     %age__ 
Cameron   90    45.5 
Davis    57    28.8 
Fox    51    25.7  
Source: White, 21/11/2005 
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Whilst lacking experience, Cameron has other leadership qualities. So far he has 
proved to be competent, he is a force for unity, he is pragmatic and Labour have 
reason to fear a Cameron led Conservative Party. In an effort to heal past wounds he 
brought William Hague back into the Shadow Cabinet and gave Iain Duncan Smith 
and Kenneth Clarke roles in a new policy development process. Moreover, Cameron 
has played down traditional Conservative issues, such as immigration, law and order 
and tax cuts. Instead, he has stressed the importance of public services, the 
environment and quality of life issues. Whilst there has been some disquiet about 
Cameron’s abandonment of traditional Thatcherite Conservatism, Cameron is not 
under serious threat and may even welcome some opposition as a visible sign that he 
is forcing his party to modernise. Cameron’s strategy seems to be working; a recent 
Mori poll showed the Conservatives leading Labour on a number of issues, not just 
traditional Conservative policy areas such as crime, taxation and immigration, but also 
education and healthcare – areas that are traditionally thought of as Labour strengths. 
The poll of peoples’ voting intentions showed the Conservatives just one point behind 
Labour (Ipsos-Mori, 11/9/2006).  
 
Under Cameron’s leadership the Conservative Party seems to be abandoning its 
obsession with ideology and returning to its traditional pursuit of power through 
pragmatism. Ironically, the party has looked to its more distant, rather than its recent 
past in order to reinvent itself. The party engineered the emergence of Howard in 
order to bring unity and discipline whilst his successor is an Old Etonian, related by 
marriage to the Astors who is more concerned with electability than ideology. 
However, Cameron has faced internal opposition from the socially conservative 
Cornerstone Group and there some unresolved ideological contradictions beginning to 
emerge8. Consequently there is nothing to suggest that Cameron will not continue to 
be vulnerable to the ideologically driven mobilisations that brought about the 
downfall of Heath, Thatcher and Major. 
                                                     
8 There is the potential for future conflict around the green agenda outlined by John Gummer’s Quality 
of Life Policy Group and the  programme of deregulation put forward by John Redwood’s Economic 
Competitiveness Group 
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Appendix A: Organisation of the Parliamentary Conservative Party 1997-2003 
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9 Died September 1999, replaced by Michael 
Portillo 
10 Died February 2000, the subsequent by-
election was won by the Lib. Dems. 
Faber, David 
Fabricant, Michael 
Fallon, Michael 
Flight, Howard 
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Hamilton, Sir Archibald 
Hammond, Philip 
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Howard, Michael 
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Hunter, Andrew 
Jack, Michael 
Jackson, Robert 
Jenkin, Bernard 
Johnson Smith, Sir Geoffrey 
Key, Robert 
King, Tom 
Kirkbride, Julie 
Laing, Eleanor 
Lansley, Andrew 
                                                     
11 Resigned June 1999. He was replaced by 
Stephen O’Brien 
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Lord, Michael 
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Sayeed, Jonathan 
Shephard, Gillian 
Shepherd, Richard 
Shersby, Sir Michael13 
Simpson, Keith 
Soames, Nicholas 
                                                     
12 Resigned October 1997. he was replaced by 
Jacqui Lait 
13 Died May 1997. he was replaced by John 
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Spring, Richard 
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Stanley, Sir John 
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Streeter, Gary 
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Taylor, John 
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Tredinnick, David 
Trend, Michael 
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Yeo, Tim 
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14 Resigned from the Conservative Party, 
November 1997 
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The Parliamentary Conservative Party 2001-2005 
 
Ainsworth, Peter 
Amess, David 
Ancram, Michael 
Arbuthnot, James 
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Atkinson, Peter 
Bacon, Richard 
Baldry, Tony 
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Bellingham, Sir Henry 
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Burns, Simon 
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Cash, William 
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Chope, Christopher 
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Francois, Mark 
Gale, Roger 
Garnier, Edward 
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Gillan, Cheryl 
Goodman, Paul 
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Greenway, John 
Grieve, Dominic 
Gummer, John 
Hague, William 
Hammond, Philip 
Haselhurst, Sir Alan 
Hawkins, Nicholas 
Hayes, John 
Heald, Oliver 
Heathcoat-Amory, David 
Hendry, Charles 
Hoban, Mark 
Hogg, Douglas 
Horam, John 
Howard, Michael 
Howarth, Gerald 
Hunter, Andrew 
Jack, Michael 
Jackson, Robert 
Jenkin, Bernard 
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Key, Robert 
Kirkbride, Julie 
Knight, Greg 
Laing, Eleanor 
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Lansley, Andrew 
Leigh, Edward 
Letwin, Oliver 
Lewis, Julian 
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Lidington, David 
Lilley, Peter 
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Luff, Peter 
MacKay, Andrew 
MacLean, David 
Malins, Humfrey 
Maples, John 
Mates, Michael 
Maude, Francis 
Mawhinney, Sir Brian 
May, Theresa 
McIntosh, Anne 
McLoughlin, Patrick 
Mercer, Patrick 
Mitchell, Andrew 
Moss, Malcolm 
Murrison, Andrew 
Norman, Archie 
O'Brien, Stephen 
Osborne, George 
Ottaway, Richard 
Page, Richard 
Paice, James 
Paterson, Owen 
Pickles, Eric 
Portillo, Michael 
Prisk, Mark 
Randall, John 
Redwood, John 
Robathan, Andrew 
Robertson, Hugh 
Robertson, Laurence 
Roe, Marion 
Rosindell, Andrew 
Ruffley, David 
Sayeed, Jonathan 
Selous, Andrew 
Shephard, Gillian 
Shepherd, Richard 
Simmonds, Mark 
Simpson, Keith 
Soames, Nicholas 
Spelman, Caroline 
Spicer, Michael 
Spink, Robert 
Spring, Richard 
Stanley, Sir John 
Steen, Anthony 
Streeter, Gary 
Swayne, Desmond 
Swire, Hugo 
Syms, Robert 
Tapsell, Sir Peter 
Taylor, Ian 
Taylor, John 
Taylor, Sir Teddy 
Tredinnick, David 
Trend, Michael 
Turner, Andrew 
Tyrie, Andrew 
Viggers, Peter 
Walter, Robert 
Waterson, Nigel 
Watkinson, Angela 
Whittingdale, John 
Widdecombe, Ann 
Wiggin, Bill 
Wilkinson, John 
Willetts, David 
Wilshire, David 
Winterton, Ann 
Winterton, Sir Nicholas 
Yeo, Timothy 
Young, Sir George
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Shadow Cabinets 1997-2001 
June 1997 – June 1998 
Rt. Hon. William Hague       Conservative Party Leader 
Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley       Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Rt. Hon. Michael Howard       Shadow Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
Rt. Hon. Sir Brian Mawhinney     Shadow Secretary of State for the Home Department 
Rt. Hon. Lord Parkinson      Chairman of the Conservative Party 
Rt. Hon. Stephen Dorrell      Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Eloyment 
Rt. Hon. Gillian Shephard  Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster 
Rt. Hon. Viscount Cranborne     Shadow Leader of the House of Lords 
Rt. Hon. Sir George Young       Shadow Secretary of State for Defence 
Rt. Hon. John Redwood  Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and President of the Board of 
Trade 
Rt. Hon. Sir Norman Fowler      Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
Rt. Hon. Michael Ancram       Constitutional Affairs Spokesman, including Scotland and Wales 
Rt. Hon. David Curry      Shadow Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
Rt. Hon. Alastair Goodlad      Shadow Secretary of State for International Development 
Rt. Hon. David Heathcoat-Amory     Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
Rt. Hon. Francis Maude      Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 
Rt. Hon. Andrew Mackay      Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland 
John Maples        Shadow Secretary of State for Health 
Rt. Hon. Iain Duncan Smith      Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security 
Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot      Opposition Chief Whip 
Rt. Hon. Lord Strathclyde      Lords Opposition Chief Whip 
 
2nd June 1998 – 2nd December 1998 
Rt. Hon. William Hague      Conservative Party Leader  
Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley       Deputy Leader  
Rt. Hon. Francis Maude       Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer  
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Rt. Hon. Michael Howard       Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Sir Norman Fowler      Shadow Home Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Lord Parkinson     Conservative Party Chairman  
David Willets                   Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Eloyment  
Rt. Hon. Sir George Young   Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster  
Rt. Hon. Viscount Cranborne     Shadow Leader of the House of Lords  
John Maples        Shadow Secretary of State for Defence  
Rt. Hon. John Redwood      Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Rt. Hon. Gillian Shephard      Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions  
Dr Liam Fox        Constitutional Affairs spokesman  
Tim Yeo        Shadow Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Gary Streeter        Shadow Secretary of State for International Development  
Rt. Hon. David Heathcoat-Amory     Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
Peter Ainsworth       Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport  
Rt. Hon. Andrew Mackay      Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Rt. Hon. Ann Widdecombe      Shadow Secretary of State for Health  
Rt. Hon. Iain Duncan Smith      Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security  
Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot      Opposition Chief Whip  
Rt. Hon. Lord Strathclyde      Lords Opposition Chief Whip 
 
Changes made June 1998 
Peter Lilley moved from Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer to Deputy Leader of the Conservative Party 
Francis Maude moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Sir Norman Fowler moved from Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions to Shadow Home Secretary 
Gillian Shephard moved from Shadow Leader of the House of Commons to Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions 
Sir George Young moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Defence to Shadow Leader of the House of Commons 
John Maples moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Health to Shadow Secretary of State for Defence 
Peter Ainsworth entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 
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Liam Fox entered the shadow cabinet as Constitutional Affairs Spokesman 
Gary Streeter entered the shadow cabinet as Secretary of State for International Development 
Tim Yeo entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food 
Ann Widdecombe entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Secretary of State for Health 
Michael Ancram appointed Conservative Party Vice-Chairman 
Sir Alastair Goodlad left the shadow cabinet 
Sir Brian Mawhinney left the shadow cabinet 
David Curry left the shadow cabinet 
 
2nd December 1998 – 15th June 1999 
Rt. Hon. William Hague      Conservative Party Leader  
Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley       Deputy Leader  
Rt. Hon. Francis Maude       Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Rt. Hon. Michael Howard       Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Sir Norman Fowler      Shadow Home Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Lord Parkinson     Conservative Party Chairman  
David Willets                   Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Employment  
Rt. Hon. Sir George Young                 Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster  
Rt. Hon. Lord Strathclyde      Shadow Leader of the House of Lords  
John Maples        Shadow Secretary of State for Defence  
Rt. Hon. John Redwood      Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Rt. Hon. Gillian Shephard      Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions  
Dr Liam Fox        Constitutional Affairs spokesman  
Tim Yeo        Shadow Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Gary Streeter        Shadow Secretary of State for International Development  
Rt. Hon. David Heathcoat-Amory     Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
Peter Ainsworth       Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport  
Rt. Hon. Andrew Mackay      Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Rt. Hon. Ann Widdecombe      Shadow Secretary of State for Health  
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Rt. Hon. Iain Duncan Smith      Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security  
Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot      Opposition Chief Whip  
Rt. Hon. Lord Henley      Lords Opposition Chief Whip 
 
Changes made December 1998 
Lord Strathclyde moved from Lords Opposition Chief Whip to Shadow Leader of the House of Lords 
Lord Henley entered the shadow cabinet as Lords Opposition Chief Whip 
Viscount Cranborne left the shadow cabinet 
 
 
15th June 1999 – 2nd February 2000 
Rt. Hon. William Hague      Conservative Party Leader  
Rt. Hon. Francis Maude       Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Rt. Hon. John Maples      Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Ann Widdecombe       Shadow Home Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Michael Ancram      Conservative Party Chairman  
Rt. Hon. Theresa May       Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Employment  
Rt. Hon. Sir George Young   Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and Constitutional Affairs spokesman 
Rt. Hon. Lord Strathclyde      Shadow Leader of the House of Lords  
Rt. Hon Iain Duncan Smith      Shadow Secretary of State for Defence  
Angela Browning       Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Rt. Hon. John Redwood      Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions  
Tim Yeo        Shadow Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Gary Streeter        Shadow Secretary of State for International Development  
Rt. Hon. David Heathcoat-Amory     Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
Peter Ainsworth       Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport  
Rt. Hon. Andrew Mackay      Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Dr. Liam Fox        Shadow Secretary of State for Health  
David Willetts       Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security  
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Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot      Opposition Chief Whip  
Rt. Hon. Lord Henley      Lords Opposition Chief Whip 
 
Changes made June 1999 
Theresa May entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Employment 
Angela Browning entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
Ann Widdecombe moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Health to Shadow Home Secretary 
John Maples moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Defence to Shadow Foreign Secretary 
John Redwood moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions 
Michael Ancram moved from Conservative Party Vice-Chairman to Conservative Party Chairman 
Dr. Liam Fox moved from Constitutional Affairs Spokesman to Shadow Secretary of State for Health 
Iain Duncan Smith moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security to Shadow Secretary of State for Defence 
David Willetts moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Employment to Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security 
Peter Lilley left the shadow cabinet 
Sir Norman Fowler left the shadow cabinet 
Lord Parkinson left the shadow cabinet 
Gillian Shephard left the shadow cabinet 
Michael Howard left the shadow cabinet 
 
 
2nd February 2000 – 26th September 2000 
Rt. Hon. William Hague      Conservative Party Leader  
Rt. Hon. Michael Portillo       Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Rt. Hon. Francis Maude      Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Ann Widdecombe       Shadow Home Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Michael Ancram      Conservative Party Chairman  
Rt. Hon. Theresa May       Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Eloyment  
Rt. Hon. Sir George Young   Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and Constitutional Affairs spokesman 
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Rt. Hon. Lord Strathclyde      Shadow Leader of the House of Lords  
Rt. Hon Iain Duncan Smith      Shadow Secretary of State for Defence  
Angela Browning       Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Archie Norman       Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions  
Tim Yeo        Shadow Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Gary Streeter        Shadow Secretary of State for International Development  
Rt. Hon. David Heathcoat-Amory     Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
Peter Ainsworth       Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport  
Rt. Hon. Andrew Mackay      Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Dr. Liam Fox        Shadow Secretary of State for Health  
David Willetts       Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security  
Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot      Opposition Chief Whip  
Rt. Hon. Lord Henley      Lords Opposition Chief Whip 
 
Changes made February 2000 
Francis Maude moved from Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer to Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Michael Portillo entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Archie Norman entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
John Maples left the shadow cabinet 
John Maples left the shadow cabinet 
 
26th September 2000 – July 2001 
Rt. Hon. William Hague      Conservative Party Leader  
Rt. Hon. Michael Portillo       Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Rt. Hon. Francis Maude      Shadow Foreign Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Ann Widdecombe       Shadow Home Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Michael Ancram      Conservative Party Chairman  
Rt. Hon. Theresa May       Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Employment  
Angela Browing  Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster and Constitutional Affairs spokesman 
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Rt. Hon. Lord Strathclyde      Shadow Leader of the House of Lords  
Rt. Hon Iain Duncan Smith      Shadow Secretary of State for Defence  
Rt. Hon. David Heathcoat-Amory     Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Archie Norman       Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions  
Tim Yeo        Shadow Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  
Gary Streeter        Shadow Secretary of State for International Development  
Rt. Hon. Oliver Letwin      Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
Peter Ainsworth       Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport  
Rt. Hon. Andrew Mackay      Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Dr. Liam Fox        Shadow Secretary of State for Health  
David Willetts       Shadow Secretary of State for Social Security  
Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot      Opposition Chief Whip  
Rt. Hon. Lord Henley      Lords Opposition Chief 
 
Changes made September 2000 
Angela Browing moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry to Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Constitutional Affairs spokesman 
David Heathcoat-Amory moved from Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury to Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
Oliver Letwin entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
Sir George Young left the shadow cabinet 
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Shadow Cabinets 1997-2003 
18th September 2001 – 23rd July 2002 
Rt. Hon. Iain Duncan Smith      Conservative Party Leader  
Rt. Hon. Michael Howard       Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Rt. Hon. Michael Ancram      Shadow Foreign Secretary and Conservative Party Deputy Leader 
Rt. Hon. Oliver Letwin       Shadow Home Secretary 
Rt. Hon. David Davis      Conservative Party Chairman  
Damian Green        Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Skills  
Rt. Hon. Eric Forth  Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster  
Rt. Hon. Lord Strathclyde      Shadow Leader of the House of Lords  
Hon. Bernard Jenkin       Shadow Secretary of State for Defence  
John Whittingdale       Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Peter Ainsworth       Shadow Minister of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Theresa May       Secretary of State for transport, Local Government and the Regions 
Caroline Spelman       Shadow Secretary of State for International Development  
John Bercow        Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
Tim Yeo        Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport  
Quentin Davies       Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Dr. Liam Fox        Shadow Secretary of State for Health  
David Willetts       Shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions  
Jaqui Lait        Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland 
Nigel Evans         Shadow Secretary of State for Wales 
Rt. Hon. David Maclean      Opposition Chief Whip  
Rt. Hon. Lord Cope of Berkeley    Lords Opposition Chief 
 
23rd July 2002 – October 2003 
Rt. Hon. Iain Duncan Smith      Conservative Party Leader  
Rt. Hon. Michael Howard       Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer  
Rt. Hon. Michael Ancram      Shadow Foreign Secretary and Conservative Party Deputy Leader 
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Rt. Hon. Oliver Letwin       Shadow Home Secretary 
Rt. Hon. Theresa May      Conservative Party Chairman  
Damian Green        Shadow Secretary of State for Education and Skills  
Rt. Hon. Eric Forth   Shadow Leader of the House of Commons and Shadow Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster  
Rt. Hon. Lord Strathclyde      Shadow Leader of the House of Lords  
Hon. Bernard Jenkin       Shadow Secretary of State for Defence  
Tim Yeo        Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry  
Rt. Hon. David Davis      Shadow Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
David Lidington       Shadow Minister of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Tim Collins       Shadow Secretary of State for Transport 
Caroline Spelman       Shadow Secretary of State for International Development  
Howard Flight       Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury  
John Whittingdale       Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport  
Quentin Davies       Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland  
Dr. Liam Fox        Shadow Secretary of State for Health  
David Willetts       Shadow Secretary of State for Work and Pensions  
Jaqui Lait        Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland 
Nigel Evans         Shadow Secretary of State for Wales 
Rt. Hon. David Maclean      Opposition Chief Whip  
Rt. Hon. Lord Cope of Berkeley    Lords Opposition Chief 
 
Changes made July 2003 
Tim Yeo moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to Shadow Secretary of State for Trade and Industry 
David Davis is moved from Conservative Party Chairman to Shadow Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
Theresa May moved from Shadow Secretary of State for Transport, Local Government and the Regions to Conservative Party Chairman 
Howard Flight entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Chief Secretary to the Treasury 
Tim Collins entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Secretary of State for Transport 
David Lidington entered the shadow cabinet as Shadow Minister of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Peter Ainsworth left the shadow cabinet  
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John Bercow left the shadow cabinet 
 
 
 
 
233
Appendix B: Chronology of Events 1997-2003 
1997 
19th June    Hague elected leader 
 
August    Hague attends Notting Hill Carnival 
 
1998 
6th October   Sun calls Hague ‘a dead parrot’ 
 
1999 
20th April   Peter Lilley’s repudiation of Thatcherism 
 
6th May    Modest gains in local elections 
 
13th June   Big gains in European elections 
 
20th November  Geoffrey Archer quits as candidate for London Mayor 
 
26th November Michael Portillo elected as member for Kensington & 
Chelsea 
 
18th December   Shaun Woodward defects to Labour 
 
2000 
1st February   Portillo appointed Shadow Chancellor 
 
3rd February  Portillo U turn on opposition to minimum wage and 
Bank of England independence 
 
15th February  1st ‘Save The Pound’ tour 
 
26th April Hague calls for householder to be given more extensive 
right to self-defence after Tony Martin case 
 
4th May Some local election gains. Lose Romsey by-election to 
the Lib-Dems 
 
8th August  Hague’s fourteen pints boast 
 
4th October Ann Widdecombe announces £100 fines for cannabis 
possession 
 
8th October   Eight cabinet ministers admit to taking drugs 
 
2001 
 
4th March  Hague’s ‘foreign land’ speech 
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28th March John Townend say immigrants have ‘undermined 
Anglo-Saxon society’ 
 
20th March  Portillo refuses to sign CRE anti-racist pledge 
 
27th April   Lord Taylor attacks Hague for not expelling Townend 
 
1st May Hague forces Taylor and Townend to back down over 
race row 
 
8th May  General election announced 
 
10th May   Conservative manifesto launched 
 
14th May  Oliver Letwin’s £20 billion tax cuts gaffe 
 
22nd May  Thatcher’s ‘The Mummy Returns’, Plymouth 
 
29th May  Hague, Major and Portillo attend Brighton rally 
 
31st May  Hague warns of 2nd Labour landslide 
 
7th June  2nd Labour landslide 
 
13th September  IDS Elected leader 
 
7th October Tells Angela Watkinson, Andrew Rossindell and 
Andrew Hunter to leave the Monday Club 
 
23rd November Conservatives lose Ipswich by-election 
 
27th December IDS refuses to join Carlton Club until they give women 
equal membership 
 
2002 
14th February  Conservatives come fourth in Ogmore by-election 
 
March    Lady Thatcher forced to quit public life 
 
5th May   Ann Winterton sacked for making racist joke 
 
23rd July   Sacks David Davis, whilst Davis is on holiday 
 
28th July    Alan Duncan confirms he is gay 
 
5th November   IDS tells party to ‘unite or die’ 
 
2003 
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14th February  Sacks Chief executive Mark MacGregor (whilst on 
holiday. Also sacks head of research Rick Nye (both 
portillistas) 
 
14th February Appoints Barry Legg as Chief Executive and chief of 
staff 
 
21st Feb Michael Portillo accuses IDS of ‘violating’ the 
Conservative Party 
 
1st May Crispin Blunt resigns and calls IDS a ‘liability’ 
 
2nd May Conservatives gain more than 500 seats in local 
elections 
 
7th May Barry Legg forced to resign 
 
17th June Conservative Treasurer, Sir Stanley Kalms resigns 
 
19th September Conservatives come third at Brent East by election 
 
22nd October Major donor Stuart Wheeler calls for IDS to quit 
 
28th October Sir Michael Spicer tells IDS he has received 25 requests 
for a vote of no confidence in his leadership 
 
29th October    IDS loses Confidence vote and resigns 
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Appendix C: Evidence of European Policy Positions 
 
Ainsworth, Peter 
Division List EDM Group 
Membership 
Public Statement Sco
re 
Europ
hile 
Eurosce
ptic 
Europ
hile 
Eurosce
ptic 
Europ
hile 
Eurosce
ptic 
Europ
hile 
Eurosce
ptic 
 
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
  
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
David Amess 
Division List EDM Group 
Membership 
Public Statement Sco
re 
Europ
hile 
Eurosce
ptic 
Europ
hile 
Eurosce
ptic 
Europ
hile 
Eurosce
ptic 
Europ
hile 
Eurosce
ptic 
 
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
EDM:    Signed EDM 1355 ‘Euro Poll’ (9/6/2003) 
 
 
Ancram, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “The EU Constitution will fundamentally change the way in 
which the British people are governed. It is clearly a great leap 
towards a single European state. The British government's 
claim that the Constitution is just a consolidation of the existing 
treaties is now shown to be absurd. No other European 
government makes this bizarre claim. You don't consolidate the 
EU by adding a new President, adding a new EU foreign 
minister with a diplomatic service, adding a binding charter of 
fundamental rights, adding vast new powers over asylum and 
immigration and giving the EU Constitution primacy over our 
own.” (Ancram, 22/10/2003) 
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Arbuthnot, James 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Atkinson, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Atkinson, Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Bacon, Richard 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
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Baldry, Tony 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - X  0 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) (Three line whip) 
 
Public Statement:   “More generally, I am very happy to be described as a Pro 
European Conservative and I suspect that I would be 
disappointed if I were not described as a Europhile on your 
database! [candidlist.com]” (Baldry, 25/8/2000) 
 
 
Barker, Greg 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Baron, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Bellingham, Henry 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
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Bercow, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1249 ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ 
(19/5/2003) 
 
Group Membership: Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe (CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:      “Subsidiarity and proportionality have failed. The growth of EU 
law making continues unabated. Too much power has been 
taken over too long a period for too little benefit or 
justification. It is hardly surprising that there is a pervasive 
public cynicism about politics as millions of people see the EU 
developing in a way that they had not expected, that they do not 
want, but that they are largely powerless to resist.” (Bercow, 
2003) 
 
 
Beresford, Sir Paul 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Blunt, Crispin 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
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Body, Sir Richard 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14 /1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  President: Campaign for an Independent Britain 
 
 
Boswell, Timothy 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - X 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Bottomley, Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- -  X - - - - 1 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 524 ‘President of the European Commission’ 
(13/4/1999) 
 
 
Bottomley, Virginia 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - - - 0 
 
 
Brady, Graham 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10 /2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 524 ‘President of the European Commission’ 
(13/4/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: Conservative Way Forward 
Brazier, Julian 
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Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Brooke, Sir Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities Amendment 
Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
 
Browning, Angela 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Advisory Board Member: The European Foundation 
 
 
Burns, Simon 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
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Burt, Alistair 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - X  - - 0 
 
Division List:  Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Tory Reform Group 
 
 
Butterfill, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10 /2001) 
 
 
Bruce, Ian 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - -  X 3 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Public Statement:  “The case against Federalism is equally overwhelming. We 
have a fully integrated Agriculture and Fisheries Policy. I 
hardly need to say more ! William has now broken the mould 
and stated clearly that we are going to roll Europe back. I 
believe he is wholly right and indeed that is the only way that 
Europe can be made to work in everyone's interests.” (Bruce, 
13/10/1999) 
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Cameron, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10 /2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “I am against transferring further power from Westminster to 
Brussels. Movement along the road to closer union with Europe 
is taking place with ever increasing steps. While calls for a 
referendum on the Constitution are loud and clear from the 
British people, the Government is taking us towards integration 
and refuses to ask people what they want in a referendum.” 
(Cameron, 5/11/2003) 
 
 
Cash, William 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 188 ‘EU Commission’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership: Chairman: The European Foundation 
 
Public Statement:  “Although this is now in the past, the need for a re-negotiating 
policy by the Conservative Party remains paramount in the 
national and in the European interest. We would then truly lead 
Europe in the direction of sanity and in line with the profound 
concerns of the populations of the other member states, 
including Germany. Variable geometry and the advocacy of so-
called flexibility simply allows the other member states to 
continue to move ahead into a hard core which is rotten on the 
inside, as the collapse of the European Commission amply 
demonstrates.” (Cash, 1999)  
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Chapman, Sir Sydney 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14 /1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Chope, Christopher 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
Group Membership:  Chairman: Conservative Way Forward 
 
Clappison, James 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Clark, Alan 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
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Clarke, Kenneth 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - X  X  -2 
 
Group Membership:  Advisory Board Member: Action Centre for Europe 
 
Public Statement:  “I remain a conviction politician and I do not hide my views on 
the single currency. I believe it will be in Britain's interests to 
join the single currency when the conditions arise including a 
sensible exchange rate.” (Clarke, 26/6/2001) 
 
 
Clarke, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- -  X - - - - 1 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Clifton-Brown, Geoffrey 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 188 ‘EU Commission’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Collins, Tim 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “With the fifth largest economy in the world, Britain can make 
a success of its own currency, if we want. No-one suggests that 
much smaller economies like Australia, Canada or Switzerland 
have to scrap their currencies to survive.” (Collins, 23/2/2000) 
 
 
 
 
Colvin, Michael 
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Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- -  X - - - - 1 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Conway, Derek 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Cormack, Patrick 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - - - 0 
 
 
Cran, James 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Curry, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - X  X  -2 
 
Chairman:   Conservative Group for Europe 
 
Public Statement:  “Well, I fear that we will move towards fighting the Election 
campaign on a vote Labour and abolish the Pound - vote 
Conservative and save the Pound, campaign.  And, I think that 
would be very misguided.  I think we're moving towards 
opposition in principle, which I would object to.” (Curry, 
2/11/1997)   
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Davies, Quentin 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - X  -1 
 
Public Statement:  The prospective attractions of a single currency are 
momentuous. We would have willingly paid a high price 
indeed for shelter from the currency crises which have beset us 
intermittently, and very destructively, over the past 30 years 
when we were experiencing them - though memories are short. 
No trading nation can for long disinterest itself in the value of 
its currency in relation to those of its major trading partners, 
and crises are inevitable from time to time under a regime of 
fragmented currencies. On the other hand, it can be argued that 
the Euro would still fluctuate against the US dollar and the yen. 
But our exposure to such fluctuations would be greatly reduced, 
partially because from the outset a much reduced proportion of 
our trade would be exposed to them - less than half - and 
partially because a large part of EU trade with third countries 
would most probably over time come to be denominated in the 
Euro itself. (Davies, 2003) 
 
 
Davis, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “…it is quite clear that the intention of both the Commission 
and the Franco-German axis is to create a presumption in 
favour of everybody joining the inner core eventually. It is also 
clear that they intend to create a system of rewards and 
penalties to ensure everyone did eventually follow where they 
led.” (Davies, 2000: p. 5) 
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Day, Stephan 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 0 
 
Division List:  Teller for the Ayes: Amendment 65 of the European 
Communities Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
 
Djanogly, Jonathan 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “I do not support Britain adopting the Euro and the idea that 
one set of interest rates will suit all countries is as much a 
nonsense this year as it will be next year.” (Djanogly, 
10/6/2003) 
 
 
Dorrell, Stephen 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - X  X  -1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Advisory Board Member: Action Centre for Europe  
 
Public Statement:  “I am an unapologetic pro-European. I believe that the United 
Kingdom was right to join the European Union, that our future 
is intrinsically tied up with the future of our partner countries in 
the EU, and that John Major was right when he said that Britain 
should aim to be at the heart of Europe.” (Hansard, 16/ 7/2003)  
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Duncan, Alan 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “The single currency is a socialist project dressed up in 
business language. I want to keep the pound and would vote 
against the euro.” (Watt, 24/5/2001) 
 
 
Duncan, Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 532 ‘European Union and the Commonwealth’ 
(16/1/2003) 
 
 
Duncan Smith, Iain 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Council Member: Conservative Way Forward 
 
Public Statement:  “One of the greatest legacies that I leave my party is unity on 
the question of Europe. This unity was not achieved at the cost 
of principle. Our position remains firmly anti-federalist. If the 
Party stays true to the line I laid down…We will repatriate our 
fisheries and our foreign aid budget. We will never accept a 
European army or a common foreign policy. We oppose the 
single currency not just for the moment, but for ever – on 
principle.” (Duncan Smith, 7/11/2003) 
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Emery, Sir Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
 
Evans, Nigel 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Faber, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - -   2 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2 /12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
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Fabricant, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “According to the analysis undertaken by the US Treasury, the 
World Trade Organisation gives us access to European markets 
regardless of whether we are members of the European Union. I 
have an interesting document produced by the US Treasury 
about two years ago. It goes into considerable detail about the 
direct and indirect costs and benefits accruing from our 
membership of the European Union. Its strange conclusion-it is 
strange because it runs contrary to everything that we are told-
is that the net benefit to the United Kingdom is minus US $40 
billion a year. Putting it crudely, that is equivalent to about 
£500 for every man, woman and child in this country every 
year, or to almost doubling our state pension overnight.” 
(Fabricant, 18/6/2003) 
 
 
Fallon, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Field, Mark 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: Conservative Way Forward 
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Flight, Howard 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: European Foundation 
 
 
Flook, Adrian 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: Conservative Way Forward 
 
 
Forth, Eric 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership: Member: European Research Group 
 
 
Fowler, Sir Norman 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
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Fox, Liam 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “The main cost of the euro would be a constitutional one - the 
UK government would lose the power to determine the 
priorities for the UK economy. More importantly, we the 
British voters would lose the power to determine our own 
economic priorities. That is too high a price to pay.” (Fox, 
2003) 
 
 
Francois, Mark 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
 
 
Fraser, Christopher 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - -  X 3 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Personal Statement: “I believe that the British people should be allowed to vote in a 
referendum on the ratification of the Treaty of Nice before the 
vote in Parliament and, in the absence of such a referendum, I 
shall vote against ratification.” (Fraser, 15/1/2001) 
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Gale, Roger 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - -  X 1 
 
Public Statement:  “Our currency, our customs and our frontiers are part of the 
heritage that I believe I was elected to protect, to preserve and 
to hand on with its integrity intact to those who follow. 
Arguably, we have given away too much already; if so, history 
will judge us accordingly. This week's publication of the 
Conservatives draft General Election manifesto, containing as it 
does a clear pledge to resist further EU intrusions into clearly-
defined areas of national policy, will I believe strike a chord not 
just with the Party faithful but with a much broader 
constituency, including tomorrow's citizens, who have been 
waiting for just such clear blue water between the United 
Kingdom and those from beyond these shores who would in the 
interests of a bureaucracy that is not ours.” (Gale, 2001) 
 
 
Garnier, Edward 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Gibb, Nick 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Council Member: Conservative Way Forward 
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Gill, Christopher 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14 /1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: Conservative Way Forward 
 
Public Statement:  “The fundamental hallmark of a free society, the right to own 
property, is threatened by the draft EU constitution. We must 
ensure that those in favour of a federal Europe are called to 
account for the small print within the constitution. Who will 
decide what is in the public interest, the unelected EU 
Commission? The EU should play no part in the sequestration 
of property freely owned by the British people.” (Gill, 
14/10/2003) 
 
 
Gillan, Cheryl 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Goodlad, Alistair 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
         
 
Left Parliament 1999 to become High Commissioner to Australia, used data from 
Heppell 2002  
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Goodman, Paul 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM: Signed EDM 1508 ‘Bruges Pamphlet and EU Spending’ 
(26/6/2002) 
 
 
Gorman, Teresa 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Director: The Freedom Association 
 
 
Gray, James 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
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Grayling, Chris 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
   (4/11/2002) 
 
 
Green, Damian 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - X  - - 0 
 
Division List:  Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001)  
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Tory Reform Group 
 
 
Greenway, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Grieve, Dominic 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
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Gummer, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - X  - - -1 
 
Group Membership: Former Chairman: Conservative Group for Europe 
 
 
Hague, William 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public statement:  “Our policy is that Brussels should do less and do it better. 
That's why the next Conservative Government will pass a 
Reserved Powers Act, to prevent EU law from overriding the 
will of Parliament in areas which Parliament never intended to 
transfer to the EU. We want our children and grandchildren to 
inherit the same freedoms that we enjoy today.” (Hague, 
16/5/2001) 
 
 
Hamilton, Sir Archie 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - -  X - - 1 
 
Group Membership: Member, The European Research Group 
 
 
Hammond, Philip 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
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Haselhurst, Alan 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - - - 0 
 
Deputy Speaker, used data from Heppell 2000 
 
 
Hawkins, Nicholas 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 188 ‘EU Commission’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “In many EU countries, if a government signs up to agree to a 
directive (as they may willingly do) which turns out to be 
contrary to their national interest, or to the interest of 
companies based in their country, they then fail to enforce it or 
turn a blind eye to breaches or never even implement it - and no 
one bats an eyelid. By contrast, our present Government 
constantly signs up to directives directly contrary to UK 
companies' interests and then enforces them to the hilt.” 
(Hawkins, 2003) 
 
 
Hayes, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
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Heald, Oliver 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Heath, Sir Edward 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - X  -1 
 
Public Statement: “All too often the anti-Europeans tell us of the nightmare 
scenarios that will follow if we join the euro. There are those 
who argue Britain should carry on as we are - in the EU, but 
outside the euro…they pretend that saying 'Yes to Europe' but 
'No to the euro' is a sensible compromise, a cost-free option - a 
third way if you like. It is not.” (Anon, 30/5/2003) 
 
 
Heathcoat-Amory, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “Fantasy Legislation. Far too frequently, lawmakers legislate 
for an entire continent in wilful ignorance of the disastrous 
local application of the law. Whether it is banning safe warm 
water discharge from whisky distillers (thus expelling 
established marine life from cold Scottish streams), rules on 
chocolate, double decker buses, or instructions on how to hold 
ladders, Brussels is seen as either a joke or a menace.” 
(Heathcoat-Amory, 20/5/2003) 
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Hendry, Charles 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Teller for the ‘noes’ - European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Heseltine, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - X  -1 
 
Public Statement: There is an army of men and women in all walks of life, in 
trade and commerce, in the unions, in politics and a wider 
world, who will follow a clear commitment that Britain is to 
join the single currency. There is no need for the five economic 
tests to have been met for a determined process of persuasion to 
begin. So it should. Now.” (Heseltine, 22/1/2002) 
 
 
Hoban, Mark 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
 
 
Hogg, Douglas 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill (17 / 10 / 
2001) 
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Horam, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Council Member: Conservative Way Forward 
 
 
Howard, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: New Europe All Party Parliamentary Group 
 
Public Statement:  “For several decades, the governments of Europe have chosen 
deliberately not to emulate the more liberal economic policies 
of the United States, but rather to implement a much more 
regulatory, and in some cases corporatist, approach. They have 
done so with the laudable aim of seeking to protect the weakest 
in society. But the result of their approach has, more often than 
not, been quite the opposite.” (Howard, 3/2/2003) 
 
 
Howarth, Gerald 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
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Hunter, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- -  X  X - - 2 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Jack, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Jackson, Robert 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - X  - - - - -1 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 943 ‘Europe Day 9th May’ (6 / 3 / 2002) 
 
 
Jenkin, Bernard 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
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Johnson, Boris 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 532 ‘European Union and the Commonwealth’ 
(16/1/2003) 
 
 
Johnson-Smith, Sir Geoffrey 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14 /1/1999) 
 
 
Key, Robert 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “Most European governments are under pressure from their 
citizens to resist the rush to federalism and economic and 
monetary union. Governments ignore their citizens at their 
peril. Conservatives believe in an open, flexible, free-enterprise 
Europe; a Europe which celebrates diversity. This can be a 
‘network Europe’, a Europe of nation states co-operating 
together.” (Key, 2003) 
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King, Tom 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Kirkbride, Julie 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Knight, Greg 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
 
 
Laing, Eleanor 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
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Lait, Jacqui 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
 
 
Lansley, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Leigh, Edward 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
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Letwin, Oliver 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “The authors have built into the Constitution the basis upon 
which, progressively, the combined forces of the Council, of 
the ECJ, of the Parliament, and of the judiciaries of the Member 
States, will transfer power over the criminal law from the 
Member States to the central authorities, and thereby help to 
establish those central authorities as the primary State. This is 
not a tidying-up exercise. To transfer power over the criminal 
law is, on the contrary, one of the most fundamental things that 
could happen to this country's constitution. It is bad enough that 
such a thing should be put forward by a Prime Minister of this 
country. It is unspeakable that he should suggest it is something 
about which it is not necessary to vote in a referendum and for 
which it is not necessary to obtain the full-hearted consent of 
the British people.” (Letwin, 2003) 
 
 
Lewis, Julian 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  x  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Personal Statement:  “In other words, the introduction of the euro and the destruction 
of separate national currencies, is an economic means towards a 
political end. The euro is a Trojan Horse designed to penetrate 
the defences of democratic states and to trick them into 
combining their economies and, inevitably, their countries.” 
(Lewis, 6/4/1999)  
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Liddell-Grainger, Ian 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Lidington, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Lilley, Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
 
 
Lloyd, Sir Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
 
Lord, Sir Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - - - 0 
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Loughton, Timothy 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 524 ‘President of the European Commission’ 
(13/4/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Luff, Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - -  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Public Statement:  “Membership of the single currency and the inability to set 
interest rates in our own interest would hit jobs and incomes. 
To safeguard people’s living standards, we need to keep control 
of our economic policy – setting the interest rates that are right 
for us. Throwing that flexibility away would undermine 
economic stability, putting jobs at risk.” (Luff, 28/5/2003) 
 
 
Lyell, Sir Nicholas 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - - - 0 
 
 
John Macgregor 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
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MacKay, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
MacLean, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Madel, Sir David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
 
Malins, Humfrey 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
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Major, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
Public Statement:  “I would certainly vote no to abolishing sterling, and entering 
into the euro. We need to be cautious and take an economic 
judgement in our British interests when we have the 
information to take it, and we don't yet.” (Anon., 14/3/1999) 
 
 
Maples, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: New Europe 
 
Personal Statement:  “It is clear that the process of change is accelerating. From 
1956 until the Single European Act in 1985, the treaty of Rome 
remained substantially unamended. However, there were only 
seven years between the Single European Act and Maastricht, 
five years between Maastricht and Amsterdam and three years 
between Amsterdam and Nice. It appears that there will be 
three to four years between Nice and the constitution. For 39 
years there was almost no change to an economic community, 
yet in a few short years we have advanced substantially towards 
a united states of Europe. The direction is clear.” (Maples, 
12/11/2003)  
 
 
Mates, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
273
Maude, Francis 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: European Research Group 
 
Public Statement:  “Perhaps the biggest threat to Britain’s ability to prosper in the 
new economy is the defeatist dogma that we are lost unless we 
scrap the pound.” (Maude, 6/10/1999) 
 
 
Mawhinney, Brian 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for opposition amendment to Debate on the Address: 
The Economy and European Affairs 
 
 
May, Theresa 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
McIntosh, Anne 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
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McLoughlin, Patrick 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Mercer, Patrick 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Merchant, Piers 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
         
 
Resigned shortly after the 1997 election, used data from Heppell, 2002  
 
 
Mitchell, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “I am a wholehearted supporter of William Hague's line to 
oppose our joining the Eurozone for this and for the next 
parliament and to resist any further integration with the 
European Union.  I am opposed on both political and economic 
grounds to joining the Euro and do not believe either the 
Conservative Party or the British public in a referendum would 
support the abolition of the £.” (Mitchell, 31/3/2000)  
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Moss, Malcolm 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Murrison, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Patrick Nicholls 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
Personal Statement:  “As far as the single currency is concerned I shall say what I 
said last time which is that I personally wouldn't vote to go into 
a single currency in any circumstances whatsoever.” (Nicholls 
11/3/2001) 
 
 
Norman, Archie 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
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O'Brien, Stephen 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Osborne, George 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: New Europe 
 
 
Ottaway, Richard 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Page, Richard 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
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Paice, James 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - -  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
 
Public Statement:  “However under Labour's plans, our Armed Forces face 
marching under the EU banner and a foreign language, as well 
as the prospect of pledging allegiance to an EU bureaucrat 
instead of the Queen. We want to be in Europe, but not run by 
Europe and we do not want to risk British lives in doing so.” 
(Paice, 15/11/2000) 
 
 
Paterson, Owen 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 188 ‘EU Commission’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE)            
Member: Conservative Way Forward 
            Member: No Turning Back Group 
 
 
Pickles, Eric 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
278
Portillo, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - -  X 1 
 
Public Statement:  “I fear that there are those building the European state who 
hope also that it can offer an alternative economic model to the 
Anglo-Saxon world. There is much talk of social Europe. It is a 
code for maintaining much higher levels of public spending and 
a much bigger role for the state than has become the norm in 
today’s world. European governments tend to be much more 
statist and corporatist, and they feel unable to adjust to a 
competitive world which tends to place more emphasis on the 
encouragement of enterprise and a reduced role for government 
in the economy. They cherish the hope of building a Europe big 
enough to resist the competitive pressures of the outside 
world.” (Portillo, 2/5/1998) 
 
 
David Prior 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Prisk, Mark 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Randall, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
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Redwood, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “The proposed Nice Treaty would do what Guy Fawkes failed 
to do - blow up parliamentary government in Britain. 
Conservatives must pledge to oppose it lock, stock and barrel, 
and renegotiate it if Labour signs. (Redwood, 2003) 
 
 
Robathan, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: European Research Group 
 
 
Robertson, Hugh 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
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Robertson, Laurence 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Roe, Marion 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
  
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
 
 
 
281
Rosindell, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 1733 ‘Euro Referendum Bill’ (14/10/2003) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: Conservative Way Forward 
 
Public Statement:  “Europe is going in entirely the wrong direction and I think it is 
time for Britain to get off this train, which is hurtling into the 
buffers. We want to have a sensible relationship with Europe 
that benefits us. We don’t want to withdraw from trade, of 
course not, that benefits us, we don’t want to withdraw from 
co-operating with neighbouring countries because that is 
sensible to do. But we do want to ensure that we control our 
own destiny and the European Union is removing, and 
ultimately will remove, the power of the British people to 
decide our own future. That’s why we simply have to draw a 
line and say no further and reverse so much of what’s 
happened.” (Rosindell, 2003) 
 
 
Andrew Rowe 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities Amendment 
Bill 1997 (2 / 12 / 1997) 
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Ruffley, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - -  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
  
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Public Statement:  “The Constitution gives more power to all the existing EU 
institutions and creates a Europe with more jobs for politicians 
and less influence for the people. The Constitution concentrates 
more executive and budgetary power in the very EU institutions 
which have been the subject of repeated and continuing 
scandals over mismanagement, waste and fraud.” (Ruffley, 
3/12/2003) 
 
 
Nick St. Aubyn 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
 
Sayeed, Jonathan 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
  
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
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Selous, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
Shephard, Gillian 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- -  X - - - - 1 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Shepherd, Richard 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
  
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFÉ) 
 
 
Simmonds, Mark 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
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Simpson, Keith 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- -  X - - - - 1 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
 
 
Soames, Nicholas 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
  
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: New Europe 
 
 
Spelman, Caroline 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - X - - - 1 
 
Group Membership:  Member: Conservative Mainstream 
 
 
Spicer, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
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Spink, Robert 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 1355 ‘Euro Poll’ (9/6/2003) 
 
 
Spring, Richard 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “We want a stronger role for national parliaments in the 
European Union, including a right to halt, not merely warn 
against, European legislation that breaches subsidiarity. We 
would enhance the powers of national parliaments to initiate 
actions to be undertaken by the European Commission. 
Similarly, if one third of the national parliaments objected to a 
Commission proposal, this must amount to an absolute veto.” 
(Spring, 10/5/2003) 
  
 
Stanley, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
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Steen, Anthony 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: New Europe All Party Parliamentary Group 
 
 
Streeter, Gary 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “I worry that the European policy wonks are getting more and 
more out of step with the ordinary people they are supposed to 
serve. They dream of a country called Europe, a power to rival 
that of the USA. As the world’s fourth largest economy, with 
all of our heritage and global connections and influence, we can 
surely aspire to a greater destiny than to become a suburb of 
Brussels.” (Streeter, 2003)  
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Swayne, Desmond 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “Our laws will be made elsewhere and our parliament will only 
be able to take decisions in those areas where the Union has 
chosen not to legislate (which is euro-speak for virtually nil). 
The most important decisions affecting our prosperity and 
almost every aspect of life will be taken out of our hands. We 
will not be able to prevent the imposition of new regulations no 
matter how damaging they might be to us. The notion that we 
would remain a self governing democracy under this new 
constitution is utterly fanciful.” (Swayne, 27/8/2003) 
 
 
Swire, Hugo 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - -  X 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM: Signed EDM 1508 ‘Bruges Pamphlet and EU Spending’ 
(26/6/2002) 
 
Public Statement:  “Conservatives want to see a Europe that is made up of self-
governing nation states which are free trading. Yes, we support 
enlargement but the British people should also be given a 
referendum on the crucial question of a European Constitution. 
Conservatives want to keep the pound and keep control of our 
own economy unlike Labour and the Liberals. We also need to 
strengthen NATO, not create a Euro Army.” (Swire, 
16/10/2003)  
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Syms, Robert 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 188 ‘EU Commission’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Tapsell, Sir Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List:  Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “A single European currency was first proposed by the Nazi 
Reichsbank to Hitler at the time of Dunkirk as a means of 
perpetuating German dominance in Europe. Now it is EU 
policy.” (Jones, 23 / 5 / 2001) 
 
 
Taylor, Ian 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - X  X  -2 
 
Group Membership:  Chairman: European Movement 
 
Public Statement:  “Eurosceptic politicians calling for a referendum even before 
the IGC has pronounced and regardless of the outcome of 
parliamentary scrutiny are unprincipled populists. Their 
judgement is soured by a euroscepticism which blinds them to 
the need to build an effective, cohesive and larger EU to look 
after the interests of British and other citizens.” (Taylor, 2003) 
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Taylor, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Taylor, Teddy 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X  X 4 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Public Statement:  “The vital thing now is to do all in our power to prevent the 
final surrender of our sovereignty, and this means uniting to 
oppose it. We must warn the people not only that the euro 
means a massive surrender of sovereignty but also participation 
in an exercise that seems doomed.” (Taylor, 9/6/1999) 
 
 
Temple-Morris, Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
         
 
Defected to Labour 1998, used data from Heppell, 2002 
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John Townend 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- -  X  X - - 2 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Council Member: Conservative Way Forward 
 
 
Tredinnick, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Trend, Michael 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - -  X - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice President: Conservatives against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Turner, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - -  X 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Public Statement:  “This Constitution moves the EU still further from being a 
partnership of sovereign nations to a Single European State, but 
I know that Islanders of all political parties and of none will 
agree with us that on this issue, which so gravely affects British 
sovereignty, the British people must be allowed the final say.” 
(Turner, 2003) 
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Tyrie, Andrew 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Viggers, Peter 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Walter, Robert 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - X  - - 0 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: Tory Europe Network 
 
 
Wardle, Charles 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Joined UKIP, 2001 
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Waterson, Nigel 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM: Signed EDM 358 ‘Performance of the Euro (No. 3) 
(11/12/2002) 
 
 
Watkinson, Angela 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:  Signed EDM 1847 ‘Future of the UK Fishing Industry’ 
(4/11/2002) 
 
 
Wells, Bowen 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X - - - - 2 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
EDM:   Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
 
Whitney, Sir Ray 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - X  - - 0 
 
Division List:  Voted for Amendment 65 of the European Communities 
Amendment Bill 1997 (2/12/1997) 
 
Group Membership:  Chairman Positive European Group 
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Whittingdale, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Widdecombe, Ann 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Wiggin, Bill 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Wilkinson, John 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
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Willetts, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - - - - - 1 
 
Division List:  Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
 
Wilshire, David 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- -  X  X - - 2 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
Winterton, Ann 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
 
 
Winterton, Nicholas 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X  X  X - - 3 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
EDM:    Signed EDM 185 ‘White Paper on Europe’ (14/1/1999) 
 
Group Membership:  Vice-President: Conservatives Against a Federal Europe 
(CAFE) 
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Woodward, Shaun 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
         
 
Defected to Labour 1999, excluded from this study 
 
 
Yeo, Timothy 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
- - - - - - - - 0 
 
 
Young, George 
Division List EDM Group Membership Public Statement Score
Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic Europhile Eurosceptic  
 X - - X  - - 0 
 
Division List: Voted against the European Communities Amendment Bill 
(17/10/2001) 
 
Group Membership:  Member: Tory Reform Group 
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Early Day Motions 
 
EDM 1847  FUTURE OF THE UK FISHING INDUSTRY  04.11.02 
 
That this House notes the despair with which recent plans to close cod fishing grounds 
have been received in North Sea fishing communities, and particularly in Scotland, 
where 20,000 jobs are now at risk; calls on the Government to make clear how it 
intends to respond to the Commission's proposals; and believes that this vital industry 
will only flourish again when national control of United Kingdom waters is restored 
and when fishermen and local communities have a genuine role in managing fish 
stocks. 
 
 
EDM 185   WHITE PAPER ON EUROPE   14.01.99 
That this House calls on Her Majesty's Government to publish a White Paper on the 
constitutional, economic and political implications of the United Kingdom joining the 
European single currency. 
 
 
EDM 1355     EURO POLL    09.06.03 
 
That this House notes that a Sky News poll on Monday 9th June revealed that 81 per 
cent. believe that the UK should never join the euro; welcomes this view; and calls on 
the Government to accept this result and rule out the euro in the foreseeable future. 
 
 
EDM 524  PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 13.04.99 
That this House calls upon Her Majesty's Government to state its opposition to the 
proposals advanced by Mr Prodi, the nominated President of the European 
Commission, in Strasbourg on Tuesday 13th April for further movement towards a 
single European state without democracy. 
 
 
EDM 188    EU COMMISSION    14.01.99 
 
That this House deplores the failure of Socialist MEPs to support measures to protect 
taxpayers' money from fraud, preferring instead to protect members of the EU 
Commission accused of fraud and nepotism; and applauds the efforts of Conservative 
MEPs to hold certain Commissioners to account on behalf of the taxpayers of Europe. 
 
 
EDM 532  EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMONWEALTH 16.01.03 
 
That this House recalls 14th January when President de Gaulle of France said 'non' to 
British membership of the European Economic Community and his comment that 
Britain would only be ready for membership when it started thinking like a 
continental country and severed its ties with the Commonwealth; forty years on and 
with the experience of British membership for thirty years; notes that whilst trade and 
co-operation between our neighbours on the continent continues to be in our nation's 
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interests, acknowledges that many aspects of membership of today's European Union 
are to the detriment of the United Kingdom such as the Common Agricultural Policy, 
Common Fisheries Policy and the tide of bureaucracy lashing against our shores; calls 
upon her Majesty's Government to strive towards the creation of a new reinvigorated 
relationship between the United Kingdom and continental Europe that does not 
involve misguided political or monetary union and restores Britain's right to govern 
herself, free of interference from Brussels; and further calls for a strengthening of the 
relationship between the Commonwealth of Nations, particularly countries such as 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada that have remained loyal friends to Britain for 
generations. 
 
 
EDM 943    EUROPE DAY 9TH MAY    06.03.02 
 
That this House looks forward to the opportunity for the United Kingdom to celebrate 
Europe Day on 9th May; recognises that 9th May marks the day in 1950 that Robert 
Schuman presented his proposal for the creation of the European Union; notes that the 
European Union has been central to the maintenance of peaceful relations and co-
existence on this continent every since; welcomes the opportunity for the UK to join 
in this annual celebration of the diversity of cultures that exist within Europe; and 
celebrates the UK's membership of the European Union. 
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Division Lists 
The European Communities Amendment Bill (17 / 10/ 2001) 
 A Bill to ratify the Treaty of Nice. 
 
Amendment 65 of the European Communities Amendment Bill 1997 (2 / 12 / 1997) 
Conservative amendment that proposed to remove certain words in article 1 of the 
Amsrterdam Treaty that referred to economic and monetary union and a single 
currency. 
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Appendix D: Evidence of Social and Moral Policy Positions 
 
Ainsworth, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for an amendment to the Local Government Bill (2000) 
that would leave out the repeal of section 28 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
  
 
Amess, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. issues  X  X  X   3 
Gay rights  X  X     2 
Euthanasia  X  X  X  X 4 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Signed EDM 692 ‘Abortion’ (26/1/98) 
   Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
 
Gay rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
   Signed EDM 92 ‘Moral Ethos of the Nation’ (12/12/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
Signed EDM 468 Euthanasia (8/1/2003) 
   Member All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
“To start calling food and fluid as medical treatment is 
absolutely crazy. Unless you eat and drink, no matter what 
brain injury or illness you are suffering from, you can't live” 
(Kallenbach, 18/1/2001) 
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 Ancram, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. issues  X  X    X 3 
Gay rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 334A ‘30th Anniversary of the 1967 Abortion Act 
Amdt. line 1. 
“…I think that anything that makes abortion easier and 
simpler, in the end is harmful to people” (Anon, 7/7/2002) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
    
 
Arbuthnot, James 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231) 
(18/12/2000) 
  
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
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 Atkinson, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X - - 3 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X  X   3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 292 ‘Human Cloning and the Use of Embryonic 
Stem Cells’ (5/2/2001) 
Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
   Signed EDM 468 ‘Euthanasia’ 8/1/2003 
   Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
 
Atkinson, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Adoption and Children Bill (Lansley 
Amendment) (20/5/2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
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 Bacon, Richard 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay  Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
 
Baldry, Tony 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay  Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
    
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
Barker, Greg  
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
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 Baron, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - X - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - X - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Signed EDM 691 ‘Contraceptive Awareness Week’ (6/2/2003) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
Bellingham, Henry 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Signed EDM 457 ‘Cell Nuclear Replacement’ (21/11/2001) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
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 Bercow, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues X  - - X - - - -2 
Gay Rights X X - - X - X  -2 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Vice Chairman: Connect 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
Voted against the Crime and Disorder Bill [Lords] 1998 
(22/6/1998) 
   Vice Chairman: Connect 
“The present law is so blatantly unfair as to raise the question 
why anyone should object in principle to changing it. Yet 
critics do so on a variety of grounds. First, a small minority 
believes that Gayity is intrinsically evil and that gay people 
should have no rights. Every MP receives some venomous mail 
to that effect. Fortunately, most people do not share that view.” 
(Bercow, 2/7/2003) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
   Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
Beresford, Paul 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay  Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
    
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia: Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
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 Blunt, Crispin 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  X  X  - - -3 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia X  X  - - - - -2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Signed EDM 1247 ‘Access to Abortion’ (27/4/1998) 
   Vice Chair All Party Parliamentary Pro-Choice Group 
 
Gay rights: Voted against the Crime and Disorder Bill [Lords] 1998 
(22/6/1998) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
   Signed EDM 96 ‘Euthanasia’ 29/11/2001 
 
 
Body, Richard 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia X  - - - - - - -1 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted for the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
 
 
Boswell, Timothy 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
310
Bottomley, Peter 
  
 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  X X - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X X  X - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 118 ‘Emergency Contraception’ (30/11/1999) 
   Signed EDM 49 ‘Human Cloning’ (6/12/2000) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Signed EDM 1176 ‘Age of Consent’ (23/11/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
 
 
Bottomley, Virginia 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Hunting  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
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 Brady, Graham 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231)’ 
(18/12/2000) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
    
Brazier, Julian 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X - - 3 
Gay Rights  X - -  X - - 2 
Euthanasia  X  X  X - - 3 
 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 334A ‘30th Anniversary of the 1967 Abortion Act 
Amdt. line 1 
Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
President: Conservative Family Campaign 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
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 Brooke, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X - - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 (14/4/2000) 
 
 
Browning, Angela 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay rights: Voted against the Crime and Disorder Bill [Lords] 1998 
(22/6/1998) 
 
 
Burns, Simon 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 578 ‘Embryonic Stem Cells and the New 
Scientist’ (13/12/2001) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill 1997 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
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Bruce, Ian 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 49 ‘Human Cloning’ (6/12/2000) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
 
 
Burt, Alistair 
 Div. List EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - X - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - X - - 2 
Euthanasia - -  X  X - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Signed EDM 395A1 ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority’ Amdt. line 1 
   Council member: Evangelical Alliance 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Council member: Evangelical Alliance 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 468 Euthanasia (8/1/2003) 
   Council member: Evangelical Alliance 
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 Butterfill, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-
2002) 
 
 
Cameron, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Adoption and Children Bill (Lansley 
Amendment) (20/5/2002) 
 
 
Cash, William 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  -  X 3 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Stem Cell Research Bill 1999-2000  
Signed EDM 692 ‘Abortion’ (26/01/1998) 
“The Church’s teaching is very clear on most “big” issues. 
There is a very strong, powerful argument against abortion, for 
example, because it is fundamentally wrong to kill innocent 
children.” (Carosa, 1999)  
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill 10 / 10 / 97 
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Chapman, Sydney 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
   Signed EDM 1273 ‘Euthanasia and the BBC’ (21/5/2003) 
 
 
Chope, Christopher 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
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Clappison, James 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia  X  X - -  X 3 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Stem Cell Research Bill 1999-2000  
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
“Eighteen is far too young a gay age of consent” (Anon, 
1/3/1999) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 832 ‘Statements from the Chief Rabbi and 
Cardinal Winning on Euthanasia’ (14/7/1999) 
“It is a profound issue, but in the past I have not been in favour 
of voluntary euthanasia,” he said, adding: “In the countries 
where it has been introduced, including Holland, it has not been 
strictly regulated.” (Whitney, 16/10/2002) 
 
 
Clark, Alan 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues          
Gay Rights          
Euthanasia          
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 Clark, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - X  -2 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
“I understand that there are moral issues; of course there are. 
However, science has always troubled people; it has always 
upset the establishment and challenged the status quo. When 
Galileo looked beyond the hills and through the clouds, he was 
accused of looking for heaven. When Darwin decided that he 
would explain how we came about, and said that it was not 
through creation but through evolution, he, too, got into trouble 
with the establishment and the Church. I dare say that those two 
were accused in their day of playing God.” (Hansard, 
19/12/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
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 Clarke, Kenneth 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - X - -2 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - -2 
Euthanasia  X - - - -  X 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
“Whilst I would always support alternatives to abortion, thus 
reducing recourse to it, I cannot foresee Parliament supporting 
radical change in abortion law without stronger signs for 
change from society itself.” (Clarke, 2001) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Voted against the Crime and Disorder Bill [Lords] 1998 
(22/6/1998) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
“I have always opposed euthanasia, and will continue to do so.” 
(Clarke, 2001) 
 
 
Clifton-Brown, Geoffrey 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X X - - - - X  -1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
Voted against the Crime and Disorder Bill [Lords] 1998 
(22/6/1998) 
“I think we've got to take a more adult approach on this matter 
and look at the child. I don't think we should exclude same-sex 
couples from adopting.” (Anon., 5/11/2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
319
 Collins, Tim 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 83A1 A Woman’s Right to Choose Amdt. line1 
(11/6/1997) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
 
 
Colvin, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Signed EDM 172 ‘Death of Caroline Bacon and the Provision 
of Contraception to Minors’ 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
 
Conway, Derek 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
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 Cormack, Patrick 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - -  X 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 “To abort is to take a life and I do not, and could not, ever 
support abortion on demand.” (Anon., 2003) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
“I speak, quite unashamedly, for the traditional, orthodox 
Christian point of view, which holds that Gayity and lesbian 
practices are not another and an equivalent normality; and 
which holds that they are practices that not only are different 
from heterosexual behaviour, but should not be ranked as equal 
or equivalent to it.” (Hansard, 22/6/1998) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
 
 
Cran, James 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
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 Curry, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted in favour of Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
 
Davis, Quentin 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted in favour of Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
 
 
Davis, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia X  - - - - - - -1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted in favour of Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted for the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
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Day, Stephan 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Hunting:   Voted for the Hunting Bill (17/1/2001) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
Signed EDM 315 ‘Euthanasia’ (29/7/1997) 
 
 
Djanogly, Jonathan  
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - -   1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted in favour of Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
 
 
Dorrell, Stephen 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X  - - X  X  -3 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
  Vice-President of Connect 
“Section 28 was perceived as dealing with an issue that was 
real, but it deals with it in an unsuccessful way. I certainly do 
not regard it as something we should leave on the statute book.” 
(Dorrell, 2002) 
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Duncan, Alan 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - X 2 
GayRights X  - - - - X  -2 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
“I voted against stem cell research and I would like to thank the 
church goers in my constituency who have written to me 
sending thank-you letters. These new regulations, which come 
in the form of secondary legislation give Ministers extra powers 
and will allow cell cloning as part of scientific and medical 
experimentation. I oppose this method of research.” (Duncan, 
2001) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
In his interview, Mr Duncan said of being gay: “It's how you're 
born, and it's no different from being born Jewish, Catholic, 
short, tall or anything else. Why on earth should the self-esteem 
of perfectly decent people be so permanently derided?” (White, 
2002) 
 
 
Duncan, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
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 Duncan Smith, Iain 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - -  X 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - X 2 
- 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
“Giving contraceptives in schools is a wrong move because it 
undermines parental authority. Decisions are being detached 
from schools and parents and given to central authorities.” 
(Montgomerie, 2002)  
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
“Let's take euthanasia for example. I am opposed to it because 
I'm not sure where you stop.” (Duncan Smith, 2001) 
 
 
Emery, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
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 Evans, Nigel 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia  X - X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 292 ‘Human Cloning and the Use of Embryonic 
Stem Cells’ 5/2/2001 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
   Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
Fabricant, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  X - - - X  -3 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 1099 ‘The European Parliament and Stem Cell 
Research’ (28/4/2003) 
“For myself, I believe that there is also a powerful moral 
imperative to cure suffering. I wonder whether a human being 
exists until at least the cells are differentiated. From all this 
there arises huge dilemmas not only involving stem cell 
research, but abortion too.” (Fabricant, 30/11/2000) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
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Faber, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 334A2 30th Anniversary of the 1967 Abortion Act 
Amdt. line 1 (30/10/1997) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia: Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 (28/1/2000) 
Signed EDM 315 ‘Euthanasia’ (29/7/1997) 
 
 
Fallon, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 237 ‘Select Committee on Human and Other 
Genetic Engineering’ (23/1/2001) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
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 Field, Mark 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Signed EDM 457 ‘Cell Nuclear Replacement’ (21/11/2001) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted in favour of Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
 
Flight, Howard 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive issues:  Voted against the Stem Cell Bill (1999-2000) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against of Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
   Signed EDM 315 ‘Euthanasia’ (29/7/1997) 
 
 
Flook, Adrian 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against of Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 468 Euthanasia (8/1/2003) 
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Forth, Eric 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gayl Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against of Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
 
 
Fowler, Norman 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - -   1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
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 Fox, Liam 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X  X 4 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X  X  X 4 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231) 
(18/12/2000) 
Member All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
“I think the use of embryos for this sort of experimentation is 
not acceptable. Because I find it ethically unacceptable, I would 
be against it for therapeutic cloning.” (Anon. 16/8/2000) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
Member All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
“I have a moral objection to euthanasia which is an act which 
purposely kills somebody. I am afraid that I simply believe that 
you do not have the right to kill another human being.” (Fox, 
29/5/2001) 
 
 
Francois, Mark 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 1522 ‘Euthanasia’(No. 2) (27/6/2002) 
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 Fraser, Cristopher 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
 
 
Gale, Roger 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - -  X 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
“As a supporter of the Parkinson’s Disease Society I recognise 
the importance of research into potential treatments for this and 
other conditions. I have nevertheless come to the conclusion 
that to take a further step down the road towards what is, 
effectively, genetic engineering, at a time when the likely 
consequences for good or ill are a matter of speculation, would 
be wrong. I shall therefore vote against the proposals tonight”. 
(Gale, 19/12/2000) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted against the Medical Treatment (Prevention of 
Euthanasia) Bill 1999-2000 
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 Garnier, Edward 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  X  - - - - -2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X  - - X 3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 1099 ‘The European Parliament and Stem Cell 
Research’ (28/4/2003) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
Signed EDM 1333 ‘Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill and the 
BMA’ (4/6/2003) 
“I welcome the Government's firm stance against euthanasia. 
Will the Minister examine with the greatest possible care any 
proposals, from wherever they come, to legalise euthanasia, 
however clinically described, and to introduce so-called living 
wills? Disposing of the inconvenient, either by commission or 
omission, may be the next step.” (Hansard, 10/12/1997) 
 
 
Gibb, Nick 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
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Gill, Christopher 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 237 ‘Select Committee on Human and Other 
Genetic Engineering’ (23/1/2001) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
Signed EDM 315 ‘Euthanasia’ 29/7/1997 
 
 
Gillan, Cheryl 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - X    0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Hunting  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Choice Group 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
 
Goodlad, Alastair 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Left Parliament 1999 to become High Commissioner to Australia, used evidence from 
Heppell 2002 
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 Goodman, Paul 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Rights: Signed EDM 395A1 ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority’ Amdt. line1 (18/12/2002) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 1522 ‘Euthanasia (No. 2) (27/6/2002) 
 
 
Gorman, Teresa 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  X  - - - - -2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Signed EDM 118 ‘Emergency Contraception’ (30/11/1999) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
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 Gray, James 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 237 ‘Select Committee on Human and Other 
Genetic Engineering’ (23/1/2001) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (1997) 
   Signed EDM 468 Euthanasia (8/1/2003) 
 
 
Grayling, Chris 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 359 ‘Right to Life Human-Rights Care Card’ 
(6/11/2001) 
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 Green, Damien 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - -  X - - 2 
Gay Rights  - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia  X    X  X 3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Member All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Member All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
“They present a case giving no real choice and instead give the 
impression that cancer sufferers die in agony or choose 
euthanasia; or that motor neurone disease patients will die in 
unrelieved pain by choking and suffocating unless they choose 
euthanasia.” (Anon., 12/12/2002)  
 
 
Greenway, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 172 ‘Death of Caroline Bacon and the Provision 
of Contraception to Minors’ (13/1/1999) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
336
 
Grieve, Dominic 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 292 ‘Human Cloning and the Use of Embryonic 
Stem Cells’ 5/2/ 2001 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
 
 
Gummer, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 468 ‘Euthanasia’ (8/1/2003) 
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 Hague, William 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - -  X 3 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia  X - - - -  X 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231) 
(18/12/2000) 
“As an MP I have always voted for more restrictive abortion 
law. I admire and respect the way in which organisations like 
Life, SPUC and Care offer support to women who are facing up 
to the difficulties associated with unexpected pregnancy.” 
(Montgomerie, 2001) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
“The truth is that section 28 allows appropriate action by 
schools and councils to educate children.” (Anon, 26/1/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
“On the euthanasia issue I think we need to watch this one very 
carefully over the next few years. There are many people who 
are trying to introduce euthanasia by the back door. I am glad to 
see my Conservative colleague, Ann Winterton MP, trying to 
stop that with a private member's bill.”  (Montgomerie, 2001) 
 
 
Hamilton, Archie 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Hunting  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
338
 Hammond, Philip 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231) 
(18/12/2000)  
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 1522 ‘Euthanasia (No. 2) (27/6/2002) 
 
 
Haselhurst, Alan 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues          
Gay Rights          
Euthanasia          
 
Deputy speaker, used evidence from Heppell 2002 
 
 
Hawkins, Nicholas 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
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 Hayes, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 1247A2 ‘Access to Abortion Amdt. line 1’ 
(29/4/1998) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
 
 
Heald, Oliver 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
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 Heath, Edward 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) (22/6/1998) 
 
 
Heathcoat-Amory, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
Hendry, Charles 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X X - - X - X  -2 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-2003 
Vice President: Connect 
“Whatever anyone’s view about Gayity (sic), every decent person 
should agree that no young person should be bullied or tormented at 
school because of their sexual orientation.” (Hendry, 25/7/2003) 
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 Heseltine, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
 
 
Hoban, Mark 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Signed EDM 1522 ‘Euthanasia (No. 2) (27/6/2002) 
 
 
Hogg, Douglas 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
“I am very reluctant to see this House to do anything which 
might encourage to adopt a Gay way of life which they would 
not otherwise have done.” (Anon., 1/3/1999) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
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Horam, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 809 ‘Sex Education in the Netherlands’ 
(4/3/2003) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 468 Euthanasia (8/1/2003) 
 
 
Howard, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
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Howarth, Gerald 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X  X - -  X 3 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 49 ‘Human Cloning’ (6/12/2000) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
Signed EDM 1176 ‘Age of Consent’ (23/11/2000) 
“The purpose was that Gayity (sic) could not be promoted as a 
pretended family relationship and that is a very precise 
definition and if you believe in the pre-eminence of marriage 
then the two follow hand in hand. The pre-eminence of 
marriage, Section 28.” (Howarth, 3/2/2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 315 ‘Euthanasia’ 29/7/1997 
 
 
Hunter, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 692 ‘Abortion’ (26/01/1998) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 359 ‘Right to Life Human-Rights Care Card’ 
(6/11/2001) 
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Jack, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
Jackson, Robert 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep Issues X   X - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X X X - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 1247a ‘Access to Abortion Amdt. line 1’ 
(29/4/1998) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
  Signed EDM 301 ‘Eviction of Gay Tenants’ (24/7/1997) 
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 Jenkin, Bernard 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - -   -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
Johnson, Boris 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-2003 
 
 
Johnson-Smith, Geoffrey 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/12/1997) 
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
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 Key, Robert 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  X    X  -3 
Gay Rights X  - - - - X  -2 
Euthanasia  X - X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 378 ‘UNFPA’s State of the World Population 
Report 2002’ (16/12/2002) 
“I believe the benefits that may be achieved in healing the sick 
in this case outweigh the downside of using cells which might 
have the potential for a full human life.” (Key, 7/11/2000) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
“One of the first things that we had to learn was that it is no 
good being judgmental about AIDS and adopting a high moral 
tone. It is no good blaming everything on lifestyle choices, as 
some hon. Members did in the 1980s. One hon. Member said to 
me: "A plague on them; they made a choice; let them die." That 
was in line with wide public perceptions at the time, and it is 
fortunate that things have moved on.” (Key, 5/3/2003) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
King, Tom 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
347
Kirkbride, Julie 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Knight, Greg 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-2003 
 
 
Laing, Eleanor 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - X - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
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 Lait, Jaqui 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - X  - - -2 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia  X - X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Member: All Party Pro-Choice Group 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
Lansley, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X X - - - - X  -1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
“Respect means not being colour-blind, but aware and active in 
designing services and policies in response to cultural 
differences, faith communities and lifestyle choices. It means 
stopping the gratuitous offence of treating gay couples as if 
theirs is a ‘pretended’ family relationship.” (Lansley, 
9/10/2001) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
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Leigh, Edward 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X  X 4 
Gay Rights  X  X - - - - 2 
Euthanasia  X  X  X - - 3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
  Signed EDM 92 ‘Moral Ethos of the Nation’ (12/12/2000) 
  Member: All-Party Pro-Life Group 
“I, and many others, believe that the use of early embryonic 
tissue--or unborn children, for that is what they are--purely for 
their cells is morally and ethically repugnant.” (Hansard, 
31/10/2000) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
Signed EDM 92 ‘Moral Ethos of the Nation’ (12/12/00) 
“The reason I have put down an amendment to retain Section 
28 is that I believe it is right and it represents the views of a 
majority of the British people” (Anon., 11/3/2003) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 1333 ‘Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill and the 
BMA’ (4/6/2003) 
Member: All-Party Pro-Life Group 
 
 
Letwin, Oliver 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
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 Lewis, Julian 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Reproductive 
Issues 
 X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X  X - -  X 3 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 237 ‘Select committee on Human and Other 
Genetic Engineering’ (23/1/2001) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
Signed EDM 1176 ‘Age of Consent’ (23/11/2000) 
“As I said in the debate on Second Reading, it is a mark of a 
civilised society that it raises ages of consent as it gets more 
civilised. The fact that the age of consent for heterosexual sex 
is lower than the age of consent for Gay sex is not a sign that 
the higher age should be adjusted to the lower age” (Lewis, 
10/2/1999) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 832 ‘Statements from the Chief Rabbi and 
Cardinal Winning on Euthanasia’ (14/7/1999) 
 
 
Liddell-Grainger, Ian 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
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Liddington, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - X - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - X - - 3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
  Director: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 359 ‘Right to Life Human-Rights Care Card’ 
(6/11/2001) 
Director: Conservative Christian Fellowship  
 
 
Lilley, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - -  X 3 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 237 ‘Select committee on Human and Other 
Genetic Engineering’ (23/1/01) 
“It is horrifying that children who are viable in the womb are 
now being murdered.” (Senior, 1997) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
  Signed EDM 468 ‘Euthanasia’ (8/1/2003) 
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 Lloyd, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X  - - - - X  -2 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) (22/6/1998) 
“The age of consent properly seeks to protect children before 
they reach an age where they themselves can choose to be 
sexually active. Both sexes are now reaching that point earlier, 
largely because of earlier physical maturation. It makes no 
sense at all to extend that age of consent far beyond the point 
where many have, rightly or wrongly, started to engage in 
sexual relationships of their own volition--the majority 
heterosexual, the minority homosexual.” (Hansard, 22/6/1998) 
 
 
Michael Lord 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - - 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - -  
Euthanasia - - - - - - - -  
 
Appointed Deputy Speaker 1997, used evidence from Heppell, 2002 
 
 
Loughton, Timothy 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
“Too many people interested in this part of the Bill are in 
danger of putting the interest of adults ahead of the children.” 
(Anon 17/5/2003) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
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Luff, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 1247A2 ‘Access to Abortion Amdt. line 1’ 
(29/4/1998) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 468 ‘Euthanasia’ (8/1/2003) 
 
 
Lyell, Nicholas 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Euthanasia: Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 (28/1/2000) 
 
 
Mackay, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  X  - - - - -2 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 378 ‘UNFPA’s State of the World Population 
Report 2002’ (16/12/2002) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
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 MacGregor, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
 
 
MacLean, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
Madel, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
(22/6/1998) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/12/97) 
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Major, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
 
Malins, Humfrey 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 809 ‘Sex Education in the Netherlands’ 
(4/3/2003) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
 
 
Maples, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
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 Mates, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X   X - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 83A1 A Woman’s right to Choose Amdt. line1 
(11/6/1997) 
 
Gay Rights:       Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
                                                                                                                      
Maude, Francis 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights X X - - X  X  -2 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
Chairman: Cchange 
“It always seemed to me a bit pointless to disapprove of Gayity 
(sic). It's like disapproving of rain.” (Anon, 15/11/1998) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
 
 
357
 Mawhinney, Brian 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 292 ‘Human Cloning and the Use of Embryonic 
Stem Cells’ (5/2/2001) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
May, Theresa 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - X  - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
358
 McIntosh, Anne 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
McLoughlin, Patrick 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
Mercer, Patrick 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
359
 Merchant, Piers 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues          
Gay Rights          
Euthanasia          
 
Resigned shortly after 1997 election, used evidence from Heppell, 2002 
 
 
Mitchell, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - - 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
 
Moss, Malcolm 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
Murrison, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
 
 
360
 Nicholls, Patrick 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000  
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/12/97) 
 
 
Norman, Archie 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X  - - X  - - -2 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
   Board member: Cchange 
 
 
O’Brien, Stephan 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
361
Osbourne, George 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
Ottaway, Richard 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  X - - - - - -2 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Signed EDM 1531 ‘World Population Day’ (7/7/2003) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
 
Page, Richard 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
362
 Paice, James 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
Paterson, Owen 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
 
Pickles, Eric 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
363
 Portillo, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X  - - - - X  -2 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
We are for people whatever their sexual orientation. The 
Conservative Party isn't merely a party of tolerance: it's a party 
willing to accord every one of our citizens respect. Why should 
people respect us if we withhold respect from them? (Portillo, 
2000) 
 
 
Prior, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X   X - - - - 0 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 172 ‘The Death of Caroline Bacon and the 
Provision of Contraceptives to Minors’ (13/1/1999) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted for the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000  
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/12/97) 
Signed EDM 832 ‘Statement from the Chief Rabbi and 
Cardinal Winning on Euthanasia’ (14/7/1999) 
 
 
Prisk, Mark 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - - 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - - 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
364
 Randall, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
  
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97)  
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002 
 
 
Redwood, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
“…a commonsense approach which prevents the abuse of 
taxpayers' money and provides parents with guarantees they 
want on what is and is not taught in the classroom.” (Anon., 
25/1/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
365
 Robathan, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97)  
 
 
Robertson, Hugh  
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep Issues - - - - - - - - - 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
366
 Robertson, Laurence 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X   X - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X  X - -  X 3 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 172 ‘Death of Caroline Bacon and the Provision 
of Contraception to Minors’ (13/1/1999) 
  
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
Signed EDM 1196 ‘Age of Consent’ 23/11/2000 
“I don't think Gays are ever going to be accepted as completely 
the same. I don't necessarily think they should be. It isn't a 
normal situation. It's not a normal act.” (Anon. 4/7/2003) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 468 ‘Euthanasia’ (8/1/2003) 
 
 
Roe, Marion 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 395A1 ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority’ Amdt. line 1 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 1333 ‘Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill and the 
BMA’ (4/6/2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
367
 Rosindell, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - X - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - X - - 2 
Euthanasia - -  X  X - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Signed EDM 395A1 ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority’ Amdt. line 1 
Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 1273 ‘Euthanasia and the BBC’ (21/5/2003) 
Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
 
Ruffley, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - - 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - - 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
 
Rowe, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
368
 St. Aubyn, Nick 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 83A1 ‘A Woman’s Right to Choose’ Amdt. Line 
1 (11/07/1997) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/12/1997) 
 
 
Sayeed, Jonathan 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
369
 Selous, Andrew  
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X  X - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - -  X - - 2 
Euthanasia - -  X  X - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Signed EDM 809 ‘Sex education in the Netherlands’ (4/3/2003) 
   Director: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Gay Rights: Teller for those who voted against Amendment 8 of the Local 
Government Bill 2002-2003 
Director: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 1333 ‘Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill and the 
BMA’ (4/6/2003) 
Director: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
 
Shephard, Gillian 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
 
 
 
 
370
 Shepherd, Richard 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Signed EDM 237 ‘Select committee on Human and Other 
Genetic Engineering’ (23/1/2001) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
 
 
Simmonds, Mark 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
 
Simpson, Keith 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Signed EDM 809 ‘Sex education in the Netherlands’ (4/3/2003) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
371
Soames, Nicholas 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
 
 
Spelman, Caroline 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X - - 3 
Gay Rights  X - -  X - - 2 
Euthanasia  X - -  X - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231) 
(18/12/2000) 
Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
372
Spicer, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
 
 
Spink, Robert 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Signed EDM 809 ‘Sex education in the Netherlands’ (4/3/2003) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 468 ‘Euthanasia’ (8/1/2003) 
 
 
Richard Spring 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights X  - - - - - - -1 
Euthanasia  X - - - -   1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
 
 
 
 
373
Stanley, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X   X - - - - 0 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231) 
(18/12/2000) 
 
 
Steen, Anthony 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights - - - - - - X  -1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 292 ‘Human Cloning and the Use of Embryonic 
Stem Cells’ (5/2/2001) 
 
Gay Rights: “Whilst I have reservations on Gay couples adopting children, I 
am advised on overwhelming evidence that children are better 
off adopted by loving couples, whether married or unmarried, 
than they would be living alone in a public institution.” (Watt, 
5/11/2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
374
Streeter, Gary 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - -  X - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - -  X - - 2 
Euthanasia  X  X  X - - 3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Director: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Director: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
Signed EDM 468 ‘Euthanasia’ (8/1/2003) 
Director: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
375
Swayne, Desmond 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X - - 3 
Gay Rights  X - -  X  X 3 
Euthanasia  X  X  X  X 4 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 395A1 ‘Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority’ Amdt. line 1 
   Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship  
“…the bill…will serve to entrap a small number of young men 
in a lifestyle that is gross and unnatural, and who might 
otherwise have led a life that was not blighted in that way” 
(Anon, 1/3/1999) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
Signed EDM 832 ‘Statements from the Chief Rabbi and 
Cardinal Winning on Euthanasia’ 
Member: Conservative Christian Fellowship 
One of the tragedies in the present fight is caused by some of 
those supporting euthanasia who feed on fear.  They claim that 
all they want is the ‘choice’ to enable people to die how and 
when they please.  Yet they present a case giving no real choice 
– and, instead, give the impression that either cancer sufferers 
die in agony … or choose euthanasia.” (Swayne, 2003) 
 
 
Swire, Hugo 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
 
 
 
376
 Syms, Robert 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
 
 
Tapsell, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/97)  
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 Taylor, Ian 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - X  -2 
Gay Rights X X - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
“The House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research, 
after thoroughly examining the issues in more detail, has 
reached a positive conclusion. These advances have been 
widely welcomed by those of us who champion the proper use 
of science for medical advancement. Stem cell and cell nuclear 
replacement (CNR) research could result in new treatments for 
degenerative diseases such as Parkinson's disease, as well as 
Aids and diabetes.” (Taylor 25/3/2002) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
 
 
Taylor, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231) 
(18/12/2000) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
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Taylor, Teddy 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 292 ‘Human Cloning and the Use of Embryonic 
Stem Cells’ (5/2/2001) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
Signed EDM 468 Euthanasia (8/1/2003) 
 
 
Temple-Morris, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues          
Gay Rights          
Euthanasia          
 
Resigned from the Conservative Party in 1998, used evidence from Heppell, 2002 
 
 
Townend, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia X  - - - - - - -1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted for the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/12/1997) 
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 Treddinick, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
 
Trend, Michael 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 49 ‘Human Cloning’ (6/12/2000) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
 
 
Turner, Andrew  
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-2003 
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 Tyrie, Andrew 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 
2000 
 
 
Viggers, Peter 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Hunting  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
“The Bill is always described as “reducing the age of consent”, 
which sounds perfectly acceptable, but has it occurred to my 
hon. Friend that, if the description were to go on to list the acts 
in question, that would put a different complexion on the 
matter?” (Hansard, 25/1/1999) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997)  
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
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 Walter, Robert 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
“I regard this as a simple matter of child protection. There is no 
concept of equality with natural sexual practices. This law will 
be a charter for child molesters and I totally oppose it.” (Walter, 
29/2/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997) 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
  
 
Wardle, Charles 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 120 ‘Medicines’ (S.I., 2000, No. 3231) 
(18/12/2000) 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/12/1997) 
Signed EDM 693 ‘Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission’ 
(8/5/2000) 
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 Waterson, Nigel 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia  X  X - -  X 3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
“The government’s obsession with Section 28 illustrates how 
Labour's liberal elite are out of touch with the mainstream 
views of everyday people across Britain.” (Anon. 25/9/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997) 
Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
“Surely the answer to euthanasia for a compassionate and 
civilised society rests with the development of our hospice 
movement, which is the finest in the world and which gives 
patients a real dignity when dying.” (Anon. 2/1/2003) 
 
 
Watkinson, Angela 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X  X - - 2 
Gay Rights  X - -  X - - 2 
Euthanasia - -  X  X - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Signed EDM 900 ‘Regulation of Fertility Clinics’ 
Member: Conservative Christian Federation 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
Member: Conservative Christian Federation 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 1333 ‘Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill and the 
BMA’ (4/6/2003) 
Member: Conservative Christian Federation 
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 Wells, Bowen 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X - - - - 2 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 237 ‘Select committee on Human and Other 
Genetic Engineering’ (23/1/2001) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/12/1997) 
 
 
Whitney, Ray 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights - - - - - - - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Signed EDM 1247A2 ‘Access to Abortion’ Amdt. Line 1  
(29/4/1998) 
 
 
Whittingdale, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X - - - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia  X - - - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997) 
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 Widdecombe, Ann 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X - - 3 
Gay Rights  X      X 2 
Euthanasia  X  X  X  X 3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Signed EDM 692 ‘Abortion’ (26/01/1998)  
   Patron of Life (Pro-life group) 
 
Gay Rights:   Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
‘I believe Gayity to be wrong but I do not pronounce 
judgements on individuals. I do however believe it to be 
wrong…I cannot say that I find it a particularly attractive 
subject to speculate on at all. (Gledhill, 1999) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997) 
Signed EDM 468 Euthanasia (8/1/2003) 
   Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
“The issue here is not whether one thinks it a good or bad thing 
that these have been the effects of those laws; rather the issue is 
that quite undeniably the effects were not foreseen. For that 
reason l believe that if we were to legalise voluntary euthanasia 
then, no matter how tightly the law was framed, in ten years 
time no Granny would be safe. If I am right then the State has 
an appropriate role in this sphere also.” (Widdecombe, 1999) 
 
 
Wiggin, Bill 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - -  X - - - - 1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues: Signed EDM 457 ‘Cell Nuclear Replacement’ (21/11/2001) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 359 ‘Right to Life Human-Rights Care Card’ (6/11/2001) 
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Wilkinson, John 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X   X - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X  X - - - - 2 
Euthanasia  X  X - - - - 2 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 83A1 A Woman’s right to Choose Amdt. line1 
(11/6/1997) 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
Signed EDM 1176 ‘Age of Consent’ (23/11/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
Signed EDM 832 ‘Statements from the Chief Rabbi and 
Cardinal Winning on Euthanasia’ (14/7/1999) 
 
 
Willetts, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues - - - - - - - - 0 
Gay Rights  X - - X  - - 0 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Gay Rights:  Voted against the Adoption and Children Bill (2001-2002) 
Board Member: Cchange 
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Wilshire, David 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia - -  X - - - - 1 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
“I believe that section 28 has worked, because the things that 
were happening stopped. If local government has no wish to 
promote or to attempt promote Gayity, what is the fuss all 
about?” (Hansard, 10/3/2003) 
 
Euthanasia:  Signed EDM 3 ‘Hospices’ (13/11/2002) 
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 Winterton, Ann 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X   3 
Gay Rights  X  X     2 
Euthanasia  X  X  X  X 4 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
   Signed EDM 692 ‘Abortion’ (26/01/1998) 
Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
 
Gay rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
Signed EDM 92 ‘Moral Ethos of the Nation’ (12/12/2000) 
 
Euthanasia:  Voted for the Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) 
Bill 1999-2000 
   Signed EDM 468 Euthanasia (8/1/2003) 
Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group 
“In any civilised society the elderly, the weak, the sick and the 
vulnerable should be given the protection of law. The 
Government and the BMA must not be allowed to turn a blind 
eye to what is happening in hospitals today. It is imperative that 
all those who have a religious faith do all they can to protect 
human dignity: for those of us in public life that means putting 
these matters before all others. I will continue to pursue this 
matter utilising every available Parliamentary opportunity.”  
(Winterton, A., 2000) 
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 Winterton, Nicholas 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues  X  X  X - - 3 
Gay Rights  X  X - -  X 3 
Euthanasia  X  X  X - - 3 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted against the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
Signed EDM 292 ‘Human Cloning and the Use of Embryonic 
Stem Cells’ (5/2/2001) 
Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group  
 
Gay Rights: Voted against Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 
2002-2003 
Signed EDM 92 ‘Moral Ethos of the Nation’ (12/12/2000) 
“If God had intended men to commit sodomy, their bodies 
would have been built differently” (Hoggart, 26/1/1999) 
 
Euthanasia:   Voted against the Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10/10/1997) 
Signed EDM 1333 ‘Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill and the 
BMA’ (4/6/2003) 
Member: All-Party Parliamentary Pro-Life Group  
 
 
Woodward, Shaun 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues          
Gay Rights          
Euthanasia          
 
Defected to Labour 1999, excluded from study 
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 Yeo, Timothy 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep.  Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights X X - - X  - - -1 
Hunting  X - - - -  X 2 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay Rights: Voted for Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-
2003 
Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
Board Member: Cchange 
 
 
Young, George 
 Division 
List 
EDM Group 
membership 
Public 
statement 
Score 
 SL SC SL SC SL SC SL SC  
Rep. Issues X  - - - - - - -1 
Gay Rights  X - - - - - - 1 
Euthanasia - - - - - - - - 0 
 
Reproductive Issues:  Voted for the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research 
Purposes) Regulations 2000 
 
Gay rights:  Voted against the Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 
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Early Day Motions 
 
EDM 301 (24/7/1997) Eviction of Gay Tenants 
That this House notes with concern the recent decision of the Court of Appeal that a 
gay man who lived with his partner for 20 years and was his full-time carer for 10 
years had no protection from eviction when his partner died, because the law affords 
such protection only to heterosexual couples; notes that the man now faces imminent 
eviction; further notes the Court of Appeal's unanimous call on Parliament to change 
the law to end this discrimination; and calls on the Secretary of State to bring 
legislation before this House to enable it to redress this injustice at an early 
opportunity.  
 
EDM 83A1 (11/6/1997) A Woman’s right to Choose Amdt. Line 1  
leave out from 'House' to end and add 'sympathises with all women experiencing 
difficulties in their pregnancies, whether these be social, economic or emotional and 
makes no criticism of those who have for whatever reason felt it appropriate to seek 
an abortion; nonetheless notes that the Abortion Act does not confer on a woman the 
right to have an abortion, but further notes that since the implementation of that law 
there have been about 4.5 million abortions in the United Kingdom of which over 95 
per cent. have been performed for reasons essentially of social convenience; observes 
that abortion has demonstrably failed to solve the social problems for which it was 
hailed as the panacea and that it has done nothing to liberate women, instead 
providing men with the opportunity to refuse to face the consequences of their 
actions; notes that opinion polls regularly show considerable opposition to social 
abortion and the killing of unborn children, including a Daily Mirror poll on the recent 
case in Scotland, in which 80 per cent. of the respondents felt it wrong for the mother 
concerned to have an abortion; and calls upon Her Majesty's Government to promote 
instead practical alternatives to abortion. 
 
EDM 315 (29/7/1997) Euthanasia  
That this House welcomes the unanimous (9-0) decision by the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America to reject physician assisted suicide; agrees with Chief 
Justice Rehnquist that 'all civilised nations demonstrate their commitment to life' and 
that 'doctor assisted suicide has no place in our nation's traditions, given the country's 
consistent, almost universal and continuing rejection of it'; furthermore notes the 
'overwhelming' rejection of euthanasia by representatives at the British Medical 
Association's annual conference in Edinburgh; and calls on the Government to 
continue with the policy of its predecessor in opposing the efforts of the vociferous 
few who would wish to legalise euthanasia either directly or through legally binding 
advance directives, living wills 
 
EDM 334A2 (30/10/1997) 30th Anniversary of the 1967 Abortion Act Amdt. line 1: 
leave out from 'House' to end and add 'expresses its sadness that in the 30 years since 
the introduction of the Abortion Act 1967 as amended by the Human Fertilisation and 
Embroyology Act 1990 over 4.5 million unborn children have been aborted; notes that 
in a significant percentage of cases psychological or psychiatric disturbances occur in 
women who have had an induced abortion; further notes that from the outset the Act 
has allowed abortion virtually on demand despite opinion poll evidence that the 
majority of the public are opposed to such a policy; and further notes that laws 
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protecting unborn children are no bar to the well being of women and families as can 
be clearly seen in Northern Ireland where maternal mortality and child death rates 
resulting from violence (including terrorist activities) are the lowest of any region in 
the United Kingdom.' 
 
EDM 692 (26/1/1998) Abortion  
That this House notes that after drawing the first place in the Private Members Ballot 
in 1966, the then honourable Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles, now the 
noble Lord Steel, was approached by the then honourable Member for Lincoln, now 
the noble Lord Taverne, on behalf of the then Right honourable Member for 
Birmingham, Stechford, now the noble Lord Jenkins, supported by the then Right 
honourable Member for Coventry East, the late Richard Crossman, and the then Right 
honourable Member for Sowerby, the late Douglas Houghton, afterwards the noble 
Lord Houghton, all members of the Cabinet, to ask if he would introduce a bill to 
liberalise abortion, promising Government support; notes that the Bill would have 
fallen but for the fact that the Government provided extra time to enable it to reach the 
Statute Book; notes that from the outset the legislation has resulted in abortion 
virtually on demand; notes that nonetheless, the present Secretary of State for Health, 
the Right honourable Member for Holborn and St Pancras, has now called for the law 
to be made even more liberal in the first weeks of pregnancy and in particular to allow 
abortion on the signature of one doctor; notes the Government's claim to hold no 
policy on abortion and; therefore, calls on them to take no action to weaken the 
minimal safeguards in the current legislation 
 
EDM 1247A2 (29/4/1998)  Access to Abortion Amdt. Line 1:   
leave out from 'effect' to end and add 'expresses, yet again, serious concern at the 
manner in which abortion virtually on demand is practised under the present law 
contrary to the promises of its sponsors; notes that two successive Gallup polls among 
gynaecologists have shown that about 72 per cent. stated that NHS hospitals in which 
they work or had worked practised abortion on demand thus creating "inequalities" 
through doctors flouting the law; notes that complaints about inequalities in the NHS 
have been persistently used by private abortion clinics to justify the enormous 
numbers of abortions carried out by their doctors practising abortion on demand; 
recalls the motion passed by a recent BMA junior doctors conference condemning the 
harrassment of junior doctors exercising their legal right not to be involved in abortion 
and asking for action to protect them; further notes that as the Social Services Select 
Committee reported in 1991 many young doctors have had their careers in 
gynaecology destroyed as a result of their objections to abortion-particularly on 
demand; and condemns the call for it to be mandatory for all doctors with a 
conscientious objection to abortion to register thus strengthening the legal framework 
for a witch-hunt against those opposed to abortion in principle as well as against those 
doctors who would accept some abortions but, acting responsibly, would object in 
other cases, such as where the operation could cause damage to the physical or mental 
health of their patients.' 
 
EDM 172 (13/1/1999) Death of Caroline Bacon and the Provision of Contraceptives 
to Minors 
That this House expresses its sadness and regret at the tragic death of 16 year old 
Caroline Bacon, who died after 11 months' paralysis following a stroke; notes that her 
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condition arose as a medical complication arising from her taking the contraceptive 
pill for six months from the age of fourteen and a half years; further notes that 
inadequate medical checks were undertaken at the time she was prescribed that oral 
contraception; believes that powerful oral contraceptives should only be prescribed to 
patients after proper counselling, advice upon attendant risks, and following due 
medical investigation; extends its deep sympathy to Mr and Mrs Bacon on the death 
of their daughter; sympathises with their anger and frustration that such contraceptives 
had been prescribed for Caroline without their knowledge; believes that all parents 
have a right to be informed that contraceptives have been prescribed to their children 
aged under 16 years; and invites Her Majesty's Government urgently to review the 
law and the guidelines issued to medical practitioners in this area. 
 
EDM832 (14/7/1999) Statements from Chief Rabbi  and Cardinal winning on 
Euthanasia 
That this House welcomes the individual statements from the Chief Rabbi, Professor 
Jonathan Sacks, and from His Grace Cardinal Thomas Winning of Glasgow, each 
expressing deep regret and concern at the BMA guidelines on withholding and 
withdrawing nutrition and hydration from patients; notes that both these important 
religious leaders view with alarm the fact that such treatment would deliberately end 
the lives of patients and 'represent a shift from a value system in which human life is 
considered sacrosanct to one in which its value is relative and subjective'; applauds 
their call to politicians, regardless of political affiliation, 'to exert their influence to 
curb the disturbing trend towards the legislation of euthanasia'; and in response calls, 
once again, on the Secretary of State immediately to circulate all hospitals and health 
care workers to emphasise that the BMA guidelines contravene the present law and 
should not be adopted. 
 
EDM 118 (30/11/1999) Emergency Contraception  
That this House congratulates the French Government for its latest initiative on 
emergency contraception; recognises that emergency contraception could make a 
significant contribution to the reduction of unwanted pregnancies but that its current 
status as a prescription-only medicine available from general practitioners, family 
planning clinics and some accident and emergency departments prevents women from 
obtaining it easily; notes that the risks associated with emergency contraception are 
extremely small and that experts on contraception have argued that it could be 
provided safely and appropriately by pharmacists without a prescription; is aware that 
the Crown Review of Prescribing, Supply and Administration of Medicines has 
recently examined the use of group protocols which allow appropriate professionals 
other than doctors, such as nurses and pharmacists to supply or administer named 
medicines; and believes that pharmacy prescription of emergency contraception 
should be implemented as soon as possible. 
 
EDM 693 (8/5/2000) Prevention of Euthanasia by Omission 
That this House notes admissions by leading members of the euthanasia lobby such as 
Professor Sheila McLean that the withdrawal of treatment, including food and fluid, 
to end the lives of PVS patients and others who are not dying endorses 'a form of non-
voluntary euthanasia'; regrets that the Department of Health has done nothing to halt 
such practices; observes wide scale newspaper reports that the denial of resuscitation 
and of assisted food and fluid to elderly and some sick patients is spreading 
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alarmingly; notes that this attitude reflects aspects of the BMA guidelines on 
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment which advocate 
extending the withdrawal of treatment, including tube feeding to a wide range of 
patients who are not in PVS; notes that the Deputy Minister for Community Care in 
Scotland has stated that doctors who follow the BMA Guidelines would be open to a 
criminal prosecution; regrets the failure, nonetheless, of the Department of Health to 
make if clear that the BMA Guidelines are not legal guidelines; notes that the 
Department must therefore accept responsibility for the treatment of elderly patients 
in some sectors of the NHS; further notes that throughout the debates on the Medical 
Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) Bill the Department of Health also supported 
misinformed attacks by the BMA to obstruct the Bill; and invites the Government to 
reconsider its position and honour its stated opposition to euthanasia and to ensure the 
Bill is given adequate time to complete all stages. 
 
EDM 1176 (23/11/2000) Age of Consent 
That this House notes that in the Other Place Her Majesty's Government arranged for 
consideration in Committee of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Bill to be taken 
seven months after its second reading; notes that Sir Keith Waterhouse in his report 
into child abuse in North Wales warned Parliament of the risks posed to boys by 
lowering the age of consent; deplores Her Majesty's Government's decision to deny 
this House the opportunity to consider the Amendments approved by the Other Place; 
further deplores Her Majesty's Government's decision to apply the Parliament Acts to 
a bill which has not concluded its consideration in both Houses; and calls on Her 
Majesty's Government to drop its plans to force this measure through Parliament by 
recourse to the Parliament Acts. 
 
EDM 49 (6/12/2000) Human Cloning 
That this House notes the strong polarisation of views both among the people of the 
country and among Right honourable and honourable Members on the important issue 
of human cloning; acknowledges that cloning raises important ethical and scientific 
questions which require the most careful consideration; welcomes as the 
commencement of a process of consideration the debate on these issues on Friday 
17th November; regrets that a majority of Right honourable and honourable Members 
did not have sufficient notice to be able to attend this important debate; believes that 
prudence and wisdom require much more detailed consideration before decisions are 
taken; and invites Her Majesty's Government to pause for further reflection, to 
withdraw the Statutory Instrument they have laid to implement the proposals of the 
Donaldson Report, and to wait before acting until such time as this House and the 
people of this country have had a full opportunity to judge the long-term implications 
of human cloning. 
 
 
EDM 92 (12/12/2000) The Moral Ethos of The Nation  
That this House notes with profound concern the announcement by health ministers 
that they intend to make the abortifacient 'morning after' pill available over the 
counter, thus undermining still further respect for both human life and for the 
institution of marriage; observes with regret that the present Government also opposes 
attempts to amend the law to prevent euthanasia; deeply regrets also its lowering to 16 
years of the age at which buggery is permitted for both boys and girls, and that it 
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remains committed to removing the ban on the promotion of homosexuality in 
schools; observes with sadness its continuing widespread promotion of contraceptives 
to teenagers; further regrets the Government's active support for the creation and use 
of human clones for scientific research; denounces this systematic assault upon the 
dignity of human life, the institution of marriage, and the traditional moral ethos of 
our nation; and calls upon the Jewish, Christian, Muslim and other faith communities 
of the United Kingdom to speak now before all in which they believe is destroyed. 
 
EDM 120 (18/12/2000) Medicines (S.I., 2000, No. 3231)   
That the Prescription Only Medicines (Human Use) Amendment (No 3) Order 2000, 
dated 8th December, a copy of which was laid before this House on 12th December, 
be annulled. 
 
EDM 237 (23/1/2001) Select Committee on Human and Other Genetic Engineering 
That this House is of the opinion that in view of the ethical, social and political 
implications inherent in the issues of human and other genetic engineering, a Select 
Committee be appointed to examine the issues involved, that the Committee do 
consist of 11 honourable Members, that the Committee be nominated by the 
Committee of Selection, that three be the quorum of the Committee, that the 
Committee have power to send for persons, papers and records, to sit notwithstanding 
any adjournment of the House, to adjourn from place to place within the United 
Kingdom and to report from time to time, and that the Committee have power to 
appoint persons with technical knowledge either to supply information which is not 
readily available or to elucidate matters of complexity within the Committee's order of 
reference. 
 
EDM 292 (5/2/2001) Human Cloning and the Use of Embryonic Stem Cells 
That this House notes repeated assertions by Government Ministers in Both Houses 
that cloning and the use of embryonic stem cells may be allowed 'only if there is no 
other way of doing the research' 19th December 2000, Official Report, Commons, 
c214; regrets the manipulation of disabled people by some scientific bodies claiming 
that the only hope of finding cures for some diseases is through human cloning and 
embryonic stem cells; notes that the findings of Dr Ilham Abuljadayel that 
'retrodifferentiation' enabling the creation of stem cells from adult cells has been 
replicated by two subsequent independent experiments, one by Professor Adrian 
Newland (Royal London Hospital Medical School); regrets that nonetheless Dr 
Abuljadayel was unable to have her findings printed in a substantial scientific journal 
in this country; shares the fears of Baroness Williams of Crosby (a former Science 
Minister) that this may have resulted from the 'scientific establishment' deciding that 
'embryonic research is the way to go' 22nd January, Official Report, Lords, c51; calls 
on the Government to monitor research ensuring that no embryo is used where 
alternatives exist; assures honourable colleagues that signatories of this Motion will 
do likewise; welcomes the establishment of a House of Lords Select Committee; and 
stresses it must be adequately balanced to ensure proper investigation into scientific 
claims and will cover the whole issue including possible censorship of investigations 
which counter current dogma of the scientific community, as well as ensuring the 
production of human clones and use of embryos only where there is no alternative. 
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EDM 359 (6/11/2001) Right to Life Human rights Care Card 
That this House notes that over two years have passed since the launch of the British 
Medical Association's Guidelines on Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Prolonging 
Treatment which advocated extending the withdrawal of treatment, including assisted 
food and fluid, from patients who were not dying; notes that this form of treatment 
was described in the Voluntary Euthanasia Society Scotland Newsletter as a 'form of 
non-voluntary euthanasia'; regrets, therefore, that the Department of Health has failed 
to inform hospitals that withdrawing food and fluid with the specific purpose of 
causing the death of patients contravenes the European Convention on Human Rights 
which 'guarantees that no-one should be deprived of his life intentionally'; therefore 
welcomes the Right to Life Human-Rights Care Card which people may carry in the 
same way that they currently carry organ-donor cards; notes that over 30 Right 
honourable and honourable Members and Peers attended the function to launch the 
card; applauds the fact that it makes clear that if anybody withdraws food and fluid 
(howsoever delivered) from the carrier with the purpose of causing death, they could 
be faced with legal action, followed if necessary by an application to the European 
Court of Human Rights; and calls on the Government to honour its pledge to oppose 
euthanasia and ensure that the Human-Rights Care Card is publicised through all 
relevant official channels. 
 
EDM 457 (21/11/2001) Cell nuclear replacement    
That this House notes the successful legal challenge by the Pro-Life Alliance through 
a Judicial Review showing that the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act does not 
cover human clones produced by the `Dolly' technique (cell nuclear replacement); 
notes that Mr Justice Cane's judgment agreed there is no law governing this form of 
cloning and that the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority has no authority 
either to license or to ban work in this field; recalls that honourable Members of both 
Houses challenged the Government's right to change the law by Statutory Instrument 
allowing the production of human clones for research exercises; further recalls the 
Government's opposition to the Lords amendment urging that no decision be taken on 
the Statutory Instrument until after the Judicial Review; recalls also EDM 37, 
`Request For Full Debate On Human Cloning', which asked the Government to cite 
those sections of the 1990 debates on the HFE Bill to support its claim that the issue 
had been thoroughly debated; notes the Government's failure to do so; regrets the 
failure of a majority of honourable Members in both Houses to scrutinise properly the 
Government's claims, thus allowing the manipulation of procedure which denied 
Members the right to full debate; and calls on the Government and honourable 
Members to investigate fully the claims of so-called scientific experts advising the 
Department of Health whose assertions that human embryonic clones are vital for 
research into many diseases, assertions which world-wide research in the last year has 
shown increasingly to be without foundation. 
 
EDM96 (29/11/2001) Euthanasia 
That this House condemns the House of Lords' decision not to grant Diane Pretty's 
husband immunity from prosecution should he help her to die; notes that every 
opinion poll conducted in the past year registers over 80 per cent. of support for 
terminally ill patients to be given the choice to die in a manner and at a time of their 
choosing; believes that this choice should not be determined by the availability of 
good palliative care; is concerned that doctors practising in the United Kingdom have 
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repeatedly admitted that unregulated assisted dying currently takes place; and believe 
that legislation to regulate assisted dying, incorporating a broad range of safeguards, 
is required to empower terminally-ill patients with the choice to die with dignity. 
 
EDM 3 (13/11/2002) Hospices 
That this House congratulates the work of Help the Hospices in highlighting the work 
and needs of the hospice movement; points out that the Conservative Manifesto 
commitment at the last general election called for an increase in the NHS contribution 
for hospice funding from 32 per cent. to 40 per cent. for adult hospices and from four 
per cent. to 40 per cent. for children's hospices; acknowledges the tireless work of the 
dedicated staff and volunteers in providing tremendous and unswerving care to the 
terminally ill; and urges the Government to give the Help the Hospices 
recommendations their urgent attention. 
 
EDM 578 (13/12/2001) Embryonic Stem Cells and the New Scientist 
That this House welcomes the editorial on the 1st December edition of the prestigious 
journal, New Scientist, that the majority of bench scientists no longer think it is 
possible or practicable to treat patients with cells derived from cloned embryos; and, 
therefore, calls on Her Majesty's Government to end its support for experimental 
embryonic cloning and to divert its energy and resources into supporting the use of 
adult stem cells for the treatment of serious disease. 
 
EDM 1522 27/6/2002) Euthanasia (No. 2)                   
That this House notes the Lord Chancellor's Consultation Paper, 'Making Decisions: 
Helping People Who Have Difficulty Deciding For Themselves'; notes that groups 
consulted for the document included the Voluntary Euthanasia Society and the British 
Medical Association both of which promote euthanasia by omission; regrets the Lord 
Chancellor's failure to consult with the British Hospice movement, an international 
beacon of excellence in the care of the terminally ill and dying; notes that no pro-life, 
Christian, Jewish nor Muslim medical groups were consulted; notes the Lord 
Chancellor's document refers inquirers to the VES for guidance on living wills and 
medical teams to the BMA guidelines on the Withdrawal and Withholding of Life 
Prolonging Treatment, a document condemned by the Chief Rabbi, Muslim leaders, 
the Evangelical Alliance, the Roman Catholic Church and many others for its 
promotion of medical killing by the withdrawal of assisted food and fluid from a wide 
range of patients; notes that 'Making Decisions' in line with the recommendations 
from an earlier Government publication of the same title, envisages a reformed 'Court 
of Protection' which could be beneficial regarding financial problems and such like; 
but regrets that this court may be used to extend the practice of non-voluntary 
euthanasia by omission, even over-riding the wishes of families (or patients' advance 
directives) in denying assisted food and fluid; urges the Government to honour its 
pledge to oppose euthanasia; and calls upon it to introduce legislation outlawing the 
withdrawal of assisted food and fluid with the purpose of causing death in patients. 
 
EDM 378 (16/12/2002) UNFPA’s Annual State of the World Population Report 2002 
That this House congratulates UNFPA on its State of the World Population Report, 
2002: People, Poverty and Possibilities: Making Development Work for the Poor; 
notes that closing the gender gap in education helps women to reduce fertility and 
improves child survival; further notes that in countries where girls are only half as 
 
 
 
 
397
likely to go to school as boys, there are on average 21.1 more infant deaths per 1,000 
live births than in countries with no such gender gap; further notes that Jeffery Sachs, 
Kofi Annan's Special Adviser on the UN Millennium Development Goals, 
commented that women's access to reproductive health services is not just a worthy 
goal on its own, but an absolutely critical tool in alleviating poverty; and recognises 
that reproductive health, family planning services and population policies feed into all 
Millennium development goals. 
 
EDM 395A1 (18/12/2002) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Amdt. line 
1:         
leave out from 'House' to end and add, 'in the light of evidence given to the Science 
and Technology Committee by Professor Austin Smith that the HFEA is "frustrating 
to deal with, inefficient and without adequate specialist knowledge", evidence given 
to that Committee by Dame Anne McLaren that "the HFEA seems to have a wider 
sphere of responsibility with every year that passes" and the Science and Technology 
Committee's own conclusion that "Parliament does not need protecting and 
democracy is not served by unelected quangos (the HFEA) taking decisions on behalf 
of Parliament", deplores the additional public money given by the Government to the 
HFEA; and calls on the Government to review in a transparent and democratic 
manner the purpose, scope and funding of the HFEA.'. 
 
 
EDM 468 (8/1/2003) Euthanasia 
That this House notes persistent statements by the Government rejecting euthanasia; 
regrets however, that in correspondence the Parliamentary Secretary to the Lord 
Chancellor's Department now asserts that the consultation document, Making 
Decisions, is based upon the Law Commission 1995 Report on Mental Incapacity, a 
document which the Conservative Government refused to implement because it would 
weaken the legal prohibition on euthanasia (Hansard, 16th January 1996; columns 
487-88); notes also that the Law Commission's report contradicts the 1994 Report of 
the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics which the Labour 
Government has consistently claimed to support; recalls that the Select Committee 
opposed euthanasia and the enshrining in Statute Law the judgement in Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland 1992 which permitted the withdrawal of assisted food and fluid from 
Mr Tony Bland with the purpose of ending his life; notes, however, that the 
Parliamentary Secretary's correspondence asserts that the Government's policy on the 
withdrawal of assisted food and fluid is based on ‘settled opinion ... as expressed by 
the medical profession and by the judiciary as expressed in case law’; notes, however, 
that Bland and subsequent judgements allow only the withdrawal of tubal feeding 
from PVS and similar cases on application to the courts; notes that the courts have not 
authorised the extension of this practice of non-voluntary euthanasia by omission to 
include other medical conditions; and calls on the Government to withdraw ‘Making 
Decisions; Helping People Who Have Difficulty Deciding for Themselves’. 
 
EDM 691 (6/2/2003) Contraceptive Awareness Week 2003 
That this House notes the importance of Contraceptive Awareness Week from 10th to 
16th February and praises the Family Planning Association for raising awareness of 
this important issue and sponsoring this noteworthy campaign; wholeheartedly 
supports FPA's campaign which this year highlights research which shows the lengths 
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people often have to go to get advice on contraception and sexual health; regrets that 
over a third of people calling FPA's helpline have had difficulty obtaining local advice 
and information on contraception and sexual health; further regrets that between 1991 
and 2001, new episodes of sexually transmitted infections seen at GUM clinics in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland rose from 669,291 to 1,332,910 and moreover, 
between 2000 and 2001, new episodes seen at GUM clinics in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland rose from 1,195,641 to 1,332,910; is highly concerned that the 
burden of STI's falls unequally in the population with young heterosexuals, men who 
have sex with men and minority ethnic groups being at increased risk; is further 
concerned that overall in the UK approximately 41,200 people are living with HIV 
about 31 per cent. of whom are undiagnosed, and that currently the number of people 
living with diagnosed HIV is rising each year; hopes that through this week awareness 
of contraception and its availability is raised as sexual health is often marginalised as 
a lifestyle or personal issue when such issues should be put at the heart of the broader 
public health agenda. 
 
EDM 1099 (28/4/2003) The European Parliament and Stem Cell Research 
That this House notes the failure of the European Parliament to ratify stem cell 
research for the potential betterment of individual health in contradiction to the 
visionary decisions made in the UK Parliament. 
 
EDM 809 (4/3/2003) Sex Education in the Netherlands 
That this House notes the publication of, Deconstructing The Dutch Utopia, by the 
Family Education Trust, a report produced by Dr Joost van Loon, a Dutch sociologist 
and Reader in Social Theory at Nottingham Trent University; notes the difference in 
teenage pregnancy rates, with England and Wales experiencing four times the level of 
The Netherlands; further notes van Loon's conclusions that claims that this results 
from more open attitudes to sex and earlier explicit sex education are without 
foundation and that his research involved detailed examinations of a selection of 
primary and secondary schools where it was found that, contrary to claims made by 
UK family planning agencies, sex education is not more explicit and neither does it 
start at younger ages than in Britain; further notes that in sex education Dutch parents 
and school governors are given more control over what is taught; further notes that 
family links in The Netherlands are far stronger, with British children five times more 
likely to live in households headed by lone parents; notes that teenage extra-marital 
sex and pregnancy are socially frowned upon and that welfare benefits for teenage 
mothers are low; concludes that, whether or not one agrees with the latter policy, the 
Dutch Utopia is non-existent and, bearing in mind the increasing rates of teenage 
pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases in Britain, calls on the Government to 
honour its pledge to promote sexual abstinence among the young and to do more to 
strengthen the role of the family. 
 
EDM 1273 (21/5/2003) Euthanasia and the BBC  
That this House notes the persistent bias of BBC programmes supporting the 
legalisation of euthanasia; further notes reports from the Disability Rights 
Commission, Disability Awareness in Action and other bodies that increasing 
numbers of disabled and sick people are frightened to be admitted to hospital because 
of the euthanasia campaign; notes the failure of the BBC to interview the disabled or 
terminally ill unless they declare support for legalised euthanasia; further notes the 
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complete failure of any BBC television or radio news programme to report a major 
survey of doctors which showed a considerable majority opposed assisted suicide and 
that almost three out of four would refuse to be involved if such practices were 
legalised; notes a story in BBC Online undermining the survey and quoting a pro-
euthanasia claim that a number of surveys show a small majority of doctors 
supporting euthanasia; challenges BBC governors to cite such surveys; notes that one 
survey claiming doctors support euthanasia was conducted for the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society and that no report has ever been produced by the internet company 
responsible for giving the number of doctors circulated, the response rate and other 
vital information showing the validity of the poll; notes the complete bias in the BBC 
News report on the tragedy of a mentally ill man who smothered his terminally ill 
parents, incorrectly claiming that he was discharged whereas he was placed under a 
two year community and rehabilitation order; and calls on the Government to require 
the BBC to show impartiality on all issues of public policy. 
 
EDM 1333 (4/6/2003) Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill and the BMA 
That this House welcomes the recent statements from the British Medical Association 
and the Royal College of Physicians opposing the Patient (Assisted Dying) Bill, a Bill 
that seeks to legalise assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia; notes the BMA's 
assertion that legalising euthanasia or assisted suicide would have a profound and 
detrimental effect on the doctor-patient relationship; further notes that the Royal 
College of Physicians states that the Bill is the wrong response to the problem of 
unalleviated suffering and is potentially dangerous; further notes a recent independent 
survey of doctors that showed a considerable majority oppose assisted suicide and 
voluntary euthanasia and that almost three out of four doctors would refuse to perform 
such practices if they were legalised; and calls upon the Government to reiterate its 
opposition to the legalisation of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia and to 
devote more resources to palliative and geriatric care. 
 
EDM 1531 (7/7/2003) World Population Day 
That this House calls attention to World Population Day on 11th July; commends the 
United Nations' Population Fund for designating this date in 1989 to focus attention 
on the importance of world population and reproductive health issues; endorses the 
concepts of sexual and reproductive health and rights as enshrined in the 1994 
International Conference on Population and Development's Programme of Action; 
and call upon the Government to increase funding to sexual and reproductive health 
and rights organisations such as UNFPA, International Planned Parenthood Concern, 
Marie Stopes International, Interact Worldwide previous Population Concern, 
International Family Health and reproductive bilateral aid in order to achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals, by improving maternal health, reducing child 
mortality, combating HIV/AIDS and ensuring environmental sustainability and 
thereby eradicating poverty. 
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Division Lists 
 
Euthanasia:   
 
Doctor Assisted Dying Bill (10 / 10 / 97) 
A pro-euthanasia Private Member's Bill introduced by Joe Ashton MP in 1997 with 
the aim of permitting a doctor to end the life of a terminally ill patient. 
 
Medical Treatment (Prevention of Euthanasia) Bill 1999-2000 (28 / 1 / 2000) 
An anti-euthanasia bill introduced by Ann Winterton, which aimed to prevent doctors 
from purposefully ending the lives of patients by withdrawing treatment (including 
assisted food and fluid). 
 
Homosexual Rights:  
 
Adoption and Children Bill (Lansley Amendment)  (20 / 5 / 02) 
An amendment to the Adoption and Children Bill that will specifically exclude same-
sex couples from adopting children.  
 
Sexual Offences (Amendment Bill) 2000 (10 / 2 / 2000) 
A bill to lower the homosexual age of sexual consent to 16, the same age 
that applies to consenting heterosexual relations. 
 
Adoption and Children Bill (2002-2002) (7 / 11 / 2002) 
An amendment to the Adoption and Children Bill that would lift the ban on unmarried 
and same-sex couples adopting children. 
 
Amendment 8 of the Local Government Bill 2002-2003, 3rd reading: Hansard 10th 
March 2003 Col. 90-93 
An amendment that would retain ‘Section 28’ 
 
 
Reproductive Issues 
 
Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2000 
The regulations specify additional purposes for which the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority may grant licences for research involving embryos under the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
 
Stem Cell Research Bill 1999-2000 
A Ten Minute Rule Bill to “amend the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
to allow the use of early embryonic tissue for the purposes of research into the 
development of regenerative therapies.” The Bill was intended to implement 
Government recommendations (in the Donaldson Report) which would extend the 
purposes for research and experimental work for which human embryos could be used 
up to 14 days after fertilisation; it would have legalised human cloning for the same 
purposes 
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